UA-69458566-1

Tuesday, December 31, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 31, 2024

 Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan

December 31, 2024, 7:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on December 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW and CTP will not publish a campaign assessment (or maps) tomorrow, January 1, in observance of the New Year holiday. Coverage will resume on January 2.

Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers, largely comprised of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, at a reported cost of over 420,000 casualties in 2024. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on December 30 that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024.[1] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced 4,168 square kilometers in 2024, indicating that Russian forces have suffered approximately 102 casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized. ISW previously observed that Russian forces gained 2,356 square kilometers in exchange for an estimated 125,800 casualties during a period of intensified Russian offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024.[2] Russian forces made 56.5 percent of their 2024 territorial gains during the September through November 2024 period. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on December 24 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024, suggesting that Russia is likely recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recently high casualty rates one for one.[3]

Russian advances have slowed in December 2024, however. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained 593 square kilometers or 18.1 square kilometers per day in December 2024, while the number of daily Russian casualties in December 2024 remained similar to the estimated daily casualty rate in November 2024. The Ukrainian General Staff reported a daily Russian personnel casualty average of 1,585 in December 2024, marking a fourth all-time high of Russia's daily casualty rate following reports that Russia's average daily Russian personnel casualty reached a new all-time high of 1,523 casualties per day in November 2024.[4] Russian forces were advancing at the notably higher rate of 27.96 square kilometers per day in November 2024.[5] Syrskyi stated on December 30 that Russian forces have suffered 1,700 casualties per day over the past week (since December 23), indicating the Russian forces may have suffered an even higher casualty rate in the last few weeks of 2024 even as Russian advances slowed.[6] The Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear if the Russian military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to decline as Russian forces continue to advance on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.

The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in 2024 but failed to accomplish these goals. Intensified Russian offensive operations in early 2024 resulted in the seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024 and subsequent Russian advances west of Avdiivka in the directions of Pokrovsk and Selydove throughout spring, summer, and fall 2024.[7] Russian forces also launched a largely unsuccessful offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast aimed at creating an unspecified "buffer zone" to defend Belgorod City from Ukrainian shelling in May 2024 and renewed offensive operations near Toretsk and west and southwest of Donetsk City in June and July 2024.[8] Western and Ukrainian sources assessed in 2023 and 2024 that Russia intended to seize the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk by the end of 2024, but Russia's slow advances in early and mid-2024 likely prompted the Russian military command to reassess and identify the seizure of Pokrovsk as Russian forces' primary offensive effort for the remainder of 2024.[9]

Russian forces thus turned back to the Pokrovsk direction in late Summer and early Fall 2024 amid a surprise Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and successfully exploited the seizure of Selydove and Vuhledar to make further advances around Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and later Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently seized Kurakhove and are attempting to envelop Velyka Novosilka from the north and south.[10] Russian forces heavily relied on platoon-, company-, and battalion-sized mechanized assaults to advance in the open fields in the Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions in recent months but consistently incurred significant armored vehicles losses during these assaults.[11] Russian forces are currently attempting to envelop Pokrovsk from the south and northeast but have thus far failed to make significant recent progress in this effort.[12] Russian forces may also at least temporarily be shifting their focus from the envelopment of Pokrovsk to making opportunistic advances due west towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border during a critical moment of Russia's ongoing efforts to undermine Western support for Ukraine.[13]

Russian forces have seized four mid-sized settlements - Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove - in all of 2024, the largest of which had a pre-war population of just over 31,000 people. Russian forces' rate of advance largely stalled around the few more urban settlements that Russian forces sought to take in 2024. Russian forces expended roughly four months in seizing Avdiivka in late 2023 and early 2024 and two months each on efforts to seize and envelop Selydove and Kurakhove in 2024. Russian forces also incurred significant personnel losses during efforts to take these settlements, and Ukrainian officials have recently estimated that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two weeks in mid-December 2024.[14] ISW has not assessed that any of the settlements that Russian forces seized in 2024 are operationally significant, as seizing these settlements has not allowed Russian forces to threaten any notable Ukrainian defensive nodes, and Russian forces have failed to conduct the kind of rapid, mechanized maneuver necessary to convert these tactical gains into deep penetrations of Ukraine's rear. ISW currently assesses that Russian forces must capture approximately 8,559 square kilometers, which include significant Ukrainian defensive positions and large cities along Ukraine's fortress belt, to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces would require just over two years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at their 2024 rates of advance, assuming that all their advances were confined to Donetsk, that they can seize large urban areas as easily as small villages and fields, and that the Ukrainians do not conduct any significant counterattacks in Donetsk.

Ukrainian forces have yet to stop Russian forces from advancing in their priority sectors, however, and Western aid remains critical to Ukraine's ability to stabilize the frontline in 2025. Ukrainian defenders have largely stalled Russian advances near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, but Russian forces continue to make gradual, grinding advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions. Ongoing Ukrainian manpower constraints and morale issues are also creating vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive lines, and Ukrainian officials must address these issues and steel defenders against Russian infantry assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine.[15] Russian forces, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, are currently operating under a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces can indefinitely advance in Ukraine but fails to account for the possibility that Ukrainian forces could inflict losses sufficient to stall or stop future Russian offensive operations.[16] Ukrainian forces, with support from Ukraine's Western allies, must therefore work to integrate Ukrainian drone operations, sufficiently resourced artillery and long-range strike capabilities, and committed Ukrainian infantry units to defend against Russian advances and undermine Putin's theory of victory in 2025.

