Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 10, 2025

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel

May 10, 2025, 3:45 pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:45am ET on May 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 10 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 0 to 0800 on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 10 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 10. Any reports of Russian ground activity in these SITREPs are implicit accusations that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.]

 

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced following the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Kyiv on May 10 that he, European officials, and US President Donald Trump are proposing a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12.[1] Zelensky called on Russian officials to respond to the proposal and stated that Europe and the United States should impose additional sanctions on Russia's energy and banking sectors if Russia fails to agree to the ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded by claiming that Ukraine has not responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin's previous ceasefire proposals and that pressuring Russia is "useless."[2] Peskov claimed during an interview with ABC News published on May 10 that Putin supported the idea of a ceasefire but has "questions" about how a ceasefire will account for recent and possible future Russian advances in Ukraine, Ukrainian mobilization, and Western military assistance to Ukraine.[3] Peskov reiterated Putin's previous demands for the West to stop all military aid to Ukraine and force Ukraine to stop mobilizing and training servicemembers as a condition of a ceasefire. Putin criticized the initial March 13 US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal and insinuated that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive military aid.[4]

Putin, Peskov, and other Russian officials have not yet offered any comparable concessions, such as stopping Russia's own force generation and defense industrial efforts, as part of a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials appear to be trying to define the conditions of any and all ceasefires in a way that facilitates further Russian battlefield gains in the short term and supports Russia's ability to attack Ukraine again in the future. Peskov also claimed that Ukraine is trying to leverage ceasefire proposals to "escape from negotiations," questioning Trump's stated objective of using a general ceasefire as a building block to precede peace negotiations.[5]

The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with the Coalition of the Willing during a semi-virtual summit on May 10, consisting of officials from Lithuania, Romania, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Australia, Croatia, Iceland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, the European Commission, and the European Council.[6] Zelensky welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Kyiv for the summit.[7] The Coalition of the Willing and NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte expressed support for the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.[8] Macron stated that the coalition is working on a proposal to deploy a military contingent to Ukraine and that the coalition will hold a series of meetings in the coming weeks.[9] NBC News reported that Ukraine, the United States, and European partners formulated a term sheet with a list of conditions for Russia to consider.[10] The document, according to an unspecified Western official, contains 22 proposals, including the 30-day general ceasefire. Reuters reported on May 9 that a French diplomatic source stated that US and European partners are finalizing the 30-day ceasefire proposal and new sanction packages if Russia refuses the proposal.[11]

Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine. Reuters reported on May 10, citing two Western security officials and a regional official, that Iran is preparing to provide Russia with an unspecified number of Fath-360 launchers in the near future.[12] The officials stated that Russia likely intends to use these launchers with the short-range ballistic missiles that Iran provided to Russia in Fall 2024. A Ukrainian military source told The Times in September 2024 that Iran provided over 200 Fath-360 ballistic missiles to Russia.[13] US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli stated in April 2024 that Iran has provided over 400 short-range ballistic missiles and "hundreds of thousands" of artillery shells to Russia.[14] ISW has not observed reports of the Russian military launching Iranian-provided missiles against Ukraine, however. Iran began providing Russia with Shahed drones in Fall 2022, and Russia began producing and using its own Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 analogues (which Russia calls Geran-1 and Geran-2, respectively) with imported Iranian components and using Iranian production licenses as early as summer 2023.[15] Russia continues to deepen military cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Russia's use of Iranian missiles against Ukraine would mark a significant intensification of Russian-Iranian relations.[16]

The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.[17] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on May 10 that the Russian government plans to close the airspace over Volgograd and Saratov oblasts near the Kapustin Yar missile launch site in Astrakhan Oblast, where Russian forces reportedly store Oreshnik missiles, from 0600 May 12 to 1600 May 13 Moscow time.[18] Russian milbloggers asserted that the airspace closure is typical for combat and test launches of ballistic missiles and claimed that the closure suggests Russia might conduct an Oreshnik strike on Kyiv City.[19]

US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression. Deputy Head of the Verkhovna Rada's Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, Yehor Chernev, told The New York Times (NYT) in a May 10 article that Ukraine is "running low" on long-range missiles, artillery, and ballistic missile defense systems.[20] An unspecified congressional official told the NYT that the United States recently approved Germany’s transfer of 125 long-range artillery rockets and 100 Patriot air defense missiles to Ukraine. A Western intelligence official stated that the Ukrainian military has improved its ability to "ration" Patriot air defense missiles by using cheaper interceptors to target smaller threats. Patriot air defense systems are essential to maintaining Ukraine's air defense umbrella, as Soviet-era and other Western-provided air defense systems are unable to intercept Russian ballistic missiles.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing.
• The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10.
• Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine.
• The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.
• US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Alleged Ceasefire Violations
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

See text below for reported violations.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[21]

