Iraq Situation Report: July 21 - 23, 2015

By: Sinan Adnan and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: July 18 - 20, 2015

By: Theodore Bell and ISW Iraq Team

Control of Terrain in Iraq: July 20, 2015

By: Sinan Adnan

Iraq Situation Report: July 14 - 16, 2015

Theodore Bell, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: July 11 - 13, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: July 09 - 10, 2015

Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Significant Offensives in Syria: June 6 - July 9, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande

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REBEL:

1. June 5 - 17: The JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room launched an offensive on June 5 which successfully seized the town of Mahambel and seven other villages along the Latakia – Idlib Highway, largely eliminating the remaining regime-held salient in Idlib Province. Rebel forces with the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room have since experienced difficulty in seizing remaining regime positions south of Jisr al-Shughour in southwestern Idlib Province or along the al-Ghab Plain in northwestern Hama Province. 

2. June 9 - 12: A number of FSA-affiliated and Islamist rebel factions announced the “Battle of Retribution for the Martyrs” on June 9 and seized the regime-held Brigade 52 base in eastern Dera’a Province following heavy clashes with regime forces. The same rebel forces later announced the “Battle of Crush the Tyrants” targeting the Tha’lah Airbase in western Suwayda Province, making initial gains before being repulsed following the arrival of Druze reinforcements.

3. June 16 - 29: Four separate rebel coalitions, including the newly-formed JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah al-Mintaqa al-Janoubiyah and two distinct operations rooms led by elements of the FSA-affiliated Southern Front, launched offensives targeting regime military positions in northern Quneitra Province in the vicinity of Druze-inhabited Mount Hermon. The stated goals of the offensives included a desire to open supply lines leading to rebel forces in the Western Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. Nonetheless, the offensives ultimately achieved only limited gains in the area as rebel forces came under pressure from clashes against alleged ISIS-affiliated rebels in western Dera’a Province, the joint Hezbollah-regime offensive on Zabadani northwest of Damascus, and Israeli warnings of a possible military intervention in the event of an attack against the pro-regime Druze of Mount Hermon.

4. June 25 - 30: Rebel forces with the FSA-affiliated Southern Front announced the "Battle of Southern Storm" on June 25 directed at seizing Dera'a City as the next phase of an effort to consolidate control over southern Syria and set conditions for an eventual assault against the Syrian capital of Damascus. Although rebel forces initially made limited tactical gains within Dera'a City, the offensive largely quieted by June 30 due to a rumored operational reassessment following high casualties and poor coordination between rebel forces. Rebel commanders nonetheless continue to insist that the “Battle of Southern Storm” will not be called off. 

5. July 2 – 8: The Fatah Halab Operations Room announced the start of the “Battle of Fatah Halab” on July 2 to seize full control over regime-held portions of Aleppo City. Combined moderate and Islamist rebel forces later seized control of the regime-held Scientific Research Center on the western outskirts of Aleppo City on July 3 amidst ongoing clashes as rebels attempted to break into the New Aleppo and az-Zahraa neighborhoods of northwestern Aleppo City. Meanwhile, JN and a number of Salafi-jihadist rebel factions also announced the formation of the Ansar al-Sharia Operations Room on July 2 and launched a parallel offensive against regime positions in the az-Zahraa district which has included at least one JN suicide attack against regime forces.

REGIME:

6. June 20 - 23: The regime reportedly deployed reinforcements including the elite ‘Tiger Forces’ Special Forces unit to the western countryside of Palmyra, sparking clashes with ISIS west of the city as well as in the nearby Sha’er and Jazal Gas Fields. Although regime officials have messaged an intent to recapture the city of Palmyra from ISIS forces, no notable offensive action has yet occurred. 

7. July 2 - 7: Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces announced the start of an offensive to seize the rebel-held town of Zabadani northwest of Damascus near the  Lebanese border on July 2. Zabadani occupies a key position near supply routes connecting Damascus to Hezbollah positions in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Clashes are currently ongoing as Hezbollah and regime forces attempt to enter the town from the west amidst clashes with JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and other rebel factions.  

YPG (KURDS):

8. June 6 - 23: Kurdish YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel factions and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes continued offensive operations to seize ISIS territory in northern Syria, seizing the ISIS-held border crossing of Tel Abyad on June 15 before moving south to capture the town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 military base on June 22-23. These gains provided a ground link between the Kurdish Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka Province (Cizire) cantons while placing joint YPG-FSA forces thirty miles north of the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City. Nonetheless, the YPG advance also elevated tensions with Turkey, which deployed military forces to its border amidst heightened concerns over “border security”. 

ISIS:

9. June 24 – July 7: ISIS launched a major offensive against regime positions in Hasaka City on June 24, seizing several of the city’s southern districts after heavy clashes which included a series of SVBIED attacks against both regime and Kurdish security installations. Regime forces reportedly began to reverse ISIS gains by the end of June following the deployment of Republican Guard reinforcements from Deir ez-Zour City, the arrival of SAA and NDF reinforcements from Qamishli, and the limited assistance provided by YPG forces in the eastern neighborhoods of the city. Nonetheless, local reports indicate that ISIS has secured additional advances against the regime in southern Hasaka City following a renewed wave of SVBIED and VBIED attacks beginning on July 1.

10. June 25 - July 6: ISIS launched a number of counterattacks against Kurdish-held terrain following the YPG successes at Tel Abyad and Ayn Issa in early June. A group of ISIS infiltrators equipped with at least two SVBIEDs entered the town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) on June 25, sparking two days of clashes which left over two hundred civilians dead. ISIS militants launched similar infiltrator attacks against two towns on the east bank of the Euphrates River on June 26 and against the recently-seized town of Tel Abyad on June 30. ISIS later launched a counterattack against joint YPG-FSA forces in Ayn Issa north of ar-Raqqa City on July 5 which included at least two SVBIED detonations; clashes are ongoing. 

KEY TAKEAWAY: Syrian rebel factions have launched long-awaited offensives against the isolated provincial capitals of Dera’a and Aleppo Cities, located in southern and northern Syria respectively. These two cities represent key lynchpins in the regime's ‘army in all corners’ strategy which allows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to claim control over all of Syria. The fall of either city to rebel forces including Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra would overturn the stalemate that has long characterized the Syrian Civil War, opening the door to further offensives against core regime terrain in Damascus and the Syrian Coast. Rebel forces have thus far achieved limited success in both cities, however, amidst reports of high casualties and poor coordination between rebel factions – in part due to friction between moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel factions and more extreme groups led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). If the rebel campaigns to seize Aleppo and Dera’a Cities stall over the coming weeks, JN and other Salafi-jihadist groups could seize the opportunity to expand their leadership role within the Syrian opposition by emphasizing the gains previously achieved in Idlib Province when rebel factions united under JN’s leadership. Rebel efforts in Aleppo and Dera’a Provinces have also been handicapped by the need to respond to the threat posed by ISIS and ISIS-sympathetic rebel brigades, which have encroached upon opposition-held terrain in both the northern countryside of Aleppo City and the southwestern countryside of Dera’a Province.

