Iran Update, April 29, 2025

Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.[1] This network of entities and individuals has facilitated the procurement of sodium perchlorate and dioctyl sebacate from China to Iran. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[2] Chinese assistance to Iran could help Iran replenish its missile stockpile and circumvent US sanctions. It is unclear if the Chinese government is directly supporting the effort, but the government’s inaction against the entities involved enables continued Chinese support for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.

The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.[3] The Houthis claimed that the facility was a migrant detention center run by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), but IOM denied that it maintained the facility.[4] IOM did confirm that it was a migrant facility. The Houthis have similarly provided inconsistent casualty numbers.[5] The facility is located next to a military base, according to publicly available maps.[6] It is unclear whether the Houthis still operate this military base. An unspecified US defense official told Reuters that CENTCOM is conducting a battle-damage assessment and inquiry into these claims.[7] A UN report condemned Saudi-led coalition airstrikes targeting the same detention center in Saada in 2022 that killed 66 people and injured 113 more.[8]

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners.[9] Qassem said that the Lebanese state—not Hezbollah—would need to fulfill these goals.[10] Iranian media falsely portrayed this statement as a priority that Hezbollah would pursue on its own, rather than a priority that Qassem believes the Lebanese state and people should adopt.[11] Qassem reiterated Hezbollah’s commitment to the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement and stated that the Lebanese government serves as the main negotiator and armed force responsible for enforcing the ceasefire with Israel.[12] Qassem secondarily called on the Lebanese state to prioritize the reconstruction of infrastructure in Lebanon. Qassem also voiced support for a stronger Lebanese state and for removing the IDF. Qassem stated that assuming these co-occurring priorities would facilitate the revival of Lebanon.

Qassem may be attempting to absolve Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government. Hezbollah has faced considerable financial challenges after the end of major fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. These challenges have prevented Hezbollah from rapidly reconstructing pro-Hezbollah areas as Hezbollah did after previous rounds of fighting.[13] Hezbollah’s effort to blame the government may be an attempt to rebuild Hezbollah’s political capital in Lebanon after the war and amid slow reconstruction.

Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after an audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. The accused sheikh denied that he was responsible for the recording, and the Syrian Interior Ministry vowed to investigate and bring the real perpetrators to “justice.”[14] Syrians protested the video in at least nine Syrian provinces on April 28 and 29, and videos of armed men threatening to retaliate reportedly circulated on social media.[15] A group of gunmen entered Jaramana, a majority Druze town southeast of Damascus, on April 28 and opened fire on a residential area.[16] Security sources told Western media that the gunmen were reportedly from neighboring Sunni-majority towns, including Meliha.[17] The General Security Services (GSS) and the Defense Ministry (MoD) deployed to Jaramana and cordoned off the town.[18] A Ministry of Interior source said that armed militants launched an “organized attack” against security services when they arrived at the scene.[19] It is unclear if the fighters were from any organized group. Engagements between the militants, Druze fighters, and government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 12 people.[20] Unspecified gunmen also attacked a joint checkpoint between local Druze factions and the GSS at the entrance to Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya, a town southwest of Damascus that has a large Druze population.[21]

Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state. The Druze community has held significant reservations about Syrian Transitional President Shara’s government since the fall of the regime. Slow governmental response to large-scale confessionalist-motivated attacks against the Druze community epitomizes Druze fears about the new government. Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri denounced the attackers as terrorists similar to al Qaeda and ISIS and criticized the Syrian transitional government’s lack of protection of the Druze community in a speech on April 29.[22] This is similar to how Hijri recently described HTS as the ”armed terrorist faction” that controls Damascus, suggesting that he views Shara‘s HTS-dominated government forces and the likely Sunni attackers of Jaramana in a similar light.[23] A Suwayda-based news outlet accused the government of remaining ”silent” on the numerous anti-Druze demonstrations that took place in Syrian cities.[24] Other minority groups, such as the Kurds in northeastern Syria, are likely watching this incident with alarm. Kurdish political parties recently cited government protection of Kurdish citizens and their rights as one of their most important demands of the government.[25] The transitional government’s inability to prevent confessionalist violence against minority groups is unlikely to build Kurdish confidence that the government will protect them if they disarm.