A Russian milblogger claimed on May 9 and 10 that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino and Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo) in apparent violation of the Victory Day ceasefire.[22]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[23]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 10.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued assaults in northern Sumy Oblast on May 10 but did not advance.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border guard detachment operating in northern Sumy Oblast stated on May 10 that Russian forces continued attacks along the international border with Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts and that Russian forces have intensified guided glide bomb strikes over the last two days.[24]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near the border area of Sumy Oblast.[25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 9 and 10 but did not advance.[26]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kupyansk direction on May 10.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka on May 9 and 10.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Mir and northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Hrekivka on May 9 and 10.[29] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Lypove.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 9 and 10.[31]

Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on May 10 that Russian forces have conducted up to 10 Shahed drone strikes against Slovyansk per night over the last week (between May 2 and May 9).[32] Lyakh reported that Russia is increasingly utilizing Shahed strikes against frontline settlements.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 9 that Russian forces advanced into the center of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and along windbreaks in the direction of Dyliivka (south of Chasiv Yar).[33]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Oleksandro-Shultyne on May 9 and 10.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking near Stupochky constantly over the last week.[35]

A Russian milblogger claimed on May 10 that Russian forces are splitting their focus in the Chasiv Yar direction between Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar) and Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[36] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating north of Chasiv Yar are trying to advance on Kramatorsk and Russian forces operating south of Chasiv Yar are trying to advance on Kostyantynivka.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division), the "Burevestnik" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), and the "Volga" Artillery Regiment (reportedly Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[37] Elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating toward Kostyantynivka.[38]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Toretsk.[39]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 10 that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently advanced east of Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk) and are attacking the settlement.[40] The milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced toward Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne and toward Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; southeast of Toretsk near Oleksandropil; southwest of Toretsk near Nova Poltavka, Hnativka, Yelyzavetivka, and Stara Mykolaivka, between Stara Mykolaivka and Sukha Balka, and toward Zorya and Malynivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on May 9 and 10.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 10 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Toretsk near Valentynivka.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 10 that Ukrainian forces also counterattacked in Toretsk.[43]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on May 10 that Russian forces recently intensified air strikes against Toretsk and that Russian forces continue to accumulate personnel in the Toretsk direction.[44]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[45] Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced along Tsentralna Street in southeastern Novoserhiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[46]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 9 that Russian forces advanced further south near Novoserhiivka than geolocated footage indicated.[47]

Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Promin, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Hrodivka, Lysivka, and Novotoretske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on May 9 and 10.[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka and Myrolyubivka.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 9 and 10 that Russian forces advanced in the fields southwest of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and near Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Preobrazhenka, and Nadiivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske, Bohdanivka, and Horikhove on May 9 and 10.[51] The Russian (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoolenivka and Novoserhiivka.[52]

Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov rported that Russian forces are attacking on motorcycles and in civilian cars with first-person view (FPV) drone support.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the eastern outskirts of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove) and along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway in the fields south of Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove).[54]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr and Odradne on May 9 and 10.[55] The Russian (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Oleksiivka.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Novopil, Rivnopil, and toward Zelene Pole on May 8 and 9.[57] The Russian (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelene Pole and Novopil.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Shcherbaky on May 9 and 10.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the BARS-3 "Rodina" Battalion (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[60]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 10 but did not advance.[61]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces did not conduct long-range drone or missile strikes against Ukraine on the evening of May 9 to 10 or during the day on May 10.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

---

[1] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/z-12-travnya-maye-rozpochatisya-povne-j-bezumovne-pripinenny-97701

[2] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/05/10/25748894.shtml ; https://t.me/tass_agency/314486

[3] https://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/us-european-weapons-ukraine-stop-ceasefire-putin-spokesperson-121659250 ; https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/kremlin-insists-arm-deliveries-ukraine-stop-agreeing-ceasefire/story?id=121656242

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025 ; https://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/us-european-weapons-ukraine-stop-ceasefire-putin-spokesperson-121659250 ; https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/kremlin-insists-arm-deliveries-ukraine-stop-agreeing-ceasefire/story?id=121656242

[6] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/ukrayina-gotova-shvidko-j-konstruktivno-ruhatisya-do-miru-vi-97689

[7] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1921183388947325373 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14165

[8] https://x.com/SecGenNATO/status/1921149708698788142 ; https://suspilne dot media/1014815-gensek-nato-pidtrimue-30-denne-bezumovne-pripinenna-vognu-v-ukraini/ ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/z-12-travnya-maye-rozpochatisya-povne-j-bezumovne-pripinenny-97701

[9] https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/coalition-of-the-willing-drafting-proposal-1746882890.html ; https://suspilne dot media/1014827-makron-anonsuvav-novi-zustrici-koalicii-ohocih-pro-so-tam-govoritimut-miznarodni-partneri/

[10] https://www.nbcnews.com/world/russia/russia-ukraine-war-trump-envoy-witkoff-interpreter-kremlin-rcna205878

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-europeans-finalising-30-day-ukraine-russia-ceasefire-proposal-diplomatic-2025-05-09/

[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-send-russia-launchers-short-range-missiles-sources-say-2025-05-09/

[13] https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/ballistic-clmpm3d7m

[14] https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/general_cavoli_opening_statements.pdf

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032125

[17] https://ua.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-kyiv-ukraine-may-9-2025/

