Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and George Barros
March 31, 2024, 6:55pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on March 31. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the April 1 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The Kremlin-controlled
Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) reportedly directed
all its clergy to change their liturgy to include pro-war prayers in
support of Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine and is likely
threatening to defrock ROC MP clergy who do not support the war. A
Russian Telegram channel with insider sources within the ROC MP
amplified on March 31 a document dated March 29, in which Head of the
ROC MP Affairs, Metropolitan Gregoriy of Voskresensk, instructed clergy
to read a prayer — the “Prayer for Holy Rus” — on a daily basis during
Lent.[1]
Metropolitan Gregoriy of Voskresensk also called on the clergy to read
the “Prayer for Holy Rus” at home and to offer to read this prayer to
parishioners. The “Prayer for Holy Rus” is a new prayer that the ROC MP
officially introduced in September 2022. This prayer is a highly
politicized and pro-war and pro-Kremlin prayer filled with Kremlin
talking points and other false Russian narratives. The prayer asks God
to “to help [Russian] people and grant [Russia] victory” against “those
who want to fight [and] have taken up arms against Holy Rus, eager to
divide and destroy her one people.”[2]
The mention of “Holy Rus” and “one people” echoes Putin’s long-term
false narrative that Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians comprise one
Russian nation, and is a misappropriation of the history of Kyivan Rus.[3]
ROC MP Head Patriarch Kirill — reportedly himself a former Soviet
Committee for State Security (KGB) officer and a known staunch supporter
of Russian President Vladimir Putin — first read the “Prayer for Holy
Rus” (which he supposedly authored) on September 25, 2022, following
Putin’s unpopular call for partial mobilization. The ROC MP had
previously instituted politicized prayers in June 2014 and March 2022
supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and ISW has long
assessed that the ROC MP is a Kremlin-controlled organization and a
known tool within the Russian hybrid warfare toolkit that promotes the
Kremlin’s interests and nationalist ideology domestically and abroad.[4]
The
ROC MP leadership has intensified internal scrutiny against ROC MP
clergy and has reportedly defrocked several clergy members that refused
to promote Kremlin-introduced prayers supporting Russia’s full-scale
invasion of Ukraine. A guest researcher at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Ksenia Luchenko, noted that the ROC
MP regards individual ROC MP clergy members’ refusal to use assigned
prayers in liturgy as perjury and a sin punishable by defrocking under
the 25th Apostolic Canon.[5]
The Christians Against War Project, a Russian organization that tracks
persecutions of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian priests, reported
that ROC MP or Russian state authorities have already disciplined no
fewer than 28 ROC MP clergy members from Russia, five from Belarus, one
from Kazakhstan, and six from Lithuania for anti-war rhetoric or
refusing to read the assigned pro-war prayers during liturgy.[6] The ROC MP has reportedly administered various punishments, including defrocking, demotions, and excommunication.[7]
Local Russian state officials opened administrative cases and issued
fines for “discrediting the Russian Armed Forces” against several such
anti-war ROC MP clergy members.[8]
Patriarch Kirill, for example, approved a decision in February 2024 to
defrock one of the most famous and respected ROC MP priests, Archpriest
Alexey Uminsky, for refusing to read the “Prayer for Holy Rus.”[9]
The Court of the Moscow Diocese also defrocked a priest in May 2023 for
substituting the word “victory” with “peace” when reading the ”Prayer
for Holy Rus.” Luchenko also reported that clergy members are
increasingly self-censoring themselves out of fear that their own
parishioners will report them for sharing anti-war sentiments.
