Taliban Supreme Leader Uses Gathering of Religious Leaders to Consolidate Power

By Peter Mills

Co-produced by the Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project

Key Takeaway: Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada leveraged a recent gathering of Taliban-aligned religious leaders to consolidate power and advance efforts to implement a hardline governance program. Akhundzada is taking on a more proactive role as the Taliban navigates internal tensions and faces continued attacks from the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (IS-KP).

The Taliban gathered more than 3,500 people from across Afghanistan for an “Assembly of Ulema [Religious Scholars]” from 29 June to 2 July. The attendees were primarily religious leaders affiliated with the Taliban movement, indicating that the gathering intended to shore up support for the Taliban instead of broadening its base of support.[1] Each Afghan district sent two religious scholars and one local or tribal elder as representatives. Each province also sent two elders, a religious scholar from the provincial capital, and five representatives from the provincial Ulema Council.[2] The Taliban pointedly did not describe this event as a loya jirga, or grand assembly, the traditional Afghan format for resolving issues of national importance, such as forming a new constitution. Tribal elders were represented at the ulema gathering but were not the primary or majority constituency as they would have been in a loya jirga. Akhundzada appears to be prioritizing support from the ulema at the expense of other stakeholders in Afghanistan, such as civil society groups or local leaders from minority groups.

Akhundzada appears to be taking a more assertive role within Taliban decision-making. The Taliban Supreme Leader traditionally seeks consensus with the Rahbari Shura, an advisory leadership council.[3] Analysts have previously seen Akhundzada as a weak leader who is unwilling to make decisions against the consensus of the Rahbari Shura.[4] His participation in a March cabinet meeting upended the Taliban’s plans to reintroduce girls’ education. Some accounts indicate that Akhundzada played a passive role and allowed a few conservative religious leaders to dominate the conservation while others indicate that Akhundzada actively opposed reintroducing girls’ education.[5] Akhundzada’s involvement—either tacitly or explicitly—in this controversial last-minute decision marked a shift in his prior ruling style of following consensus-based decisions made from his seclusion in Kandahar. Akhundzada broke more fully with his past leadership style by publicly visiting Kabul for the first time to speak at the June to July ulema gathering,  indicating that he is taking a more assertive role in Taliban decision-making.

Akhundzada used the ulema gathering to assert his authority over the Taliban movement and receive pledges of obedience from religious leaders across Afghanistan. Akhundzada gave a keynote address on his vision for the Taliban government that included several anecdotes calling for unquestioning obedience. The chairman of the gathering, Sheikh Habibullah Haqqani, used his opening remarks to emphasize total obedience to the Taliban leadership.[6] The gathering concluded with an 11-point resolution that included a pledge of allegiance to Akhundzada.[7] These repeated demands for and declarations of loyalty indicate a concerted effort by Akhundzada to consolidate his control over the ulema. They also suggest that Akhundzada is concerned about his ability to exert control in the face of divisions within the Taliban movement.

Akhundzada’s speech and its chosen audience indicate that internal tensions within the Taliban remain a problem. The predominantly pro-Taliban composition of the gathering indicates that Taliban supporters were the primary audience for Akhundzada’s speech. It also suggests that this gathering was concerned with addressing factional infighting instead of building a broader base of legitimacy for the Taliban government. Akhundzada repeatedly admonished Taliban leaders for fighting with each other over personal conflicts and “worldly desires,” likely referring to financial resources.[8] Taliban leaders continue to compete with each other for control of mining revenues in Afghanistan.[9] Akhundzada implicitly acknowledged that Taliban in-fighting could bring down the government.

Akhundzada’s speech did not directly address IS-KP despite several IS-KP attacks targeting the ulema gathering. IS-KP militants attempted to attack the ulema gathering on June 30 and fired rockets targeting the gathering on July 1.[10] The June 30 attack involved a brief firefight between several attackers and Taliban special forces from the Ministry of Interior.[11] These attacks indicate that extensive Taliban security preparations did not eliminate IS-KP’s ability to conduct attacks in Kabul but did prevent IS-KP from meaningfully disrupting the gathering.[12] Akhundzada’s speech did not mention the security threat posed by IS-KP but did proclaim the Taliban’s purity and righteousness compared to other Islamic groups.[13] This comment may have been intended to rebuke recent IS-KP rhetoric undermining the Taliban’s legitimacy as an Islamic organization.[14]

Akhundzada’s speech indicates that he remains ideologically extreme and unlikely to compromise on social policy or acquiesce to demands from the international community. Akhundzada emphasized that ideology, not land or money, was the root of the Taliban's insurgency against the international coalition supporting the former Afghan republic and, more importantly, that this fight continues.[15] He emphasized that he would not let nonbelievers establish their laws or culture within Afghanistan. [16] Akhundzada claimed that the international community does not want Afghanistan to be independent.[17] Akhundzada’s speech makes it clear that he does not believe the international community will ever agree to his vision of Shari’a law, and that, therefore, no lasting agreement can exist between the Taliban government and the international community. Akhundzada claimed that he would refuse any pressure that the international community might apply to the Taliban government, even if the international community used “nuclear weapons” on Afghanistan.[18]

Women were not represented at the ulema gathering, and it is unlikely there will be any significant change in the Taliban government’s policy toward girls’ education. Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi said no women were permitted to attend this gathering and that they would be represented through their sons.[19] Sayed Nasrullah Waizi, a Shi’a scholar from Bamiyan Province, called for the gathering to re-open secondary schooling for girls.[20] This statement by a Shi’a scholar indicates that the gathering did include at least some non-Sunni scholars and that there was at least some discussion surrounding girls’ education. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the reopening of girls’ schools would be discussed during the gathering but provided no details.[21] It is unclear if other scholars felt similarly but were dissuaded from voicing their objections to the current Taliban policy on girls’ education. The closing resolution for the gathering made no specific mention of reopening secondary schooling for girls. It stated only that the Taliban should protect the rights of women, children, and minorities in line with Shari’a.[22] Akhundzada’s speech did not mention girls’ education, suggesting that it is not among his policy priorities.