The regime’s successful defense of Aleppo and Dera’a Cities thus far belies that fact that the continued dedication of valuable combat resources to outlying “corners” of Syria risks overextending the defensive capabilities of regime forces. The regime appears particularly vulnerable to an offensive by ISIS against the Syrian central corridor while regime forces are fixed in northern and southern Syria. Although ISIS has directed its main effort in Syria over the past month against Kurdish YPG forces in northern Syria in a likely effort to protect ar-Raqqa City, ISIS remains a critical threat to both the regime’s core territory and its remaining remote outposts in eastern Syria. ISIS continued to launch probing attacks against rebel forces in the Eastern Qalamoun Mountains and regime positions in eastern Hama and Homs Provinces in a likely bid to seek opportunities for further territorial advancement in the vicinity of against Homs, Hama, and Damascus Cities meant to balance losses in northern Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, a major offensive by ISIS against Hasaka City in northeastern Syria forced the regime to deploy valuable elite Republican Guard units away from Deir ez-Zour City in a move possibly designed to weaken the regime's defenses there. The combined effects of these pressures taken in conjunction with ongoing rebel offensives could ultimately force the Syrian regime into an unwilling contraction, generating additional opportunities for ISIS to expand. 

The initiatives undertaken by the Syrian regime and its foreign backers during this reporting period suggest that the regime may be preparing for such an outcome. Regime forces have reportedly begun large-scale fortification efforts along the approaches to Damascus and Latakia in order to protect the regime’s core terrain in western Syria. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and regime forces have directed offensive operations to clear the remaining rebel presence in the Qalamoun Mountains along the Lebanese border – a necessary precondition for the formation of a loyalist rump state with connectivity to Hezbollah-dominated regions of Lebanon.  In light of these observations, the deployment of elite regime combat units to regions west of Palmyra in central Syria may also constitute a defensive maneuver to buffer the Syrian central corridor against further ISIS advances rather than a decisive effort to recapture the city as hinted by senior regime officials.  Overall, the limited offensive maneuvers conducted by the Syrian regime in recent months suggest that the regime’s capacity to set the terms of battle and dictate the trajectory of the Syrian Civil War may have been significantly degraded by the concurrent pressures of rebel and ISIS offensives.

Iraq Situation Report: July 07 - 08, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: July 02 - 06, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Rebels Launch New Offensive in Southern Syria

by: Jennifer Cafarella

Rebel forces in Southern Syria have mobilized for what they hope will be the final phase of a major campaign to force the regime to withdraw from Southern Syria.  Should they succeed, they may achieve enough momentum to advance to Damascus and may force the Assad regime to contract from outlying areas, including southern, eastern, and northern Syria where the regime is also challenged. A successful operation by rebels in Southern Syria could therefore alter the stalemate of the Syrian war even though rebels across northern and southern Syria are not coordinated. Rebels in Southern Syria represent a strong potential partner for the U.S. not only to end the Syrian war, but also to limit the expansion of ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. The moderate rebel Southern Front coalition has played a leading role in Southern Syria since the summer of 2014, a distinction from other fronts on which moderate rebels play a minimal role. Islamists brigades have fought alongside them, however, and Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) has supported their effort, indicating that the influence of moderate rebels in Southern Syria is vulnerable. While their tactical cooperation may improve their chances of driving pro-regime forces from southern Dera’a province, it may also limit future opportunities for the U.S. to capitalize upon their success if moderate rebels are not empowered to remain in the lead through increased international support.

Syrian rebel forces in the moderate Southern Front Coalition declared“Battle of Southern Storm” in Dera’a Province on June 24, 2015. The objective of the Battle of Southern Storm appears to be to oust the regime from of Dera’a Province and to set conditions for an eventual assault on Damascus. After allowing one day for civilians to evacuate the city, rebels launched a “large scale” attack against pro-regime forces in Dera’a City on June 25. Rebels made initial advances, seizingthe Dera'a National Hospital and a regime-held checkpoint near the Bassel al-Assad Stadium in northern Dera'a City, significant because Dera’a city has not been an active frontline over the past year. Regime forces responded with a major increase in aerial bombardment including over 60 barrel bombs in Dera’a City and its outskirts on June 25 alone. Clashes remain ongoing as of July 2 with the participation of Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other hardline Islamist brigades, although it is unclear which side is currently gaining momentum. The initial JN and rebel gains in Dera’a City are a notable escalation, though they do not yet constitute a sufficient challenge to pro-regime forces in the city to prompt a regime withdrawal. The “Battle of Southern Storm” however will likely not be restricted to Dera’a city, but rather target the breadth of regime outposts remaining in Dera’a province.   

Primarily moderate rebel forces supported by JN and other Islamist rebels set the conditions for this offensive through a yearlong campaign to eliminate major regime-held military bases in the Dera’a and Quneitra countryside. This preparation of the battlefield reflects a long-term campaign design, of which the latest battle for Dera’a City is a recent component. Beginning in June 2014, combined anti-Assad forces successfully restricted the regime to an isolated salient that connects Damascus to Dera’a City. The spokesperson for the Battle of Southern Storm on June 24, 2015 designatedthis entire stretch of regime-held terrain as a military zone, indicating that the battle is not limited to Dera’a City, but rather is intended to “liberate” the entirety of Dera’a Province. The initial goal of the offensive is to force the regime to fall back to the regime stronghold of Izra’a, north of Dera’a City, according to the deputy commander of a prominent moderate brigade participating in the operation named the Yarmouk Army. If successful, this offensive could allow rebel forces to consolidate in southern Dera’a Province before advancing northward toward Damascus.

Moderate and Islamist Rebels Establish New Command-and-Control Structures

The list of participating rebel brigades in the Battle of Southern Storm is currently unclear. It is possible that negotiations are still ongoing between the Southern Front, JN, and Islamist brigades, which could account for the slow start to the offensive. According to a Southern Front representative, the offensive is coordinated through a “higher central operations room,” which appears to be a new structure established for the purposes of this offensive beginning in June 2015. According to the Yarmouk Army deputy commander, the Battle of Southern Storm involves seven geographically based operations rooms, the term that opposition forces use for headquarters that ensure unity of effort across different groups on the battlefield. The commander did not disclose the composition or location of these operations rooms, which likely include both moderate and Islamist brigades across multiple front lines in southern Syria.

Prior to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm, the Southern Front created a new coordinative body in an attempt to formalize its command and control of the more than 40 brigades within the Southern Front. The relationship between this new body and the Battle of Southern Storm operations room is unclear. The role of the Southern Front coalition in rebel military campaigns was previously limited to unifying the political programs and social media efforts of numerous brigades, many of which receive support from regional and Western backers through a Military Operations Command (MOC) center in Amman, Jordan. The Southern Front announced the establishment of a new Joint Military Command on May 15, 2015 under the leadership of Abu Osama al-Joulani from the First Army, a prominent rebel coalition folded under the umbrella of the Southern Front. The new joint command is intended to function as a formal military headquarters with support staff to coordinate the operations of the Southern Front’s component brigades. The command includes five subsidiary offices for operations, armament, logistics, relief, and management. It is unclear whether this joint military command will succeed in increasing the effectiveness of moderate rebel operations against the regime, and some Southern Front commanders have continued to report inefficiencies in the organization’s operations. Its formation is nonetheless a notable step forward that could increase the effectiveness of moderate rebel forces within the Battle of Southern Storm, and it may signal an increase in support provided to the Southern Front by outside backers in the MOC.