Parishioners, for example, reportedly called the police on a ROC MP
priest in March 2022 after he prayed for peace in Ukraine. The ROC MP
recently intensified Kremlin rhetoric about Russia’s war in Ukraine and
cast it as an existential and civilizational “holy war,” and the Kremlin
will likely continue to use the ROC MP to promote its imperialist and
aggressive goals in Ukraine and elsewhere to secure long-term domestic
support for Putin’s war efforts.[10]
The ROC MP also recently approved an ideological and policy document
tying several Kremlin ideological narratives together in an apparent
effort to form a wider nationalist ideology around the war in Ukraine
and Russia’s expansionist future.[11]
Russia
conducted another series of missile and drone strikes largely targeting
Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of March 30 to 31 as
delays in US security assistance continue to degrade Ukraine’s air
defense umbrella and enable Russia to significantly damage Ukraine’s
energy grid. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian
forces launched 14 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; 11
Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and
occupied Crimea; one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea;
and one Kh-59 cruise missile from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[12] The Ukrainian Air Force added that Ukrainian forces shot down nine Kh-101/555 missiles and nine Shahed drones.[13]
The Rivne Oblast Police reported that Ukrainian forces also shot down a
Kh-55 missile and an Iskander missile over Rivne Oblast.[14]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched two S-300
air-defense missiles at Selydove, Donetsk City and an unspecified number
of S-300 missiles at Beryslav, Kherson Oblast.[15]
Lviv Oblast Military Administration Head Maskym Kozytskyi reported that
Russian forces conducted a cruise missile strike on the same critical
infrastructure facility that Russian forces previously struck on March
24 and March 29, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
struck unspecified targets in Stryi, Lviv Oblast.[16]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces targeted energy and
agricultural infrastructure in Kherson Oblast, struck civilian
infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, and struck energy infrastructure in
Odesa Oblast.[17]
Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported
that they implemented emergency power shutdowns in Odesa City and nearby
areas following the overnight Russian strike on energy facilities in
southern Ukraine.[18] Russian forces reportedly shot down one of their own Kh-101 missiles over Saratov Oblast on the morning of March 31.[19]
Ukrainian
forces appear to have repelled a Russian battalion-sized mechanized
assault near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on March 30 — the first
battalion-sized mechanized assault since Russian forces began the
campaign to seize Avdiivka in late October 2023. A Ukrainian
serviceman reported on March 31 that Russian forces, including elements
of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, Central Military
District [CMD]), committed 36 tanks and 12 BMP infantry fighting
vehicles (IFV) to a large-mechanized assault near Tonenke on March 30.[20]
Geolocated imagery published on March 31 shows a large number of
destroyed and damaged Russian armored vehicles and tanks along a road
northwest of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka).[21]
The Ukrainian serviceman stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 12
Russian tanks and eight IFVs during the assault and noted that the
frontal assault failed to breakthrough the Ukrainian line. This appears
to be the first report of any elements of the 90th Tank Division
participating in assaults following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka and
ISW previously assessed that elements of the 90th Tank Division,
alongside other Russian units and formations, likely represent a
sizeable uncommitted operational reserve that the Russian military
command can commit to continue and intensify efforts to push west of
Avdiivka.[22]
The elements of the 6th Tank Regiment appear to have failed in their
March 30 attack near Tonenke, however, suggesting that elements of
Russia’s uncommitted operational reserve near Avdiivka may be too
degraded or otherwise unable to lead further Russian advances westward
in the short term.
The scale of the Russian mechanized
assault on March 30 is significant. Russian forces have not conducted a
mechanized assault this large since the beginning of the Russian
localized offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in late October 2023, when
Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed almost 50 Russian tanks and over
100 armored vehicles on October 19-20, 2023.[23]
Ukraine’s ability to defend against the March 30 assault, particularly
near Avdiivka where Ukrainian forces have been forced to quickly
withdraw to new, defensive positions following the loss of the
settlement, is a positive indicator for Ukraine’s ability to defend
against future large-scale Russian assaults and the expected summer 2024
Russian offensive operation. Ukrainian officials, justifiably so,
continue to warn about Ukraine’s ability to defend against the expected
summer Russian offensive effort in the face of ammunition shortages,
manpower limitations, and delayed Western assistance.[24]
Ukrainian forces may have had to expend a significant amount of
material to defend against the Russian assault near Tonenke,
highlighting Russia’s ability to conduct assaults that force Ukraine to
expend outsized portions of its already limited material and manpower
reserves to defend against.[25]
Ukraine’s demonstrated ability to skillfully defend against a
large-scale Russian assault in a particularly critical part of the front
despite Ukraine’s challenges suggests that Ukrainian forces can achieve
significant battlefield effects if they are properly equipped.
The
Russian command may be prioritizing the Avdiivka area in Donetsk
Oblast. The Russian military command’s willingness to commit a
battalion’s worth of tanks to an attack near Avdiivka indicates that
this assault was a priority effort. The Russian command may focus their
forecasted late spring/summer 2024 offensive operation on western
Donetsk Oblast in hopes of building upon Russian forces’ steady but
marginal advances in this sector.[26]
Ukrainian officials have recently warned that Russian forces are
accumulating personnel along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis, near Bakhmut,
near Avdiivka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but ISW continues to
assess that Russian forces will likely only be able to launch a
concerted large-scale offensive operation in one operational direction
at a time due to Russia’s own manpower and planning limitations.[27]
French
Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on March 31 that France
will provide an unspecified number of Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles
and “hundreds” of armored vehicles and other equipment to Ukraine.[28] Lecornu
stated that France will provide Ukraine with “hundreds” of old, but
still functional, armored vehicles and equipment from the French
military and that the materiel will arrive in 2024 and early 2025.
