Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Kiley Pittman of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek, Alex Chou, and Luke Jacobus of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: July 30, 2025
The
China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for
the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update
supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses
Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for
the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to
controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) prevailed in the mass recall votes targeting its legislators on July 26. All
24 votes failed to reach the threshold needed to trigger a special
election that could have removed KMT legislators from office.[1]
Seven more votes targeting KMT legislators will occur on August 3. The
ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) would need to recall and flip
six of these seats to gain a majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY).
DPP-aligned
civil society groups initiated the mass recalls in February 2025 after
the KMT and other opposition lawmakers passed controversial legislation
that jeopardized Taiwanese resilience against PRC aggression. The
legislation included sweeping federal budget cuts and measures that have
paralyzed the Constitutional Court. The DPP has framed the KMT as
cooperating with the CCP and exposing Taiwan to PRC threats.[2]
The
failed recall votes likely reflect public frustration with the
associated political instability—rather than a surge in support for the
KMT. Taiwanese polls since the votes indicate that most people oppose
the recall campaign. Only seven of the 24 failed votes met the threshold
needed to be considered valid, demonstrating that the vast majority of
Taiwanese voters refused to participate in the votes and that the DPP
failed to mobilize supporters sufficiently.
The failed
recall votes will allow the KMT to continue undermining the Executive
Yuan and obstructing Lai’s agenda. KMT Chairman Eric Chu Li-lun framed
the failed votes as a public rejection of “one-party dominance” and
popular support for KMT oversight of the DPP.[3]
Lai has focused his agenda on strengthening Taiwanese defenses and
resilience against PRC aggression and subversion. He will struggle,
however, to advance his agenda if the KMT and other opposition parties
continue to counter his efforts.
The PRC has framed the
failed votes as a popular rejection of the DPP and the Lai
administration in order to discredit and delegitimize them. PRC
officials have consistently framed the recall campaign as an indication
of DPP authoritarianism and have more recently asserted that the failed
votes indicate public disapproval.[4]
The Taiwan Information Environment Research Center—a public opinion and
misinformation research body—noted that the PRC significantly increased
its public criticisms of the DPP in the runup to the recall votes.[5]
The
United States has made numerous political and trade concessions to the
PRC amid their bilateral talks, including denying Taiwanese President
William Lai Ching-te permission to visit New York. The United
States blocked Lai from visiting New York on a diplomatic trip in August
2025 after the PRC objected to the visit, according to the Financial Times and Bloomberg.[6]
The sources cited concern within the Trump administration that PRC
dissatisfaction would spoil ongoing US–PRC talks that aim to lay the
groundwork for a summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping later
this year.[7]
Similar concerns were cited regarding US technology export controls,
such as those on advanced chips, which were lifted in advance of the
bilateral talks in Stockholm.[8]
The
PRC has increasingly sought to limit Taiwanese leaders’ contact with
the United States in recent years. Sitting Taiwanese presidents have
visited the United States at least 17 times since 1995, including seven
times during the tenure of Lai’s predecessor, President Tsai Ing-wen.
The PRC has launched increasingly regular large-scale military exercises
in response to US–Taiwanese contact after Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan
in August 2022. Lai’s first trip to the United States occurred in
December 2024 during a diplomatic tour to Pacific island allies, which
the PRC answered with large-scale naval and air exercises around Taiwan.[9]
The
US denial of Lai’s transit through New York risks setting a negative
precedent for future US and allied behavior toward Taiwan. The PRC could
interpret the decision as an indication of the US's willingness to
concede on issues on which the PRC places special emphasis. This
perception will likely lead the PRC to make similar demands regarding
limiting contact between the United States and Taiwan in the future. The
United States previously canceled Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington
Koo’s meeting with US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge
Colby in June 2025 shortly after a Trump–Xi phone call.[10]
The PRC may be emboldened further by a recent US decision to ease
export controls targeting the PRC. Beijing has leveraged its superior
supply of rare earth minerals, on which the United States relies heavily
for many advanced technology products, to extract concessions from the
United States.
