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Friday, May 22, 2015

Iraq Situation Report: May 21-22, 2015

By: Theodore Bell and Patrick Martin


Control of Terrain in Syria: May 22, 2015

by: ISW Syria Team



ISIS Sanctuary: May 22, 2015

ISIS seized the Tanf border crossing between Iraq and Syria, circled in the map above. The status of the Walid border crossing on the Iraq side is still unknown and assessed to be contested.



ISIS Sanctuary: May 22, 2014


ISIS seized the Tanf border crossing between Iraq and Syria, circled in the map above. The status of the Walid border crossing on the Iraq side is still unknown and assessed to be contested.


Thursday, May 21, 2015

The Regime's Strategic Objectives

This analysis of the Syrian regime’s strategic objectives is adapted from the ISW report “An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria by ISW Syria Analyst Christopher Kozak published in April 2015. 

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May 21 Update: The recent fall of the strategic city of Palmyra to ISIS highlights the risks faced by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as he attempts to counterbalance the regime’s increasingly-fraught military position with his desire to maintain an “Army in All Corners” strategy. Palmyra represented a key lynchpin in the system of remote outposts garrisoned by the regime throughout the country as a way of maintaining the appearance of a national presence while reinforcing Assad’s “own legitimacy as the only viable alternative to a failed, jihadist-dominated Syrian state.” The loss of Palmyra thus marks a major blow to the campaign designs of the Assad regime and signals that time may be running out for Assad’s plan to garner international support as the only effective anti-ISIS actor on the ground.

The military campaign of the Syrian regime has been primarily driven by Assad’s core objective to preserve his rule in a post-war Syria through a negotiated “political solution.” However, Assad’s efforts to drive the situation on the ground in a favorable direction faced a number of key challenges. The geographic dispersion of regime positions and the countrywide scope of the Syrian Civil War forced the Assad regime to prioritize among military fronts in 2014, enabling opposition forces to advance in multiple locations including Idlib and Dera’a Provinces. Salafi-jihadist rebel groups also grew in strength and coordination in 2014. The regime faced new challenges on the battlefield as the consolidation of military strength among JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and other Salafi-jihadist factions in Syria throughout 2014 enabled numerous major battlefield victories over the regime in Aleppo, Idlib, and Dera’a Provinces.

However, these developments also sparked new opportunities for Assad to align with the international community by fueling the narrative that the Syrian government faces an invasion of ‘terrorists’ that poses a transnational threat. Assad promoted this framing of the conflict in order to reinforce his own political legitimacy as the only viable alternative to a failed, jihadist-dominated Syrian state. Assad likely reasons that by avoiding decisive defeat and preserving his presence throughout the country, the insurgency will eventually be depleted as opposition forces grow increasingly radicalized and alienated from their domestic and international supporters.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Visits Troops in Jobar
Maintaining Syrian Territorial Integrity

The Assad regime prioritizes maintaining Syrian Arab Army (SAA) presence throughout Syria in order to frame its claim to a united and contiguous post-war Syrian state. President Assad expressly delineated this policy in his January 2015 interview with Foreign Affairs, stating: “If you look at a military map now, the Syrian army exists in every corner. Not every place; by every corner, I mean north, south, east, west, and between. If you didn't believe in a unified Syria, that Syria can go back to its previous position, you wouldn't send the army there as a government.” The strategy of an “army in all corners” is designed to preclude a partitioned Syria or rump Syrian state from forming. The existence of SAA formations across Syria also provides President Assad with a political narrative as the leader of a sovereign and undivided country. Assad is unable, however, to use his dispersed footprint to establish security throughout the country in the face of an active armed opposition.