Lecornu also reported that France will provide a “new batch of Aster 30
missiles” to Ukraine for the SAMP/T MAMBA air defense systems and that
France is developing remotely operated munitions to provide to Ukraine
as early as summer 2024.
Russian President
Vladimir Putin signed on March 31 the scheduled decree authorizing
Russia’s semi-annual spring military conscription, which will conscript
150,000 Russians between April 1 and July 15.[29] The
decree specifies that Russia’s spring 2024 conscription will conscript
men aged 18 to 30 years old who are not currently in military service.
Russia’s spring 2024 conscription marks the first conscription cycle in
which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will conscript men up to age
30. The Russian law raising the upper limit of the conscription age
from 27 to 30 years of age officially came into force on January 1,
2024, although Putin signed the law in August 2023.[30] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Russian men who turned 27 before the end of 2023 and men who are 28 or 29 and currently in zapas (general
mobilizable human resource composed of men who could be mobilized
regardless of prior military experience) are excluded from conscription.[31]
Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir
Tsimlyansky stated on March 29 that the spring 2024 conscription cycle
will include the conscription of men in occupied Ukraine and all Russian
federal subjects, except for certain federal subjects in northern
Russia due to inclement weather.[32]
The Geneva Convention forbids any occupying power to force civilians in
occupied territories to serve in the occupying power’s military or
auxiliary services.[33]
Tsimlyansky also stated that Russia will not deploy Russian conscripts
to occupied Ukraine and that conscripts will not participate in combat
or support operations in the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess
that the Kremlin remains unlikely to deploy conscripts to participate in
combat operations in Ukraine due to concerns that conscript causalities
may cause societal discontent within Russia, although Russia may expand
its crypto-mobilization efforts during the spring 2024 conscription
cycle.[34] The Kremlin, however, will likely continue using conscripts to defend the international border between Ukraine and Russia.[35]
The
Russian military command reportedly appointed Chief of Staff of the
Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Alexander Lapin as commander of
the newly formed Leningrad Military District (LMD). Ural regional information agency URA.ru, citing an unspecified military source, claimed on March 31 that the Russian military command appointed Lapin as LMD Commander.[36]
There has been no official confirmation of this appointment. Lapin
previously served as the commander of the Central Military District
[CMD] and commanded Russian forces in Kharkiv and northern Donetsk
oblasts during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in September 2022, which
resulted in significant Russian territorial and materiel losses.[37]
Russian military bloggers widely criticized Lapin for Russian
battlefield defeats under his command in September 2022, but later
received praise for his role in defending Belgorod Oblast against raids
by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian forces in May and June 2023.[38] URA.ru
has previously accurately reported on Lapin’s previous appointments
prior to their official confirmations and may have credible insider
sources within the CMD given its affiliation with the Russian government
and the outlet’s presence within the CMD’s geographic boundaries.[39]
The Kremlin continues efforts to enforce Russian federal laws in post-Soviet countries where Russia has no legal jurisdiction. Russian
Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov stated on March 31 that Russia will
continue to assert its right, contrary to international law, to enforce
Russian federal law on officials of NATO and post-Soviet states for
their actions taken within the territory of their own countries where
Russian courts have no jurisdiction, despite acknowledging that
prosecuting such cases would be “unrealistic.”[40]
The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has placed multiple
officials from NATO member countries on its wanted list for them
allegedly breaking various Russian laws within their own counties.[41]
ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s attempt to enforce its
federal laws over NATO officials for actions in their own countries
effectively denies the sovereignty of these states and are part of
Russian efforts to set informational conditions justifying possible
Russian escalations against NATO states in the future.[42]
Russian
authorities conducted a counterterrorism operation and detained
suspected terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on March 31. The
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in Dagestan declared a
counterterrorism operation regime in Makhachkala and Kaspiysk, and the
Russian National Anti-Terrorism Committee stated that Russian
authorities detained three militants who were allegedly planning
terrorist acts.[43]
Dagestan Head Sergei Melikov stated that Russian authorities conducted
the counterterrorism operation as part of efforts to strengthen security
in the region following the Crocus City Hall attack.[44]
Select Russian milbloggers alleged that the detained terrorist suspects
in Dagestan are connected to the Crocus City Hall attackers.[45] Russian authorities previously meted out minor punishments following large-scale antisemitic riots in Dagestan in October 2023.[46]
The intensification of counterterrorism operations in Russia,
particularly in the Caucasus region, is likely due to either Russian law
enforcement’s actual heightened fears of another terrorist attack in
Russia or part of efforts to show the Russian public that authorities
are taking competent preventative steps following the major law
enforcement and intelligence failure that was the Crocus City Hall
attack.