Akhundzada’s vision for the Taliban government will maintain an exclusive system where power resides with long-time Taliban commanders and religious leaders. He stated that the implementation of Shari’a will depend upon unity between Taliban rulers and the religious leadership.[23] Akhundzada reaffirmed a general amnesty for former Afghan government officials but noted that “forgiveness does not mean to bring them to the government.”[24] As such, power in the Taliban government will continue to reside with Taliban-affiliated religious leaders and long-time Taliban commanders. Akhundzada’s decision to maintain an exclusive government, rather than build a more inclusive government, will limit the ability of non-Taliban powerbrokers to influence government policy.

 

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[1] https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-grand-gathering-women/31923501.html
https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/gandhara-briefing-taliban-hazara-madrasahs-grand-assembly/31924733.html

[2] https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1540832552545550336

[3] https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/the-ban-on-older-girls-education-taleban-conservatives-ascendant-and-a-leadership-in-disarray/

[4] https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/taleban-in-transition-how-mansurs-death-and-hibatullahs-ascension-may-affect-the-war-and-peace/

https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/the-ban-on-older-girls-education-taleban-conservatives-ascendant-and-a-leadership-in-disarray/

[5] https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/the-ban-on-older-girls-education-taleban-conservatives-ascendant-and-a-leadership-in-disarray/

[6] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220701-taliban-s-reclusive-supreme-leader-attends-afghan-clerics-meeting
https:// www (dot)ariananews(dot)af/afghan-scholars-issue-11-point-resolution-after-3-day-mass-gathering-in-kabul/

https://twitter.com/MJalal313/status/1542236892728643586
https://twitter.com/TOLOnews/status/1542502697609269248

https://twitter.com/hijrah1428/status/1542459802508529664

[7] https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1543222423251738625

[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhSvQ1eDp8E

[9] https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/afghanistan-taliban-mining-resources-rich-minerals/

[10] https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1542949024147324933

[11] https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1542622469001023488

[12] https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1542485843968917507
https://twitter.com/samijahesh1/status/1542868514133790720
https://twitter.com/sw989fm/status/1542841807230406657

[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhSvQ1eDp8E

[14] https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-deems-taliban-nullifiers

https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1550045211606360070

[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhSvQ1eDp8E

[16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhSvQ1eDp8E
https://twitter.com/TajudenSoroush/status/1543582033145987081

[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhSvQ1eDp8E

[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/men-will-represent-women-gathering-national-unity-taliban-leader-2022-06-29/

[20] https://www(dot)ariananews(dot)af/turkey-awaits-iea-response-to-kabul-airport-offer-erdogan/

[21] https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-grand-gathering-women/31923501.html

[22] https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1543228617987133442

[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhSvQ1eDp8E

[24] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/01/taliban-leader-hits-out-foreign-demands-afghan-government

https://www.bbc.com/pashto/afghanistan-62006186?at_campaign=64&at_custom1=%5Bpost+type%5D&at_custom3=BBC+Pashto&at_medium=custom7&at_custom2=twitter&at_custom4=033C0CB2-F91A-11EC-8FB7-03DA2052A482

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Layne Phillipson, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 28, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian grouping in Donetsk Oblast is likely seeking to capitalize on recent marginal gains southeast of Bakhmut by continuing to attempt to advance in that area. Russian forces may be de-emphasizing attempts to take Siversk in order to concentrate on Bakhmut, but it is too soon to tell. Russian forces continued efforts to advance northward on Bakhmut from recently gained positions around Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Power Plant while pursuing southwestward advances along the T1302 highway from recently captured positions in Berestove. By contrast, Russian forces have been struggling to make concrete gains around Siversk and have not made any confirmed advances toward the city since the capture of the Luhansk Oblast Administrative border in early July. Russian command is likely, therefore, seeking to maintain momentum around Bakhmut, potentially at the expense of continued pressure on Siversk. Russian forces remain unlikely to take Bakhmut itself, despite recent incremental advances in its direction.

Putin replaced Colonel-General Gennady Zhidko as deputy defense minister and head of the Main Military-Political Directorate on July 28.[1] Putin signed a decree appointing Colonel-General Viktor Goremykin to Zhidko’s position and has not publicly announced the appointment of Zhidko to a new position.[2] ISW previously reported that Zhidko would become the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, a report that appears to have been incorrect.[3]