Key Takeaways
- Taiwan: The opposition KMT prevailed in the mass recall votes targeting its legislators. The failed recall votes likely reflect public frustration with the associated political instability—rather than a surge in support for the KMT. The failed votes will allow the KMT to continue undermining the Taiwanese Executive Yuan and President Lai’s efforts to improve Taiwanese defenses and resilience against PRC aggression and subversion.
- PRC: The United States has made
numerous political and trade concessions to the PRC amid bilateral
talks, including denying Taiwanese President Lai from visiting New York.
The US rejection of Lai’s requested visit risks setting a negative
precedent and will likely embolden the PRC to make similar demands,
limiting contact between the United States and Taiwan in the future.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
PLA
aerial incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
reached their highest level in the past year. The PRC has normalized a
higher frequency of ADIZ incursions to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness
and response threshold and to probe response protocols. The
PRC calibrates its military activities around Taiwan to intimidate and
deter it from taking actions supportive of Taiwanese sovereignty. PLA
incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have become a near daily occurrence that
often serve as a barometer for the PRC reactions to political
developments regarding Taiwan. Spikes in ADIZ incursions often
correspond with political events that the PRC opposes, including
high-level meetings between Taiwanese and foreign officials or
expressions of Taiwanese sovereignty by Taiwanese leaders.
This
new normal of ADIZ incursions represents one of the many aspects of
intensifying PRC coercion against Taiwan and the Lai administration. The
normalization of more frequent ADIZ incursions by PLA aircraft raises
the threshold of coercive activity that would trigger a Taiwanese
response, making it more difficult for Taiwan to detect and respond to a
real threat in time. Taiwan must put personnel on standby to respond to
ADIZ incursions, which strains resources and exhausts personnel.
The
China Coast Guard (CCG) conducted three known incursions into Kinmen’s
restricted waters in July 2025, continuing the PRC normalization of such
incursions. Four CCG ships simultaneously entered Kinmen’s restricted waters on July 10, 29, and 30.[11]
These incursions are part of the PRC's effort to reduce Taiwan’s threat
awareness and readiness and test Taiwanese responses. The Taiwan Coast
Guard Association (CGA) has reported a total of 78 incursions since
February 2024. These incursions typically happen three to four times a
month. The Coalition Defense of Taiwan (CDOT)-ISW tracked each reported
incursion dating back to September 2024—the publicly available data
prior to then is incomplete and thus excluded from the graph below.
CCG
East China Sea Branch spokesperson Zhu Anqing said on July 30 that
these incursions were “routine law enforcement patrols” to effectively
manage and control Xiamen-Kinmen waters.[12]
CCG intrusions into the waters south of Kinmen resemble a rehearsal for
operations to cut Kinmen off from resupply or intervention by sea,
which would require PRC ships to position themselves south of the
island. The CCG’s simultaneous entries into the restricted waters around
Kinmen provide the CCG with experience in choreographing the initial
actions that would be required for a blockade of Kinmen. The CCG likely
aims to desensitize Taiwan and its partners to such intrusions, which
could help cultivate surprise in an actual blockade scenario.
China
The
PRC and Vietnam concluded their first combined army training exercises
on July 30. The PRC and Vietnam have grown closer diplomatically,
economically, and militarily since the United States recently imposed
tariffs. The exercises occurred from July 21–30 and included
drills focused on reconnaissance drone operations and other coordinated
tactics.[13]
The PRC and Vietnam have previously held combined naval and land border
patrols, but this marks the first combined ground force exercise
between the two states. The PRC is Vietnam’s largest trading partner,
and Vietnam is the PRC’s fourth-largest trading partner and the largest
PRC trading partner within ASEAN.[14]
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping visited Vietnam from April 14 to 15,
shortly after the announcement of US tariffs to emphasize the importance
of continued PRC–Vietnam cooperation amid US unilateralism and
uncertainty.[15]
Vietnam has taken steps toward greater cooperation with the PRC since
then, holding two other military exercises with the PLA Navy and CCG.[16]
Closer
PRC–Vietnam defense ties and the imposition of US tariffs on Vietnam
risk disrupting the burgeoning US–Vietnam defense partnership.