Islamist forces supported by JN also created new formal military alliances in the lead-up to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm.  JN, the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement (HASI), and eight primarily Islamist brigades announced the formation of the Harmoun Army in northern Quneitra Province on June 16. Then, on June 20, JN, HASI, and seven other Islamist rebel groups announced the formation of the Jaysh al-Fatah [“Army of Conquest”] “southern sector” in order “to unify rebel ranks” to combat both “domestic and foreign challenges,” a likely reference to outside funding and military support  received by many Southern Front rebel brigades. Jaysh al-Fatah includes relatively small brigades that are loosely associated with the Southern Front in addition to the primarily Islamist Fatah al-Sham operations room. The exact relationship between the Harmoun Army and Jaysh al-Fatah is unclear, but the participation of JN and HASI in both structures indicates that there is likely substantial coordination between the two. Both groups also operate in close proximity to the moderate A'sifa al-Haqq Operations Room based in northwestern Dera’a Province and led by the moderate Southern Front’s First Army. The Harmoun Army, Jaysh al-Fatah, and A’sifa al-Haqq constitute lower echelon military structures that each coordinates the activities of numerous rebel brigades, and in the case of the Harmoun Army and Jaysh al-Fatah, their operations extend farther into southern Syria. Where their operations are co-located southwest of Damascus, it is possible these three smaller coalitions will achieve unity of effort against the regime through one local operations room within the Battle for Southern Storm despite their ideological differences. The question of JN’s increased influence or dominance over moderate rebel structures remains a concern given this potential development.

Rebel Attempts to Limit al-Qaeda Affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra

There are other causes of concern. The Jaysh al-Fatah southern sector is a repeat of a successful model for military operations established by JN and Islamist forces in Idlib Province. The creation of the original Jaysh al-Fatah operations room in Idlib Province enabled JN and Islamist forces to seize control of a majority of Idlib Province from pro-regime forces beginning in March 2015. JN established a second version of the Jaysh al-Fatah model in the Qalamoun region of the Damascus Countryside in April 2015, and has since called for the establishment of a Jaysh al-Fatah version in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. JN’s ability to export this model indicates its growing momentum in Syria and its continued significance as a military power in the fight against Assad. JN’s intent to leverage its influence within these structures to shape rebel governance structures and religious activity appears to have prompted some Islamist groups to pressure JN quietly to relinquish its al-Qaeda affiliation. JN’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Joulani rejected this proposal in a two-part interview with al-Jazeera in May and June through which he firmly reasserted JN’s allegiance to al-Qaeda. Islamist forces are likely to continue to accommodate JN’s al-Qaeda character as long as combined JN-Islamist operations against the regime continue to achieve success.

Moderate rebel forces seek to limit JN’s influence in a future post-Assad Syrian state. JN’s deepening role within Islamist structures counters this effort by ensuring JN’s staying power within the province. The Southern Front increased its rhetoric against JN in early 2015, likely prompted by JN’s increasingly overt links to al-Qaeda in public statements. In early April 2015, six rebel brigades released statements condemning JN’s transnational agenda. After the formation of Jaysh al-Fatah, the Southern Front released a statement distancing itself from the new operations room, accusing Jaysh al-Fatah of imposing its own “unnationalistic” agenda against the will of the Syrian people. A number of Southern Front affiliates also released independent statements confirming their refusal to cooperate with Jaysh al-Fatah, including the First Army, Seif al-Sham Brigades, and the 24^th Infantry Division. These statements reaffirm the commitment of Southern-Front affiliated brigades to establishing a secular and democratic post-Assad Syrian state in the face of growing JN prominence, possibly in order to satisfy outside supporters. The statements are likely also an attempt to encourage rebel brigades to refrain from deepening their cooperation with JN in Southern Syria by placing a stigma on military structures with overt JN participation.

There is nonetheless little indication that the Southern Front will actually terminate its military cooperation with JN in the near term. Statements by moderate rebel brigades have not resulted in observable changes on the battlefield, where JN, Islamist, and moderate rebel forces continue to operate in close proximity. The Jaysh al-Fatah operations room and the Southern front reportedly confirmed their cooperation prior to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm and may have actually formalized their relationship. The participation of JN and Islamist rebels in clashes in Dera’a City, as well as the inclusion of Southern Front-affiliated brigades in the Jaysh al-Fatah coalition, furthermore indicates that segregation between moderates and JN-allied Islamists is unlikely to emerge in Southern Syria. In fact, according to “informed” pro-rebel sources cited by the Syrian activist network Zaman al-Wasl, efforts are underway to “enhance” the coordination between the Southern Front, JN, and Islamist rebels. A rebel source claimed that there are 40 suicide bombers ready for deployment in the Battle of Southern Storm, likely confirming that JN will contribute directly to offensives led by primarily moderate brigades.

The trend in Southern Syria points toward deeper cross-spectrum integration of anti-Assad actors in the absence of direct outside intervention. Additional success against Assad will therefore likely come at the cost of the continued rise to influence of JN and its Islamist allies. Public statements by moderate rebel commanders reflect this reality. In interviews with Syrian activist networks, moderate rebel commanders have consistently deflected questions regarding how to navigate differences between Islamists and moderates in a post-Assad environment. While moderate rebels have become more willing to criticize JN’s vision, they continue to refrain from condemning the Islamist agenda held by other rebel groups such as HASI in favor of remaining united in the fight against Assad. This overall prioritization of the fall of the Assad regime above other long-term questions is a characteristic of Syrian rebel brigades across front lines from northern to southern Syria. Recognizing this reality is a necessary precondition of fruitful engagement with Syrian rebel forces in an effort to accelerate an end to the Syrian war.

Effect on the Regime

The Battle of Southern Storm nevertheless threatens the Assad regime at a particularly vulnerable time. The regime is facing challenges to its remaining outposts on multiple fronts, including Deir ez Zour and Hasaka in the east, Idlib and Hama in the north, and Homs and Qalamoun in central Syria. The seizure of Dera’a City by anti-Assad forces could be a sufficient turning point in the Syrian war to prompt a regime contraction out of Southern Syria toward the Syrian capital, despite the fact that anti-Assad actors in northern, eastern, and southern Syria are not coordinated. Alternately, it is possible that remaining pro-regime forces in Dera’a City are sufficiently capable to resist combined anti-Assad forces. There is reportedly a regime special operations headquarters at the Dera’a City municipal stadium that includes Iranian-sponsored forces. Iran may choose to increase its direct support to Assad in order to forestall regime defeat at Dera’a City. The defeat of the stronghold of Iranian-sponsored paramilitary forces in Busra al-Sham by combined JN, Islamist, and moderate rebels on March 24th indicates, however, that even additional Iranian support may be insufficient to retain Dera’a City.