[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91444 ; https://strana dot today/news/484756-rf-zakryvaet-vozdushnoe-prostranstvo-nad-polihonom-hde-ispytyvajut-oreshnik.html ; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/rosiya-zakrivae-povitryaniy-prostir-kapustinim-1746857988.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=post ; https://t.me/astrapress/80888

[19] https://t.me/rusich_army/23323 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22874

[20] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/10/world/europe/eu-ukraine-weapons.html

[21] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28078; https://t.me/OSHP_225/4988

[22] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91428 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23312 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91473 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26431 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164260

[23] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91433

[24] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xws0LfMnT3w&t=2805s; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/10/peremyrya-na-sumskomu-napryamku-vorog-syple-kabamy-a-nashi-zbyvayut-molniyi-zi-strileczkoyi-zbroyi/

[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164193

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076

[27] ttps://t.me/RVvoenkor/91480

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076

[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076

[32] https://suspilne dot media/1014531-posolstvo-ssa-poperedilo-so-rosia-gotue-masstabnu-povitranu-ataku-zelenskij-uviv-sankcii-proti-rf-1172-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746867046&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[33] https://t.me/t3mny/2272

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076

[35] https://t.me/t3mny/2272

[36] https://t.me/yurasumy/22885

[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91419; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164172

[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164234

[39] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1921110347345285197; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DJRKHT4sL_1/

[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64143

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076; https://t.me/t3mny/2272; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64143

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91430; https://t.me/wargonzo/26431

[44] https://suspilne dot media/1014531-posolstvo-ssa-poperedilo-so-rosia-gotue-masstabnu-povitranu-ataku-zelenskij-uviv-sankcii-proti-rf-1172-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746863775&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[45] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1921097153646133470; https://t.me/ewoks152bbs/203

[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9115 ; https://t.me/gostrikartuzy/950

[47] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31497

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26431 ; https://t.me/don_partizan/8226

[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543

[50] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31497 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64129

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076

[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543

[53] https://suspilne dot media/1014531-posolstvo-ssa-poperedilo-so-rosia-gotue-masstabnu-povitranu-ataku-zelenskij-uviv-sankcii-proti-rf-1172-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746862814&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9110 ; https://t.me/dumky_frontovyka/1944

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12438

[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/52543

[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076

[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164194

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FdgiQoYCZqkBk92AfYpURbvS7EuwCkzLyp4wRys7tSJ6p8TLFL5oLRrF6ggBMfMxl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24079 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24076

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/52362

Iran Update, May 9, 2025

 Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

The verbal ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis appears to only cover one of the three reported original US demands conveyed by Oman at this time.[1] The United States reportedly passed three demands to the Houthis via Oman, according to a Yemeni analyst. The three conditions required the Houthis to cease all attacks on US commercial and military vessels, stop targeting Israel, and re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap. The Houthis have followed the first condition to cease attacks on US commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, but have demonstrated that they will not comply with the second demand to stop targeting Israel.[2] The Houthis attacked Ben Gurion Airport and the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on May 9, for example (see below for more information on this attack). The Houthis could re-engage with the roadmap

The Houthis could re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap and technically follow a second of the three demands. The Houthis are unlikely to engage seriously in peace talks because the Houthis have not suffered any defeats that would force them to the negotiating table, however.[3] The roadmap includes a “political process under UN auspices” that would presumably work towards some form of power-sharing agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.[4] The Houthis are likely unwilling to engage in negotiations that would cause them to lose their control over northern Yemen because they desire to control all of Yemen and view themselves as the rightful Yemeni government. The Houthis appear to believe that the US-Houthi ceasefire is a “victory.“[5]

The Yemeni analyst stated that Saudi Arabia was “fully informed” of the US proposal and Omani mediation efforts, but the extent of the Houthi engagement with the third condition remains unclear.[6] Riyadh and the Houthis almost reached a deal before the October 7 War broke out in 2023 and have maintained communication since.[7] The timing of the US-Houthi ceasefire is particularly significant as US President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia on May 13 and 14, although Yemen is reportedly not on the agenda for his Riyadh meetings, according to the Yemeni analyst.[8]

The ambiguity surrounding the US-Houthi ceasefire will likely cause international shipping companies to exercise caution before reentering the Red Sea in greater numbers. The ceasefire only applies to US vessels, according to the reported terms, though US officials have suggested that the agreement covers all ships.[9] The Houthis have implied that they will not attack other ships. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi referred to the Houthi maritime attack campaign in the past tense on May 8, suggesting the campaign would not continue.[10] The last Houthi attack on commercial shipping was in November 2024, though the Houthis threatened to resume the attack campaign in March 2025. The Houthis may be interfering with international shipping, however. The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on May 9 that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Red Sea lasting several hours.[11] The Houthis have interfered with GPS systems in the past.[12] These disruptions, combined with the ambiguity surrounding the ceasefire, suggest that the safety of commercial shipping in this maritime corridor remains under threat.