Key Takeaways:
- The
Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP)
reportedly directed all its clergy to change their liturgy to include
pro-war prayers in support of Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine
and is likely threatening to defrock ROC MP clergy who do not support
the war.
- The ROC MP leadership has intensified
internal scrutiny against ROC MP clergy and has reportedly defrocked
several clergy members who refused to promote Kremlin-introduced prayers
supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
- Russia
conducted another series of missile and drone strikes largely targeting
Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of March 30 to 31 as
delays in US security assistance continue to degrade Ukraine’s air
defense umbrella and enable Russia to significantly damage Ukraine’s
energy grid.
- Ukrainian forces appear to have
repelled a Russian battalion-sized mechanized assault near Avdiivka,
Donetsk Oblast, on March 30 — the first battalion-sized mechanized
assault since Russian forces began the campaign to seize Avdiivka in
late October 2023.
- French Defense Minister
Sebastien Lecornu announced on March 31 that France will provide an
unspecified number of Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles and “hundreds” of
armored vehicles and other equipment to Ukraine.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed on March 31 the scheduled decree
authorizing Russia’s semi-annual spring military conscription, which
will conscript 150,000 Russians between April 1 and July 15.
- The
Russian military command reportedly appointed Chief of Staff of the
Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Alexander Lapin as commander of
the newly formed Leningrad Military District (LMD).
- The Kremlin continues efforts to enforce Russian federal laws in post-Soviet countries where Russia has no legal jurisdiction.
- Russian
authorities conducted a counterterrorism operation and detained
suspected terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on March 31.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and southwest of Donetsk City on March 31.
- The
Russian government continues to fail to properly compensate volunteer
and irregular forces fighting in Ukraine, despite recently passing new
legislation that simplifies the access to veteran statuses for these
servicemen and their families.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
The
Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 31 that Ukrainian forces
repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group that attempted to
cross the international border near Stara Huta, Sumy Oblast.[47]
Ukrainian
forces recently advanced near Kreminna amid continued positional
engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 31.
Geolocated footage published on March 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces
recently advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[48]
Positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka,
west of Kreminna near Terny, and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[49]
Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms
Army [CAA], Western Military District [WMD]) reportedly continue
operating in the Kupyansk direction; elements of the Chechen Akhmat
Spetsnaz “Aida” Detachment reportedly continue operating near
Bilohorivka.[50]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Positional
engagements continued near Bakhmut on March 31, but there were no
confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that
Russian forces advanced near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), although
ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[51]
Positional engagements continued near Bohdanivka, west of Bakhmut near
Ivanviske and Chasiv Yar, and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka,
Andriivka, and Pivdenne.[52]
A Ukrainian unmanned aerial systems (UAV) battalion commander operating
in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces are concentrating
their attacks in the direction of Chasiv Yar because Chasiv Yar is at a
dominant height.[53]
Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Luhansk
People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the
Bakhmut direction; and elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (2nd AC) are reportedly operating near Spirne (northeast of
Bakhmut).[54]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka amid continued
positional engagements in the area on March 31. Geolocated imagery
published on March 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced northwest of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) in a mechanized assault
that Ukrainian forces defeated.[55]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near
Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka), south of Nevelske (southwest of
Avdiivka), and near Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka).[56]
Positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi
and Semenivka, west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Tonenke, and southwest
of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[57]
Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk
People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Pervomaiske.[58]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid
continued positional engagements in the area on March 31. Geolocated
footage published on March 31 indicates that Russian forces recently
marginally advanced southwest of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk
City).[59]
Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near
Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City), although another Russian milblogger
claimed that there is conflicting information about the situation in
Heorhiivka.[60]
Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near
Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka; and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda
and Novomykhailivka.[61]
Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized
Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District
[SMD] are reportedly operating near Pobieda, and elements of the
Russian ”Tiger” Volunteer Detachment are reportedly operating near
Novomykhailivka.[62]
Positional
engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on
March 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.