Shara’s government took several initial steps following the Jaramana attacks that suggest it may move more resolutely to protect the Druze community. A transitional government delegation met with Jaramana’s Druze leaders on April 29 and agreed to hold the perpetrators of the attack responsible.[26] The GSS also coordinated with Druze militias to escort hundreds of Druze university students from Latakia, Tartous, and Homs provinces back to Jaramana and Suwayda Province.[27] Security services were also deployed to Druze areas across Syria.[28] These are minor steps that certainly do not meet the expectations that the Druze or Kurdish communities have demanded of Shara, however. Shara is unlikely to allay the fears of these groups without repeated concrete actions that take real steps towards protecting Syria’s minority communities.

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Priorities: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners. Qassem may be attempting to absolve Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government.
• Iran-China Relations: The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the IRGC, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.
• Druze-Government Relations in Syria: Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial appreciated from 814,000 rials to one US dollar on April 28 to 813,000 rials to one US dollar on April 29.[29]

A fire broke out at the “Ava Nar Parsian” warehouse in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province, on April 29.[30] The explosion killed two individuals and injured two others.[31] Iranian authorities announced that the cause of the explosion remains under investigation.[32] The facility manufactures fireworks and gunpowder and operates under the supervision of the Iranian National Security Council (NSC), a sub-council of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[33] A similar explosion in May 2021 occurred at “Sepahan Nargostar,” a complex in the same district of Esfahan Province that was linked to the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA).[34] The incident follows a major explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port on April 26 and Iran’s thwarting of a “widespread” cyberattack on April 28.[35]

The Iranian Parliament initiated impeachment proceedings against Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh on April 29.[36] A member of the ultraconservative Paydari Front, Mohammad Mannan Raisi submitted the motion, and 40 other parliamentarians signed it. Raisi cited "inaction" at the Ports and Maritime Organization, closure of the national housing registration website, failure to implement laws tied to population growth policies, and poor handling of housing market regulations as the main reasons for the motion of impeachment.[37] The impeachment motion follows the April 26 explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, Iran’s largest container port, which handles approximately 85 percent of Iran’s shipping container traffic.[38] Iranian officials cited safety failures and “false statements” in the exploded cargo’s documentation at Shahid Rajaei Port, which raises broader concerns about government oversight.[39] The regime may use impeachment efforts like this one to demonstrate responsiveness to public demands and manage potential unrest. A large protest broke out after a deadly incident in 2022, after the collapse of a building in Khuzestan Province, constructed by individuals close to the regime.[40] Demonstrators expressed anger over the government's failure to enforce construction standards and its mismanagement of the disaster’s aftermath.[41]

Iran continues to bolster economic ties with neighboring countries to mitigate the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy. Iran and Kyrgyzstan held their 14th Joint Economic Committee meeting in Tehran on April 26 and 27.[42] Iranian officials, including Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, met with Kyrgyz officials to discuss trade facilitation and port and transit cooperation. The officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to establish a joint investment committee to streamline future cooperation efforts. Iran and Kazakhstan separately signed an MOU on April 29 to expand port and transit cooperation.[43] Kazakhstan will reportedly present an investment plan for Shahid Rajaee Port in Iran soon. The port was severely affected by an explosion and a series of fires on April 26.[44]

Iran continues to pursue defense and economic cooperation with Zimbabwe. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Zimbabwean Defense Minister Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri in Tehran on April 28.[45] Nasir Zadeh stated that Iran can support Zimbabwe’s counterterrorism efforts. Iranian defense officials previously met with Zimbabwean officials in April 2024 to discuss defense cooperation, likely to pursue uranium or other minerals in Zimbabwe.[46] Nasir Zadeh and Muchinguri-Kashiri also criticized US sanctions on Iran and Zimbabwe and emphasized the importance of cooperation to circumvent sanctions.[47] Iran and Zimbabwe previously signed 12 bilateral economic agreements in July 2023.[48] These meetings are part of an ongoing Iranian effort to improve ties with African states as part of Iran's broader neighborhood policy centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states to undermine the impact of international sanctions.