The regime has substantial military fortifications north of Dera’a City on the Damascus-Dera’a Highway that it could choose to reinforce in the event of a loss at Dera’a City in order to blunt further rebel advances toward the capital. The regime likely does not possess sufficient manpower reserves, however, to do so, especially under growing strain from ISIS in Eastern Homs, Deir ez-Zour, and Hasaka Provinces. The regime is therefore unlikely to succeed in holding an interim defensive line near Izra’a and could choose to withdraw to a more defensible perimeter around Damascus if rebel forces begin to seize greater terrain. This would likely involve a full withdrawal from Dera’a and Suwayda Provinces, and possibly from remaining regime strongholds in northern Quneitra Province, or conversely a surge of pro-regime activity in Quneitra province, strategically positioned next to the Golan Heights. Such a contraction would cause a major shift in the Syrian war, likely requiring Assad to abandon his current strategic objective to maintain his claim to the entirety of Syria.

The regime has reportedly begun to increase its fortification of Damascus, potentially signaling that it intends to harden the capital against future rebel assault as a defensive priority. Existing military fortifications on the high ground on the southern outskirts of the capital, originally intended to blunt an Israeli armored advance from the Golan Heights, provide an existing line of defense that the regime could sufficiently consolidate by withdrawing forces from Dera’a. Regime forces began constructing nearly two kilometers of earthen berms along the Old Dera'a Highway and the Hawsh Belas Industrial Complex south of Damascus on June 23 in an effort to fortify the southern and southwestern entrances to the capital. In a worst-case scenario, the regime may even calculate that chemical weapons will be necessary to halt rebel gains or screen a withdrawal from southern Syria. A report citing U.S. intelligence officials, released on June 28, warned that the regime’s situation may be growing sufficiently dire to prompt the regime to use remaining vestiges of the its chemical weapons stockpile, which experts think Assad may possess.

There have been multiple indicators of the regime’s unease over its disposition in southern Syria. At least two separate groups of pro-regime soldiers have defected to rebel ranks since the beginning of 2015, highlighting declining morale. Iranian officers reportedly executedregime officers in the Dera’a City Municipal Stadium, likely in an attempt to deter further defections or punish perceived failings on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the regime continues to struggle to rally the minority Druze population of neighboring Suwayda Province to replenish pro-regime ranks. Druze residents have actively resisted attempts to implement forced conscription campaigns in Suwayda Province and Druze elders have articulated a policy of restrained self-defense and neutrality in the fighting between regime and rebel forces. Roughly 100 newly enlisted Druze soldiers fled their posts in Eastern Suwayda Province on June 24, allegedly in response to the regime’s intent to deploy them into Eastern Dera’a Province. If the regime contemplates a partition, it is likely that the Druze will prevent the regime from withdrawing its armor from Suwayda Province and opt for allegiance with Syrian rebels. Druze fighters have intervened twice since the beginning of 2015 to prevent the regime from deploying armored columns out of Suwayda Province, likely in order to ensure the Druze population has sufficient military resources to ensure its own protection.

Setting the Conditions for Damascus?

The desire to advance against Damascus in the long-term is a common objective that will likely continue to unite moderate, JN, and Islamist forces on an operational level. The Southern Front in particular has consistently messaged its operations in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces as condition-setting efforts for a drive to Damascus. The inclusion of prominent Damascus-based rebel commanders into the Southern Front joint command could also indicate the active preparation for a future Damascus offensive. In addition to its five offices, the joint command includes a delegate from the Qalamoun region of the northern Damascus countryside, Bakkour al-Salim, the former leader of the FSA-affiliated Damascus Military Council. The Southern Front has historically included Qalamoun in its claimed area of operations, so the inclusion of Salim into the Southern Front joint command is not necessarily a departure that signals near-term intent to conduct major operations in Damascus. Nonetheless, the inclusion of prominent Damascus-based rebel commanders in the Southern Front joint command indicates that the Southern Front retains a strategic vision that involves leveraging advances in southern Syria into eventual gains in the Syrian capital.

More notable are reports of increasing negotiation between the Southern Front and prominent Islamist brigades based in Damascus. These talks with actors not historically associated with the Southern Front could indicate active efforts to cultivate a new Damascus front as a follow-on operation to the Battle of Southern Storm. Prominent Damascus based Islamist commander Zahran Alloush, the leader of Jaysh al-Islam, has allegedly decreased his direct oversight of rebel operations in the capital in order to participate in a series of meetings with regional actors. Abu Mohammad al-Fateh, the leader of another Damascus based Islamist group named the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union, has reportedly filled in as the leader of the Damascus rebel coalition the Eastern Ghouta Unified Command in Alloush’s absence. Alloush reportedly arrived in Turkey on April 17 for a series of undisclosed talks, including a meeting with members of HASI leadership. Then, on June 6, unconfirmed reports indicated that Alloush traveled to Amman, Jordan, in order to meet with foreign intelligence officials and Syrian rebel commanders. According to one report, this meeting focused on discussing options to counter both ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. Rumors circulating on Twitter meanwhile alleged that the intelligence officials asked Alloush to coordinate with the Southern Front against ISIS and JN in both Dera'a and Quneitra Provinces, and discussed the potential for replacing Jaysh al-Islam’s flag with the Syrian Revolutionary flag. Alloush has also begun to step back from his previously sectarian rhetoric, most notably during an interview with McClatchy DC in which Alloush referred to the Alawite sect as “part of the Syrian people”. This appears to confirm that outside supporters of Alloush, namely Saudi Arabia, and of the Southern Front broadly are actively exploring options to achieve unity of effort across previously disparate moderate and Islamist rebel ranks.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The emerging situation in Southern Syria provides a new opportunity for the U.S. to engage in Syria. The aggregate effects of the rebel campaign in Southern Syria, recent JN and rebel victories in Idlib Province, and continued pressure by ISIS on the Assad regime across multiple fronts may sufficiently disrupt the regime to render a feasible end to the Syrian war. A reevaluation of the scope of the U.S. train and assist program can generate meaningful ground partnerships if it accommodates a wider mission in Syria, namely helping rather than discouraging rebels from their primary effort to overthrow Assad. Especially given the recently confirmed defection of another vetted unit of Syrian rebels from the program, the program as it stands currently is not poised to have a positive impact upon either the Syrian war or the war against ISIS. The moderate rebel Southern Front on the other hand offers a compelling option for direct U.S. engagement under an altered policy framework. The Southern Front does not, however, present a full solution.

The U.S. could consider the possibility of leveraging select Islamist rebels as allies alongside the Southern Front. Even strong moderate rebels in Southern Syria are insufficient to defeat Assad or to ensure the establishment of a stable post-Assad Syrian state capable of addressing the threats of al-Qaeda and ISIS. The involvement of powerful Islamist rebel groups that are not committed to JN may therefore be critical for achieving success in Syria. A spectrum of Islamist brigades exists in Syria, ranging from hardline groups with close ideological affiliation with JN to more mainstream groups with a desire for Shari’a law to inform a post-Assad Syrian state. The U.S. has the option to engage with the latter category, namely mainstream independent Islamist groups that are fighting alongside moderate forces. Attempts by the moderate Southern Front to negotiate constructive relationships with Islamist brigades, possibly including some Damascus-based Islamists, signal an opportunity for the U.S. and regional partners to capitalize on existing options for cross-spectrum rebel coordination that does not cater directly to al-Qaeda’s interests. This engagement must extend to northern Syria, where moderates and Islamists continue to work in close coordination against the regime, but also where moderates are operating at a relative disadvantage.