US–Vietnam military cooperation was elevated to a comprehensive
strategic partnership in 2023.[17]
This partnership, coupled with enhanced economic ties, marked a high
point in US–Vietnam relations. US–Vietnam relations could face a
significant decline in the wake of US economic policy and increased
engagement from the PRC. Other ASEAN states could similarly turn toward
the PRC if they perceive the United States as an unreliable trading
partner.[18]
The PRC Central Military Commission (CMC)-controlled outlet, PLA Daily,
published a three-part series discussing how military personnel must be
subordinated to the CCP.[19] This series follows the CMC issuing new
guidance to PLA political officers to further enhance party loyalty
among the military ranks. The first part of the series focused
on political loyalty and the duty of political officers to ensure the
absolute control of the CCP over the PLA.[20]
The second part of the series emphasized that political officers should
uphold truthfulness and put the advancement of the CCP before personal
interests.[21]
The final part of the series covered the importance of political
officers in promoting integrity in the military promotion process. The
series condemned nepotism in the promotion of military commanders.[22]
The PLA Daily
series—along with the new CMC guidance to PLA political
officers—reflects ongoing CCP efforts to promote political loyalty and
ideological conformity within the military. The National People’s
Congress has removed over a dozen military lawmakers and defense
industry executives since its current term began in March 2023,
including former CMC member Miao Hua, former defense ministers Li
Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, and Navy Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Li Hanjun.[23] The purges may partially result from the CCP's perception of inadequate commitment to Xi Jinping and the party.[24] The PLA Daily commentaries
suggest that the purges relate to the CCP's perception that military
personnel have pursued self-interest over party interests or engaged in
corrupt military promotion processes. The CMC has not published the full
text of its new guidelines, but more information regarding the
guidelines or the PLA purges at large may be announced at the Politburo
meeting before the CCP leaders’ retreat in Beidaihe in early August.[25]
Northeast Asia
Japan
The PRC protested Taiwanese Foreign Affairs Minister Lin Chia-lung’s visit to Japan.
Lin visited the World Expo in Osaka and Taipei Economic and Cultural
Representative Office in Tokyo during his unpublicized visit, making Lin
the first Taiwanese foreign minister to visit Taiwan’s de-facto embassy
in Japan.[26]
Lin also met with members of the Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative
Council, including former Japanese Defense Minister Minoru Kihara and
Former Economic Security Minister Sanae Takaichi, a popular candidate to
replace Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.[27]
The Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council is a cross-party group
of Japanese legislators aimed at promoting relations and parliamentary
exchanges with Taiwan. Members of the council have made official visits
to Taiwan multiple times and declared in its 2025 policy guidelines that
a Taiwan contingency must be prevented.[28]
The
Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) claimed that Lin’s trip
was a “private visit” and declined to release details. The PRC Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) filed official complaints with Japan over Lin’s
visit.[29]
Liu reiterated that the Taiwan question is at “the core of the PRC’s
core interests” and should be the foundation of PRC–Japan relations. Liu
added that Japan has “provided a stage for anti-China separatist
activities” by tolerating Lin’s “illegitimate visit [窜访][30]
The PRC often refers to Taiwanese official visits as “illegitimate” to
undermine Taiwanese sovereignty. The PRC Embassy in Tokyo and MFA
spokesperson Guo Jiakun also issued protests against Lin’s visit to
Japan.[31]
The
Japanese Foreign Ministry did not comment on Lin’s visit, as Japan’s
executive branch has typically refrained from engaging with Taiwanese
officials since Japan switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC in
1971. Japan does not have laws regulating relations with Taiwan like the
United States’ Taiwan Relations Act. Government exchanges with Taiwan
are often carried out by Diet members and former executive branch
officials, including former prime ministers. The PRC routinely
criticizes “any form of official exchanges with Taiwan,” including by
legislators and former officials, and demands countries to “stop sending
the wrong signals to Taiwan-independence separatists,” however.