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast likely seek to capitalize on recent marginal territorial gains around Bakhmut and may deprioritize efforts to take Siversk.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults northwest of Slovyansk and northeast and southwest of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations around Avdiivka to reduce Ukrainian strikes in and around Donetsk City.
• Russian forces may be setting conditions for renewed offensive operations toward Kharkiv City.
• Russian forces attempted a limited ground offensive on the Southern Axis but are likely facing territorial losses in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces are attempting to preserve their ground lines of communication over the Dnipro River connecting Kherson City to rear areas in eastern Kherson Oblast.
• The Kremlin continued measures to compensate for officer and manpower losses in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is continuing to institutionalize its occupation administrations in occupied parts of Ukraine to prepare for sham referenda, annexation, and integration into Russia.
• Russian occupation forces are continuing to pressure Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas to use Russian rubles and passports and to attend Russian-run schools, setting conditions for longer-term social control in occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
• Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
• Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted a series of limited ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk on July 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force attempt near Brazhkivka, about 25 km northwest of Slovyansk in contested territory.[4] Russian troops also reportedly attempted to advance from the Dovhenke area to Mazanivka, about 20 km northwest of Slovyansk, and from Pasika to Dolyna, about 20 km northwest of Slovyansk.[5] On July 27, the Ukrainian General Staff indicated that a Russian reconnaissance group operated near Ukrainian positions in Pasika, seemingly suggesting a limited Ukrainian counterattack in the area.[6] However, reports of a Russian attempt to advance southwest of Pasika toward Dolyna confirm ISW’s control of terrain assessment that Pasika remains in Russian-controlled territory. Russian forces additionally continued shelling settlements northwest of Slovyansk along the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border and northeast of Slovyansk around Pryshyb and Tetyanivka.[7]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in the Siversk area and Ukrainian positions around Siversk City on July 28.[8]

Russian forces continued efforts to advance southwest toward Bakhmut along the T1302 highway and conducted ground attacks southeast of Bakhmut on July 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance attempt in the direction of Berestove to Nahirne, which is along the T1302 and about 20 km northeast of Bakhmut.[9] Russian forces continued to fight on the outskirts of Soledar (less than 10 km northeast of Bakhmut) and attempted to advance around Volodymyrivka and Stryapivka.[10] Russian forces additionally conducted limited ground assaults southeast of Bakhmut around Vershyna, Vidrodzhennya, Semihirya, Klynove, and Myronivskyi and are likely attempting to leverage ground gained around Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirske Power Plant to support attempts to advance north. [11] Russian forces continued artillery strikes in the vicinity of Bakhmut.[12]

Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations in the Avdiivka area to reduce Ukrainian strikes on the Donetsk City area. Deputy Head of the Ukrainian General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate Oleksii Gromov stated that Russian forces are deploying elements of the 2nd Army Corps (forces of the Luhansk People’s Republic) and other unspecified formations to the Avdiivka area to form offensive groups, which suggests that Russian forces may be increasingly interested in committing combat power to assaults on Avdiivka.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces resumed assault operations in the direction of Avdiivka and Pisky, just southwest of Avdiivka.[14] Multiple Russian sources reported that Russian troops are increasing artillery pressure on Avdiivka in order to support more serious ground attacks against Ukrainian lines of defense surrounding the city.[15] Russian milbloggers are progressively emphasizing the increase in the pace of operations in the Avdiivka area and claiming that Ukrainian forces are using positions around Avdiivka to target Russian positions in Donetsk City.[16] This recent Russian push is likely premised on extending the Russian defensive pocket around Avdiivka and pushing Ukrainian forces out of fortified positions that have existed since 2014 in order to relieve pressure against Russian assets in Donetsk City. This push likely does not indicate that Russian forces are opening up a new offensive in the southwestern sector of Donetsk Oblast intended to drive far into the oblast.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not make any territorial gains on the Kharkiv Axis on July 28 but may be setting conditions for renewed offensive operations in the Kharkiv City direction. The Derhachi City Council reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces continued fighting in Kozacha Lopan, Tsupivka, Dementiivka, and Velyki Prokhody, north of Kharkiv City.[17] Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Russian forces conducted successful raids on Ukrainian positions near Borshchova, Sosnivka, and Petrivka, which could later enable Russian forces to advance on Kharkiv City from the Ruska Lozova salient to Borshchova, approximately 28 km northeast of Kharkiv City.[18] Russian forces launched an airstrike near Rusky Tyshki, approximately 25 km north of Kharkiv City, and continued launching tube and rocket artillery strikes at Kharkiv City and settlements to the north, northeast, and southeast.[19] Successful Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv are extremely unlikely, but the Russians will likely try to gain more ground in the oblast before the September referenda.

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces attempted a limited ground assault on the Southern Axis on July 28 but are likely suffering territorial losses in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground assault toward Brukivka-Bikohirka, Kherson Oblast, and that Russian forces in the Kryvoriz'kyi direction in northern Kherson Oblast are focusing on regaining lost positions.[20] Deputy Head of the Ukrainian General Staff’s Main Operative Command Brigadier General Oleksii Gromov reported that Russian forces are transferring reserves from the Kharkiv and Luhansk directions to the Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih directions.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted artillery duels around Novovoznesensk, Potemkyne, and Vysokopillya, south of Kryvyi Rih.[22] Russian forces shelled the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River near Lozove, Kherson Oblast, confirming that Ukrainian forces retain a bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[23] Russian forces continued shelling along the entire line of contact.[24]

Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian military infrastructure on the Southern Axis on July 28. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Melitopol airfield after Russian forces began to repair the airfield from the July 23-24 strikes.[25] Fedorov stated that Russian forces use the airfield as a hub for weapons and equipment deliveries.[26] Ukrainian forces likely struck Russian military infrastructure in Chornobaivka on the northern outskirts of Kherson City. Footage of Chornobaivka shows a large smoke plume rising from the city, and Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administrative Head Serhiy Khlan posted a picture of the smoke plume with a caption suggesting that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike.[27]