 

A carefully tailored engagement with some Syrian Islamist groups could enable the U.S to take action to contain and diminish JN’s influence in Syria. It is critical that the U.S. take action to reverse the formalized coordination between JN and Islamist forces that translated into joint JN and Islamist governance structures within Idlib City after seizing the City in March 2015. A similar development in Southern Syria may become likely if the Battle of Southern Storm succeeds, in which the Southern Front is compelled to accept the involvement of JN and Islamist actors in post-Assad institutions. Over the long term, this embedded JN presence is a strategic threat for the U.S. because of the staying power and access to resources it provides to al-Qaeda in Syria. The U.S. could leverage increased support to both moderate and select Islamist forces to appeal to more hardline Islamist groups such as HASI to abandon their allegiance to JN. HASI’s participation in cross-spectrum rebel efforts to establish a united political program, notably through the Syrian Revolutionary Command Council based in Turkey, indicates that the U.S. could likely succeed in this effort. The U.S. should nonetheless be prepared for JN to attempt to rally its rebel allies to resist the U.S. and fight U.S.-supported rebels. With sufficient U.S. commitment, however, JN will be unable to sustain this narrative in the long term.

A defeat of the regime in southern Syria will likely produce escalating violence in the absence of intervention to mitigate potential risks. Rebel advances will likely provoke the regime to resort to desperate tactics such as the use of residual chemical weapons capability in order to forestall defeat in Southern Syria or facilitate a regime contraction. In the absence of overt support by the U.S. or regional actors to Syrian rebels, the regime may calculate that it can act with impunity and continue its escalation against civilians. Further atrocity by the Syrian regime could prompt retributive attacks by Syrian rebel groups against pro-regime populations, such as those in remaining besieged enclaves north of Aleppo City and northeast of Idlib City. JN will likely capitalize on escalating violence in order to propagate its sectarian narrative, and possibly generate support for a campaign against the coastal Alawite heartland. This increased destabilization within the Syrian Civil War will provide opportunities for ISIS to expand, potentially encouraging ISIS to launch a major spectacular attack against a major regime target such as Homs City.

Furthermore, the narrow focus of the U.S. on a counter-ISIS mission despite these realities risks encouraging regional actors to undertake unilateral action, which could actually provoke further instability and spillover of the Syrian war. Unconfirmed reports have emerged that indicate Turkey, Israel, and Jordan are independently contemplating the establishment of no-fly zones or humanitarian corridors along their respective borders. For Turkey, the focus is negating the ability of Syrian Kurds to declare an independent state along the Turkish border, in addition to likely Turkish desire to resettle Syrian refugees on the Syrian side of the border. For Israel, the calculation appears to focus on the security of the Golan Heights border. For Jordan, the consideration of a humanitarian corridor appears to reflect a desire to prevent JN from ascending further, as it did in Idlib Province. The vocal reports of the consideration of unilateral measures by these governments likely signals increasing pressure on the U.S. to intervene in Syria. If the U.S. continues to ignore their calls for American leadership, it is a dangerous but likely scenario that the U.S. will ultimately have to provide that leadership in the future under worse circumstances.

The U.S. must therefore carefully consider the options for intervention in Syria while recognizing the likely cost of refraining to act. In mid-2015, a large and sustained engagement with a spectrum of Syrian rebels as a component of a comprehensive strategy to end the Syrian war offers the opportunity for the U.S. to accomplish three strategic objectives in the region: to mitigate the humanitarian disaster in Syria, to contain and diminish al-Qaeda’s influence, and to set the conditions to defeat ISIS. Conversely, limited means of intervention, such as no fly zones, train and assistance only of vetted rebels, or targeted airstrikes against ISIS and al-Qaeda, incur greater risk of atrocity and violent extremism if they are not pursued as components of a strategy to the Syrian war. The forms of limited intervention proposed by neighboring states meanwhile leave the growing strength of JN in Syria entirely untouched, presenting a long term and strategic threat in the form of a highly capable and resilient al-Qaeda affiliate. While the realistic options for successful intervention are costly, they must nonetheless be considered in accordance with the likely outcomes of the Syrian Civil War in order to ensure U.S. national security and stability in the region.

Iraq Situation Report: June 30 - July 01, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: June 27 - 29, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: June 25 - 26, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

ISIS Counterattacks in Northern Syria

by: Christopher Kozak with Jennifer Cafarella

ISIS launched a series of spectacular counterattacks on June 24-25 in a two-pronged line of effort targeting Kurdish and regime forces in northern Syria. ISIS conducteda wave of suicide attacks in Hasaka City in northeastern Syria on June 24, detonatingtwo SVBIEDs as well as three or four SVESTs targeting Kurdish internal security and regime-held checkpoints in a move likely intended to soften the city’s defenses. ISIS later launchedan offensive against Hasaka City on June 25, detonating at least one VBIED and seizingthe regime-held southwestern neighborhoods of the city. ISIS’s advance allegedly received supportfrom tribal fighters previously aligned with the Assad regime. Simultaneously, approximately thirty to forty ISIS fighters disguisedin Kurdish YPG and Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebel uniforms infiltratedthe Kurdish border town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) on June 25, detonating twoSVBIEDsat the border crossing to Turkey and clashing with YPG forces.

ISIS’s synchronized attacks in northern Syria likely represent part of an overarching campaign to contain its opponents in the area and set conditions for further advances in Syria. The attacks in Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka City appear designed to disrupt ongoing YPG-led anti-ISIS operations in northern ar-Raqqa Province in order to divert pressure away from core ISIS terrain in ar-Raqqa City. The scale of the ISIS offensive against Hasaka City also suggests that ISIS may intend to seize the city to offset recent losses to Kurdish and rebel forces along the Syrian-Turkish border at the border crossing of Tel Abyad as well as the town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 base further south. At minimum, ISIS’s attacks in Ayn al-Arab and Hasaka City demonstrate that ISIS possesses sufficient resiliency to absorb losses in northern Syria without losing the capability to conduct military operations. Alternately, reports indicating that ISIS did not mount fierce resistance in either Tel Abyad or Ayn Issa suggest that ISIS may have accepted a degree of calculated risk north of ar-Raqqa City in order to conserve resources for new lines of effort targeting Hasaka City, central Syria, or other regions of the country. 

Iraq Situation Report: June 23 - 24, 2015

Sinan Adnan, Patrick Martin, and ISW Iraq Team

The Regime's Offensive Campaign: Damascus and Environs

This analysis of the Syrian regime’s offensive campaign in Damascus and the nearby environs is adapted from the ISW report “An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria by ISW Syria Analyst Christopher Kozak published in April 2015. 

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June 24th Update: As the Syrian Civil War moves into its fifth year, the Assad regime appears increasingly incapable of mounting successful large-scale offensive maneuvers capable of securing and holding territory amidst a string of recent ISIS, JN, and Syrian opposition advances. Unconfirmed reports over the past twenty-four hours indicate that Syrian rebels may now be preparing for a major offensive to seize Dera’a City in southern Syria in preparation for a potential drive on Damascus. The excerpt below details the regime’s military operations in Damascus and its environs through late 2014 and into 2015 in order to provide context regarding the military priorities and capabilities of the Assad regime in southern Syria. ISW will release a publication next week detailing recent developments in the south and their implications for the Syrian Civil War.