Syria

The Syrian Kurdish Independents Association rejected the Kurdish Unity Conference’s April 26 platform.[49] The Syrian Kurdish Independents Association is a political organization founded in Turkey in 2016, now based in Turkish-controlled Afrin.[50] The organization opposes the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and considers the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the SDF to be terrorist organizations.[51] Tammo emphasized that Syrian Kurds are an integral part of Syrian society and rejected the conference's goal to secure a federal system that grants authority to Kurdish “militias.”[52] Kurdish political parties released a unified statement on April 26, which called for a federal Syrian structure that could create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[53] The head of the Syrian Kurdish Independents Association, Abdul Aziz al Tammo, claimed on April 27 that the agreement was established among external actors and is not representative of Syrian Kurds.[54] Tanno criticized the conference for not demanding the release of illegal detentions in SDF prisons and an end to Kurdish child abductions in the Qandil Mountains.[55]

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani stressed the urgent need for sanctions relief and called on the UN to prevent Israel from continuing to destabilize Syria.[56] Shaibani spoke at the UN Security Council. He noted the Syrian transitional government’s current engagement with international mechanisms like the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), the Fact-Finding Mission to Syria, and the Human Rights Council to support economic recovery, reconstruction, and transitional justice.[57] Shaibani warned that Assad-era sanctions will hinder progress in these areas and could drive a cycle of violence.[58] Foreign Minister Shaibani stated that Syria will not be a source of instability in the region or pose a threat to its neighbors.[59] Shaibani warned that Israeli airstrikes and border incursions in Syria constitute violations of Syrian sovereignty, risk igniting grievances that could destabilize the region.[60] He urged the United Nations to partner with the Syrian transitional government to support the growth of a secure and prosperous Syria.[61]

Iraq

Nothing Significant to Report.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

CENTCOM conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since 1:00 pm ET on April 28.[62] CENTCOM conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in Harf Sufiyan, Amran Governorate, and one airstrike targeting al Mahadhir, Sahar District, Saada Governorate, on April 28.[63] CENTCOM also conducted at least six airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in Rabt al Anan, al Jawf Governorate, on April 29, which is approximately 20km behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[64] CENTCOM struck Houthi infrastructure in Maqbanah District, Taiz Governorate, four times at approximately 9:00 am ET on April 29, which is less than 50km from the southern frontlines in Taiz Governorate.[65]

At least three separate CENTCOM sorties struck Houthi underground facilities and weapons depots around Sanaa City on April 28.[66] A Yemeni journalist reported that one of these sorties killed nine Houthi fighters at Barash Camp on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City, including the air defense site commander Captain Ahmed Asem Abu al Ezz, one of the base’s senior officers Abu Zaid al Muayyad, and Abdullah al Dhari, a Fater-1 missile air defense system expert.[67] The Fater-1, which is a Houthi version of the Soviet-made SA-6 surface-to-air missile system, has a maximum range of 24 km and a maximum altitude of 14 km.[68]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See the topline section.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks in the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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[1] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0116

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2025#_ednf140a522d3cea14403f595938b4fa4d14a583f72f41c46ae2ad413da5d848f8e23 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-14-2025

[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/houthis-say-u-s-airstrike-in-yemen-killed-nearly-70-people-in-migrant-detention-center-7e9b2510 ;

[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/houthis-say-u-s-airstrike-in-yemen-killed-nearly-70-people-in-migrant-detention-center-7e9b2510 ; https://yemen.iom.int/news/statement-iom-spokesperson-situation-yemen

[5] https://x.com/RiyadhAldubai/status/1917302026989416577

[6] https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1916759806548857085 ; https://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=16.929884&lon=43.732538&z=15&m=w&show=/8655366/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D9%8A&search=16.9304412%0943.73352785 ; https://www.google.com/maps/place/16%C2%B055'49.6%22N+43%C2%B044'00.7%22E/@16.9304425,43.7328841,245m/data=!3m2!1e3!4b1!4m4!3m3!8m2!3d16.9304412!4d43.7335278!5m1!1e2?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI1MDQyMy4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D