North Korea
South
Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said that he will
recommend that President Lee Jae-myung scale back upcoming US–South
Korea combined military exercises in response to a statement from North
Korea’s Kim Yo Jong. This would mark the first instance of South Korea
altering its military activity along the inter-Korean border since Lee
took office. Kim Yo Jung, Deputy Director of the Publicity and
Information Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and sister
of WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un, delivered a speech on July 28
saying that South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s efforts to improve
inter-Korean relations were all “futile.”[32]
Kim cited several of Lee’s policy changes, such as the halting of
propaganda through radio broadcasts and leaflet distribution, and
described the efforts as “meaningless” given South Korea’s continued
military cooperation with the United States.[33]
Kim identified combined US–South Korean military exercises as a
roadblock for future communication, as Pyongyang perceives them to be
preparations for an invasion. The Lee administration maintained its
desire to resume inter-Korean dialogue following Kim’s speech.[34]
Lee and Unification Minister Chung Dong-young both emphasized the
importance of establishing peace, despite Kim’s assertion that North
Korea continues to view South Korea as an “enemy.”[35]
Chung said that he will propose to Lee an adjustment in the upcoming
combined US–South Korea Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) military exercises
following Kim’s statement.
Chung did not provide details
on what this adjustment would entail, and it is unclear whether Lee
would agree to alter the exercises. An adjustment to the UFS exercises
would likely entail a reduction in the exercise scale, which in previous
years has included around 19,000 South Korean troops and took place
over eleven days.[36]
The Lee administration, up to this point, has not made any changes to
its military positioning or activities, despite its stated desire to
reduce tensions with North Korea. An adjustment in the UFS exercises
immediately following Kim’s speech could suggest to the North Korean
government that the Lee administration is willing to make further
concessions in order to progress towards inter-Korean dialogue and
peace. This would go against the United States’ stated desire for
“alliance modernization,” which includes increased South Korean defense
spending, greater cost sharing for US assets deployed in South Korea,
and a desire for Seoul to play a role in a potential US conflict with
the PRC.[37]
US–South Korean misalignment on defense priorities could have
significant impacts on regional security and the alliance between the
two states.
South Korea
PRC Foreign
Affairs Minister Wang Yi called for greater PRC-South Korea cooperation
and urged a move away from the United States during his first phone
call with South Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Cho Hyun on July 28. The
PRC is exploiting current US-South Korean trade and defense
disagreements to target and weaken their alliance. The call
between Wang and Cho took place soon after the last-minute US
postponement of the scheduled 2+2 trade and financial talks between top
US and South Korean officials ahead of the August 1 tariff deadline.
Japan and the Philippines both secured trade deals with the United
States last week.[38] The United States also announced a 60 million US dollar aid package to the Philippines.[39]
The United States formally asked South Korea to expand its Mutual
Defense Treaty commitments to include conflicts in the Indo-Pacific
beyond the Korean Peninsula, implying support for the United States in a
potential US–PRC conflict, and to increase its defense spending from
2.3 percent of GDP up to 5 percent during trilateral talks in Tokyo on
July 18.[40]
The US requests go against South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s
stated desire to improve South Korean–PRC relations. US President Donald
Trump and President Lee separately announced on July 30 that the United
States and South Korea had reached an initial framework for a trade
deal ahead of the deadline.[41]
Wang
emphasized to Cho the importance of close PRC–South Korean relations,
to the implicit exclusion of the US as a significant partner. Wang
asserted that PRC-South Korea relations “are not targeted at any third
party, and should not be subject to any third party,” and urged South
Korea to maintain its autonomy and “oppose decoupling and supply chain
disruption,” veiled references to US economic behavior.[42]
Cho expressed that South Korea would continue to strengthen its
