Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Jessica Sobieski, Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 1, 2025, 6:00 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 1. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the July 2 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
A Russian occupation official
claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for
the second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian
milbloggers denied this claim. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 30 that Russian forces seized all of Luhansk Oblast.[1]
Russian milbloggers denied Pasechnik's claim, however, stating that
Russian forces have not cleared Nadiya and Novoyehorivka (both east of
Borova).[2] One milblogger claimed that some border areas are still contested "gray zones."[3]
Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on July 3, 2022,
that Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces
were subsequently able to regain positions in Luhansk Oblast during the
Fall 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive.[4]
Ukrainian forces made advances in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts
during the Fall 2022 counteroffensive and disrupted Russian plans to
resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of the "fortress belt" in
Donetsk Oblast.[5]
Russian forces have since failed to retake significant swathes of
territory that Ukrainian forces liberated in the Kharkiv
counteroffensive, including Kupyansk, Borova, Izyum, and Lyman. Russian
forces intensified offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, and
Lyman directions in early 2024 and have continued attempts to advance
toward these three settlements over the last one and a half years.[6]
ISW assessed in late November 2024 that Russian forces had seized
roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, and Russian forces have struggled
in the seven months to seize the last one percent.[7]
The
Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to
include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to
200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military. The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on June 27 and 28
showing Russian officials visiting the Novosibirsk Higher Military
Command School and a new military training ground in Krasnodar Krai and
highlighted that Russia is creating motorcycle training programs at
these facilities.[8]
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian Ground Forces
Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev discussed improving Russia's
ability to train forces and generate new officers at the Novosibirsk
Higher Military Command School, and Belousov ordered Mordvichev to equip
the school with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to help
train cadets in modern tactics. Russian Deputy Defense Minister
Yunus-Bek Yevkurov stated that the Krasnodar Krai training ground has a
modern driving range for motorcycles, ATVs, and quad bikes and noted
that Russia has modernized over 200 training centers to account for the
new tactics that Russian forces are using in Ukraine. The Russian
military command has been working to formalize motorcycle tactics and
training throughout the Russian military in recent months.[9]
Russian
sources continue to speculate on the Russian MoD's ability to formalize
and further improve Russian motorcycle usage, however. A
Russian Telegram channel claimed on June 13 that Mordvichev pioneered
the use of motorcycles and ATVs in late 2024 in order to facilitate
further Russian advances toward Pokrovsk.[10]
The Telegram channel stated that the Russian force grouping in the
Pokrovsk direction developed formal norms for using motorcycles by June
2025 and that the Russian military command is attempting to replicate
these norms in other frontline areas. The Telegram channel reiterated
that Russian servicemembers receive most of their motorcycles from
volunteer organizations or purchase motorcycles independently, but noted
that Mordvichev intends for the Russian MoD to centrally provide
motorcycles for troops and establish a motorcycle stockpile. The
Telegram channel, citing unspecified sources in the Russian military,
stated that Russia purchased over 40,000 Chinese-made motorcycles in
2024 and that Russian forces have received 20,000 of these motorcycles.
One Russian military source told the channel that the Russian MoD
intends to purchase 120,000 motorcycles, 30,000 ATVs, and 12,000 buggies
by the end of 2025. Another source in the Russian MoD stated that the
MoD intends to purchase up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other types
of light vehicles — likely in 2025. The Telegram channel stated that
Mordvichev also intends to hire a group of instructors to teach troops
how to best operate motorcycles and that some of these instructors may
be former Wagner Group members.
A Russian milblogger and
former Storm Z instructor complained on June 30 that Russian motorcycles
and ATVs are vulnerable to Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone
strikes and that Russian motorcycle assaults result in higher
killed-in-action (KIA) to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios, however.[11]
The milblogger noted that motorcycle assaults could be more successful
should Russian forces use motorcycles in tandem with significant air,
drone, and electronic warfare (EW) support. Motorcycle usage has
allowed Russian forces to marginally improve their ability to dodge
Ukrainian drones in contested "gray zones" along the frontline, but
Russia's rate of advance has yet to increase beyond a foot pace despite
efforts to integrate faster-moving vehicles into assault tactics.
Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia's rear. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on July 1 that SBU drones struck the “Kupol” Electromechanical Plant in Izhevsk, Republic of Udmurtia.[12]
The SBU sources reported that the drones traveled 1,300 kilometers to
the target and that at least two drones struck two factory buildings,
causing a fire. The SBU sources reported that the plant produces Tor and
Osa air defense systems and Garpiya long-range strike drones.
Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows a drone striking the plant,
causing an explosion.[13]
Republic of Udmurtia Head Alexander Brechalov acknowledged on July 1
that Ukrainian drones struck an enterprise in Izhevsk, starting a fire.[14]
Russian milbloggers largely responded to the strike by continuing to
call for Russian authorities to strengthen air defenses to protect the
defense industrial base in the Russian rear.[15]
The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system. Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 1 that the
Ukrainian command will assign training battalions to the newly created
army corps and that the training battalions will operate as part of unit
training centers.[16]
Syrskyi announced that Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian General
Staff Major General Ihor Skybyuk will oversee the training. Syrskyi
announced a prohibition on accumulations of Ukrainian forces and means
and tent camps, likely in response to recent Russian strikes against
Ukrainian concentrations in the Ukrainian rear.[17]
Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian authorities are building structures to
protect training areas from strikes. Syrskyi noted that Ukrainian forces
will undergo more training to counter Russian strike drones.
Russian-Azerbaijani
relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale
incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the
December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane. The
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) protested on July 1 against
Azerbaijan's "unfriendly actions" that the Russian MFA claimed are
"deliberate" steps to dismantle bilateral relations.[18]
The Russian MFA claimed that the recent detention of ethnic
Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg was lawful and that Baku's accusations
against Russian law enforcement agencies are an interference in Russia's
internal affairs. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Baku of
taking actions that are "not in line" with the "spirit and character" of
Russian-Azerbaijani relations.[19]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev spoke on the phone on July 1 and discussed the detentions in
Yekaterinburg.[20]
Russian milbloggers largely criticized Azerbaijan for deliberately
trying to undermine its relationship with Russia and claimed that
Azerbaijani authorities and media are trying to play up the detention of
ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia to galvanize Azerbaijani society against
Russia.[21]
Azerbaijani-Russian relations deteriorated in late 2024 when Russia
refused to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024, downing
of an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane, likely shot in mid-air by
Russian air defense before crashing in Kazakhstan.[22]
An
investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found
that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW
assessed at the time. The Center for Human Rights in Armed
Conflict reported on June 26 that Russian forces conducted the July 28,
2022, strike against a barracks at the Volnovaska Penal Colony near
Olenivka, Donetsk Oblast that killed Ukrainian POWs.[23]
The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported that available
evidence disproves the Russian claim that Ukrainian forces struck the
barracks with HIMARS rockets. The report found that Lyubivka (roughly
four kilometers east of Olenivka) was the likely launch site of the
strike. The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported that the
Russian military — likely a group affiliated with the Russian General
Staff — planned and organized the strike and likely coordinated with the
Federal Service in Executing Punishments (FSIN). ISW assessed at the
time of the strike that Russian forces were responsible for the killing
of 53 Ukrainian POWs at the Russian-controlled prison.[24]
Key Takeaways:
- A
Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the
entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia's
full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim.
- The
Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to
include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to
200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military.
- Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia's rear.
- The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system.
- Russian-Azerbaijani
relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale
incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the
December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane.
- An
investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found
that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW
assessed at the time.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the
international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube
artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort
#2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into
eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast,
the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly
advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 1.