Russian forces are attempting to preserve their ground lines of communication over the Dnipro River connecting Kherson City to rear areas in eastern Kherson Oblast. Russian forces established a ferry crossing under the Antonivskyi Bridge to allow passenger traffic to cross the Dnipro after Ukrainian strikes on July 27 rendered the bridge unusable.[28] Russian occupation authorities repaired the Darivka Bridge east of Kherson City enough to reopen the bridge to passenger traffic; they tore down the previously reported pontoon bridge erected after Ukrainian strikes on the bridge on July 23.[29]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian military authorities continued to take measures to compensate for personnel losses in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 28 that Russian military leadership has begun to assign the officer rank of junior lieutenant to non-commissioned officers (NCOs) without requisite education or experience on a widespread basis.[30] The GUR additionally reported that the Russian military leadership is forming specialized medical commissions to identify servicemembers who are faking illnesses to get out of service requirements.[31]

Russian federal subjects continued to form regionally-based volunteer battalions. Russian media outlet Bez Formata reported on July 28 that the “Bootur” battalion from Russia’s eastern Sakha Republic (also known as “Yakutia”) has been formed with 105 volunteers for deployment into Ukraine.[32] The GUR notably reported that servicemembers from eastern regions such as Yakutia are reluctant to participate in the war in Ukraine partially due to the fact that these volunteer units are not formed on a professional basis.[33] ISW has updated the map of volunteer battalions to reflect developments in the Sakha Republic.

The Kremlin is continuing to leverage private military companies (PMCs) to support operations in Ukraine. Commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) General Stephen Townsend stated on July 27 that the Wagner Group PMC has transferred an unspecified number of forces from Libya to fight in Ukraine.[34] The Kremlin is increasingly relying on the Wagner Group as its premier strike group and Wagner Group leadership likely seeks to maintain its presence in Ukraine (and by extension, its positive perception with Russian military leadership) through importing fighters from other areas of operation.[35]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

The Kremlin is continuing to institutionalize its occupation administrations in occupied parts of Ukraine to prepare for sham referenda, annexation, and integration into Russia. Russian Senator Andrei Klishas said on July 28 that he “fully admits” that the primary objective of the autumn session of the Russian Duma will be “the integration of new territories into the legal space of the Russian Federation.”[36] The autumn session is scheduled to begin on September 12, one day after the most likely date for sham annexation plebiscites to be held in occupied territories. In the meantime, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) announced on July 28 that it has created “temporary departments” and deployed MVD employees to occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts to support occupation authorities in “ensuring order on the streets,” assisting in the formation of local police departments, conducting operational-search activities, fighting extremism, and assisting in the “permanent issuance” of Russian passports.[37] The Kremlin has likely been unable to recruit many Ukrainians to enforce occupation laws and combat resistance efforts in occupied territories.

Russian occupation forces are continuing to pressure Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas to use Russian rubles and passports instead of Ukrainian hryvnias and identification documents. Acting Ukrainian Head of Kherson Oblast Dmytro Butrii said on July 28 that Russian occupation forces have banned the use of the hryvnia in Kherson and that occupation police are patrolling local markets to threaten and punish those using hryvnias.[38] Butrii also reported that occupation officials have begun to remove ATMs from local markets, suggesting that the Kremlin may be attempting to not only eliminate the use of the hryvnia, but also limit cash access to civilians who cooperate with the occupation administration. The Kremlin could also attempt to drive occupied areas toward a cashless (and therefore more trackable) economy. Russian milblogger Boris Rozhin claimed that 10% of Zaporizhia Oblast residents had received or were in the process of receiving Russian passports as of July 28.[39] He also claimed that passportization is underway in occupied parts of Kharkiv Oblast and claimed that the slow formation of Kharkiv occupation administration accounts for the low percentage of Kharkiv residents in the passport process so far.

Russian occupation authorities are also advancing their efforts to influence schools and curricula in occupied territories in the face of some Ukrainian resistance. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov claimed that all Zaporizhia Oblast school leaders have refused to cooperate with occupation authorities as of July 28.[40] Fedorov said that occupation officials have decided to consolidate four unspecified universities in occupied areas down to one and that 2,000 students would return at an unspecified date, compared to peacetime university attendance of 14,000 students in the oblast. Russian Zaporizhia Occupation Administration Head Yevheny Balitsky claimed on July 28 that his agenda for a meeting with senior occupation officials included not only discussions of price controls, social payments, and the annexation referendum, but also preparation for the new academic year, demonstrating the degree to which occupation officials are prioritizing control over Ukrainian education in occupied territories.[41]

Ukrainian advisor to the mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko reported that Ukrainian teachers from Donetsk and Mariupol completed a pre-certification course for “knowledge and teaching of Russian propaganda” to children in occupied territories. Occupation officials likely brought in Russian specialists to reform Ukrainian curriculums and may be forcing Ukrainian teachers who hope to keep their jobs to re-certify their educational credentials to match Russian standards and curricula. Evacuees from near Mariupol told NPR on July 9 that Russian forces threatened to take children from their parents if they did not attend schools with Russian teachers, suggesting that children in occupied areas will be largely forced to attend Russian-controlled educational institutions.[42] That Russian effort is one component of the Kremlin campaign to set conditions for longer-term Russian social control throughout occupied parts of Ukraine.