relations with the PRC, “face history squarely (正视历史) and jointly
safeguard regional peace,” according to the PRC readout of the call,
echoing language from the PRC-Japan-South Korea trilateral foreign
ministers’ meeting held in March.[43]
Cho reportedly invited Wang to visit South Korea, which Wang agreed to
do “at a time convenient for both sides,” suggesting that further
diplomatic engagement between the two countries is likely.[44]
Wang’s statement may reflect the PRC’s assessment that current US–South
Korea tensions and Lee’s relatively pro-PRC stance present an
opportunity to disrupt the US–South Korea alliance. PRC military
strategists view US relationships with its global allies as a key
strength in its ability to contest the PRC, but one which the PRC can
blunt by targeting and weakening these relationships through hybrid
warfare operations, especially in the diplomatic and information
domains.[45]
Oceania
Australia
tested precision strike missiles (PrSMs) for the first time as part of
its annual Talisman Sabre exercises. This year’s Talisman Sabre exercise
is its largest and most comprehensive thus far, reflecting an
increasing emphasis on Indo-Pacific security. Australia tested
these US-supplied systems two years ahead of schedule as part of its
largest annual training exercise, which is ongoing at the time of
writing.[46]
The 2025 Talisman Sabre exercises marked the first time that the United
States, United Kingdom, and Australia executed a combined High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battery, as well as the first time the
United States demonstrated its Typhon Missile capabilities at a
Talisman Sabre exercise.[47]
Deputy Commanding General for US Army Pacific Lieutenant General Joel
Vowell said that such surface fire capabilities would comprise a key
asymmetric response to PRC anti-access/area denial.[48]
Nineteen
nations are participating in the 2025 Talisman Sabre exercises,
reflecting coalition-building efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Vowell said
that PRC behavior, along with threats from North Korea and Russia, drove
increased participation in the exercises.[49] UK Secretary of State for Defense John Healey reportedly told the Telegraph that the United Kingdom is prepared to jointly fight alongside Australia in the Pacific.[50]
Former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison similarly urged the
United States to “double down” on economic support to the Indo-Pacific
as a means of strategic competition with the PRC.[51] The PRC criticized a joint statement between the UK and Australia critiquing PRC policy, including toward Taiwan.[52]
The PRC statement, which came shortly after a UK aircraft carrier
arrived in Australia for the Talisman Sabre exercises, accused the UK
and Australia of “unwarranted accusations and political manipulation.”[53]
The PRC will likely continue to criticize US-UK-Australian
coalition-building efforts in an attempt to divide US allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific.
[1] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202507260216.aspx
[2] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20250328001564-260407
https://www.storm dot mg/article/5348584
[3] https://www.kmt dot org.tw/2025/07/blog-post_26.html
[4] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/fyrbt/202507/t20250727_12714386.htm
http://www.news dot cn/tw/20250728/477919155fb5481f98e9680325fd3803/c.html
[5] https://iorg dot tw/_en/da/114#h2-1
[6] https://www.ft.com/content/21575bec-5cdd-47ee-9db2-3031c4ea7ca7
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-28/trump-weighs-whether-to-allow-taiwan-leader-s-transit-through-us?srnd=homepage-asia
[7] https://www.ft.com/content/21575bec-5cdd-47ee-9db2-3031c4ea7ca7
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-28/trump-weighs-whether-to-allow-taiwan-leader-s-transit-through-us?srnd=homepage-asia
[8] https://www.ft.com/content/a13ba438-3b43-46dd-b332-4b81b3644da0
[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/10/world/asia/taiwan-china-naval-largest.html
[10] https://www.ft.com/content/baf4a261-1fce-4c38-b05f-ccd01d3be750;
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-cancelled-meeting-with-taiwan-china-trade-talks-loomed-ft-reports-2025-07-30/;
https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6167389
[11] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/acn/202507100335.aspx;
https://www.cga dot gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=165614&ctNode=650&mp=999
[12] https://www.ccg.gov dot cn/hjyw/202507/t20250730_2801.html
[13] https://en.vietnamplus dot vn/vietnam-china-conclude-first-joint-military-training-exercise-post323696.vnp#:~:text=The%20exercise%2C%20running%20from%20July,over%20170%20pieces%20of%20equipment.