Taken as a whole, Assad’s military campaign has largely succeeded only in generating further disorder. The strategy of defensive protraction adopted by the Assad regime resulted in a grueling and destructive stalemate across most of the battlefields of Syria through 2014 and into 2015. Limited manpower and resupply options constrained the offensive capabilities of pro-regime forces, forcing Assad to prioritize a small number of fronts while maintaining a reactive stance throughout the remainder of the country. This force posture has entrenched a state of persistent conflict in Syria which exacerbated humanitarian ailments, deepened polarization among the populace, and provided space for jihadist forces to expand their social and military control relatively unchecked. An increasing reliance on paramilitary and Iranian proxy forces along the most critical frontlines in Aleppo, Damascus, and the Alawite heartland failed to secure decisive victories against opposition forces and fueled sectarian narratives of conflict promulgated by extremist actors. An examination of the frontlines in Aleppo, Damascus, and central Syria where Assad chose to go on the offensive demonstrates how Assad balanced his available resources in order to achieve some battlefield success while preserving the ongoing stalemate across the country.

Aleppo

One of the keys to Assad’s military strategy has been the campaign for Aleppo, a major commercial capital in northern Syria and Syria’s second-largest city. A continuous military presence in the city is essential to Assad’s claim to control all of Syria, though rebels have contested the city since 2012. Full control of Aleppo would strengthen the negotiating position of the regime in any future political settlement. It holds equal value to the opposition. The frontlines between regime and rebel forces within Aleppo city proper have remained relatively static for over two years as both sides lack the necessary manpower and equipment to clear and hold the dense urban terrain of the city. The regime decided to lay siege to rebel positions in the city in late 2013, shifting the relevant battlespace to the rural outskirts of the city where the regime’s superiority in armor and air assets could be maximized in support of offensive maneuver operations largely unseen in the rest of Syria. This ‘siege-and-starve’ strategy also followed the model of similar sieges by the regime throughout the country, most notably in Homs city and the suburbs of Damascus.

The regime began the first phase of its encirclement campaign by seizing the heavily defended urban terrain of the Sheikh Najjar Industrial City northeast of Aleppo on July 5, 2014. The advance by the regime took advantage of advances made by ISIS north of Aleppo city which threatened rebel supply lines crossing into Turkey and spurred confusion among opposition ranks. Regime forces augmented by a range of pro-regime irregulars launched a second phase of advance and seized the villages of Handarat north of Aleppo city on October 3, 2014, in a direct threat to the only major rebel supply line into Aleppo city, the Castello Road. This same coalition of pro-regime forces entered the al-Mallah farmlands west of Handarat village on December 14, 2014. The growing delays between these advances, as well as an increasing reliance on Iranian proxy fighters staging through the Nayrab Airbase, suggested that the year-long operation to encircle Aleppo had come under increasing stress by late 2014.

In a sign of the pressures placed upon pro-regime forces, the regime encirclement of Aleppo suffered its first significant setback in February 2015. On February 17, 2015, regime forces supported by fresh NDF, Hezbollah, and Shi’a Afghan reinforcements seized large portions of the villages of Bashkuy, Rityan, Duwayr al-Zeitun, and Hardatnin north of Aleppo following a rapid westward advance. The regime likely sought to break the siege of the Shi’a-majority towns of Nubl and Zahraa northwest of Aleppo, linking their forces in an arc of control dominating almost all opposition supply lines in the northern countryside of Aleppo. However, the scale and speed of the advance apparently overextended regime forces, leaving their positions vulnerable to rebel counterattack. 

Rebel forces recaptured the villages north of Aleppo within four days after clashes which killed over 150 pro-regime fighters. JN, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, and other allied Salafi-jihadist groups also captured the al-Mallah farmlands on February 20, 2015 and portions of Handarat village on March 10, reducing regime gains to the October 2014 status quo. This reversal demonstrated the difficulties that the regime faces in completing the encirclement of Aleppo while operating at the end of an extended supply line. However, despite these setbacks, regime forces still pose a dire threat to opposition-held Aleppo. Aleppo is a key northern “pin” on the map of Syria and Assad remains unlikely to abandon his campaign for any reason. The arrival of further regime reinforcements or an escalation of rebel infighting in Aleppo could enable the regime to complete the encirclement of the city. The end result of this operation would be a protracted siege of Aleppo which subjects the rebel-held districts of Syria’s commercial capital to starvation and punishing aerial bombardment in a powerful symbolic and strategic blow to the Syrian opposition. 

Securing Damascus

The elimination of the opposition threat to the Syrian capital of Damascus formed the second core component of the Assad regime’s military strategy. Durable control over the formal seat of government and the home of several million Syrian citizens provides the Syrian regime with a solid claim to domestic and international legitimacy. Damascus is also key terrain from a military perspective due to the high number of airbases, military installations, and elite SAA units present in the vicinity of the city. Damascus also serves as a key transit route for shipments of Iranian weapons and equipment to Lebanese Hezbollah and other proxy forces via the Damascus International Airport. Rebel forces began actively contesting the capital in early 2012 and currently hold large swathes of the eastern and southern suburbs of the city.

The regime’s campaign for Damascus can be broken into two distinct lines of effort. The first primary focus is the battle to reduce and eventually eliminate the strong rebel pocket in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs, a mixed rural-urban region which holds an estimated 160,000 civilians and opposition fighters.167 Eastern Ghouta has been the scene of some of the fiercest urban fighting in the capital, including the August 21, 2013 chemical weapons attacks targeting several opposition-held districts in the area. Meanwhile, the regime has also conducted a systematic effort to neutralize other opposition-held neighborhoods through sieges, starvation, and ceasefire agreements, preserving its combat power for other battlefronts. Assad has heavily relied upon his elite ‘praetorian guard’ units – including the Republican Guard and the 4th Armored Division – as well as Iranian proxy forces in order to prosecute his campaign in Damascus. Regime forces concentrated their offensive capacities against Eastern Ghouta in an attempt to neutralize and compress the largest pocket of opposition fighters in the capital. In contrast, the Assad regime utilized siege-and-starve tactics to neutralize rebel forces in the denser urban terrain of southern Damascus with minimal military effort.

Eastern Ghouta

The regime directed its main efforts in early 2014 towards driving rebel forces from Jobar and Mleiha, two districts of eastern Damascus which formed part of the western defensive line for opposition-held Eastern Ghouta. Jobar represented the furthest line of opposition advance into Damascus city proper and its heavily-developed urban environment provided rebel forces with a decisive advantage which the assaulting forces of the elite SAA 105th Brigade Republican Guard were unable to overcome. Regime forces targeted Jobar with heavy artillery, airstrikes, and ballistic missiles on a daily basis, while both rebel and regime fighters have constructed complex networks of tunnels used to facilitate troop movement and ferry food and other supplies. In some cases, both sides have used ‘tunnel bomb’ attacks to burrow explosives underneath opposing strongholds. Under these conditions, the situation in Jobar remains a virtual stalemate as of April 2015. 