Russian President Vladimir Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" during his New Year's address on December 31 - signaling the Kremlin's continued efforts to militarize Russian society and maintain regime stability by appeasing the growing Russian veteran community.[17] Putin claimed that the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" will honor current Russian servicemen, the 80th Anniversary of the Second World War, and other veterans who fought for Russia. Putin approved a list of instructions for the Russian government on December 20 that aims to expand Russia's network of military-patriotic educational programs as part of his "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" policies.[18] Putin will likely also continue to expand and institutionalize additional support programs for veterans as part of the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," many of which the Kremlin began in 2023 and 2024 likely out of a concern that an ever-growing number of dissatisfied Russian veterans could threaten the stability of Putin's regime. Putin notably created and significantly expanded the functions of Russia's Defenders of Fatherland State Fund in 2023 and 2024, which pledges to support Russian veterans who fought in Ukraine.[19] Putin also introduced the "Time of Heroes" state-wide initiative in Spring 2024, which aims to install Kremlin-selected Russian veterans into positions of power within the Russian government and business sector, and Russian authorities have already appointed two participants of this program to lead two major Russian military-patriotic institutions.[20] Putin also passed numerous decrees offering veterans subsidies and benefits throughout 2024 and will likely continue to do so in 2025 - despite the increasing costs of such policies - to ensure that the veteran community does not harbor grievances against the Kremlin and its war effort in Ukraine.[21] Putin's commitment to initiatives such as the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" and other support efforts for veterans are increasingly committing Russia to long-term financial obligations.

Ukrainian naval drones reportedly downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea, reportedly marking the first time that a naval drone has shot down an air target. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 31 that it destroyed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter using the R-73 "Sea Dragon" missiles launched from a Magura V5 naval strike drone in the Black Sea.[22] The GUR noted that Ukrainian naval drones damaged another Russian Mi-8 helicopter but that the damaged helicopter eventually landed at an airfield. The GUR stated that the naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters marked the historic first destruction of an aerial target with a naval drone. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhayev claimed that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian aerial drones and two naval drones over and in the Black Sea overnight on December 31, but did not acknowledge the downing of the Mi-8 helicopter.[23] Russian milbloggers expressed concerns that Ukraine's ability to incorporate Ukrainian naval drones as part of Ukraine's air defense capabilities will complicate Russia's efforts to destroy Ukrainian naval drones, as Russia relies on helicopters and Su-30SM fighter jets to target naval drones that are far from Crimea's shore.[24] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces also destroyed a Russian Tor air defense system in southern Ukraine, and a local Crimean source claimed that Ukrainian forces may have struck a Tor air defense system near occupied Kozacha Bay (southwest of Sevastopol).[25]

Ukrainian forces struck the Yarsevskaya oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and a building used by the Russian military in Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 and 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 31 that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) launched drone strikes against the Yarsevskaya oil depot, resulting in a series of intense explosions, heavy smoke, and oil tanks catching on fire near the depot.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the nearby oil refinery supplied the Russian war effort. Russian authorities confirmed that Ukrainian drones struck the oil refinery in Yarsevsky Raion, resulting in an oil spill and fire at the refinery.[27] Yartsevsky Raion Head Roman Zakharov confirmed the Ukrainian drone strike on social media but later deleted the post and amplified Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin's claim that the debris from downed Ukrainian drones resulted in a fire at the oil refinery.[28] Russian opposition outlet Astra, citing unnamed sources, reported that Ukrainian forces launched at least six Storm Shadow missile against a building used by Russian forces in Lgov on December 30.[29] Astra reported that the strike killed eight Russian servicemembers, wounded several Russian servicemembers, and wounded one civilian. Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an apartment building in Lgov.[30]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers, largely comprised of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, at a reported cost of over 420,000 casualties in 2024.
  • The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in 2024 but failed to accomplish these goals.
  • Russian forces have seized four mid-sized settlements - Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove - in all of 2024, the largest of which had a pre-war population of just over 31,000 people.
  • Russian forces would require just over two years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at their 2024 rates of advance, assuming that all their advances were confined to Donetsk, that they can seize large urban areas as easily as small villages and fields, and that the Ukrainians do not conduct any significant counterattacks in Donetsk.
  • Ukrainian forces have yet to stop Russian forces from advancing in their priority sectors, however, and Western aid remains critical to Ukraine's ability to stabilize the frontline in 2025.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" during his New Years' address on December 31 - signaling the Kremlin's continued efforts to militarize Russian society and maintain regime stability by appeasing the growing Russian veteran community.
  • Ukrainian naval drones reportedly downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea, reportedly marking the first time that a naval drone has shot down an air target.
  • Ukrainian forces struck the Yarsevskaya oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and a building used by the Russian military in Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 and 31.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
  • The Russian government will deprive prisoners who volunteer to fight in Ukraine of the one-time enlistment bonus starting January 1, 2025, marking another instance of Russia trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of war.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in Ukraine's salient on December 31. Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) published later geolocated footage on December 31 that indicates that Ukrainian forces seized Kruglenkoye (southeast of Korenevo) and reported that Ukrainian forces established positions in a settlement previously held by North Korean and Russian forces in Kursk Oblast, likely referring to Kruglenkoye.[31] Geolocated footage published on December 30 shows that Ukrainian forces also advanced east of Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha) along the 38K-024 highway.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced from Russkaya Konopelka to Agronom (both east of Sudzha), where Russian forces are currently attacking, and to the outskirts of Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are 2.5 kilometers away from Sudzha.[34]  Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[35] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Korenevsky Raion.[36]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the international border north of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan, north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi, and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on December 30 and 31 but did make any confirmed advances.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kreminna amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 31. Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[38] Additional geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Terny.[39] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces currently control 90 percent of Terny.[40] The Ukrainian Khortytsya Group of Forces reported on December 31 that Russian forces conducted a roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Nova Kruhlyakivka (west of Svatove).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that poor weather conditions, including rain and fog, are complicating Russian operations along both banks of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction.[42] Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Zahryzove, Lozova, Stepova Novoselivka, and Kruhlyakivka; west of Svatove near Zeleny Hai, Kopanky, Pershotravneve, Novoyehorivka, and Nadiya; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Ivanivka, Druzhelyubivka, Cherneshchyna, Novoserhiivka, and Terny; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova and Hryhorivka; and west of Kreminna near Yampolivka on December 30 and 31.[43] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Hrekivka (northwest of Kreminna).[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk amid continued offensive operations in the area on December 31. Geolocated footage published on December 24 indicates that Russian forces likely seized Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 31 that Russian forces are advancing towards a water reservoir just east of Siversk and that Russian forces advanced 900 meters along a railway south of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[46] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on December 30 and 31.[47]