Assad’s remote outposts incur risk to his campaign. Their strict defensive posture and inability to project force into their surroundings makes them targetable by opposing forces. Limited options for reinforcement and resupply can leave their garrisons isolated and vulnerable in the face of concerted offensives. This risk was brutally demonstrated in July and August 2014 when ISIS militants overran a series of holdout regime military bases in ar-Raqqa and Hasaka Provinces, capturing and executing hundreds of SAA soldiers. Nevertheless, these strongholds also frequently withstand enemy attacks, providing the Assad regime with staying power at little cost. The besieged Wadi al-Deif and al-Hamidiyah military bases in southern Idlib Province, for example, fixed opposition forces for nearly two years before being overrun in a joint Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)–Ahrar al-Sham (HASI) operation in December 2014. Ultimately, this element of regime strategy fails when outposts are isolated and overwhelmed. This trend may accelerate in 2015 amidst increasing coordination between mainly-Islamist opposition forces.

Dominating Human Terrain

The Assad regime also seeks to maintain its control over the Syrian civilian population in order to bolster its image as the only legitimate governance structure in the country. President Assad has repeatedly stated that the most critical battle in Syria is the one for the Syrian people. Assad also detailed this policy in his interview with Foreign Affairs: “Before talking about winning territory, talk about winning the hearts and minds and the support of the Syrian people. That’s what we have won. What’s left is logistical; it’s technical. That is a matter of time.” Experts estimate that the Syrian regime controls between 55 and 72 percent of the Syria’s remaining populace as of January 2015. The Syrian opposition, on the other hand, controls less than a third of the country’s population – affirming President Assad’s boast that “the communities which embraced terrorists have become very small.” Assad did not mention that the remainder of Syria’s population now lies within areas under the regime’s control as a deliberate outcome of Assad’s own punitive depopulation campaigns.

On the ground, this rhetoric translates into an extremely lethal form of population-centric counter-insurgency (COIN) in areas under opposition control. The Syrian regime inflicts mass punishment against civilians in opposition areas to force large-scale displacement. Regime ground forces besiege rebel-held neighborhoods and cities, cutting off aid supplies and spurring thousands to flee to regime zones of control in the face of starvation. Civilians in opposition-held zones are also subject to indiscriminate targeting by artillery, airstrikes, and crudely-devised “barrel bombs.” By March 2015, these barbaric methods had killed more than 220,000 Syrians and displaced over 11.5 million civilians, mainly from opposition-held terrain. In sum, the concentration of the Syrian population in territory controlled by Assad comes in large part as the result of a humanitarian crisis generated by the regime itself.
Syrian Defense Minister Fahd al-Freij

This disparity offers the Assad regime several distinct advantages over rebel forces. Control over the majority of the surviving Syrian population provides opportunity to tap manpower reserves to aid the regime’s fight and also restricts civilians from joining the Syrian opposition. The regime also benefits from enduring economic activity that generally no longer exists in rebel-held areas. Continuous efforts to depopulate opposition-held zones and consolidate civilians into regime-held areas feed into the narrative that “the majority of the Syrian people…support their president.” This argument manipulates Syria’s recent history and portrays the staying power of Bashar al-Assad and his government favorably in political negotiations. Acceptance of this statement at face value risks legitimizing mass violence against civilians as a tool which could be used in other conflicts.

Projecting Domestic and International Legitimacy

The regime uses the appearance of enduring military and social control in Syria to bolster domestic and international legitimacy in preparation to discuss political settlement. Assad regularly uses “jihadism” in Syria as an argument to curry international favor. In an interview conducted on November 28, 2014, President Assad criticized U.S.-led coalition airstrikes against ISIS in Syria by insisting that “terrorism cannot be destroyed from the air, and you cannot achieve results on the ground without land forces.” Regime officials regularly promote the SAA as the only realistic force with the “experience in the field” to counter terrorist groups operating in Syria, such as JN or ISIS Assad reaffirmed in a later interview on January 20, 2015 that this partner “definitely…has to be Syrian troops.” In some cases, Assad backs his claims with force. The Syrian Air Force, for example, conducted several sorties against the ISIS “capital” of ar-Raqqa in a move clearly designed to align with the global anti-terrorism campaign following the launch of anti-ISIS coalition air raids in Syria on September 22, 2014.