Positional engagements continued southeast of Velyka Novosilka near
Vodyane, south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske, and southwest of
Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne.[63]
Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern
Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Staromayorske.[64]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional
engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 31, but
there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements
continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[65]
Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces are
taking advantage of changing weather conditions in southern Ukraine to
increase their aerial reconnaissance by using more than 200
reconnaissance drones per day.[66]
Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya
Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are limiting their use of armored
vehicles when conducting assaults near Robotyne.[67]
Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized
Rifle Brigade, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District
[SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]
Elements of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized
Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Nesteryanka
(northwest of Robotyne).[69]
The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully
attacked in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky on March 31.[70]
Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are conducting one to three light
infantry assaults without armored vehicle support near Krynky per day.[71]
Humenyuk stated that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces, which
operates in the Zaporizhia and Kherson directions, is transferring
forces and equipment from occupied Crimea to unspecified areas but are
using “very complicated logistics” because Russian command has banned
the use of obvious logistics routes at risk of Ukrainian interdiction.
Humenyuk stated that the Dnepr Grouping of Forces has a sufficient
number of forces to conduct rotations (likely tactical-level rotations),
but the Dnepr Grouping of Forces has been unable to conduct successful
assaults for a long time. A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian
serviceman operating in the Kherson direction said that there is
currently a lull in Russian and Ukrainian activity and that both sides
are only operating drones.[72]
The Russian serviceman reportedly claimed that Ukrainian forces have
superior electronic warfare (EW) systems and coordination between drone
and artillery units in the Kherson direction, rendering better results
for Ukrainian forces in the area.[73]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Ukrainian
Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General
Kyrylo Budanov forecasted that Russian forces will resume launching
Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea Fleet in the near future.[74]
Budanov stated that Russian forces have been using Kh-101 air-launched
cruise missiles for several months while stockpiling Kalibr missiles.
Budanov explained that Kalibr missiles are less effective than Kh-101
missiles but noted that Russian stocks of Kh-101 missiles have likely
decreased as a result of Russia’s reliance on these missiles. Budanov
also observed that Russian forces mainly use Tu-95 strategic bombers and
occasionally Tu-22 supersonic bombers to conduct missile strikes
against Ukraine.[75]
Budanov added that Russian forces have not used supersonic
nuclear-capable Tu-160 heavy strategic bombers for a long time and that
Russian forces only use Tu-22s once a week to launch Kh-22 anti-ship
missiles due to unspecified technical problems with the aircraft.
Budanov stated that Russian forces modernized the Kh-22 missile and
developed the Kh-32 missile on the basis of the Kh-22 missile and may
adapt the missiles launched by Tu-22s to operate on Tu-95s or Tu-160s.
Budanov further clarified that Russian forces have been using
thermobaric ODAB-1500 volumetric-detonating aviation bombs in Ukraine
for some time and denied the reports that Russian forces only recently
used the bomb for the first time during an air strike against Sumy
Oblast.[76]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The
Russian government continues to fail to properly compensate volunteer
and irregular forces fighting in Ukraine, despite recently passing new
legislation that simplifies the access to veteran statuses for these
servicemen and their families. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin
signed a decree on March 27 that simplified the process for obtaining
veteran statuses for individuals who fought in volunteer battalions and
private military companies (PMCs) and cooperated with the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Ukraine.[77] A Russian lawyer told state-run regional outlet Ura.ru
that the decree will shorten the processing time and simplify
procedures for volunteer and irregular forces to confirm their
participation in the war effort, which will allow them and their
families to receive appropriate compensations. The lawyer added that the
decree especially applies to fighters who have lost contracts with
their volunteer battalions and PMCs, including those who were affected
by the disbanding or transfer of their irregular units to the
jurisdiction of the Russian MoD. Russian Prosecutor General Igor
Krasnov, however, acknowledged in a televised interview published on