Russian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on December 31. Geolocated footage published on December 27 indicates that Russian forces advanced to Lermontova Street in northern Chasiv Yar.[48] Russian forces attacked within Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on December 30 and 31.[49] Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on December 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked within Toretsk and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on December 30 and 31.[51] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on December 31 that Russian forces conducted a roughly company-sized mechanized assault in the direction of Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk).[52] Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on December 31. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on December 31 that Russian forces seized Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and a Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.[54] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized Vozdvyzhenka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced along the railway line toward Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[55] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Myrolyubivka, Zelene Pole, and Promin; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Vovkove, Kotlyne, Solone, Pishchane, Novovasylivka, Novoolenivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, Novovasylivka, and Ukrainka on December 30 and 31.[56] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 329th and 80th tank regiments, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD), and 74th and 55th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA, CMD) are operating in the Pishchane-Kotlyne area and Novoolenivka-Novoyelyzavetivka area.[57]

Russian forces recently advanced into the western outskirts of the Kurakhivska Thermal Power Plant (TPP) just west of Kurakhove but it is unlikely that Russian forces have seized the entire TPP. Geolocated footage published on December 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into the western outskirts of the TPP.[58] ISW assesses that Russian forces likely advanced into the western outskirts of the TPP from positions in Stari Terny (northwest of Kurakhove and the TPP), as it is unlikely that Ukrainian forces held significantly fortified positions along the western shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir. A Russian source claimed on December 31 that Russian forces have encircled the Ukrainian grouping in the TPP and nearby industrial zone and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the western shore of the reservoir, further indicating that Russian forces likely advanced along the western shore of the reservoir and hold positions in both the eastern and western outskirts of the TPP.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) participated in the advance into the TPP and insinuated that Russian forces advanced to the western outskirts of the TPP from the outskirts of Kurakhove and have seized most of the TPP.[60] Ukrainian forces may maintain positions in the central areas of the TPP, however, as the industrial area may provide sufficient defensible positions for Ukraine to maintain a limited defense in the area. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may attempt to outflank Ukrainian positions at the TPP by advancing south from Stari Terny, and such an advance may complicate Ukraine's ability to supply positions at the TPP and complicate future Ukrainian withdrawals from the TPP.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in other areas of the Kurakhove direction on December 31. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th and 5th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) recently advanced from Stari Terny towards Shevchenko (both northwest of Kurakhove) and either partially or completely seized Shevchenko.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kurakhove and have seized most of Shevchenko.[63] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kurakhove direction reported that Russian forces have been using civilian vehicles to transport infantry to frontline positions over the last month and that Russian forces are removing the doors and rooves from these vehicles in order to transport more infantry and supplies.[64] Russian forces continued assaults in Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka, Ukrainka, Shevchenko, and Slovyanka; and west of Kurakhove near Dachne on December 30 and 31.[65] Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on December 31 but did not make any confirmed gains. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on December 31 that Russian forces conducted offensive operations with an unspecified number of armored vehicles near Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar).[67] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th and 5th motorized rifle brigades, 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are attempting to advance on Ulakly (northwest of Vuhledar) from Shevchenko in the north and Zelenivka from the south.[68] Russian forces continued attacking north of Vuhledar near Uspenivka and northwest of Vuhledar near Kostyantynopolske, Yantarne, Uspenivka, and Kostyantynopil on December 30 and 31.[69] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Ulakly (northwest of Vuhledar).[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on December 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka itself, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozlyv, southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Neskuchne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka and Novosilka on December 30 and 31.[71] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka.[72]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 30 and 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 30 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[73] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on December 30 and 31.[74] Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction, and elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Orikhiv.[75]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on December 30 and 31 but did not make any confirmed advances.[76]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on December 31 that Russian forces launched six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; one Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile and eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tula Oblast; six Kh-69 cruise missiles from Belgorod Oblast; and 40 Shaheds and decoy drones from  Bryansk and Rostov oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile, five Kh-69 cruise missiles, and 16 Shaheds; that 24 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Russian ballistic missiles struck targets in Kyiv and Sumy oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported on December 31 that Russian forces launched overnight missile and drone strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast, resulting in debris from downed drones damaging residential buildings.