Russian forces conducted attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 30 and July 1.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the Glushkovo and Tetkino (southeast of Glushkovo) directions.[26]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment
(reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of
Forces) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[27]
Elements of the 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are
reportedly operating near Tetkino and Novyi Put (southwest of
Glushkovo).[28]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 1 but did not advance.
Russian
forces continued attacks in the Sumy Oblast border area, including
northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky on June 30 and July 1.[29]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near
Yunakivka, Sadky, Novomykolaivka, Andriivka (all north of Sumy City),
and Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[30]
The
chief of staff of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction
reported on July 1 that Russian forces are moving on foot individually
to avoid discovery by Ukrainian forces and have to walk 10 kilometers to
reach the frontline before attacks.[31] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are using motorcycles and quadbikes for logistics.
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Andriivka and Khotin (north
of Sumy City).[32]
Drone operators of the "Anvar" Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring
to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking
Ukrainian positions near Sadky.[33]
Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Aida" Detachment, drone
operators of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade and "Rubikon"
Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and artillery elements of the
106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[34]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 1 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Zelene and
northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June
30 and July 1.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[36]
The
commander of a Ukrainian company operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast
reported on July 1 that Russian forces near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv
City) are accumulating and attacking in small groups up to a detachment.[37]
The commander noted that previous Russian armored vehicle attacks were
unable to even pass the Russian second line of defense before Ukrainian
forces struck the vehicles.
Order of Battle: Drone
operators of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Bati" Detachment (204th
"Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 1 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Milove,
Dovhenke, Radkivka, and Holubivka and toward Petro-Ivanivka; northeast
of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova
Novoselivka and toward Novoosynove and Pishchane on June 30 and July 1.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
See topline text for claims of Russian advances in Luhansk Oblast.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations east of Borova near Kopanky and
southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and toward Olhivka on June 30 and
July 1.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[41]
A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to
advance west from Lozova (northeast of Borova) in order to envelop
Bohuslavka (west of Lozova) from the south.[42] The milblogger claimed that part of Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) is a contested "gray zone."
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Ridkodub
(north of Lyman) and advanced north of the settlement.[43]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Novyi Myr,
Karpivka, and Ridkodub and toward Serednye and Shandryholove; northeast
of Lyman near Myrne, Zelene Dolyna, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman
near Torske on June 30 and July 1.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub.[45]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction
reported that Russian forces are using MT-LB armored fighting vehicles
to transport infantry closer to Ukrainian positions.[46]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 283rd and 488th motorized rifle
regiments (both of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined
Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly
operating in Karpivka.[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed
territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued assaults in the Siversk direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south
of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) and are attacking into the eastern
outskirts of Siversk.[48]
Russian
forces continued assaults northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and
Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk toward Vyimka, and south of Siversk
toward Zvanivka on June 30 and July 1.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th
Airborne (VDV) Division seized Shevchenko Microraion (southwestern
Chasiv Yar) and advanced in eastern Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[50]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest,
west, and southwest of Chasiv Yar and into and near Bila Hora.[51]
Russian
forces continued assaults in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar
near Predtechyne and toward Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne on June 30
and July 1.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bila Hora.[53]
The
commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Kramatorsk
(Chasiv Yar) direction reported that Russian forces are currently
attacking less intensely than in late May and early June 2025.[54] The commander noted that Russian forces are leveraging motorcycles to transport infantry closer to Ukrainian positions.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd
Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR]
Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 72nd Motorized
Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Bila
Hora.[55]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Toretsk, southeast of
Poltavka, and northwest of Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[56]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced
northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and toward Nelipivka and
Kleban-Byk (both northwest of Toretsk).[57]
Russian
forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka;
northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka and Popiv Yar and toward Rusyn Yar;
west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske; and southwest of
Toretsk near Leonidivka on June 30 and July 1.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dyliivka.[59]
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck
Ukrainian positions near Raiske (northwest of Toretsk in the Ukrainian
near rear) with a Geran-2 drone (Russian-made analogue of the
Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones).[60]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 944th Self-Propelled Artillery
Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), 238th Artillery
Brigade (8th CAA), 221st Separate Engineer-Sapper Battalion, and 163rd
Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.[61] Elements of the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka.[62]
Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st
Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in
Dachne (northeast of Toretsk).[63]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 29 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Myrolyubivka (east
of Pokrovsk).[64]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk).[65]
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and toward Razine,
Koptieve, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and
Myrolubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka;
south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near
Udachne on June 30 and July 1.[66]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction
stated that Russian forces continue to deploy small infantry assault
groups, sometimes with heavy armored vehicle support.[67]
The spokesperson stated that Russian forces frequently attack at night
and that Russian forces are increasingly using scooters, folding and
carrying the scooters as soon as Russian forces reach impassable roads.