[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthi-tv-say-30-bodies-were-recovered-after-us-strike-sadaa-2025-04-28/

[8] https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110842

[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yv1KVMy1Bjs&ab_channel=i24NEWSEnglish; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13418396

[10] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13418396

[11] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/742042/

[12] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13418396

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/24/world/europe/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-government-economy.html

[14] https://t.me/syrianmoi/24055; https://x.com/AhmdAlkfry89/status/1916946396185608332

[15] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917161218810540216 ; https://x.com/idleb_online/status/1917236988194734248; https://x.com/idleb_online/status/1916883937198059649; https://x.com/dr_alssagheer/status/1917207388526121274; https://x.com/Ahmad_1alshble/status/1916941219197841509; https://x.com/mazen00711/status/1916964990294151493; https://x.com/Wesam_Asei/status/1916957640678380003; https://x.com/aliimaroush/status/1916935110525378773; https://x.com/SyrNetworkNews/status/1916926198069739720

[16]https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917161218810540216

[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/more-than-dozen-killed-sectarian-clashes-near-syrian-capital-2025-04-29 ; https://x.com/putintintin1/status/1917265494005973185

[18] https://x.com/OmarEdlbi/status/1917186947770159298 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917161218810540216

[19] https://t.me/syrianmoi/24055 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917161218810540216

[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/more-than-dozen-killed-sectarian-clashes-near-syrian-capital-2025-04-29/

[21] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0AZ94tv4czygGaDS7zvfHU9HvkuNpGscrdhVhwD8wuXgDhhJYH1Nf3jjDUT1brfjnl ; https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2025/04/29/eyewitnesses-clashes-jaramanh-damascus-countryside-amid-record-prophet-insult

[22] https://x.com/ivarmm/status/1917219403310997692 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1372840697288231

[23] https://www.npr.org/2025/04/09/g-s1-58707/syria-druze-militias

[24]https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0e1RUkaTanmmeoF77jWu9p4bacwygqLQnWLw5e8ALt41vmRBMjJm7CThc6v2NLjGLl

[25] www dot npasyria.com/211587

[26] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917263939861172345

[27] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917238338689421790 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917258680120271180

[28]https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1917252550224433161; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917240599373295957;

[29] Bon-bast.com

[30] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3301676

[31] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1055796

[32] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3301676

[33] https://ava-nar dot com/

[34] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/23/blast-at-iran-factory-as-israel-accuses-state-of-providing-drones-to-hamas

[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025

[36] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3301895

[37] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3301895

[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025

[39] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/29/world/europe/iran-port-explosion.html

[40] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202206094045 ;

https://www.mei.edu/publications/country-free-fall-corruptocracy-full-swing-why-building-collapse-iran-matters

[41] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-protests-abadan-building-collapse-death-toll/

[42] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512407

[43] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/09/3302108

[44] https://x.com/TamadonTV_EN/status/1916462058880540890 ; https://x.com/Abraracurs64713/status/1916751946737713545

[45] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/741998/

[46] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/10/3077087 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-may-16-2024-russian-outreach-across-africa-irans-uranium-aims-is-mozambique-continues-march#_edn0f99d097bfd5354c400db6b2ad155bfa74

[47] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/741998/

[48] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/13/iran-signs-agreements-with-zimbabwe-as-raisi-wraps-up-africa-tour

[49] https://halabtodaytv dot net/archives/281328

[50] https://syrianmemory dot org/archive/entities/5cc57afa2f7ab5000121dcda

[51] https://syrianmemory dot org/archive/entities/5cc57afa2f7ab5000121dcda

[52] https://halabtodaytv dot net/archives/281328

[53] https://levant24 dot com/news/2025/04/kurdish-unity-conference-continued-calls-for-decentralized-governance-in-syria/