Forces from the elite SAA 4th Armored Division supported by NDF, Iraqi Shi’a fighters, and Hezbollah launched an offensive against Mleiha on April 3, 2014. Although the town was subjected to a constant barrage of airstrikes and ballistic missiles, regime ground troops proved unable to make significant initial gains. By the end of May 2014, pro-opposition media claimed that the clashes in Mleiha had killed over eight hundred pro-regime fighters. The withdrawal of Iraqi Shi’a militias from Syria following the fall of Mosul in June 2014 slowed the regime’s push for Mleiha. Activist sources reported that the majority of Iraqi fighters along the Mleiha front had departed by June 19, 2014, forcing the regime to ease its assault on the area. However, the mobilization and deployment of over 1,000 Hezbollah fighters to Damascus in order to “defend the Sayyida Zeinab shrine” quickly revitalized the regime’s offensive. On July 12, 2014, SAA supported by NDF and Hezbollah advanced around the eastern perimeter of Mleiha, placing the town and several hundred opposition fighters under siege. Although JN fighters used an SVBIED attack to successfully break the siege on August 3, 2014, pro-regime forces reestablished the cordon one week later. “The regime forces now wrap around the perimeter of the town,” the opposition Mleiha Local Council reported. 

Under siege and faced with punishing bombardment from the air, rebel fighters withdrew from Mleiha on August 14, 2014 in a major victory for regime and Hezbollah forces. An activist asserted that “the loss of Mleiha is considered as important as the loss of the Qalamoun” region along the Lebanese border to a similar joint regime-Hezbollah operation in early 2014.

Regime forces capitalized on momentum gained from the capture of Mleiha as well as the arrival of reinforcements drawn from the nearby Qalamoun region to secure several additional victories against the Syrian opposition in Eastern Ghouta. SAA and NDF forces seized the village of Adra and the adjacent Adra Industrial City after a series of clashes from September 25 to 27, 2014, restricting rebel freedom of movement towards the Qalamoun region to the northeast. Meanwhile, Republican Guard units and rebel forces traded possession of the Dukhaniyah suburb located northwest of Mleiha multiple times in September 2014 in heavy clashes which included several alleged chlorine gas attacks before regime fighters finally secured the district on October 6, 2014. 

The Assad regime next turned its attention towards the town of Douma, a major rebel stronghold in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs dominated by prominent Islamist faction Jaysh al- Islam. On November 6, 2014, SAA forces seized the Wafidin Camp north of Douma, severing the last remaining opposition supply line into Eastern Ghouta. Over subsequent months, the Syrian Air Force sharply intensified its bombardment of Douma and other towns in Eastern Ghouta, causing hundreds of casualties. Mosques in Eastern Ghouta began cancelling Friday prayers in order to avoid presenting tempting targets to regime pilots. The severity of these airstrikes prompted Jaysh al-Islam to announce a retaliatory campaign of rocket attacks targeting Damascus city in late January to early February 2015 in a move publically portrayed as an attempt to deter further regime bombardment. 

The Assad regime leveraged illegal tactics of collective punishment in order to encourage the depopulation of rebel-held areas. On November 24, 2014, regime forces opened the Wafidin Camp crossing to permit “dozens” of families to flee Eastern Ghouta. In late January 2015, Syrian state media claimed regime forces evacuated over 2,000 additional civilians from the area. On March 19, 2015, opposition sources reported that another 1,000 civilians were allowed to flee Eastern Ghouta via a checkpoint in Harasta. These mass evacuations served a clear propaganda purpose by highlighting the cleavages between rebel forces and the populace under their control. The policy of evacuations also fuels suspicions and infighting amongst rebel forces in Eastern Ghouta regarding potential reconciliation agreements with the regime. Overall, however, the regime campaign against Eastern Ghouta appears to have stalled amidst a shift in regime focus towards countering rebel gains in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces to the south. 

Siege-and-Starve

The Assad regime has relied on a system of sieges to force the submission of opposition-held neighborhoods throughout Damascus without diverting valuable combat resources from Eastern Ghouta. Regime forces also employ these blockades to depopulate rebel-held terrain, draining the pool of opposition support while bolstering the legitimacy of the Syrian government. One internal UN World Food Program document implicitly acknowledging that civilians can only receive food if they relocate to regime-held areas. The widespread use of deliberate starvation as a tool of war prompted the UN Security Council to pass UNSC Resolution 2139 on February 22, 2014, underscoring that “starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited by international humanitarian law” and demanding that “all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” to all areas of Syria. Despite this rebuke, the Assad regime has continued its siege-and-starve campaign in southern Damascus unabated through 2014 and into 2015, particularly in the southwestern suburb of Darayya and the Yarmouk Camp district of Damascus. 

The Assad regime has utilized the siege-and-starve strategy to coerce several opposition-held neighborhoods of Damascus into ceasefire and ‘normalization’ agreements. These deals serve to deescalate scattered fronts throughout Damascus, enabling the regime to redirect its limited military resources towards high-priority areas such as Eastern Ghouta. The ceasefires also provide the Assad regime with a narrative of “national reconciliation” which bolsters its claim to political legitimacy by demonstrating a willingness to forge peace. President Assad has consistently underlined in interviews that ceasefire agreements are “something concrete” which provide a “measure of confidence” for a political settlement. On February 5, 2015, he established a high committee on reconciliation staffed by five cabinet ministers, three provincial governors, and the head of the National Security Bureau. These reconciliation agreements provoke distrust on the ground, however, from both the opposition and the regime. An opposition activist in a Damascus neighborhood under one such agreement expressed this sentiment stating that “this isn’t a reconciliation…this is a ceasefire until circumstances play in the revolution’s favor.” Meanwhile, an anonymous official in the regime Ministry of Reconciliation Affairs noted: “We have reservations; we do not see it as reconciliation, just a cessation of hostilities as weapons remain with both sides.” 

The examination of one prominent Damascus ceasefire deal provides a reflection of these tensions. The southwestern Damascus suburb of Moadamiyah concluded a local ceasefire agreement with regime forces in December 2013 after a punishing siege. The ceasefire was promoted as a sign of ongoing “national reconciliation;” however, the Assad regime delayed in meeting its obligations and only partially lifted its siege. Reflecting upon the ceasefire agreement over a year later in February 2015, an activist from Moadamiyah wrote in the Washington Times: “The regime continues to cut off power, gas and other basic services to Moadamiyah. Some humanitarian aid is allowed to enter, but not nearly enough for the town’s residents…Most egregiously, bombardments continue and the regime has resumed arrest raids on civilians.” Read the full report for accounts of a similar ceasefire agreement in the southern Damascus neighborhoods of Yalda, Babbila, and Beit Sahem in February 2014.

Qalamoun

The Assad regime sought to clear and hold the Qalamoun Mountains, a strategic region northeast of the capital running along the Lebanese border, in order to defend the northern approaches to the capital and maintain access to the M5 Highway connecting Damascus to Homs, Hama, and the Syrian coast. The establishment of a strong regime presence along the border region also served to sever cross-border rebel supply lines based out of eastern Lebanon. Thus, regime forces launched a major operation to clear the Qalamoun on November 15, 2013. The timing of this offensive coincided with the end of major regime combat operations to clear the supply line to Aleppo city in an indication of the military advantage enjoyed by the Assad regime in late 2013. Lebanese Hezbollah fighters played a key role in the offensive, providing strained and inadequately equipped regime units with large amounts of manpower skilled in mountain warfare.