March 31 that there are reports about payment delays for veterans who
fought in Ukraine.[78]
The
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on
March 30 that Russia is training new personnel recruited in occupied
Ukraine, including Mariupol, to strengthen border areas.[79]
The GUR reported that Russian forces are strengthening Russia’s
international border regions with Ukraine in Belgorod, Kursk, and
Bryansk oblasts following a series of cross-border raids conducted by
all-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteer groups. The GUR noted that Russia is
training personnel to identify and repel sabotage and reconnaissance
groups, conduct assault operations in urban environments, and protect
critical infrastructure facilities. The GUR added that the Russian
command is planning to relocate elements of the Russian 5th
Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army, Western Military
District) from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Kursk Oblast to defend
Russia’s international border.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian
forces reportedly used a modernized Kh-101 cruise missile that uses an
augmented payload with an additional warhead at the expense of a reduced
flight range. Ukrainian military-focused outlet Defense Express reported
on March 29 that Ukrainian forces downed a Kh-101 missile on the night
of March 28 to 29 and that this missile had two warheads that
collectively weighed about 800 kilograms (compared to 450 kilograms for a
regular Kh-101 missile).[80] Defense Express
stated that the modernized Kh-101 has a smaller fuel tank, freeing up
space for a second warhead, but reduces the missile’s flight range from
5,500 kilometers to about 2,250 kilometers. Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Shoigu visited the “Raduga” State Machine Building Design Bureau
(GosMKB “Raduga”), a subsidiary of Tactical Missile Corporation (KTRV),
in Moscow Oblast on January 18, where a KTRV official told Shoigu that
GosMKB “Raduga” had increased the warhead of an unspecified missile from
450 kilograms to 800 kilograms.[81]
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
The
Kremlin information operation baselessly alleging Ukrainian involvement
in the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack appears to be
successfully convincing the Russian public. The Financial Times
(FT) reported on March 31 that UK-Ukrainian pollster OpenMinds
conducted an online poll of 652 Russians and found that a little over 50
percent of respondents stated that they believe Ukrainian authorities
were responsible for the Crocus City Hall attack.[82]
The OpenMinds poll also found that 27 percent of respondents blamed the
Islamic State (IS) for the attack and 6 percent of respondents blamed
the West. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has continued to
blame Ukraine for the Crocus City Hall attack and a has implicated
Ukraine in a broader set of alleged “terrorist” attacks against Russia
and demanded that Ukrainian authorities arrest and extradite all the
people involved.[83]
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov claimed
that the FSB knows who organized several unspecified terrorist attacks
in Russia and will do “everything necessary” to punish them.[84]
ISW continues to assess with high confidence that the IS conducted the
Crocus City Hall attack and has yet to observe independent reporting or
evidence to suggest that an actor other than IS was responsible for or
aided the attack.[85]
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/orthozombies/811 ; http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/5962654.html ; https://t.me/astrapress/52720
[2] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/5962654.html ; https://t.me/astrapress/52720
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024
[4] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/3675026.html;
[5] https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91622
[6] https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91622;
https://shaltnotkill dot
info/presledovanie-hristian-za-antivoennuyu-pozicziyu-ili-podderzhku-ukrainy-v-zashhite-ot-agressii-so-storony-religioznyh-organizaczij-i-vlastej/
[7] https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91622
[8] https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91622
[9] https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91622
[10]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9Choly-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets
[11]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9Choly-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets
[12] https://t.me/kpszsu/12642
[13] https://t.me/kpszsu/12642
[14] https://t.me/NPU_Rivne/19452 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/31/na-rivnenshhyni-zbyto-rakety-iskander-ta-h-55/ ;
[15] https://dn.npu.gov dot ua/news/dvi-liudyny-zahynulo-piatero-zaznaly-poranen-politsiia-donechchyny-zibrala-dokazy-voiennykh-zlochyniv-rf ; https://suspilne
dot
media/717634-dvi-raketi-po-selidovomu-ta-s-300-po-mikolaivci-obstrili-doneccini-za-dobu/
; https://www.facebook.com/pho.gov.ua/posts/799010158927714
[16] https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/12917; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65073
[17] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/31/na-odeshhyni-rosijski-okupanty-vdaryly-po-energetychnij-infrastrukturi/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/4631 https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7758 ; https://t.me/synegubov/8861 ; https://t.me/synegubov/8862