[54] https://halabtodaytv dot net/archives/281328

[55] https://halabtodaytv dot net/archives/281328

[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU

[57] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU

[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU

[59] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU

[60] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU

[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8eGkkMhqypU

[62] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916902218885628398;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916905401347346567;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916911329308266724;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916931898028286105;

https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1917068593725886920;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917207233923862992; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917207233923862992;

https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1917211041492246798

[63] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916905401347346567;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916931898028286105

[64] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917207233923862992

[65] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1917211041492246798

[66] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916902218885628398; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1916911329308266724; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1917068593725886920

[67] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1917176850096464235

[68] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1917176850096464235

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 29, 2025

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Anna Harvey, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

April 29, 2025, 6 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on April 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government.[1] Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 29 that Ukrainian civilians, particularly those living in the Black Sea region, must "determine their own future."[2] Patrushev specifically noted that Odesa City spent over two centuries as the Russian Empire's and Soviet Union's outpost in the Black Sea and claimed that Odesa City residents have "nothing in common" with the current Ukrainian government. These statements are a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2023 claim that Ukrainians living in the Black Sea region have nothing "to do with Ukraine" and that Odesa is a "Russian city" and follows Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's April 14, 2025 claim that the Ukrainian government "does not represent" residents of Odesa City and other Ukrainian territories.[3] Patrushev claimed that Russia "respects the will of the [Ukrainian] people" and attempted to justify Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Crimea, Donbas, and "Novorossiya" — an invented region in Ukraine which the Kremlin has claimed includes all of eastern and southern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia.[4] Medvedev also claimed that the current Ukrainian government does not speak for the Ukrainian people.[5] Medvedev's and Patrushev’s statements reference the longstanding Kremlin demand for regime change in Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government that could struggle to oppose or even support the Kremlin's goal to occupy more territory in Ukraine at a later time of the Kremlin's choosing.[6]

Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the "illegitimacy" of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's presidency would create legal difficulties in direct peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but that Russia is more interested in starting negotiations and "everything else is secondary."[7] Peskov claimed on April 24 that Russia would restart its war should "people...question the legitimacy" of Zelensky and stated that Russia has "no confidence" in the Ukrainian government.[8] Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that all Ukrainian governments since 2014 are "illegitimate" and that Russia would not view any agreements concluded with the current Ukrainian government as binding.[9] Putin and other Russian officials have similarly claimed that Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024, and have additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials.[10] The Ukrainian Constitution explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.[11] The Kremlin is deliberately coupling its purported interest in Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations with its false narrative of Zelensky's illegitimacy in order to set conditions for Russia to claim that any future peace settlement that Russia signs with Zelensky is illegitimate, to renege on the agreement, and relaunch the invasion at the time of Russia's choosing. Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian Constitution.

Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire. Lavrov claimed on April 29 that the May 8 to 11 ceasefire will be the "beginning of direct negotiations, without preconditions," but stated that Russia considers the US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day ceasefire to be a "precondition."[12] Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term ceasefires, claiming that Russia cannot accept any longer-term ceasefire since such ceasefires require extensive monitoring measures. Lavrov stated that Russia does not think "honest" monitoring is possible during a 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the Ukrainian government does not have full control over all Ukrainian military units and will be unable to guarantee that Ukrainian forces adhere to the May 8 to 11 ceasefire.[13] Putin similarly declared a unilateral Easter ceasefire in mid-April 2025, and Russia has consistently accused Ukraine of violating previous ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations.[14] Ukraine — unlike Russia — supports US President Donald Trump's proposals for a 30-day temporary ceasefire or more permanent ceasefires.[15] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine and to maintain the illusion that Russia is interested in meaningful peace negotiations.[16]

Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population. Medvedev claimed that the West is attempting to use a principle of "peace through force" to harm Russia, but that Russia's only possible response to this principle is "peace through fear."[17] Medvedev claimed that other approaches do not work but that "fear still works." Medvedev claimed that the leaders in the European Union (EU) are "Russophobic" and that Russia's relations with Europe have "passed the point of no return."[18] Medvedev attempted to argue that allegations that Russia is trying to attack Europe are "nonsense."[19] Patrushev claimed that parts of Europe, including France and Germany, are "flirting with the Nazis" and "deploying the military machine against Russia."[20] Patrushev claimed that the United Kingdom (UK), the EU, and NATO leaders are threatening Russia and criticized NATO for holding large-scale exercises on its eastern flank, claiming that these exercises are practicing offensive actions against Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on April 29 at the "Great Heritage — Common Future" forum dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and claimed that Russia must prevent the revival of Nazism and the spread of destructive ideologies, including Russophobia and national or religious intolerance.[21] Putin's statements paralleled those of Medvedev and Patrushev, but were more tempered as Putin did not criticize or threaten Europe. Kremlin officials, including those within Putin's inner circle, have recently threatened European states, including NATO member states, and are setting conditions to justify potential future Russian aggression against Europe.[22]

Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies. Putin claimed that the world must create a new security architecture, particularly in Eurasia.[23] Putin claimed that the basis of this Eurasian security architecture could be already existing organizations, such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Patrushev similarly claimed in the April 29 TASS interview that the "Western-centric world" is no longer useful and that the popularity of BRICS and the SCO is growing.[24] Putin first proposed an alternative Eurasian and world security system in June 2024, reportedly with the support of People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping.[25] The organizations that Putin listed as the possible foundation of his proposed Eurasian security architecture are mostly Russian- or PRC-dominated and are meant as alternatives to the United Nations (UN) or US-led alliances. Putin's renewed calls for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture notably come as Russian and North Korean officials abruptly started to publicly acknowledge their military cooperation in Russia's war in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN, BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power.[27] These efforts aim to make Russia's geopolitical clout more resilient and to expand the space in which Russia can spread narratives and create perceptions.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government. Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea.
• Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing.
• Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.
• Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population.
• Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Alleged Ceasefire Violation
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in Kursk Oblast on April 29 as Russian forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their limited remaining positions in the area.[28]

Russian milbloggers claimed on April 29 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in unspecified border areas of Kursk Oblast.[29]

Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields west of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[30]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields southwest of Popovka (west of Demidovka).[31]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Popovka, in Grayvoron Raion (west of Belgorod City), and in unspecified areas along the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast border.[32]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian airbase and explosives factory in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of April 28 to 29. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on April 29 that sources in the Ukrainian security services and Russian rescue services stated that Ukrainian drones struck the Savasleyka Air Base, where a branch of the 4th Center for Combat Application and Crew Training is stationed, and the state-owned Sverdlova Plant in Dzerzhinsk that produces industrial explosives.[33] Astra reported that at least one Ukrainian drone struck the air base and that two drones hit the explosives plant. Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed on April 29 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strikes over two raions in the oblast.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna Street in northern Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City).[35]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed April 29 that Russian forces advanced further in northern Bilovody, in the fields northeast of Bilovody, and near Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City).[36]

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued northeast of Sumy City near Bilovody and Loknya.[37]

Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Hryhorov reported on April 29 that Russian forces do not control Zhuravka, Veselivka, Basivka, or Novenke (all northeast of Sumy City) and that these areas are in a contested "gray zone."[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, as well as elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[39]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lytpsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 28 and 29.[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Kharkiv Oblast.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Doroshivka (northwest of Kupyansk), and some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in fields west of Doroshivka.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border) and to central Mala Shapkivka (north of Kupyansk).[43]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashaivka, Zapadne, and Mala Shapkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on April 28 and 29.[44]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov rejected on April 29 the Russian MoD's April 28 claim that Russian forces seized Kamyanka.[45] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian fortifications and outposts remain in the village and that fighting continues in the area. An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue efforts to cross the Oskil River in multiple places to create a full bridgehead, but that Russian forces remain unable to establish pontoon crossings.[46]