The regime also attempts to maintain vestiges of democratic processes in order to underscore the claims of legitimacy made by the Syrian government. The 2014 Syrian presidential elections were widely held by regime officials as an expression of mass popular support for the Syrian government despite pervasive indications of fraud and voter suppression. The Assad regime retains a “tolerated” internal opposition group, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCCDC), which provides a façade of political pluralism. On January 26, 2015, regime officials even traveled to Moscow to hold talks with NCCDC members. The NCCDC possesses no representation from either the exiled Syrian National Coalition (SNC) opposition government or the armed Syrian opposition on the ground. The delegations unsurprisingly agreed on most of the key building blocks of the regime’s political strategy, including the maintenance of Syrian unity and sovereignty, the importance of combating terrorism, and the necessity of a political settlement.

The Assad regime’s political goals generated a military strategy which remained relatively consistent throughout 2014 and into 2015 despite shifts in battlefield dynamics which forced the regime to adapt to new circumstances. These disruptions, including unexpected rebel successes in southern Syria and the withdrawal of thousands of allied Iraqi Shi’a fighters from Damascus following the fall of Mosul in June 2014, have often sparked key inflection points in the campaign for Syria. These shifts forced the regime to adapt its capabilities frequently, but they have rarely altered the ways in which regime forces have attempted to carry out the war. This resiliency indicates that the Assad regime possesses a coherent military strategy that has been robust enough to absorb the pressures of unanticipated events. Assad likely believes that upholding this clear plan of action while avoiding unnecessary risks on the battlefield will allow him to win the war for Syria without an outright military victory.
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Next installment: The Regime's Military Capabilities: Part 1--The Syrian Army, Paramilitaries, and Asymmetric Capabilities 

Wednesday, May 20, 2015

Control of Terrain in Syria: May 20, 2015

by: ISW Syria Team






Syria Situation Report: May 14-20, 2015

by: Jennifer Cafarella


ISIS Sanctuary Map: May 20, 2015

ISW has updated its ISIS Sanctuary map. This map, covering both Iraq and Syria, shows the extent of ISIS zones of control, attack, and support throughout both countries.



Iraq Situation Report: May 19-20, 2015

By: Jessica Lewis McFate, Theodore Bell, and Patrick Martin

Op-Ed: The Fall of Ramadi Was Avoidable

By Kimberly Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan
The Washington Post, May 18, 2015


The seizure of Ramadi on Sunday leaves President Obama’s strategy against the Islamic State in ruins not only in Iraq but also throughout the Muslim world. It means that the Iraqi security forces will almost certainly not be able to recapture Mosul this year and, therefore, that the Islamic State will retain its largest city in Iraq. Worse, it gives the group momentum again in Iraq even as it gains ground in Syria and expands in the Sinai, Yemen, Afghanistan and elsewhere. This defeat was avoidable. Neither the Islamic State nor any other al-Qaeda offshoot has ever taken a major urban area actively defended by the United States in partnership with local forces. This is what happens when a policy of half-measures, restrictions and posturing meets a skillful and determined enemy on the battlefield. If the president does not change course soon, he will find that his legacy is not peace with Iran and ending wars, but rather the establishment of a terrorist state with the resources to conduct devastating attacks against the United States and a region-engulfing sectarian war.

Obama reacted slowly and reluctantly to the initial Islamic State surge last June from Syria into Mosul and then down the Tigris toward Baghdad. He authorized U.S. air support to assist the defense of the Kurdish capital of Irbil in August and eventually deployed first a few hundred and then a few thousand U.S. advisers. He did not allow those advisers to fight alongside the Iraqi units they were assisting. U.S. airstrikes have destroyed many fixed Islamic State targets and killed its fighters by the thousands since then, mainly in Iraq, but have allowed the group to retain a haven in Syria and even to maneuver freely within Iraq.