Israeli defense officials gave conflicting information about whether the US THAAD missile defense system succeeded or failed to intercept a Houthi ballistic missile on May 9. The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport and claimed a drone attack targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area in central Israel on May 9.[13] Israeli defense officials stated on May 9 that the US THAAD system successfully intercepted the Houthi ballistic missile, but other unspecified Israeli defense sources said that the THAAD system failed to intercept the missile.[14] The unspecified Israeli defense sources said the Arrow 3 intercepted the missile.[15]

Details about the activities of senior Hezbollah commanders in northern Yemen in the early 2010s demonstrate how Iran and its allies likely share lessons, techniques, and capabilities over time.[16] Yemeni sources posted new photos and information showing Hezbollah advisers in Yemen on May 8. [17] The IDF killed both Hezbollah advisers in Fall 2024 during the campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] One Hezbollah commander, Ali Adel Ashmar, played a major role in the capture of Amran and Sanaa cities, which happened in July and September 2014, respectively.[19] This suggests that Hezbollah played a major role in advising the 2014 Houthi campaign. Hezbollah also sent Mohammad Hussein Srour, who at the time of his death was Hezbollah’s Aerial Command commander, to Yemen to support the development of Houthi missile capabilities and drone manufacturing.[20] Key Houthi commanders have now assumed an advising role with Iraqi militias that is similar to Hezbollah’s advising role in Yemen. A US airstrike killed a top Houthi drone expert outside Baghdad in July 2024, for example.[21] This demonstrates how Iran and its key proxies and partners share lessons learned, techniques, and capabilities over time and across the region. The Houthi commanders in Iraq today surely share lessons learned from their Hezbollah advisers in the 2010s, as well as the lessons the Houthis have learned over two decades of war against several different regional and international powers.

Unspecified Iranian diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands.”[22] Iranian sources added that shifting US demands on Iran’s missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance are complicating progress in the negotiations. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously stated on April 16 that “contradictory” US positions do not help the negotiations and emphasized that “Iran must hear Washington’s real stance” to assess whether a framework agreement is possible.[23] An Iranian expert close to the regime separately stated on May 1 that the fourth round of talks originally scheduled for May 3 was postponed due to “contradictory US positions.”[24] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff initially said Iran could enrich uranium to 3.67 percent, but later demanded all enrichment be stopped and eliminated.[25] Witkoff then said in a Breitbart interview on May 9 that he hoped that Iran would “voluntarily“ stop enrichment before adding that the US “red line“ is that “an enrichment program can never exist in Iran again.“[26] Araghchi confirmed on May 9 that the fourth round of talks will take place in Muscat, Oman, on May 12.[27] An Iranian Parliamentarian claimed on May 6 that the talks were postponed partly due to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi’s reported desire to join the nuclear talks as a European representative.[28] The Parliamentarian also claimed that Grossi provided reports to the United States suggesting that Iran is “very close” to a nuclear bomb.[29] Araghchi held a phone call with Grossi on May 9 to discuss cooperation between Iran and the agency and the current status of the US-Iran nuclear talks.[30] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that Iran will accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its nuclear program, as Iran views uranium enrichment as its “undeniable right” and sees giving up as a core national red line. CTP-ISW also continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to concede on its missile program, as the missile program is essential to its defense strategy, especially given the weakness of Iran’s conventional armed forces.[31]

Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi visited the Abdanan Air Defense Group in Ilam Province on May 9 to assess its combat readiness and defensive capabilities.[32] Mousavi emphasized the key role of air defense in protecting Iran’s airspace, and stressed the importance of modern training, advanced technologies. Various senior Iranian commanders including Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Haji Zadeh conducted several inspections on Iranian air defense zones in southeastern, south and western Iran in recent weeks.[33] The amount and frequency of these air defense inspections are highly unusual. Senior Iranian commanders do not typically visit so many air defense sites within such a short period of time. Iranian commanders are presumably conducting these inspections to ensure that units remain prepared for a strike.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced on May 9 that it held a conference to discuss its disarmament and will soon announce a decision of “historic importance.”[34] PKK-affiliated media reported that the PKK held a two-day conference from May 5 to 7 in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil Mountains after imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called for the group to disarm.[35] Ocalan made the historical call in late February 2025 after months of negotiations with the pro-Kurdish Turkish People’s Equality and Democracy (DEM) party and politicians allied with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[36] The PKK said it would provide “relevant documents and information” along with its upcoming announcement.[37] A Turkish journalist who previously wrote for a pro-Erdogan newspaper reported on May 9 that the PKK is expected to announce that it will end all operations against Turkey and will disband itself, citing two sources familiar with the matter.[38] The PKK Executive Committee said in late February 2025 that it would disarm in response to Ocalan’s call to dissolve the group, but several high-ranking PKK leaders have continued to insist since Ocalan’s call that Turkey must free Ocalan from prison before the group officially disarms.[39] Erdogan and his Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) have repeatedly stressed that they will not negotiate with the PKK and that PKK disarmament is a unilateral process.[40] DEM Party co-chair Pervin Buldan told PKK-affiliated media on May 9 that Erdogan will “imminently” make a statement on the PKK announcement.[41]