[14] https://www.vietnam-briefing.com/news/vietnam-china-economic-partnership-amid-global-tensions-top-chinese-leaders-visit.html/
[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-xi-meet-vietnam-leaders-kick-off-southeast-asia-tour-amid-us-tariffs-2025-04-14/
[16] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3318904/china-vietnam-set-first-joint-army-drills-us-trade-war-draws-neighbours-closer?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[17] https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/10/fact-sheet-president-joseph-r-biden-and-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-announce-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-21-2025
[19] http://www.81 dot cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-07-21&paperNumber=01&articleid=959582
[20] : http://www.81 dot cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-07-22&paperNumber=01&articleid=959656
[21] : http://www.81 dot cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-07-23&paperNumber=01&articleid=959776
[22] http://www.81 dot cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2025-07-24&paperNumber=01&articleid=959841
[23] : https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3319628/chinas-pla-daily-outlines-image-redemption-checklist-political-officers?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-24-2025
[25] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3319628/chinas-pla-daily-outlines-image-redemption-checklist-political-officers?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[26] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202507250241.aspx
[27] https://www.yomiuri.co dot jp/election/yoron-chosa/20250722-OYT1T50186/
[28] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aopl/202503260387.aspx
[29] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/sjxw_674887/202507/t20250725_11677529.shtml
[30] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/sjxw_674887/202507/t20250725_11677529.shtml
[31] http://jp.china-embassy.gov dot cn/sghd/202507/t20250726_11677839.htm; https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202507/t20250728_11678284.shtml
[32] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1753655893-503765603/press-statement-of-kim-yo-jong-vice-department-director-of-c-c-wpk/
[33] https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/north-korea-will-never-reconcile-with-south-says-lees-overtures-futile/
[34] https://www.nknews dot org/2025/07/seoul-reaffirms-will-to-establish-peace-after-north-korea-rejects-engagement/
[35] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3319785/north-korea-rejects-seouls-push-dialogue?module=top_story&pgtype=section
[36] https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2024-08-30/north-korea-joint-military-exercises-15020673.html
[37] https://www.chosun dot com/english/national-en/2025/07/24/XQM6KKFHUZDBVL74FINMXJ6BLU/
[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-south-korea-trade-talks-postponed-over-bessent-schedule-tariff-deadline-looms-2025-07-24/
[39] https://ph.usembassy.gov/u-s-announces-php3-billion-in-foreign-assistance-for-the-philippines/
[40] https://www.chosun dot com/english/national-en/2025/07/24/XQM6KKFHUZDBVL74FINMXJ6BLU/
[41] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/07/30/trump-threatens-new-tariffs-india-friday-deadline-deals-nears/
[42] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjdt_674879/wjbxw_674885/202507/t20250728_11678086.shtml; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3319928/take-independent-tack-china-wang-yi-urges-south-koreas-new-foreign-policy-chief
[43] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjdt_674879/wjbxw_674885/202507/t20250728_11678086.shtml; https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202503/1330626.shtml
[44] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/diplomacy-defense/2025/07/28/H5GP7F4SEVDKVC6U7CBBVSCB3A/
[45] https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3141-4.html
[46] https://www.newsweek.com/us-australia-flexes-missile-strike-capability-himars-2104943
[47] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4253459/growth-in-participation-new-capabilities-made-talisman-sabre-25-successful/
[48] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4253459/growth-in-participation-new-capabilities-made-talisman-sabre-25-successful/
[49] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4253459/growth-in-participation-new-capabilities-made-talisman-sabre-25-successful/
[50] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2025/07/29/2003841084
[51] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aopl/202507240275.aspx
[52] https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/statement-australia-uk-ministerial-consultations-aukmin-july-2025
[53] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/china-fires-back-at-us-allies-political-manipulation/ar-AA1Js7vG?ocid=BingNewsSerp