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[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/18010; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202207280001

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/18010; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202207280001

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFWGLB3bfkiGL9vXP6sn6DTQcPUT9ek7HrmTbU5kRTCnUiDpZu8l

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mzzz9NNmitFYarD3HWP3uaSktWD9xXRfp5ja2qdpdmyo7WnLbQ2s2FrQDugWhVZol; https://t.me/synegubov/3792

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372408655072219; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFWGLB3bfkiGL9vXP6sn6DTQcPUT9ek7HrmTbU5kRTCnUiDpZu8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mzzz9NNmitFYarD3HWP3uaSktWD9xXRfp5ja2qdpdmyo7WnLbQ2s2FrQDugWhVZol

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mzzz9NNmitFYarD3HWP3uaSktWD9xXRfp5ja2qdpdmyo7WnLbQ2s2FrQDugWhVZol; https://t.me/mod_russia/18004

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFWGLB3bfkiGL9vXP6sn6DTQcPUT9ek7HrmTbU5kRTCnUiDpZu8l

[10] https://t.me/rybar/36268; https://t.me/rybar/36285; https://t.me/kommunist/7840; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2631; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/38733; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFWGLB3bfkiGL9vXP6sn6DTQcPUT9ek7HrmTbU5kRTCnUiDpZu8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mzzz9NNmitFYarD3HWP3uaSktWD9xXRfp5ja2qdpdmyo7WnLbQ2s2FrQDugWhVZol

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFWGLB3bfkiGL9vXP6sn6DTQcPUT9ek7HrmTbU5kRTCnUiDpZu8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mzzz9NNmitFYarD3HWP3uaSktWD9xXRfp5ja2qdpdmyo7WnLbQ2s2FrQDugWhVZol; https://t.me/kommunist/7840; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/38733; https://t.me/readovkaru/1119; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/58551; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/58611

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFWGLB3bfkiGL9vXP6sn6DTQcPUT9ek7HrmTbU5kRTCnUiDpZu8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mzzz9NNmitFYarD3HWP3uaSktWD9xXRfp5ja2qdpdmyo7WnLbQ2s2FrQDugWhVZol; https://t.me/rybar/36285; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/38756; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/38733; https://t.me/stranaua/54832; https://t.me/stranaua/54861; https://t.me/stranaua/54870

[13] https://youtu.be/Ouse5YHYnTc?t=1093

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFWGLB3bfkiGL9vXP6sn6DTQcPUT9ek7HrmTbU5kRTCnUiDpZu8l

[15] https://t.me/nm_dnr/8610; https://t.me/kommunist/7856; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/58575; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/58618; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/38733; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/58575

[16] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/58575; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/58618; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/38733; https://t.me/sashakots/34589; https://t.me/strelkovii/3005; https://t.me/strelkovii/3003; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1552560514919591937; https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1552403398791778305; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1552564096309927936; https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1552403398791778305; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1552567141441802240; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1552567141441802240; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/58570; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5281; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5291; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5292; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5294; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5295; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5296; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5297; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5300; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5305; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5307; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5308; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5313; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5314; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/5315; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/38754; https://t.me/readovkanews/39380

[17] https://t.me/der_rada/2124

[18] https://t.me/rybar/36248

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFWGLB3bfkiGL9vXP6sn6DTQcPUT9ek7HrmTbU5kRTCnUiDpZu8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mzzz9NNmitFYarD3HWP3uaSktWD9xXRfp5ja2qdpdmyo7WnLbQ2s2FrQDugWhVZo; https://t.me/rybar/36248; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/16323; https://t.me/synegubov/3792; https://t.me/rybar/36285; https://t.me/der_rada/2124; https://t.me/rybar/36285https://t.me/stranaua/54768; https://t.me/GalinaMinaeva/2500; https://t.me/stranaua/54768; https://t.me/GalinaMinaeva/2500

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mzzz9NNmitFYarD3HWP3uaSktWD9xXRfp5ja2qdpdmyo7WnLbQ2s2FrQDugWhVZol

[21] https://youtu.be/Ouse5YHYnTc?t=1206

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFWGLB3bfkiGL9vXP6sn6DTQcPUT9ek7HrmTbU5kRTCnUiDpZu8l

[23] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1552623309581336582; https://t.me/asbmil/3362; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1552623311749881856; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1535965017924947968; https://twitter.com/mdfzeh/status/1535910384179236864

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFW; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021rtvyCyoTG58saFW

[25] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/329

[26] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/329

[27] https://t.me/hueviyherson/22983; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1552647593485910016?s=20&t=OceMZQ1vH-wR6j1AzlQ8pA https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1552634740129382401; https://t.me/hueviyherson/22983; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1552647593485910016?s=20&t=OceMZQ1vH-wR6j1AzlQ8pA https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1552634740129382401

[28] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/16323; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1552385428971462659; https://t.me/UAonlii/33941; https://t.me/hueviyherson/22973 https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1552633967240781826; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1552622416383311874; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/729; https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0q4o1v5SmGg62sthNTDq3bCGvi485KiWyRbTCz13x1vDsJz1MdMdQoUUkGDcSzuTul?__cft__[0]=AZUbRYmBOoRgO1DZGgWA49oNAe9dvR9J552F61cG_1eDEt3Oh2kDmAzF5PEcdneVQw01U070lBnkk-I3M2h8BN5EmIrpoIAPbLrnj9t4Kb5trRHDFXTkaICzefhbwMP2L73Yx40NKMyseaD14ZR34n7SbuZweOrZyzDuzxZkhIQH3w&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[29] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/155261944341040742; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23