The PKK’s possible refusal to disarm may result in a Turkish decision to resume attacks on alleged PKK targets in northern Syria, which could further complicate the US-backed Syrian Defense Forces’ (SDF) integration into the Syrian state. Turkey identifies the targets of its operations in Syria as the “PKK,” even when striking forces under the SDF.[42] Turkey often equates the entirety of the SDF and the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the PKK.[43] YPG elements in the SDF, while linked to the PKK, have prioritized the protection of Syrian Kurds over the achievement of PKK objectives in recent months. Turkey has linked its campaign to disarm the PKK through Ocalan to the US-backed SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.[44] Turkish officials stated in late February 2025 that they believed Ocalan’s call for the PKK to disarm and dissolve would pressure the SDF into disarmament and integration into the Syrian transitional government under the Defense Ministry.[45] This belief is based on the Turkish government's conflation between the PKK, the SDF, and the YPG, which dominates the SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from the SDF, but he rejected Ocalan’s call and argued that it “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.”[46] Abdi later agreed to integrate the SDF and Kurdish-controlled territory into the Syrian state in March 2025.[47]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Houthi Ceasefire: The verbal ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis appears to only cover one of the three reported original US demands conveyed by Oman at this time. The three conditions required the Houthis to cease all attacks on US commercial and military vessels, stop targeting Israel, and re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap.
• Houthis and the Saudi-Led Roadmap: The Houthis are unlikely to seriously re-engage in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap because the Houthis have not suffered any defeats that would force them to the negotiating table. The Houthis are likely unwilling to engage in negotiations that would cause them to lose their control over northern Yemen because they desire to control all of Yemen and view themselves as the rightful Yemeni government. The Houthis appear to believe that the US-Houthi ceasefire is a “victory.“
• Red Sea and Shipping Prices: The ambiguity surrounding the US-Houthi ceasefire will likely cause international shipping companies to exercise caution before reentering the Red Sea to a greater degree.
• The Axis of Resistance in Yemen: Details about the activities of senior Hezbollah commanders in northern Yemen in the early 2010s demonstrate how Iran and its allies likely share lessons, techniques, and capabilities over time. Key Houthi commanders have now assumed an advising role with Iraqi militias that is similar to Hezbollah’s advising role in Yemen. A US airstrike killed a top Houthi drone expert outside Baghdad in July 2024, for example.
• Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Unspecified Iranian diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on May 8 that the US-Iran nuclear talks are “faltering” over Iranian uranium enrichment restrictions and “fluctuating US demands.”
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): The PKK announced on May 9 that it held a conference to discuss its disarmament and will soon announce a decision of “historic importance.”

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 831,000 rials to one US dollar on May 8 to 840,000 rials to one US dollar on May 9.[48]

Iran faces growing disruption to its key oil exports as US sanctions on Chinese refineries threaten its main revenue stream. Reuters reported on May 8 that US sanctions imposed in March and April 2025 on two small Chinese independent refineries—Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical and Shandong Shengxing Chemical—have begun to disrupt Chinese handling of Iranian crude oil.[49] The sanctioned refineries now face a loss of port access, financing restrictions from major Chinese banks, and the loss of domestic crude oil supply from state firms like China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).[50] The sanctioned Chinese refineries are also using third-party entities to sell their products and bypass formal restrictions. The US State Department separately sanctioned China-based Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group and three oil terminal operators, along with numerous firms, vessels, and captains, for facilitating hundreds of millions of dollars in Iranian oil sales on May 8.[51] These sanctions follow an increase in US sanctions targeting China-based entities involved in the illicit Iranian oil trade as part of US President Donald Trump’s renewed "maximum pressure" campaign.[52] China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, purchasing approximately 90 percent of Iran’s total oil exports, according to Reuters.[53]

Syria

US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce said on May 9 that the US has a sanction waiver mechanism “in place” but is waiting for Syria to “appropriately” respond to US conditions.[54] Bruce’s statement comes amid US debates over easing sanctions on Syria.[55] The United States gave Syrian officials a list of conditions for partial US sanctions relief on March 18. These demands called on Syria to combat terrorism, adopt a policy of non-aggression with neighboring states, and exclude foreign fighters from official roles.[56] The Syrian government responded to the US on April 26 and said that it had addressed a majority of these conditions.[57] The government has fought terrorists and adopted a non-aggression policy, but it has not excluded foreign fighters from official positions.[58] Bruce also condemned the Syrian Defense Ministry’s May 5 appointment of Brigadier General Ahmad al Hais (Abu Hatem Shaqra) as a division commander in the army, which Bruce called a “serious mistake that the [United States] does not support.”[59] Shaqra founded and commanded Ahrar al Sharqiya in 2016, a Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) faction comprised of fighters from eastern Syria who were close to Shaqra.[60] The United States sanctioned Ahrar al Sharqiya and Shaqra in 2021 for committing abuses against civilians, particularly Syrian Kurds, and integrating former ISIS members into its ranks.[61]