The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have a quantitative drone
advantage in the area.
Order of Battle: Elements of the
Russian "Typhoon" Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th
Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD])
reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[68]
Drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern
Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions
near Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk).[69]
The
Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces
conducted a missile strike against the headquarters of the Russian 8th
CAA (SMD) in occupied Donetsk City on June 30.[70] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the strike killed the acting commander of the 8th CAA, Colonel Ruslan Goryachkin.[71]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Dachne (south of
Novopavlivka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) and seized the settlement.[72]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dachne.[73]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of
Shevchenko, west of Komar, west of Yalta, and southwest of Zirka (all
south of Novopavlivka).[74]
Russian
forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka
near Novoserhiivka, Muravka, and Novomykolaivka; southeast of
Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Oleksiivka, Bahatyr, Zelenyi Kut, and
Novoukrainka; and south of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Zaporizhzhia,
Fedorivka, Perebudova, Vesele, Komar, and Dachne on June 30 and July 1.[75]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near
Kotylarivka (east of Novopavlivka), Muravka, Zirka, and Perebudova.[76]
A
servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka
direction stated that Russian forces are no longer deploying columns of
seven to eight motorcycles but are now deploying only two to three
motorcycles at a time.[77]
The servicemember stated that Russian forces are deploying small
infantry groups of two to three personnel with infantry fighting vehicle
(IFV) and motorcycle support. The servicemember stated that Russian
forces are moving first on motorcycles — accumulating forces three to
five kilometers from the frontline — and then moving in small groups on
foot.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
struck a bridge over the Vovcha River along the H-15
Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway near Iskra (southwest of
Novopavlivka in the Ukrainian near rear).[78]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Dachne.[79] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia, Zirka, and Yalta.[80] Elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Horikhove.[81]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north
and south of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), east of
Maliivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), and
near Novopil (west of Velyka Novosilka).[82]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and
toward Voskresenka, Komyshuvakha, and Maliivka and west of Velyka
Novosilka near Novopil on June 30 and July 1.[83]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade
(Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly
operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[84]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[85]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 30 and July 1.[86]
Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 1 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted assaults southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 30 and July 1.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kamyanske.[88]
Ukraine's
Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 1 that
Ukrainian partisans destroyed a railway track in occupied Zaporizhia
Oblast on June 26 and disabled a train on July 1 as part of ongoing
efforts to complicate Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine.[89]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv and Stepnohirsk
(north of Kamyanske).[90]
Russian forces continued assaults in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on June 30 and July 1 but did not advance.[91]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th
VDV Division) are reportedly operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.[92]
The
GUR reported on July 1 that Ukrainian drones destroyed a Russian
Pantsir-S1 air defense system and its crew, several radars, and an Su-30
aircraft at an airfield near occupied Saky, Crimea.[93]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of June 30 to July 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 1 that
Russian forces launched 52 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk City;
Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[94]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 14
drones and that 33 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian
electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian drones struck three unspecified locations in Ukraine. Ukraine's
Southern Operational Command reported on July 1 that Russian forces
conducted a ballistic missile strike against Hulyaipole, Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast on the morning of July 1 and destroyed civilian infrastructure in
the area.[95]
The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 2,453 Shahed
drones, 14 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, 27 Iskander-K cruise
missiles, 8 Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, 93 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise
missiles, 12 Kalibr cruise missiles, and 13 Kh-59/69 guided aircraft
missiles in June 2025.[96]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/323191;
[2] https://t.me/dva_majors/74441; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170901 ;
[3] https://t.me/wargonzo/27613
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112624
[8] https://t.me/mod_russia/54205 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54209
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725
[10] https://t.me/volyamedia/1546
[11] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2646 ; https://t.me/kcpn2014/3194 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2647 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2648
[12] https://suspilne dot media/1055937-droni-sbu-vrazili-zavod-kupol-v-izevsku-akij-viroblae-zrk-i-bpla-dla-armii-rf-dzerela/
[13]
https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1939950559227707403;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1939970377075081581;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1939965308489392186;
https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1939957556144644587
[14] https://t.me/brechalov/6830; https://t.me/brechalov/6835
[15] https://t.me/rybar/71805 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170930; https://t.me/rybar/71816
[16] https://t.me/osirskiy/1202
[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2025
[18] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62067
[19] https://tass dot ru/politika/24400355
[20] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-rozmovu-z-prezidentom-azerbajdzhan-98773; https://president dot az/en/articles/view/69287
[21] https://t.me/dva_majors/74464 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74463; https://t.me/dva_majors/74429; https://t.me/dva_majors/74458; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170887; https://t.me/rybar/71808; https://t.me/rybar/71817
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624
[23]
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/g3bqh1rvkko6x2rkqd0hi/Barracks-200-EN.pdf?rlkey=xm20hr1qa16b0k9k33touozq8&e=1&st=yzt9mcls&dl=0
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1
[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/74441; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30647
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/54286
[28] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38051; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94850
[29]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
; https://t.me/dva_majors/74441; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170938
[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/27613; https://t.me/smotri_z/45755; https://t.me/dva_majors/74441
[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/01/po-10-km-pishky-ta-povzkom-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-taktyku-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-na-sumshhyni/
[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/74428;
[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170938
[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/74459; https://t.me/iamsniper/14045; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30638; https://t.me/basurin_e/19615; https://t.me/tass_agency/323372;
[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl?__cft__[0]=AZWqKZyHVHRbiaxmijAaLVMR-qx-0_Ei2MpjVxjH0fG2dpTs4NK13whZlNt9ui9thhxEn2ZJGVCeUu4-_RgntL4U58LAXaZALc19AhbDh8BfHDxJBYJJOdLvDgo0yTcNGYSOq5Yg8_9y6_WXYjhaT_Voq4X5llHFmiQW1IqBDpYznA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal?__cft__[0]=AZXCXirJANzSg_3bmrRYbhIl0ihdf5QHBZRFdvtTDtJI4XLtYPlMZYVsb-L8usazTUXOFu0khEdWjHQcB80XFn6NpQP8vyU3aA_rViqLCA3NtK6jeGtlWzrBgBwPUsdHC2OkPyluXqqusdwvQqi66mwys3P1LWaUQR1GCdV9T6q5PQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0351L9wj9pvAzAK3fBypWmAeNUMxuLJxXpyrMBkaPnuujCnSL1tjDdXD1kHRzhB7Hil?__cft__[0]=AZUls_4THZIaALQgLRx5JMVtP6AMdGS1-jKyBIoBKJqcMzM_hC3yqdwZIEf4J4HidClCZg6Y5u-2c64ZvUo6ymdOovM3A7jCkfLKnH3q7uhktHW48fdVSGsLqPfW0duo3sLgMRVDBz-8ITsnSrunMBazPqqaWZQy9MHJgfgySo0YVA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30644; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13508
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30644
[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/01/tam-obstrilyuyut-tam-kilzona-vyzhyty-nerealno-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-vidmovlyayutsya-ity-v-shturmy/
[38] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5812
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30666
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30666
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37960; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30656
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30656
[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30656
[46] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1055643-rosijski-vijska-sturmuut-limanskij-napramok-malimi-grupami-dnami-zsu-znisili-mtlb-ta-pihotu-rf/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/01/pihotynczi-yaki-desantuvalysya-buly-znyshheni-poblyzu-lymanu-protyvnyk-ne-vstygaye-realizovuvaty-plany/
[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37960
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30629
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/27613 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30655 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37991; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30669