[18] https://suspilne
dot
media/717676-v-ukrenergo-povidomili-pro-naslidki-nicnoi-ataki-rf-u-akih-oblastah-zastosovuutsa-vidklucenna/;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/03/31/ukrenergo-povidomylo-pro-naslidky-raketnoyi-ataky-rosiyan/;
https://www.facebook.com/npcukrenergo/posts/pfbid05MpsgTZCMF3xaCT75bbMzZRV9wCuRcUZzxFNnv6kdpVd3fickw6gv2RNFpksCqcnl
[19] https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/rosiyany-zbyly-svoyu-raketu-h-101-u-saratovskij-oblasti/ ; https://t.me/milinfolive/119488
[20] https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1774387800978100329 ; https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1774388295679537646
[21] https://t.me/Airborne1126/12674; https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1774399692085895350
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102023
[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024
[28] https://www.politico
dot eu/article/france-missiles-used-armored-vehicles-ukraine/ ;
https://www.leparisien dot
fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-la-france-va-livrer-des-centaines-de-blindes-anciens-et-des-missiles-aster-a-kiev-31-03-2024-AUH36UH47NHXPGRLUYNJKNILZQ.php
[29]
https://t.me/tass_agency/240883 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240884 ;
https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20401393 ; http://publication dot
pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202403310001 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37200 ;
https://t.me/idelrealii/34673 ; https://t.me/severrealii/24121 ;
https://t.me/bazabazon/26533 ; https://meduza dot
io/news/2024/03/31/putin-podpisal-ukaz-o-voennom-prizyve-v-armiyu-zaberut-150-tysyach-rossiyan
; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18139
[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2024
[31] https://t.me/tass_agency/240884?single
[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024
[33] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-51
[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2023
[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024
[36] https://ura dot news/news/1052750027 ; https://t.me/russicatrend/3880 ; https://t.me/rusbrief/215979
[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011023
[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar01192023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011023
[39]
https://ura dot news/news/1052599018 ; https://ura dot
news/news/1052599162 ; https://ura dot news/news/1052616993 ;
https://ura dot news/articles/1036285731
[40] https://t.me/zarubinreporter/2334 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/20401779
[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031224
[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031224
[43] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/20401145 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240886 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240887
[44] https://kavkaz.rbc dot ru/kavkaz/freenews/660931a89a79471f66930508 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240901
[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55309 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19101
[46] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111823
[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fzxqfiWr8UajfLtTSxKFNxoZzRm8d2xaEsGxYWfpdKS21UVSg3a4Uh1wXvadFoNbl
[48] https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1774411770414657892; https://t.me/ob_army_ua/70
[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/37206 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DcVXcJ287qQuT2fpJa9K4LBQDaukJ33kYV4Zzp2jLf9A9jyGCp37M8GEaZ1dTSdyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtPxfB6PT4sz7Rmky6y3fZo41yXZgFkzdHFgpUoTsVTtY6NSJPiLJaLQPmj3A9mZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fzxqfiWr8UajfLtTSxKFNxoZzRm8d2xaEsGxYWfpdKS21UVSg3a4Uh1wXvadFoNbl
[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65089
[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8838
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fzxqfiWr8UajfLtTSxKFNxoZzRm8d2xaEsGxYWfpdKS21UVSg3a4Uh1wXvadFoNbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DcVXcJ287qQuT2fpJa9K4LBQDaukJ33kYV4Zzp2jLf9A9jyGCp37M8GEaZ1dTSdyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtPxfB6PT4sz7Rmky6y3fZo41yXZgFkzdHFgpUoTsVTtY6NSJPiLJaLQPmj3A9mZl ; https://t.me/rybar/58711 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8838 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8857 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8880 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19096 ; https://suspilne dot media/717758-rosijska-armia-ne-mala-uspihiv-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-minuloi-dobi-fedorenko/ ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37206
[53] https://suspilne dot media/717758-rosijska-armia-ne-mala-uspihiv-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-minuloi-dobi-fedorenko/
[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118549
[55] https://t.me/Airborne1126/12674; https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1774399692085895350
[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8838 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8880 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55305