Israeli media reported on May 9 that Syrian officials asked Israel for time to allow the Syrian transitional government to “organize” and “stabilize its internal affairs” during Emirati-mediated talks in Abu Dhabi.[62] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has reportedly facilitated recent talks between Israel and Syria on security, counterterrorism, and confidence-building measures.[63] Israeli media reported that three close aides to President Ahmed al Shara met with two Israelis with previous Israeli security experience in Abu Dhabi on a recent, unspecified date.[64] An Israeli official who did not confirm whether they had personally attended the talks said that the Israel-Syria talks were “preliminary, non-committal discussions.”[65] Unspecified members of the Syrian delegation told the Israelis that Syria has no interest in conflict with its neighbors, including Israel.[66] Israeli officials reportedly said that Shara’s messages were “positive but not enough.”[67]

The Syrian Navy conducted its first “large-scale" naval operation on May 9 to combat smuggling along the Syrian coast.[68] Syrian naval forces arrested several human traffickers and seized weapons aboard vessels during the operation.[69] The Syrian Navy began to conduct routine patrols along the Syrian coast on April 25.[70] There has been significant smuggling and human trafficking along the Syrian coast for over a decade.[71]

Syrian Energy Minister Mohammad al Bashir and Turkish Energy Minister Alp Arslan Bayraktar signed a natural gas deal on May 9.[72] Bashir is a trained engineer who served as interim Syrian prime minister from December 2024 to March 2025 and as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-controlled Syrian Salvation Government prime minister in Idlib from January 2024 to December 2024.[73] Turkey will supply Syria with six million cubic meters of natural gas per day through the Kilis-Aleppo pipeline located in northwestern Syria.[74] Bayraktar said that Turkey aims to start supplying natural gas within three months.[75] Bashir said that the Turkish supply will contribute to increasing electricity usage and improving the energy situation in Syria.[76] The Syrian government has consistently sought foreign assistance for its severely damaged energy sector since coming to power in December 2024.[77] Syrian President Shara met with US businessman and Argent liquified natural gas (LNG) company CEO Jonathan Bass on May 2 to discuss potential investment in Syria’s energy infrastructure by Western firms.[78] Bashir has also recently met with Saudi and Qatari officials to discuss cooperation in the energy sector.[79] Qatar began providing natural gas supplies to Syria from Jordan in mid-March to help address electricity production shortages and improve infrastructure.[80]

Likely Alawite insurgents conducted an unsuccessful raid targeting the Syrian Army’s 56th Division barracks in Khirbet al Maza, Tartous Province, on May 8.[81] 56th Division soldiers reportedly wounded several insurgents in the attack..[82] The 56th Division pursued the retreating insurgents and continued to search the local area for fighters.[83] The attack follows the Syrian Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) reinforcement and increased surveillance in Tartous Province as part of a security plan to counter the Alawite-majority, pro-Assad insurgency that has been active in Tartous since the fall of the Assad regime.[84] This is the first pro-Alawite insurgent attack on Syrian government forces since April 21.[85] The pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigades, a sectarian Alawite insurgent group in western Syria, denied that the attack took place.[86] The Coastal Shield Brigades has frequently published false information about Assad regime elements and has framed recent extrajudicial killings targeting former regime commanders across Syria as murders against innocent civilians.[87] Extrajudicial killings—including those targeting former regime elements—are destabilizing and underscore the need for transitional justice.

The General Security Services (GSS) thwarted a likely Lebanese Hezbollah-supported attempt to smuggle weapons, ammunition, and narcotics into Lebanon from Serghaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on May 9.[88] The weapons included a locally-produced anti-FPV drone gun, a 9A91 compact assault rifle, and a light machine gun.[89] A large box of the prescription opioid Tramadol was also found along with tactical accessories, such as rifle scopes, gas masks, and a tactical chest rig.[90] The smugglers were likely attempting to smuggle these supplies to Hezbollah, which is in the process of reconstituting itself after the Fall 2024 Israeli campaign in Lebanon. Serghaya lies on a road that travels northwards into Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, which is a Hezbollah stronghold. Hezbollah could use Tramadol as a substitute for morphine or other pain management drugs in combat, though Hezbollah could also generate money by smuggling Tramadol.[91] GSS forces previously seized a weapons shipment heading to Lebanese Hezbollah in Serghaya on January 26.[92]

Gunmen on motorcycles and Salafi-jihadi groups continued to conduct extrajudicial revenge killings targeting former Assadists across Syria from May 7 to 9, which underscores the need for transitional justice in Syria. Unknown gunmen on motorcycles killed a former Assad regime Air Force Intelligence member on May 7.[93] Unknown gunmen separately killed a Tiger Forces fighter in Safira, Aleppo Province, in a separate attack on May 8.[94] The Tiger Forces were an elite special forces unit that was part of Assad’s Syrian Arab Army.[95] Salafi-Jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah assassinated a National Defense Forces (NDF) commander in the al Waer neighborhood of Homs City, on May 9.[96] The slain commander was known for his efforts to organize a military defense of Homs City against HTS before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[97] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah also assassinated a Shia Assad regime fighter known for his association with Liwa al Quds in the al Mashad neighborhood of Aleppo city in a separate attack on May 9.[98] Liwa al Quds was a pro-Assad Palestinian militia. These killings are spurred in part by a lack of government-led transitional justice efforts to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the civil war.