[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/27613 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30655 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37991; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30669
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30669
[54] https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2025/07/01/taktyka-shtovhannya-pryam-strashne-na-kramatorskomu-rosijski-shturmovyky-masovo-styrayutsya-ob-ukrayinsku-oboronu/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fo40sNBTM40
[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37991; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37995
[56] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939822468060893335; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939819664319660042; https://t.me/UA_Military_Police/766; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9492; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939782682465992897; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939783962097840387; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3244; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939792509347008653
[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl; https://t.me/rusich_army/24451; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557
[59] https://t.me/rusich_army/24451
[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/54296
[61] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13976; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13974
[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65557
[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37991; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37995
[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9496; https://t.me/lost_armour/5722
[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559
[66]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl;
[67]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/07/01/my-z-czogo-smiyalys-ale-vony-navchylys-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosijski-komandyry-hochut-hoch-yakus-peremogu/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38066
[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170925
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26140
[71] https://t.me/astrapress/85319; https://t.me/a_shtirlitz/31313; https://t.me/astrapress/85229
[72]
https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1939754443253457171;
https://t.me/mo114rf/96; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9488;
https://t.me/osintpen/1331
[73] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170931
[74] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94849; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37977; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65537
[75]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl; https://t.me/rybar/71800; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65530; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65531; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65536; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65537; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559; https://t.me/rybar/71815; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170858
[76] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65537; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65536; https://t.me/dva_majors/74441
[77]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/07/01/adminkordon-yim-yak-medom-namazanyj-rosiyany-poyednuyut-bmp-j-motoczykly-z-malymy-grupamy-pihoty/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fo40sNBTM40
[78] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94800
[79] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94824 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30668
[80] https://t.me/rybar/71800
[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65559
[82] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37977; https:// t me/voenkorKotenok/65537; https://t.me/wargonzo/27613; https://t.me/dva_majors/74441; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170858
[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65537; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170858; https://t.me/wargonzo/27613
[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/15763
[85] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38010
[86] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[87] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dR4EFGYsSrPJSWkorDL8GPDkcYHSYUXymKm71dYVzWV76yHerYSNGq4ddkNXVnfPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[88] https://t.me/dva_majors/74441
[89]
https://gur.gov dot
ua/content/paralich-lohistyky-voroha-detali-hurkotu-na-zaliznytsi-u-zaporizkii-oblasti.html
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/07/01/paralich-logistyky-okupantiv-u-gur-rozkryly-detali-gurkotu-na-zaliznyczi-u-zaporizkij-oblasti/;
https://t.me/DIUkraine/6319
[90] https://t.me/dva_majors/74428
[91] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eZM7eGw8ZKqFG9u76XY1gGFTkammLPGSoAkGA3NCcZJ7uwzYZVPZ1a7UT2PmT7Fal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0219tSm4E14bjtYdKTfHPo2Lf5GMtPw1RzGoVcXDpniRNM1HTbKXoeeNwWSa19WKJRl
[92] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20926
[93]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/07/01/nyshhat-czili-uhylyayuchys-vid-raket-udarni-bobry-vrazyly-rls-ta-su-30-na-aerodromi-v-sakah/;
https://t.me/DIUkraine/6316
[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/37451
[95] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12659
[96] https://t.me/kpszsu/37464