[30] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-popovniuiut-defitsyt-ofitseriv-za-rakhunok-serzhantskoho-skladu-ta-namahaiutsia-vyiavliaty-symuliantiv-za-dopomohoiu-spetsializovanykh-medkomisii.html

[31] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-popovniuiut-defitsyt-ofitseriv-za-rakhunok-serzhantskoho-skladu-ta-namahaiutsia-vyiavliaty-symuliantiv-za-dopomohoiu-spetsializovanykh-medkomisii.html

[32] https://yakutsk.bezformata dot com/listnews/otryad-bootur-iz-yakutii-otpravilsya/107871469/; https://yakutsk.bezformata dot com/listnews/otryad-bootur-iz-yakutii-otpravilsya/107871469/

[33] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-popovniuiut-defitsyt-ofitseriv-za-rakhunok-serzhantskoho-skladu-ta-namahaiutsia-vyiavliaty-symuliantiv-za-dopomohoiu-spetsializovanykh-medkomisii.html

[34] https://www.state.gov/special-online-briefing-with-general-stephen-j-townsend-commander-u-s-africa-command-u-s-africom/

[35] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2022/07/14/a-mercenaries-war

[36] https://t.me/stranaua/54773; https://t.me/andreyklishas/1004

[37] https://t.me/stranaua/54864; https://t.me/mediamvd/12837

[38] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/729

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/58587

[40] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/329

[41] https://t.me/BalitskyVGA/105

[42] https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1110577369

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 27, 7:30 pm ET

 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces appear able to sustain only two significant offensive operations in Ukraine at this time, one attempting to seize Siversk and the other advancing on Bakhmut. These operations have focused on advances in the Siversk, Donetsk Oblast, direction from Verkhnokamianka and Bilohorivka and in the Bakhmut direction from the areas of Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant since the end of the operational pause on July 16.[1] Russian forces have committed enough resources to conduct near-daily ground assaults and to seize territory on these two axes but have been unable to sustain a similar offensive operational tempo or to make similar territorial gains elsewhere in Ukraine. The Russian offensive, therefore, remains likely to culminate before seizing any other major urban areas in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces currently appear able to sustain only two significant offensive operations in Ukraine, both in Donetsk Oblast, and the Russian offensive remains likely to culminate before seizing additional significant population centers.
• Ukrainian forces may have launched a localized counterattack southwest of Izyum.
• Russian forces attacked settlements east of Siversk and northeast and southeast of Bakhmut.
• Ground fighting is ongoing north of Kharkiv City.
• Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivskyi Bridge for the third time in ten days on July 27, likely rendering it unusable.
• The Mari El Republic north of Kazan sent two volunteer battalions to train and is forming a third battalion to deploy to Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities are importing Russians to work in occupied territories due to a lack of Ukrainian collaborators.
• Mariupol occupation authorities continue withholding humanitarian aid to force civilians to cooperate with and work for the occupation administration.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
• Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
• Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff released vague information indicating that Ukrainian forces may have launched a localized counterattack southeast of Izyum. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reconnaissance group in Pasika (approximately 18 km southeast of Izyum) that attempted to “expose Ukrainian positions” in the settlement on July 27.[2] There is no visual confirmation of Ukrainian forces operating in Pasika as of this publication and ISW is unable to verify this report. ISW assessed that Russian forces control Pasika based on geolocated footage of Russian forces advancing south via Bohorodychne (just southeast of Pasika) in mid-July.[3] Ukrainian forces holding a position in Pasika would require a Ukrainian counteroffensive that reached Pasika (likely via Bohorodychne), but Ukrainian and Russian sources have not claimed such an operation as of this publication. The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported that Ukrainian forces stopped another Russian advance on Bohorodychne on July 26 but did not claim that Ukrainian forces recaptured territory northwest of Bohorodychne.[4] The Russian Occupation Administration Head in Sviatohirsk Vladimir Rybalkin claimed that unconfirmed Ukrainian social media reports that Ukrainian forces retook Yarova, Sviatohirsk, and Bohorodychne are false.[5] ISW will continue to monitor the situation and try to fill information gaps in this area.

Russian forces continued to shell settlements northwest of Slovyansk and southwest of Izyum on July 27.[6] Russian forces have also shelled Chepil, about 60 km northwest of Slovyansk between Kharkiv City and Izyum.[7] Russian forces previously conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force in the Chepil area on July 26, and the shelling may indicate that Russian forces seek to set conditions to advance into the settlement.[8]

Russian forces attempted limited ground assaults east of Siversk on July 27 but did not make any new territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to attack Verkhnokamyanske (about 8 km east of Siversk) from the northeast.[9] Russian forces also reportedly launched an airstrike on Serebryanka (approximately 8km northeast of Siversk) and shelled settlements around Siversk.[10]

Russian forces continued to attack settlements southeast and northeast of Bakhmut and made limited territorial gains on July 27. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults on Soledar (approximately 13 km northeast of Bakhmut) from the southeastern direction.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reconnaissance-in-force attempt on Semihirya (about 16 km southeast of Bakhmut) and an attack on Berestove, situated on the T1302 Bkahmut-Lysychansk highway.[12] Geolocated footage showed that Wagner mercenaries have reached Klynove (about 12 km southeast of Bakhmut), and Russian Telegram channel Readovka claimed that Russian forces established control over Pokrovske, just northeast of Klynove.[13] Svitlodarsk City Military Administration Deputy Head Maxim Cherevko confirmed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Novoluhanske (about 20 km south of Bakhmut), and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Militia claimed full control over the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant.[14] Donetsk Oblast Administration stated that Russian forces launched a missile strike that destroyed a hotel in Bakhmut.[15]

Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations around Avdiivka or near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border on July 27.[16] LNR Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselev maintained that Russian forces began an assault on Avdiivka, however.[17]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not make any territorial gains on the Kharkiv City Axis on July 27. The Derhachi City Council reported that heavy fighting is ongoing in Tsupivka as well as near Kozacha Lopan, Dementiivka, and Velykhiy Prohhody north of Kharkiv City.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces have established pontoon bridges in unspecified areas on this axis to improve logistics.[19] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synegubov reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City’s Industrial District with S-300 anti-air systems.[20] Russian forces continued shelling along the entire line of contact.[21]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian forces struck the Russian-controlled Antonivskyi Bridge east of Kherson City overnight on July 26-27 for the third time in ten days.[22] Ukrainian forces launched eight projectiles at the Antonivskyi vehicle bridge and two projectiles at the Antonivskyi railway bridge, 6 km east up the Dnipro River from the vehicle bridge.[23] Russian-backed Kherson Oblast Administration Deputy Kirill Stremousov announced that the vehicle bridge is closed to all traffic and that the rail bridge also sustained damage.[24] Images and footage of the strike aftermath show damage across the entire width of the vehicle bridge, likely rendering the bridge inoperable.[25] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian air defense shot down ten Ukrainian Vilkha and HIMARS projectiles over Antonivka and Brilivka, likely referring to the bridge strikes, but footage of the strikes shows Russian air defense systems only activating after the Ukrainian strikes landed.[26]

Russian forces attempted a limited ground assault on the Southern Axis on July 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted an assault in the Bilohirka, Kherson Oblast, area, southwest of Davydiv Brid, but withdrew.[27] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian stronghold in Andriivka, 15 km southwest of Davydiv Brid, and fully retook the settlement.[28] Russian forces reportedly struck Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, with up to 40 Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) projectiles from positions in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, overnight on July 26-27.[29] Russian forces also struck industrial infrastructure, repair enterprises, and residential areas in Mykolaiv City on July 27.[30] Russian forces continued shelling along the entire line of contact.[31]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) continued to establish volunteer battalions throughout Russia for deployment to Ukraine. The Mari El Republic (an ethnic republic established for the indigenous Mari people and situated north of Kazan) formed and deployed two volunteer battalions named “Iden” and “Poltysh” to training grounds on July 27 and is currently forming a third battalion named “Akpatr.”[32] Yoshkar-Ola City Administration announced the recruitment for the battalions on May 30 for any man that has completed nine grades of schooling (middle school).[33] Local media outlets reported that recruits will receive over 300,000 rubles (approximately $5,050) per month and that families may receive five million rubles (approximately $84,200) if the serviceman dies in combat.[34] Russian Telegram channel “Mozhem Obyasnit” collected statements from men and their relatives from Moscow, Kemerovo Oblast, Tyumen, and Lipetsk Oblast who reported receiving recruitment calls attempting to persuade them to enlist in the “Sobyaninskiy Polk” Moscow-based volunteer battalion.[35] Some responders reported receiving aggressive recruitment calls after signing up for public employment services, while other formerly conscripted men were falsely told that they had already signed military contracts, despite not entering the military service after their conscription period. Such a country-wide call for recruits for the “Sobyaninskiy Polk” likely indicates that Russian forces are facing challenges in recruiting personnel for the Moscow volunteer battalion. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) intercepted a call with a Chechen fighter from “Vostok” (presumably the newly-formed “Vostok Akhmat”) battalion, which likely confirms that some elements of certain volunteer battalions have deployed to Ukraine.[36]

The Kremlin continues to show preference for some ethnic groups over others during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which may spark ethnic unrest in Russia. Ukrainian Deputy Justice Minister Olena Vysotska said that the Kremlin prioritizes returning Chechen fighters in prisoner exchanges but is not as interested in exchanging personnel from the Buryatia Republic or the Far East.[37] Vysotska added that the Kremlin shows almost no consideration for the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) prisoners of war. YouTube channel “The People of Baikal” reported that Buryatia has lost at least 208 servicemen in combat as of July 1, and the channel’s criticism indicates the formation of some region and ethnicity-based opposition platforms in Russia.[38]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Ukrainians in occupied territories are refusing to collaborate with Russian occupation officials en masse, forcing the Kremlin to import Russian citizens to fulfill basic tasks. Russian officials continue to struggle to procure enough labor to reopen businesses, clear rubble, or establish occupation bureaucracies in occupied Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 26 that the three branches of the Russian Promsvyazbank failed to open as expected in Kherson Oblast because insufficient numbers of Ukrainian civilians agreed to work there—Promsvyazbank and other financial institutions are key to the Kremlin’s plans to replace the hryvnia with the ruble in occupied Ukrainian territories.[39] The Kremlin has begun to transfer Russian government officials into new roles in occupied Ukrainian oblasts; the Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 26 that the Kremlin appointed former Moscow Deputy Head of Criminal Investigations Department Oleg Koltunov as the head of the Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Administration’s Ministry of Internal Affairs.[40] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian authorities have insufficient medical personnel in Luhansk Oblast because locals refuse to cooperate, forcing the Kremlin to import Russian doctors from Novosibirsk and Volgograd on a rotational basis.[41]