Suwayda Province Governor Mustafa Bakour announced on May 8 that police stations will open in four areas of Suwayda Province.[99] The activation of new police stations in Suwayda City, Shabha, Salkhad, and outside of Suwayda City, Suwayda Province, is the result of a recent agreement between the Syrian transitional government and Druze leaders to integrate Suwaydawi fighters into state security services.[100] Bakour recently confirmed that Suwayda’s police forces, which will be composed of Suwaydawi policemen, have already integrated into the Syrian Ministry of Interior.[101] Bakour said that there are 100 officers and nearly 2,100 personnel in the police forces thus far, which includes both former officers and new recruits.[102] A non-Suwaydawi officer appointed by Damascus will command these police forces, likely in order to ensure the police remain responsive to the state.[103]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

---

[1] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ; https://www.axios.com/2025/05/06/houthi-ceasefire-trump-yemen-attacks

[2] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm

[3] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862

[4] https://osesgy.unmissions.org/update-efforts-secure-un-roadmap-end-war-yemen; https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1145087; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-reaffirms-its-commitment-promoting-dialogue-among-all-parties-yemen-2023-09-19/

[5] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm

[6] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862

[7] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-reaffirms-its-commitment-promoting-dialogue-among-all-parties-yemen-2023-09-19/

[8] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862; https://www.axios.com/2025/05/03/trump-gulf-leaders-summit-saudi-arabia

[9] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/06/politics/us-to-stop-strikes-on-houthis-in-yemen

[10] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3478139.htm; https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be

[11] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1920869477698191489

[12] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CTC-SENTINEL-042024_cover-article.pdf

[13] https://t.me/army21ye/2955 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1920833856283787289

[14] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1920835058656571694

[15] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1920837162976604486

[16] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1920609794534109678 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1920612464401531052

[17] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1920609794534109678 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1920612464401531052

[18] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1855678557323985366 ; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2024/11/11/liveblog-hezbollah-commander-houthi-advisor-eliminated/ ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/09/26/israel-eliminates-head-of-hezbollah-drone-unit/ ; https://x.com/IDF/status/1839337017936875640

[19] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2024/12/E_271_24.pdf

[20] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/09/26/israel-eliminates-head-of-hezbollah-drone-unit/ ; https://x.com/IDF/status/1839337017936875640

[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/08/05/us-strike-iraq-houthi-drone/

[22] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202505081189

[23] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/27/3292802

[24] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1917961234391224733

[25] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/15/politics/us-iran-talks-focus-nuclear-verification-trump-envoy-says-intl/index.html ;

https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1911963766972953004 ;

https://x.com/SE_MiddleEast/status/1912141949932298432

[26] https://x.com/gbrew24/status/1920888597143564420; https://x.com/gbrew24/status/1920865275081011565 ; https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2025/05/09/exclusive-steve-witkoff-shreds-his-total-fake-news-critics-the-neocon-element-believes-that-war-is-the-only-way-to-solve-things/

[27] https://x.com/Tasnimnews_Fa/status/1920887609993138354

[28] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2060020/

[29] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2060020/

[30] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/19/3308949

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-16-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-2-2025

[32] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/19/3308847

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-24-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-16-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-21-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-4-2025

[34] https://firatnews dot com/kurdIstan/pkk-12-kongresi-basariyla-yapildi-212451

[35] https://firatnews dot com/kurdIstan/pkk-12-kongresi-basariyla-yapildi-212451

[36] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895120510109000176

[37] https://firatnews dot com/kurdIstan/pkk-12-kongresi-basariyla-yapildi-212451

[38] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pkk-officially-disband-week-sources-say; https://www.middleeasteye.net/users/ragip-soylu

[39] https://firatnews dot com/guncel/bayik-Onder-apo-disinda-kimse-kongre-yi-toplayamaz-210411; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2025

[40] https://www dot dailysabah.com/politics/top-turkish-official-denies-talks-with-pkk-says-group-must-lay-down-arms/news ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kurdish-pkk-militia-says-it-will-heed-jailed-leaders-peace-call-declare-2025-03-01/

[41] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/05/pkk-holds-congress-response-ocalans-call-end-war-turkey

[42] https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1893598676729172100 ; https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1892889632943055124 ; https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1890315552893055361

[43] https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025

[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025

[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024

[48] www.bon-bast.com

[49] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctions-china-refiners-over-iran-oil-disrupt-operations-sources-say-2025-05-08/

[50] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctions-china-refiners-over-iran-oil-disrupt-operations-sources-say-2025-05-08/

[51] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/third-china-based-teapot-refinery-designated-for-violating-iran-sanctions/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20is%20sanctioning,dollars'%20worth%20of%20Iranian%20oil.

[52] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-2/#:~:text=Iran's%20behavior%20threatens%20the%20national,its%20support%20for%20terrorist%20groups.