[78] Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Artyukh reported on December 31 that Russian forces launched a morning strike involving 13 missiles against Shostka, Sumy Oblast that damaged infrastructure and three boiler rooms.[79]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on December 31 that Ukrainian forces downed a total of 1,300 Russian missiles of various types, 11,200 strike drones, 3,200 reconnaissance drones, 40 fixed-wing aircraft, and six helicopters in 2024.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian military increased its production and use of ballistic missiles against Ukraine in 2024.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian government will deprive prisoners who volunteer to fight in Ukraine of a one-time enlistment bonus starting January 1, 2025, marking another instance of Russia trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of war.[81] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on December 28 that removed the right to a one-time enlistment bonus for Russian prisoners who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Some Russian federal subjects (regions) increased one-time enlistment payments to prisoners up to 505,000 rubles ($4,786) in Fall 2024, and Russian authorities have increased such monetary incentives in hopes of recruiting additional troops to serve in Ukraine.[82] The decree notably follows Russian President Vladimir Putin's controversial decision to change Russian policy in November 2024 guaranteeing a one-time payment of three million rubles ($28,434) to all Russian servicemen who have been wounded in combat in Ukraine since March 2022 and instead offering only an enhanced compensation of four million rubles ($37,912) to servicemen officially deemed "heavily wounded" in combat.[83] The Russian government originally introduced high enlistment bonuses for prisoners and compensation for all wounded servicemen to incentivize military recruitment after Putin decided against declaring general mobilization in Spring 2022. Financial incentives became the key pillar of the Russian military's recruitment campaign and personnel retention efforts over the past nearly three years, and ISW continues to assess that the reversal of such incentives indicates that this system is becoming economically unsustainable for the Kremlin.[84]

The Russian MoD's Main Directorate of Combat Training is reportedly failing to properly train new recruits, likely because the Russian military command urgently needs reinforcements to support grinding assaults in eastern Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that the MoD's Main Directorate of Combat Training offers a recruit training program for less than 30 days instead of the recommended 45 days.[85] The milblogger observed that the training program and its timeframes are not mandatory and that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov has not issued a decree formalizing a training program for recruits in order to avoid launching new bureaucratic processes. The milblogger noted that the lack of a formalized training program creates an environment in which training varies based on the orders of individual grouping of forces (GOF) commanders. The milblogger added that on average Russian servicemen receive about 14 to 16 days of training and that the amount of time allocated for training depends on the military command's deadline for reconstituting units and preparations for offensives. The milblogger noted that Russian units along the frontline typically look like a combination of poorly trained infantry, heavily damaged equipment, a lack of junior commanders, and greatly reduced planning capabilities.

The milblogger's account differs dramatically from the Russian MoD's description of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's naval infantry training program, which Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov inspected on December 31.[86] Belousov visited an unspecified Southern Military District (SMD) training ground where Russian recruits supposedly receive tactical fire, medical, engineering, and combat coordination training under the leadership of Russian officers with prior combat experience in Ukraine. BSF Commander Vice-Admiral Sergei Pinchuk told Belousov that recruits also receive specialized training such as using and repelling unmanned aerial systems (UAVs). Belousov also toured a UAV lab located at the training ground used for training UAV crews and testing new equipment.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://t.me/osirskiy/1012

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2024

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1864580705948184870 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19018 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19032 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19056 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19100 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19114 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19141 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19160 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19179 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19196 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19232 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19246 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19258 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19282 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19308 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19332 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19351 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19379 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19389 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19425 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19445 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19483 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19507 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19521 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19555 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19592 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19602 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19617 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19636 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19651 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19675 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19700

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024

[6] https://t.me/osirskiy/1012

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024 ;

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024

[17] https://www.ural56 dot ru/news/736043/ ; https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27649/5032481/ ; https://expert dot ru/news/vladimir-putin-v-novogodnem-obrashchenii-zayavil-chto-vse-budet-khorosho/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294220 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/12/31/putin-vystupil-s-novogodnim-obrascheniem