Russian occupation officials are likely leveraging food aid and other humanitarian assistance to force occupied populations to cooperate with and work for Russian occupiers. The Mariupol City Council announced on July 27 that Russian forces stopped providing humanitarian assistance to Mariupol residents to force residents to demine and clear rubble on behalf of the occupation administration in exchange for food, as ISW forecasted in June.[42]

Russian occupation officials are additionally continuing to mobilize faux grassroots movements to set conditions for a falsified referendum on the Russian annexation of occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 26 that Russian public relations specialists and political technologists have deployed to occupied Melitopol.[43] The center reported that their first objective is to create a public movement called “We Are Together with Russia” to rally in support of the falsified referendum that occupation officials likely aim to hold as soon as September. The GUR reported on July 26 that occupation forces released a 14-page booklet for pro-Russian supporters and collaborators in Ukraine entitled “Handbook for Ukrainian Citizens on Organizing Resistance to the Kyiv Puppet Government.”[44] The guide advises pro-Russian Ukrainians to disrupt general societal functioning in many ways, including by giving confusing and illogical answers when asked for advice, conducting Ukrainian conversations slowly to force the interlocutor to offer to switch to Russian, inserting anecdotes to distract from decision-making conversations, not reporting signs of corruption, using extra medicine, creating superfluous documents and requests, and spending more time in the bathroom at work.[45]

---

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372408655072219

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/371713048475113

[5] https://t.me/stranaua/54684

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372408655072219; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372041931775558

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372041931775558;

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372041931775558; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372408655072219

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372408655072219

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372408655072219

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372041931775558

[13] https://t.me/grey_zone/14455; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1552273677718372358; https://twitter.com/rollowastaken/status/1552281940711116802; https://readovka.news/news/105872

[14] https://freeradio.com dot ua/boiovyky-zakhopyly-novoluhanske-na-donechchyni/; https://t.me/millnr/9165

[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L8VmPKF1C08; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1552150460248858625

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372408655072219; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372041931775558

[17] https://t.me/denazi_UA/16441

[18] https://t.me/der_rada/2107

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372041931775558

[20] https://t.me/synegubov/3780

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372041931775558; https://t.me/synegubov/3779; https://t.me/der_rada/2107; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372408655072219

[22] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/16280; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/726 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/725; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0HkdUSUZceJWj51JS485LisQX6Qx2ndrAyxWv8KUjuv9SbVbfWwx21TYvQvM9ZnuMl&id=100011135681468

[23] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1552225314092113921;

[24] https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1552140308351270917; https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1552184809522401280; https://t.me/tass_agency/148442; https://t.me/tass_agency/148449

[25] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1552174291919466496; https://t.me/Ratnik2nd/3951; https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1552200437767585800; https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1552203134734417920

[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/17974;

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372041931775558

[28] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2351507905003011

[29] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1387; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1013308262673127

[30] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1013308262673127; https://t.me/stranaua/54627

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372408655072219; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/372041931775558; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/10901; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/725; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1907

[32] https://yocity12 dot com/news/obshchestvo/v-mariy-el-sozdali-dva-natsbatalona-dlya-opravki-na-spetsoperatsiyu-v-ukrainu/

[33] https://yocity12 dot com/news/obshchestvo/zhitelyam-mariy-el-predlagayut-300-tysyach-za-mesyats-uchastiya-v-spetsoperatsii/

[34] https://yocity12 dot com/news/obshchestvo/v-mariy-el-sozdali-dva-natsbatalona-dlya-opravki-na-spetsoperatsiyu-v-ukrainu/

[35] https://t.me/mozhemobyasnit/13091

[36] https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=98&v=ULNSzjVjFjk&feature=emb_title&ab_channel=%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%83%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%9C%D0%9E%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B8; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/chechenska-i-afhanska-iaselky-rashyst-nynishniu-viinu-z-poperednimy.html

[37] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-minyust-rf-obmin-polonenymy/31962110.html

[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NlaaSLBFps0; https://www.ft.com/content/e98976cd-27e2-455d-806a-fe1618b86cb5

[39] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov dot ua/2022/07/26/v-hersoni-cherez-nestachu-kolaborantiv-ne-zmogly-povnoczinno-zapraczyuvaty-viddilennya-okupaczijnogo-banku/

[40] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov dot ua/2022/07/26/ochilnykom-policziyi-na-okupovanij-chastyni-zaporizkoyi-oblasti-stav-slidchyj-z-moskvy/

[41] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov dot ua/2022/07/26/rosiyany-zvozyat-medykiv-na-luganshhynu-cherez-vidmovu-misczevyh-z-nymy-spivpraczyuvaty/

[42] https://t.me/mariupolrada/10350; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13

[43] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov dot ua/2022/07/26/rosiyany-pochaly-shukaty-masovku-dlya-legalizacziyi-referendumu-na-pivdni/

[44] https://gur dot gov dot ua/content/v-rf-vypustyly-spetsialnyi-dovidnyk-dlia-prorosiiskykh-zradnykiv-i-kolaborantiv.html

[45] https://gur dot gov dot ua/content/v-rf-vypustyly-spetsialnyi-dovidnyk-dlia-prorosiiskykh-zradnykiv-i-kolaborantiv.html