[53] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-march-iranian-oil-imports-surge-us-sanctions-fears-2025-04-10/

[54] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-08-2025/#post-628618-SYRIA

[55] https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2025/04/16/should-syria-get-sanctions-relief-00293691

[56] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-lists-demands-un-syria-seeks-sanctions-relief-2025-04-25

[57] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26/

[58] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26 ; https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1889296890627272975 ; https://x.com/MohammedHawaidi/status/1888899612590719029

[59] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-08-2025/#post-628618-SYRIA

[60] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919371128302100651 ; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919373420296278177 ; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919378447228362904 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2025 ; https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/06/25/remnants-of-the-deiri-opposition-contention-and-controversy-in-north-aleppo

[61] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0292#:~:text=the%20Syrian%20GID.-,AHRAR%20AL-SHARQIYA,engaged%20in%20the%20commission%20of%20serious%20human%20rights%20abuse%20in%20Syria.,-AHMAD%20IHSAN%20FAYYAD

[62] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx

[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/

[64] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx

[65] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx

[66] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx

[67] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx

[68] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1920582998161813769 ; https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1920583001336951101

[69] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1920582998161813769

[70] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/3755

[71] https://maritime-executive.com/article/syria-s-new-regime-seizes-cargo-of-iranian-weapons-in-tartus ; https://maritime-executive.com/article/cma-cgm-renews-terminal-lease-at-latakia-syria-s-notorious-smuggling-port ; https://apnews.com/article/cyprus-human-smuggling-syria-lebanon-turkey-arrests-e55ecbe91ea22ad14971f7a1560b473f ; https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/middle-east/196936-190312-exclusive-iran-reviving-maritime-smuggling-route-to-syria-using-civilian-firms ; https://www.ynet dot co.il/article/4042891

[72] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1920842668654960708

[73] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/682894/%D8%A5%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/11/world/middleeast/syria-bashir-prime-minister.html

[74] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1920842668654960708

[75] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1920795599047123325

[76] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1920842668654960708

[77] https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/011725-feature-syria-seeks-to-rebuild-oil-and-gas-industry-but-needs-western-backing#:~:text=However%2C%20Syria's%20oil%20and%20gas,former%20dictator%20Bashar%20al%2DAssad. ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-8-2025 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/qatar-supply-gas-syria-with-us-nod-sources-say-2025-03-13/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkish-energy-ministry-delegation-visit-syria-discuss-energy-cooperation-2024-12-24/

[78] www dot sana.sy/en/?p=354232; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-dangles-oil-peace-for-u-s-help-on-sanctions-bc0481a0

[79] https://sana dot sy/en/?p=353814 ; https://sana dot sy/en/?p=354339

[80] https://www.undp.org/arab-states/press-releases/qatar-provides-reliable-natural-gas-supplies-syria-critical-improving-electricity-supply

[81] https://alikhbariah dot com/%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d8%aa%d9%8f%d8%ad%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%84-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%b7/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920766078767997115 ;

[82] https://alikhbariah dot com/%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d8%aa%d9%8f%d8%ad%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%84-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%b7/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920766078767997115 ;

[83] https://alikhbariah dot com/%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d8%aa%d9%8f%d8%ad%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%84-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%b7/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920766078767997115 ;

[84] https://alikhbariah dot com/%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d8%aa%d9%8f%d8%ad%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%84-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%b7/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-syria%E2%80%99s-emerging-insurgency

[85] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2025#:~:text=Likely%20Alawite%20insurgents,restrict%20insurgent%20movement.

[86] https://t.me/almougahid313/494

[87] https://t.me/almougahid313/494 ; https://t.me/almougahid313/473 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920063779661816192 ; https://www.facebook.com/Sewar.Sul/photos/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%81/3866503183601595/?_rdr

[88] https://alikhbariah dot com/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%85-%d9%8a%d8%ad%d8%a8%d8%b7-%d8%b9%d9%85%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a8-%d8%a3%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%a9-%d9%88%d9%85%d8%ae/

[89] https://www.youtube.com/watchv=0XTC8KvC9gY ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920776712708604112 ; https://x.com/warsmonitoring/status/1032603158781063168 ; https://x.com/war_noir/status/1899930769658609737

[90] https://www.youtube.com/watchv=0XTC8KvC9gY

[91] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11375843/

[92] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1883434966425772390

[93] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920506923398365308 ; https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1920305470704582831 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/195M7VEwZo/

[94]https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920506923398365308 ; (GRAPHIC) https://x.com/Al_Basheer1/status/1920483010664628576

[95] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/25th_Special_Mission_Forces_Division

[96] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920816057968734353 ;                    https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/56661; https://t.me/alaydiat/334;                     https://x.com/SyrNetworkNews/status/1920832499074183665 ;                    https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1920874858222592085 ;

[97] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920816057968734353

[98] https://t.me/alaydiat/328 ; https://www.facebook.com/AL.LAYARMUN/posts/pfbid0VPFFbejCcQgMbYNWcp8KG7tALbaeSfsBt2M2xR5KNZTLE3SCdurwKfNzTE1V3BVgl ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EyvuqQy1F/ ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920873586031468874

[99] https://sana dot sy/?p=2216401

[100] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02xMMPDoW9Sw7y5eaoUrok2BkFsojUpTw1gKZvfLJRtuMD6LemhqUxPjsnXeAzTesEl&id=61573484227328&_rdr ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

[101] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919098569878798395; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

[102] https://sana dot sy/?p=2216401

[103] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1919100469105864982 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919098569878798395