Regime forces supported by Hezbollah and the NDF rapidly advanced south along the M5 Highway towards Damascus, seizing a string of rebel-held towns including Deir Attiyah in late November 2013, an-Nabek in mid-December 2013, and the opposition stronghold of Yabroud on March 16, 2014. (Read “The Fall of Yabroud and the Campaign for the Lebanese Border” by ISW Analyst Isabel Nassief.) As thousands of rebel fighters fled into Lebanon or further southwest towards Damascus, the regime offensive continued to move along the Lebanese border. Rebel and Hezbollah sources indicated that Hezbollah fighters led most of the ground offensives in the Qalamoun while the SAA restricted itself to providing air and artillery support. This deep reliance on foreign proxy forces to achieve battlefield success illustrated the declining agency of the Assad regime on the battlefield.

Regime and Hezbollah forces proved unable to clear rebel presence from the rural regions of the border despite holding most urban centers in the Qalamoun and maintaining unrestricted use of the M5 Highway. One Hezbollah fighter noted in an interview the difficulties in securing the rugged terrain of the region, stating that “It’s impossible for us to control all the mountains along the border, but we have enough people to do reconnaissance and ambushes.” These limitations forced Hezbollah and regime forces to man static defensive positions in unfriendly terrain, leaving their fighters vulnerable to attack. Rebel forces exploited the disruption caused by the withdrawal of Iraqi Shi’a militiamen from Syria in mid-June 2014 to launch a wave of deadly raids against Hezbollah and NDF checkpoints located on the outskirts of Rankous, Asal al-Ward, Hawsh al-Arab, Ras Ma’ara, Deir Attiyah, and Yabroud. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and NDF fighters continued to bear an increasing share of the combat burden in the northern Qalamoun as the Syrian regime redeployed its regular SAA units in the area to reinforce frontlines in Damascus city and Zabadani in the southern Qalamoun. This pressure sparked open clashes on several instances between Hezbollah fighters and local NDF militiamen rooted in accusations that Syrian forces rarely participate in fighting, leaving their Hezbollah partners unsupported.

Primary regime efforts in Qalamoun shifted in the summer of 2014 to the town of Zabadani located northwest of Damascus near the Jdaydet Yabous border crossing, a primary supply route used by Lebanese Hezbollah to transport fighters and weapons between Syria and Lebanon. The Assad regime first focused on isolating Zabadani from rebel reinforcement and resupply. Regime forces established a cordon around Zabadani and subjected the town to heavy shelling with artillery and barrel bombs throughout the summer and fall of 2014. However, in late December 2014 Ahrar al-Sham, JN, and other opposition forces launched an offensive which seized several checkpoints and military installations northwest of Zabadani, loosening the regime siege over the area and threatening Jdaydet Yabous. Clashes to reassert the cordon around Zabadani are still ongoing as of April 2015 with regime forces unable to secure a decisive advantage.

Deraa/Quneitra

Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces in southern Syria formed a major source of opposition strength which directly threatened the southern approaches to Damascus. Nonetheless, regime forces in the two provinces operated in a relatively passive defensive stance throughout 2014, appearing content to slowly trade territory in the heavily-militarized region in order to devote limited reinforcements to other fronts. SAA units based in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces were rarely reinforced, while pervasive anti-regime sentiment among the local population resulted in low NDF recruitment. Most SAA formations in southern Syria remained in close vicinity to their bases despite the spread of the Syrian civil war due to both pragmatic concerns over the political reliability of conscript soldiers as well as strategic concerns regarding the fears of an Israeli incursion. The Assad regime also likely remained confident that opposition forces could not breach the Damascus ‘military zone,’ a belt of strongpoints and army facilities south of the city originally designed to shield the capital against an Israeli armored thrust from the Golan Heights. 

Increasing rebel unification and a series of successful opposition offensives in summer and fall 2014 increasingly challenged the regime disposition in southern Syria. Rebel fighters had seized a series of hills and military facilities in southern Quneitra Province by May of 2014, enabling opposition forces to form a continuous zone of control along the Jordanian border. Rebel momentum continued unabated, despite asymmetric response by the Syrian regime including large numbers of barrel bomb attacks, air raids, and heavy artillery shelling. JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and the FSA-affiliated Southern Front seized the Quneitra border crossing with the Golan Heights on August 28, 2014, as well as Tel al-Hara, the location of a joint Russian-Syrian signals intelligence facility on October 5, 2014. JN and other rebel forces later seized complete control over the town of Sheikh Miskin on January 25, 2015 despite the reinforcement of regime units by Hezbollah fighters and IRGC officers, threatening the regime’s supply line to isolated forces in Dera’a city. 

This rapid succession of rebel gains threatened to bring Syrian opposition forces to the southern gates of Damascus city, forcing the regime to re-evaluate its strategy. Regime forces responded by launching an offensive against rebel positions in northwestern Dera’a Province on February 9, 2015 with support from at least forty tanks of the elite 4th Armored Division. Iran reportedly played a key role in the planning, organization, and execution of the offensive, with activists claiming that a large proportion of involved ground forces were composed of fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, and the ‘Fatimiyoun’ Iranian-Afghani Shi’a militia. 

Multiple sources claimed that overall leadership for the operation was provided by ‘Iranian commanders’ with Syrian officers being transferred away from the front or executed for alleged collaboration with rebel forces. In support of this claim, IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani reportedly made a public appearance along the frontlines on February 11, 2015. In another notable indicator, this offensive followed the aforementioned Israeli airstrike in the al-Amal Farms area of Quneitra Province on January 18, 2015 which killed several prominent Hezbollah commanders, including Jihad Mughniyeh, as well as IRGC ground forces commander General Mohammad Ali Allahdadi. This delegation of senior Hezbollah and IRGC figures was likely conducting final preparations for the upcoming offensive. The degree of Iranian leadership and coordination witnessed in this offensive was unprecedented and signalled a willingness by Iran to adopt a more overt posture in Syria in order to protect its interests in the country. 

Within days, the pro-regime coalition made significant gains – seizing the rebel-held towns of Deir al-Adas, Deir Makir, and al-Danajah in northwestern Dera’a Province while threatening the towns of Kafr Nasij, Kafr Shams, and Masharah. Rebel commanders stated that pro-regime forces employed a number of unfamiliar tactics which initially overwhelmed opposition units once again underscoring the notion that Iran and its proxy forces took lead over the SAA and regime military commanders in this offensive.

The trajectory of pro-regime forces indicated that they likely intended to recapture the strategic heights at Tel al-Hara, reestablishing dominance over a large swath of the Dera’a Plain. However, despite declarations by opposition defense minister Maj. Gen. Salim Idriss that “the balance of power is in favor of the Iranian militias” in southern Syria, regime advances slowed in the face of several counteroffensives and the arrival of large numbers of rebel reinforcements to the area. Opposition groups continued to gain ground against the regime in other parts of the province despite being placed on the defensive in northwestern Dera’a Province. Rebel forces seized the town of Busra al-Sham along the border with Suwayda Province on March 25, 2015 and the Nasib border crossing with Jordan six days later. These victories underscore the limitations of Assad’s military forces even when augmented by Iranian proxies and advisors.

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