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2024

[19] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73775; http://www.en.kremlinru/cata dot log/persons/632/events/70823

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2024; http://www.en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/74292; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/administration/75579; https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2024/12/11/heroes-of-their-time-en

[21] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/66b5083e9a7947500d70e9cb; https://nao24 dot ru/obshestvo/43175-prezident-rossii-podpisal-ukaz-o-vyplatah-uchastnikam-svo.html; https://realnoevremya dot ru/news/314559-putin-podpisal-zakon-o-zaschite-vyplat-za-uchastie-v-svo-pri-bankrotstve

[22] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5127 ; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/istorychnyi-udar-voiny-hur-vpershe-u-sviti-znyshchyly-povitrianu-tsil-za-dopomohoiu-morskoho-drona-magura-v5.html ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1874003631730811084 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1873991746255716425

[23] https://t.me/razvozhaev/9464

[24] https://t.me/rybar/66809; https://t.me/rybar/66811; https://t.me/rusich_army/19743

[25] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0hmLex6GGe9g3JHR27W77rghCrCehe6p8rruPAA4Jmzd3oFcfsRU1fohaTvnUTfrjl; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/72467

[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19715

[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/294167 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294168

[28] https://suspilne dot media/914753-ukrainski-droni-atakuvali-naftobazu-v-smolenskij-oblasti-rf/; https://t.me/anohin67/4838 ; https://www.severreal dot org/a/neftebaza-zagorelas-v-smolenskoy-oblasti-iz-za-ataki-bpla/33258877.html

[29] https://t.me/astrapress/71487

[30] https://t.me/Hinshtein/8926

[31] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10866; https://t.me/ukr_sof/1334; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24180

[32] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1873878181914304693; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1873878184065953873; https://t.me/BoogeYmanZ/173

[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21787; https://t.me/dva_majors/61486    

[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21787

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/47492; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/66356 ;  https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1874041361634406515; https://t.me/rusich_army/19744 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149747; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/47144 https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42682    

[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21771

[37] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12183 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3320 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885

[38] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1873835253967839582; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1873818727994835060

[39] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1873836298127237573; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1873818727994835060; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7972

[40] https://t.me/rybar/66806; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149730  

[41] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885

[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/61486; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12183    

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885; https://t.me/dva_majors/61486         

[44] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/4695

[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7973; https://t.me/rubpak54/237;  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61138

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21780

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl   

[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7976; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1874125554938724459; https://t.me/slovianskbrigade/518

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885; https://t.me/wargonzo/24034    

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21771 

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885   

[52] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885

[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83668; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13199 

[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2459 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61134

[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61134; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149649 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61130

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21782

[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2458

[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7977; https://t.me/SolovievLive/306365

[59] https://t.me/vrogov/18500 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83635

[60] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30327

[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624

[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2458 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02Zr7LnehoR4XjbuAfqU5XqfxoxvrV5zJrwN4B6Q5FBPGuxmSHtNhqa4ZfVsJrjowal

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21785 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83635 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61132

[64] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/30/pid-kurahovym-vorog-vlashtovuye-shturmy-v-styli-bozhevilnyj-vanka/

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885

[66] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83629 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83628

[67] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3885

[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2458 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02Zr7LnehoR4XjbuAfqU5XqfxoxvrV5zJrwN4B6Q5FBPGuxmSHtNhqa4ZfVsJrjowal

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149730 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149659 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21785 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83635

[70] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13198

[71]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0hmLex6GGe9g3JHR27W77rghCrCehe6p8rruPAA4Jmzd3oFcfsRU1fohaTvnUTfrjl

[72] https://t.me/voin_dv/12556

[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/61486   

[74]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021FMYrdLaiN4WxKPETedj4GDY9za1xsdgY9fU23DuxbaBJmCg2cSS7yDEMJhrytFol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EgF3vWeV7pC96jZBTmdiNMEiTUkM3tbNy5xPLZwb6BGNpPMcAWfVdtku8vG6fmHGl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0hmLex6GGe9g3JHR27W77rghCrCehe6p8rruPAA4Jmzd3oFcfsRU1fohaTvnUTfrjl

[75] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6587 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83634   

[76]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NUvFea2KD3h8yzLTjEdruXe53k8ZSUcHgXkJYRz7u5i61RXkz8K41kqPQcKZ8ko4l ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0hmLex6GGe9g3JHR27W77rghCrCehe6p8rruPAA4Jmzd3oFcfsRU1fohaTvnUTfrjl  

[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/25836

[78] https://t.me/kyivoda/23985

[79]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/31/udar-po-shostczi-rosiyany-zastosuvaly-13-raket/

[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/25847

[81] http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202412300021 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/amp/7420623 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/12/31/pravitelstvo-rf-otmenilo-edinovremennye-vyplaty-zaklyuchennym-podpisavshim-kontrakt-s-minoborony-rf; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/12/31/24753260.shtml; https://t.me/idelrealii/39334 ; https://t.me/severrealii/29005; https://t.me/astrapress/71493; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21561  ; https://t.me/sotaproject/92044  

[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2024

[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024

[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024

[85] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1852

[86] https://t.me/mod_russia/47447

 

 