Russian forces limited continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka on April 28 and 29.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the eastern outskirts of Lypove (north of Lyman) and advanced southeast of the settlement, reached northern Kolodyazi (southeast of Lypove), and advanced south of Nove (immediately east of Lypove).[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Nove and toward Lypove, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna, and northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Myrne, Katerynivka, Kolodyazi, and Novyi Mir on April 28 and 29.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk), indicating that Russian sources no longer claim that Russian forces have seized all of the settlement.[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 28 and 29.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 29 that Russian forces seized northern Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and advanced in fields east of Chasiv Yar.[52]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske and Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on April 28 and 29.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna Street in southern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[56]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tarasivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Berezivka (all southwest of Toretsk).[57]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Stara Mykolaivka, Oleksandropil, Yelyzavetivka, and Tarasivka on April 28 and 29.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Berezivka (southwest of Toretsk).[59]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on April 29 that Russian forces recently conducted a combined mechanized and motorized assault of an unspecified echelon in the Toretsk direction with armored vehicles and motorcycles.[60] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 29 that Russian forces continue to conduct infantry and motorized assaults in the Toretsk direction and are increasingly using motorized vehicles and fiber-optic drones.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 68th Tank Regiment, are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[62] Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Shcherbynivka.[63] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and the 944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kalynove (southwest of Toretsk).[64]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the railroad line west of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces occupy one-third of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced northeast of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[66]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Novotoretske, and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Zelene, and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novoserhiivka, Zvirove, and Pishchane on April 28 and 29.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kotlyne, Lysivka, Udachne, and near Shevchenko.[68]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone activity is complicating Russian advances and logistics near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka and that central Lysivka is a contested "gray zone."[69]

Order of Battle: Engineering elements of the Russian 12th Separate Engineering Brigade (201st Military Base, Central Military District [CMD]), sappers of the 351st Separate Engineer Sapper Battalion (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD), and "Somali" Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlayrivka, Troitske, Nadiivka, and Sribne; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 28 and 29.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Uspenivka.[73]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that small Russian assault groups mostly attack toward Ukrainian positions on foot but sometimes use motorcycles.[74]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway (southwest of Kostyantynopil), west of Kostyantynopil, and north and northwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[75]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopill and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne and Bahatyr on April 28 and 29.[76] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault consisting of five motorcycles near Odradne.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne and Bahatyr.[78]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently destroyed two bridges over the Vovcha River near Zelenyi Kut and Novoukrainka (both west of Oleksiivka).[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[80]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on April 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Vilne Pole.[81]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvvilne, Vilne Pole, Burlatske, Shevchenko, Vesele on April 28 and 29.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vesele.[83]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces near Vilne Pole.[84]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Lobkove on April 28 and 29.[85]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kherson direction on April 28 and 29 but did not make confirmed advances.[86]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and “FOBOS” drone group (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[87]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 100 Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Aktarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 37 drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 47 Russian decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[89]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko discussed Belarusian support for Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) at an April 29 meeting in Volgograd City.[90] Putin and Lukashenko agreed to expand cooperation in aircraft construction. Putin stated that Russia is ready to lay the foundations for the drone production facility in Belarus that Russia announced first announced in March 2024.[91] Russia will likely use this drone production factory to support combat operations in Ukraine and long-term efforts to expand Russia's military production capability.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

---

[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/23813173

[2] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23801487

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/14/12/2023/657acd6a9a79477cbd43f7d5

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625

[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/23813173

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125

[7] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/68108dd59a7947818ebfc843 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/29/peskov-nazval-vopros-o-legitimnosti-zelenskogo-vtorichnym-a-pervichnym-mirnye-peregovory

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524

[11] https://rm.coe dot int/constitution-of-ukraine/168071f58b ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025

[12] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/main/predlozhenie-o-peremirii-eto-nachalo-pryamyh-peregovorov-bez-predvaritelnyh-usloviy-lavrov

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/312559; https://tass do t ru/politika/23808087

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar0413

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825;

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[17] https://moscow.er dot ru/activity/news/dmitrij-medvedev-na-zapade-lezhit-vina-chto-idealy-poslevoennogo-miroustrojstva-spravedlivogo-bezopasnogo-i-sbalansirovannogo-mira-ostalis-mechtami ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23813001; https://tass dot ru/politika/23813001

[18] https://tass dot ru/politika/23813097

[19] https://tass dot ru/politika/23813787

[20] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23801487

[21] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76824

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025

[23] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76824

[24] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23801487

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/26209; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34979