[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fzxqfiWr8UajfLtTSxKFNxoZzRm8d2xaEsGxYWfpdKS21UVSg3a4Uh1wXvadFoNbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DcVXcJ287qQuT2fpJa9K4LBQDaukJ33kYV4Zzp2jLf9A9jyGCp37M8GEaZ1dTSdyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtPxfB6PT4sz7Rmky6y3fZo41yXZgFkzdHFgpUoTsVTtY6NSJPiLJaLQPmj3A9mZl ; https://t.me/rybar/58711 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37206 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8880 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8869 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8858 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19096 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55305
[58] WARNING: Graphic Content https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55305
[59] https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1774406478150979881?s=20; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1774406681570476411?s=20; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1774403325988864416?s=20; https://t.me/odshbr79/152
[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8880 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19096 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55305
[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fzxqfiWr8UajfLtTSxKFNxoZzRm8d2xaEsGxYWfpdKS21UVSg3a4Uh1wXvadFoNbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DcVXcJ287qQuT2fpJa9K4LBQDaukJ33kYV4Zzp2jLf9A9jyGCp37M8GEaZ1dTSdyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtPxfB6PT4sz7Rmky6y3fZo41yXZgFkzdHFgpUoTsVTtY6NSJPiLJaLQPmj3A9mZl ; https://t.me/rybar/58711 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8880 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19096 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55305
[62] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65061 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118562
[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/37206 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fzxqfiWr8UajfLtTSxKFNxoZzRm8d2xaEsGxYWfpdKS21UVSg3a4Uh1wXvadFoNbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DcVXcJ287qQuT2fpJa9K4LBQDaukJ33kYV4Zzp2jLf9A9jyGCp37M8GEaZ1dTSdyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtPxfB6PT4sz7Rmky6y3fZo41yXZgFkzdHFgpUoTsVTtY6NSJPiLJaLQPmj3A9mZl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8838
[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65094 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/9585
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fzxqfiWr8UajfLtTSxKFNxoZzRm8d2xaEsGxYWfpdKS21UVSg3a4Uh1wXvadFoNbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DcVXcJ287qQuT2fpJa9K4LBQDaukJ33kYV4Zzp2jLf9A9jyGCp37M8GEaZ1dTSdyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtPxfB6PT4sz7Rmky6y3fZo41yXZgFkzdHFgpUoTsVTtY6NSJPiLJaLQPmj3A9mZl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19096
[66] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7763
[67] https://suspilne dot media/717718-ukraini-vidomij-akisnij-ta-kilkisnij-sklad-rosijskih-vijskovih-u-krimu-gumenuk/
[68] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118536
[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/38708
[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fzxqfiWr8UajfLtTSxKFNxoZzRm8d2xaEsGxYWfpdKS21UVSg3a4Uh1wXvadFoNbl https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DcVXcJ287qQuT2fpJa9K4LBQDaukJ33kYV4Zzp2jLf9A9jyGCp37M8GEaZ1dTSdyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtPxfB6PT4sz7Rmky6y3fZo41yXZgFkzdHFgpUoTsVTtY6NSJPiLJaLQPmj3A9mZl
[71] https://suspilne dot media/717718-ukraini-vidomij-akisnij-ta-kilkisnij-sklad-rosijskih-vijskovih-u-krimu-gumenuk/
[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/38714
[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/38714
[74] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/31/kyrylo-budanov-sprognozuvav-vykorystannya-rosiyanamy-kalibriv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T88RnpKNN_s
[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/31/kyrylo-budanov-rozpoviv-pro-litaky-yaki-rosiyany-osoblyvo-berezhut/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T88RnpKNN_s
[76] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/31/kyrylo-budanov-prokomentuvav-vykorystannya-rosiyanamy-bomby-odab-1500/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T88RnpKNN_s
[77]
https://ura dot news/news/1052749501; https://live24 dot
ru/obschestvo/uchastnikam-dobrovolcheskih-batalonov-i-chvk-v-rossii-oblegchili-poluchenie-statusa-veterana-boevyh-dejstvij-i-lgot.html;
http://static.government dot
ru/media/files/WRa7NA6fF6Kwg5SAVh3rtqAnEu6WayS1.pdf
[78] https://t.me/zarubinreporter/2338 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/20402493 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240909 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18146
[79]
https://t.me/DIUkraine/3663 ; https://gur.gov dot
ua/content/panuie-strakh-terorystychna-rosiia-zmitsniuie-kordony-u-trokh-rehionakh.html
[80] https://defence-ua dot com/news/rf_pochala_virobnitstvo_h_101_z_dvoma_bojovimi_chastinami_raketa_dijsno_stala_vdvichi_nebezpechnishoju-14892.html
[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2024 ; https://defence-ua dot com/news/rf_pochala_virobnitstvo_h_101_z_dvoma_bojovimi_chastinami_raketa_dijsno_stala_vdvichi_nebezpechnishoju-14892.html
[82] https://www.ft.com/content/e5b52757-1faf-4e6c-9adf-5c018dbf24e6
[83] https://t.me/MID_Russia/38240
[84] https://t.me/tass_agency/240892 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/2335 ; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/20401923
[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024