The Islamic State maneuver that led up to the fall of Ramadi was sophisticated and many weeks in the making, as a recent publication from the Institute for the Study of War shows. It entailed diversionary attacks in Baiji and Garma, a prison break in Diyala, attacks against pilgrims in Baghdad and raids near Ayn al-Asad air base west of Ramadi, a major hub of U.S. forces and Iraqi training. It was accompanied by a coordinated offensive around Deir ez-Zor, in Syria, that could give the group the ability to operate all along the Euphrates and toward Damascus as well. Numerous Islamic State fighters moved across Iraq and Syria. Although they leveraged poor weather that impedes U.S. reconnaissance, such activity must have created a signature that a properly resourced U.S. force in the region would have detected, and it certainly created a proliferation of targets on the ground for combinations of attack aviation and ground maneuvers — had those resources been available and allowed to operate freely. U.S. military power, properly employed and resourced, can thwart these kinds of maneuvers. The fall of Ramadi was unnecessary and avoidable....

Read the rest of this Op-Ed here.
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Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War. Frederick W. Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute

Monday, May 18, 2015

Control of Terrain in Iraq: May 18, 2015

By: Sinan Adnan, Theo Bell, and Patrick Martin
 
 

Iraq Situation Report: May 16-18, 2015

By: Sinan Adnan, Theo Bell, and Patrick Martin
 

ISIS Captures Ramadi

By: Patrick Martin, Genevieve Casagrande, Jessica Lewis McFate, 
and the ISW Iraq and Syria Teams 


For years, ISW has paid close attention to Ramadi and its strategic importance as the capital of the largely Sunni Anbar Province.  ISIS first attacked both Ramadi and Fallujah in January 2014.  Although driven from Ramadi by local tribes and the ISF, ISIS contested control of the city since then.  

ISIS’s capture of Ramadi over May 15-18 was the culmination of months of ISIS probing and shaping operations around the city. Despite strategic gains by ISIS in Anbar and continued attacks on Ramadi throughout 2014, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) largely defended Ramadi successfully and maintained supply lines into the city center. ISIS however came close to overcoming their defenses in October 2014 and December 2014. ISIS resumed major attacks on Ramadi in April 2015, and on May 15, 2015, ISIS launched a coordinated attack on multiple fronts, contesting and eventually seizing major government infrastructure in central Ramadi by May 17, 2015.  This strategic gain constitutes a turning point in ISIS’s ability to set the terms of battle in Anbar as well to project force in eastern Iraq. It is also an important element of ISIS’s consolidation strategy, enhancing ISIS’s overall defense.

This presentation tracks the ISIS campaign against Ramadi from January 2014 to its capture this past weekend.  See the full presentation here.





Thursday, May 14, 2015

New ISIS Offensives in the Syrian Civil War

By: Christopher Kozak

Key Takeaway: ISIS has neither been defeated nor relegated entirely to the defensive in Syria despite a string of losses to Kurdish forces assisted by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes. Instead, ISIS has launched two major offensives targeting Syrian military positions in central and eastern Syria since May 6, 2015, likely taking advantage of the Assad regime’s preoccupation with recent JN and rebel advances in Idlib Province. A consolidation of these gains would leave ISIS in position to contest and potentially seize the most important remaining military installations in eastern Syria, eliminating any potential roadblocks to further ISIS expansion into the Syrian central corridor.

ISIS dramatically escalated its efforts against the Assad regime in eastern Syria over the past week, initiating two major offensives targeting several towns and military positions in Deir ez-Zour and Homs Provinces. These operations demonstrate that ISIS has not lost its offensive capability in Syria despite a string of significant losses to Kurdish forces supported by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes in northeastern Syria. The size and scope of these offensives indicates that ISIS may have made the strategic decision to direct a large portion of its combat reserves and materiel resources away from Kurdish territory in eastern Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces towards central Syria. This shift is likely motivated by a desire to reassert ISIS’s ‘narrative of victory’ following recent setbacks in northern Syria and in Iraq which have slowed the group’s operational momentum. The perceived weakness of the Assad regime following major victories by JN and rebel forces in Idlib City and Jisr al-Shughour presents an inviting target for ISIS’s expansion. ISIS may also desire to reaffirm its status as a prominent anti-Assad actor in response to the JN successes in Idlib Province in order to bolster its recruitment efforts among the Syrian opposition.