Iran Update, December 31, 2024

Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A new group announced its opposition to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government.[1] Armed opposition by the group—named the Syrian Popular Resistance—would likely exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and even risk driving fissures in the HTS-led coalition. The Syrian Popular Resistance in a statement on December 29 threatened to attack HTS and HTS-affiliated leaders purportedly in response to the killing of Christians, Shia, and Sunnis since overthrowing the Bashar al Assad regime.[2] The Syrian Popular Resistance labeled the HTS-led coalition as “Kharijites,” which derogatorily frames the coalition as heretical. The statement by the Syrian Popular Resistance comes as nascent opposition against HTS has appeared, especially along the Syrian coast, which is predominantly populated by the Alawite minority.[3] It is possible that the Syrian Popular Resistance is affiliated with this activity, though CTP-ISW cannot verify the exact nature and origin of the group. Growing conflict between HTS and minority and opposition groups would fuel sectarian tensions, drive an escalation cycle, and risk destabilizing Syria further. Although HTS leader Ahmed al Shara has repeatedly used tempered and inclusive rhetoric in recent weeks, he would struggle to contain such a cycle of violence given some of the extreme Salafi-jihadi and sectarian actors that constitute his coalition.

There are growing indications that Iran is trying to stoke and exploit sectarian violence in Syria. Doing so would weaken the HTS-led interim government and help reestablish the Axis of Resistance in Syria. The main outlet of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) called on December 31 for a counter-revolution in Syria, framing it as a response to the "occupation" of Syria by "takfiri terrorists."[4] This term refers to apostates and is commonly used by Iran to refer to the so-called “Islamic State” and other armed Sunni organizations. The IRGC report added that the liberation of Syria is “imminent.” This rhetoric from the IRGC marks the first time that CTP-ISW has observed Iran appearing to call for a revolt against the HTS-led interim government. Rhetoric from Iranian leaders and state media has until this point ambiguously called for the formation of armed resistance in Syria but would often mention resistance to Israeli ground operations in southwestern Syria in the same breath. That the main outlet of the IRGC made these remarks is especially noteworthy given that regional sources have claimed that the IRGC is planning to organize, direct, and support new proxy and partner militia networks in Syria. It is also noteworthy that the IRGC report comes around the same time that the Syrian Popular Resistance announced its formation and opposition to the HTS-led interim government. Iranian state media has previously reported on the formation of armed resistance against HTS in positive terms.[5] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately stated on December 31 that "a new resistance has been born [in Syria] that will manifest itself in the coming years" during a meeting with the Omani foreign affairs minister.[6]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to clash in northern and northeastern Syria on December 31. The SDF mourned a fighter that died in clashes near Qara Qozak bridge on December 31, indicating that fighting has persisted there.[7] Anti-SDF media claimed that the SDF and SNA continued to clash west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[8] An SDF media official reported that SNA forces in Manbij City attacked the SDF with heavy artillery near a town that is 15 km southwest of Manbij City on December 30.[9] Anti-SDF media also claimed that the SNA fired artillery at SDF positions near Kobani on December 31.[10] US Defense Department deputy press secretary said on December 30 that the ceasefire between Turkey and SDF continued to hold around Kobani, where Turkish forces have reportedly massed along the Syria-Turkey border.[11]

The HTS-led Military Operations Department continued to clash with pro-Assad elements that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm. Syrian media reported small arms fire during a Military Operations Room raid in northern Damascus that is generally considered loyal to the former Assad regime on December 31.[12] Other sources disputed the account of clashes and said that the HTS-affiliated forces only entered the suburb to detain three gunmen when called by neighborhood officials.[13] HTS-affiliated forces operated against former regime elements in other Damascus neighborhoods without reports of small arms fire as well.[14] The Damascus clashes appear to have been isolated and minor, if they even occurred at all, especially compared to the interim government’s deployment to coastal Syria during which it used attack helicopters against pro-regime fighters.[15] The HTS-led Military Operations Department additionally imposed a curfew in Talbiseh, north of Homs City, during an operation to detain former regime fighters.[16]

An unspecified Israeli official speaking to Israeli media expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the US-led international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen.[17] The official emphasized the threat that the Houthis pose to international security and shipping and that the international coalition should ”confront and eliminate this threat.” The Israeli official also emphasized that the Houthis should not be underestimated due to their advanced technologies and intent to threaten Israel, international shipping, and other regional targets, including Saudi Arabia.