[30] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27712; https://t.me/pentagonkh/233; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6021

[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884

[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/70087; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13017

[33] https://t.me/astrapress/80049

[34] https://t.me/glebnikitin_nn/6636; https://t.me/tass_agency/312596

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9020; https://t.me/OMBr67/2630

[36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9020; https://t.me/OMBr67/2630; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162906

[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63869

[38] https://deepstatemap dot live/#11/51.1703027/35.0595861; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1005845-na-sumsini-zbilsilas-sira-zona-u-napramku-lokni/; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35301 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1006003-pro-okupaciu-naselenih-punktiv-na-sumsini-mova-ne-vedetsa-nacalnik-ova-grigorov/

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90788; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162902; https://t.me/dva_majors/70125; https://t.me/dva_majors/70139; https://t.me/dva_majors/70141; https://t.me/rusich_army/23006

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976

[41] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7896; https://t.me/wargonzo/26212

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/51930 ; https://t.me/vrogov/20066; https://t.me/tass_agency/312655; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90805; https://t.me/dva_majors/70122; https://t.me/tass_agency/312685; https://t.me/tass_agency/312685; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63863

[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63863

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675;

[45] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1005793-voni-trisecki-zbrehali-v-osuv-hortica-prokomentuvali-zahoplenna-kamanki-na-harkivsini/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025

[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/vony-odrazu-ryyutsya-yak-kroty-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-okupantiv-hovayut-v-yihnih-norah/

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675;

[48] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31423

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675;

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27700; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884; https://t.me/tass_agency/312602

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34993

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34969; https://t.me/tass_agency/312611;

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34993

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27707

[56] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1917146365030781247; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/167; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9024

[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63865; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34971; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162843; https:// t.me/voenkorKotenok/63867; https:// t.me/motopatriot78/34983

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34971; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162843

[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63865

[60] https://t.me/ombr_28/2105 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/zashyta-bronekolona-i-shvydkisni-motoczykly-nashi-bijczi-vidbyly-kombinovanyj-shturm-rosiyan/

[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/na-sonczi-struny-tak-vidblyskuyut-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-dereva-vkryti-merezhyvom-optovolokna/

[62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162905 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70096

[63] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1917146365030781247; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/167; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9024

[64] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13733

[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9028; https://t.me/skala425/591

[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884

[67] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63867; https://t.me/dva_majors/70087 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162843; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162900

[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63867; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63868; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34975

[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692

[70] https://t.me/milinfolive/147124; https://t.me/wargonzo/26206; https://t.me/wargonzo/26221

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162900

[72] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675;

[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34975

[74] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/vmiyut-vidmichaty-lyudski-syluety-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-atakuyut-pid-plashhamy-nevydymkamy/

[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9019; https://www.facebook.com/37obrmp/videos/681331965053328/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9018; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9027; https://t.me/odshbr79/552

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XZGVo1qYmHFfu4p5U5N1Nt1hYEbKmLYdr2GU6MXr5yebUUBLp9SLJNT4VgwXo4AQl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; https://t.me/wargonzo/26209; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63870;

[77] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976

[78] https://t.me/wargonzo/26209 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14672

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27697 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70087

[80] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34965 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14664

[81] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9026; https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/1045086750863680/

[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63870

[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/14667

[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/14660

[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XZGVo1qYmHFfu4p5U5N1Nt1hYEbKmLYdr2GU6MXr5yebUUBLp9SLJNT4VgwXo4AQl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XZGVo1qYmHFfu4p5U5N1Nt1hYEbKmLYdr2GU6MXr5yebUUBLp9SLJNT4VgwXo4AQl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643

[87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162868; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63862

[88] https://t.me/kpszsu/33462

[89] https://t.me/kpszsu/33462; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21196; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1005615-cerez-masovanu-ataku-bpla-na-dnipropetrovsini-zaginula-ditina-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-misci-udaru/; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79619; https://t.me/synegubov/14051; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11616; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4526; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1005519-rosia-bezpilotnikami-atakuvala-kiiv-e-travmovana/

[90] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76825

[91] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2025