ISIS’s escalation in eastern Syria began on May 6, 2015, when ISIS launched a wide-scale attack targeting the regime-held sections of eastern Deir ez-Zour city. Clashes centered around the southeastern neighborhoods of al-Sina’a, ar-Rusafa, and al-Omal, all located north of the regime-held Deir ez-Zour Military Airport. ISIS seized the al-Jumayn Checkpoint in the al-Sina’a District after conducting a tank-borne SVBIED against the position. ISIS also made additional advances in the al-Omal and Jubaylah Districts after detonating at least two tunnel bombs under regime positions. On May 13, ISIS claimed to seize Saker Island in the Euphrates River north of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport following a week of heavy clashes. As of publication, ISIS forces have capitalized on their control of Saker Island to stage attacks into Harrabesh District and other areas along the northern perimeter of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport.
104thRepublican Guard Brigade commander Brig. Gen. Issam Zahreddine in Deir ez-Zour, late 2014
Photo Distributed by Al-Masdar News, September 5, 2014

ISIS’s advance in Deir ez-Zour has likely been enabled in part by the reported redeployment of regime Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine and his elite 104th Republican Guard Brigade away from Deir ez-Zour to the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus in early May 2015. The 104th Brigade played a key role in stabilizing frontlines between ISIS and the regime in Deir ez-Zour after its arrival to reinforce the SAA 137thBrigade in Deir ez-Zour in early 2014. The defense of Deir ez-Zour represented a key component of Assad’s “army in all corners” strategy, which called for pro-regime forces to maintain far-flung combat outposts such as the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport in order to pin the bounds of a unified post-war Syrian state and reinforce Assad’s claim to political legitimacy. The withdrawal of the 104th Brigade signifies a clear deprioritization of the Deir ez-Zour front by the Assad regime and suggests that recent rebel advances in western Syria may be forcing the regime to reevaluate the viability the “army in all corners” strategy.

ISIS applied additional pressure to the Assad regime on May 13, 2015, launching a second offensive targeting regime positions throughout eastern Homs Province. One element of the ISIS advance targeted al-Sukhna northeast of Palmyra, capturing the town after heavy clashes which killed nearly sixty combatants and left over one hundred wounded. On the same day, ISIS conducted a two-pronged offensive targeting the major regime strongpoint of Palmyra from the north and west, seizing the al-Amiriyah District north of the city and shelling the strategic Palmyra Military Airbase with Grad rockets. ISIS militants conducted raids targeting a large complex of weapon depots located northwest of Palmyra, while pro-ISIS social media accounts also claimed the seizure of several regime checkpoints surrounding the T3 Pumping Station east of the city. As of May 14, activists continued to report heavy clashes between ISIS and regime forces on the northern, western, and eastern outskirts of Palmyra.
ISIS Offensives in Central Syria, May 6 – May 14, 2015

The ISIS offensives targeting al-Sukhna and Palmyra differ dramatically from the previous pattern of ISIS attacks witnessed in eastern Homs Province. Previous ISIS operations in the region had emphasized rapid, mobile raids against isolated regime positions that were intended to inflict casualties and seize weapons while avoiding retaliatory airstrikes. In contrast, the recent offensives reveal that ISIS retains the desire and capability to secure and hold urban terrain. If ISIS can consolidate its gains, it will be in position to contest the Palmyra Military Airbase and simultaneously isolate the ground line of communication to the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport via the Homs-Palmyra-Deir ez-Zour Highway. ISIS’s advances in both Deir ez-Zour and eastern Homs Province threaten to undermine the remaining military installations in eastern Syria, eliminating any potential roadblocks to further encroachment by ISIS into the Syrian central corridor near Homs and Hama cities. The Assad regime suffers from long-standing manpower problems which force the regime to conduct a zero-sum balancing act across its many standing fronts and its forces have been further strained by recent opposition advances in both northern and southern Syria. This lack of a flexible combat reserve means that Assad will likely have to choose between devoting resources to face the emergent ISIS threat in central Syria or the advancing JN-rebel coalition in western Syria. In either scenario, Salafi-jihadist factions are set to make further territorial gains in Syria.