These Israeli comments come amid continued US airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed US airstrikes targeting Houthi command-and-control sites and military infrastructure on December 30 and 31.[18] Houthi media confirmed two US airstrikes hit around al Tuhayta, south of Hudaydah on December 30, 10 airstrikes hit the 22nd May military complex and two airstrikes hit al Arad military complex, both in Sanaa.[19] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis tried to preempt the US airstrikes by firing a drone and seven cruise missiles at the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier.[20] CENTCOM intercepted these projectiles and destroyed a Houthi coastal radar site.[21]

Sarea also claimed the Houthis fired two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion airport and a power station south of Jerusalem in central Israel on December 31.[22] An Israeli war correspondent confirmed that a Houthi ballistic missile fragment crashed in Beit Shemesh, near Jerusalem, late on December 30 but did not cause any major damage.[23] The IDF intercepted a missile from Yemen before it entered Israeli airspace, and sirens sounded across central Israel to warn of falling debris.[24]

Key Takeaways:

  • Syria: A new group announced its opposition to the HTS-led interim government. Armed opposition by the group—named the Syrian Popular Resistance—would likely exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and even risk driving fissures in the HTS-led coalition. There are growing indications that Iran is trying to stoke and exploit sectarian violence in Syria. Doing so would weaken the HTS-led interim government and help reestablish the Axis of Resistance in Syria.
  • Yemen: An unspecified Israeli official speaking to Israeli media expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the US-led international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. These comments come amid continued US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.
  • Gaza Strip:  The IDF Air Force killed a Hamas special operations forces (SOF) commander in the humanitarian area of Khan Younis on December 31. Palestinian fighters returned to their regular tempo and method of attacks in Jabalia refugee camp on December 31.
  • Lebanon:  Lebanese and Lebanese Hezbollah media reported IDF shelling around Chebaa, southeastern Lebanon, on December 31. The IDF 91st Division continued to operate in southeastern Lebanon on December 31. A senior IDF Northern Command officer told Israeli media on December 31 that Israel is prepared for all possibilities in Lebanon, including extending the presence of the IDF beyond the ceasefire’s stipulations.

Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF Air Force killed a Hamas special operations forces (SOF) commander in the humanitarian area of Khan Younis on December 31. The IDF stated that Abdalhadi Sabbah commanded Hamas Nukhba SOF fighters in the Western Khan Younis Battalion.[25]  Sabbah participated in the October 7, 2023, attack into Israel and continued to attack the IDF in the Gaza Strip.[26] The IDF stated that it took steps to minimize collateral damage from the strike within the humanitarian zone.[27] The IDF Air Force separately confirmed that it killed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) rocket commander who was responsible for the northern Gaza Strip in early December 2024.[28]

Palestinian fighters returned to their regular tempo and method of attacks in Jabalia refugee camp on December 31. Hamas and PIJ attacked IDF 162nd Division armor in Jabalia on December 31 in two small-scale, isolated incidents.[29] The militias used explosively formed penetrators, rocket-propelled grenades and other high-powered improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack the IDF.[30] These attacks come after Palestinian fighters conducted a relatively large multi-wave attack targeting the IDF around Jabalia refugee camp in groups that ranged from six to 30 fighters on December 30.[31] This attack was noteworthy given it was significantly larger than most other militia operations in the Gaza Strip in recent months; fighters have typically operated in small squads rather than as a small company.

Three Palestinian militia mortared the IDF around the Netzarim Corridor, south of Gaza City, on December 31.[32]

Palestinian militias conducted a rocket attack into southern Israel on December 31. The IDF announced that it intercepted a single rocket that crossed from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.[33] No militia has claimed the attack at the time of this writing.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

  • End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

Lebanese and Lebanese Hezbollah media reported IDF shelling around Chebaa, southeastern Lebanon, on December 31.[34] The IDF began operating in the area in early November 2024. [35]

The IDF 91st Division continued to operate in southeastern Lebanon on December 31.[36] The IDF 769th Brigade located a warehouse in Wadi al Saluqi, containing a significant number of weapons, including unspecified launchers, missiles, and IEDs. The IDF also located rocket launchers, IEDs, small arms, missiles, observation devices, and tactical combat equipment in nearby buildings. IDF 769th Brigade Commander Avraham Marciano noted that a 120-mm mortar was ready target Israeli villages along Ramim ridge. The IDF last operated around Wadi al Saluqi on December 19, according to local reports.[37] Lebanese media reported on December 31 that the IDF detonated explosives and conducted a drone strike in Bani Hayyan, southeastern Lebanon.[38] Hezbollah media reported on December 20 that the IDF withdrew from Bani Hayyan after entering the town on December 11.[39]

Hezbollah media reported on December 31 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL deployed to Chama, southwestern Lebanon, after the IDF withdrew from the town.[40] The LAF reported that the next phase of deployment will include specialized units conducting an engineering survey of the town to remove unexploded ordinances.[41]  

A senior IDF Northern Command officer told Israeli media on December 31 that Israel is prepared for all possibilities in Lebanon, including extending the presence of the IDF beyond the ceasefire’s stipulations.[42] The officer added that the LAF will face “significant challenges” in deploying forces to meet the ceasefire’s requirements. The LAF and UNIFIL have already deployed to multiple towns in southern Lebanon to backfill the IDF since the ceasefire went into effect on November 27.[43] A Hezbollah politician and a Hezbollah-affiliated journalist separately threatened on December 31 that Hezbollah would act if the IDF extended its presence in Lebanon beyond the ceasefire’s terms.[44]The IDF is required to withdraw from Lebanon by January 25, 2025.[45]

Lebanese media reported on December 31 that Hezbollah politician Ihab Hamadeh threatened that Hezbollah will “exercise its national duty” if Israel uses its ground operations into Syria to threaten Lebanon from the east.[46] Israel first began operations within the Israel-Syria disengagement zone on December 8 to protect Israel from possible instability in Syria amid the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime.[47]

Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on December 31 that the LAF has arrested over 300 Syrians who entered Lebanon illegally.[48] The LAF reportedly arrested 314 Syrians in the north and 15 Syrians in Bekaa Valley. The LAF separately arrested 60 individuals and an unspecified number of Palestinians and Syrian individuals for various drug and weapons-related charges throughout northern Lebanon, Beruit’s southern suburbs, and Bekaa Valley.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Faud Hussein and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Assad al Shaibani agreed to bolster Iraqi-Syrian coordination against the so-called “Islamic State” during a phone call on December 30.[49] Hussein also expressed interest in resuming the operations of the Iraqi embassy in Damascus. Iraqi embassy staff left Damascus in early December for Lebanon due to insecurity in Syria.[50]

Lebanese Hezbollah Central Council member Hassan al Baghdadi met with unspecified Iranian-backed Afghan Fatemiyoun Division commanders in Mashhad in northeastern Iran.[51] Baghdadi emphasized that Israel is ”increasingly powerless” against the Axis of Resistance and reaffirmed the Axis of Resistance‘s commitment to continue fighting to destroy Israel.[52]

Iranian Law Enforcement Command Border Guard Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Ali Goudarzi met with Iraqi Border Forces Commander Lieutenant General Mohammed Abdul Wahab Sekr in Marivan in northwestern Iran on December 31.[53] Goudarzi highlighted agreements reached on enhanced intelligence exchanges, sharing expertise, coordinated patrols, and conducting joint exercises, aimed at preventing drug trafficking, illegal migration, arms smuggling, and terrorist activities.[54]

Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi paid an official visit to Iran on December 30. Busaidi met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in Tehran.[55] All three Iranian officials told al Busaidi that, according to the orders of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran has refrained from changing its policy of prohibiting the production and use of nuclear weapons. These meetings come as Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program and senior Iranian officials have discussed the possibility of reversing this policy.[56]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on December 31 to discuss efforts to address inflation, the devaluation of the Iranian currency, and energy shortages.[57] Pezeshkian stated that discussions included using subsidies to help consumers, fostering economic cooperation with neighboring countries, and energy conservation efforts.[58]

The United States sanctioned IRGC subsidiary Cognitive Design Production Center (CDPC), which specializes in influence operations, for trying to interfere in the 2024 US presidential election.[59] CDPC has specifically tried inciting political tensions among US voters since 2023.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


[1] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/4918

[2] https://t.me/syria_mukawama/4918

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-28-2024

[4] https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/22592

[5] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/716172

[6] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85705540/

[7] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1874043118372139448

[8] https://t.me/sohebb1993/20657 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131554

[9] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1873835888045863175 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1873840861307691129

[10] https://t.me/sohebb1993/20656

[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-fears-military-buildup-by-turkey-signals-preparations-for-incursion-into-syria-1c2e88e9 ; https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4018066/pentagon-deputy-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-hosts-press-gaggle/

[12] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131555 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1874016196107845874 ; https://www.instagram.com/asharqnews/reel/DEQFRD8CxsN/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B2/743219/

[13] https://t.me/damascusv011/27150

[14] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1874092552909169149 ; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1874111877586051432

[15] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate122824

[16] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1873996556933968137

[17] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/israel-pushing-international-coalition-as-solution-to-houthi-threat-official-says/

[18] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1874089194030567561

[19] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1873832533340918020; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1874077114376532414

[20] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1873982038560436696 ;

https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1874089194030567561

[21] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1874089194030567561

[22] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1873982038560436696

[23] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1873844685673775265

[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1873841368285798869 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1873844685673775265

[25] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874146665206345734

[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874146669312508323

[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874146669312508323

[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874013236594696317

[29] https://t.me/sarayaps/19012 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/19013

[30] https://t.me/sarayaps/19012 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/19013

[31] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1873743642063495644

[32] https://t.me/sarayaps/19008 ; https://t.me/alwya2000/7232

[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1874043992897429762

[34] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126077 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/188925

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-9-2024

[36] https://www dot idf.il/261457

[37] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/109593

[38] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110368 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126096 ; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1874118706801864774

[39] https://english dot almanar.com.lb/2294987

[40] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/12978462?s=tg

[41] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1874083943546224793

[42] https://www.israelhayom dot com/2024/12/31/top-idf-commander-strategic-positions-in-lebanon-vital-for-northern-israels-defense/

[43] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/12978462?s=tg ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2024

[44] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110383 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110314

[45] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1861789420564709573

[46] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110383

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-8-2024

[48] https://al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/817986

[49] https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81-%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AB%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82

[50] https://www.barrons.com/news/iraq-evacuates-damascus-embassy-staff-to-lebanon-diplomatic-source-44ed68e4

[51] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/716412

[52] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/716412

[53] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4419678

[54] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4419678

[55] https://president dot ir/fa/156308;https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/75904;

https://tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/10/3229243

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-8-2024 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-16-2024

[57] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58808

[58] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58808

[59] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2766