Erdogan Prepares Underhanded Response to Turkey's Vote

By Elizabeth Teoman

Key Takeaway: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is preparing for an imminent challenge to the victory of his political opposition in Istanbul. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost the key urban centers of Istanbul and Ankara in the 2019 Turkish Local Election held on March 31, 2019. Erdogan has rejected these results and plans to seek a total annulment of the vote in Istanbul. Regardless of the ultimate ruling by the Turkish Supreme Election Board, this approach will further disrupt the fragile electoral processes and institutions in Turkey. Erdogan could exploit a protracted legal dispute over the election to fraudulently reverse the results and partially reverse the gains of the opposition.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is pursuing a dangerous course of action to annul unfavorable local election results in Istanbul.

• The AKP is poised to lose the key urban centers of Istanbul and Ankara to the rival Republican People’s Party (CHP) following the 2019 Turkish Local Elections. The Turkish Supreme Election Board already validated the victory of the CHP in Ankara on April 8.[1]

• Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) Deputy Chair Ali Ihsan Yavuz stated on April 9 that the AKP will petition the Turkish Supreme Election Board to invalidate the results in Istanbul.

• Erdogan holds a strong personal connection to Istanbul. Erdogan began his career in politics with his election as the Mayor of Istanbul in 1994. He is unlikely to concede this core terrain without a fight and has already blamed the “irregular” results on “organized crime” networks in Istanbul.

• Erdogan met with the AKP’s Supreme Executive Board in Ankara on April 10. The Board reportedly reviewed a comprehensive district-by-district analysis of the election results. It may also decide to meet again after a possible decision on a new round of voting in Istanbul.

Erdogan has likely secured support from his nationalist allies for a new election in Istanbul.

• Erdogan met with allied Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairman Devlet Bahceli at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on April 10. This meeting may presage an imminent call to annul the vote and hold new elections in Istanbul from Erdogan.

• Bahceli previously expressed support for proposed new elections in Istanbul on April 9. His support signals that the AKP and MHP will likely remain unified within their joint People's Alliance despite their unexpected losses in the 2019 Turkish Local Elections.

Erdogan has escalated his public intimidation of the Turkish Supreme Election Board.

• Erdogan claimed that authorities have not yet eliminated the influence of the outlawed Gulen Movement from all institutions during an event in Ankara on April 10.

• Erdogan’s statement is likely a threat directed at the Turkish Supreme Election Board, which ruled against several recount petitions by the AKP. It could alternatively aim to set conditions for future investigations against his opponents, including CHP Mayor-Elect of Istanbul Ekrem Imamoglu.

• Erdogan’s behavior is consistent with his long-standing campaigns to discredit rival institutions that could curb his power and undermine popular trust in the political opposition.

It remains unclear whether the Turkish Supreme Election Board can withstand the pressure from Erdogan and whether Erdogan will settle for only a partial annulment of the results in Istanbul.

• The AKP has not yet formally applied to annul the election results in Istanbul. It may still reevaluate its strategy during an upcoming meeting on April 12. The Turkish Supreme Election Board will likely rule on any challenge within twenty-four hours of receiving a formal request.

• The Turkish Supreme Election Board may call for only a partial annulment of several contested districts rather than the entirety of Istanbul. It has in particularly focused its review on allegations of voter fraud raised in the opposition-leaning Buyukcekmece District of Istanbul.

• Erdogan will likely be unable to reverse the results in Istanbul in the event of a partial annulment without an expensive and widespread campaign of fraud organized by the AKP. The CHP is likely to call for mass street protests to reject any partial or full annulment in Istanbul.

---
[1] Fatih Hafiz Mehmet, “Turkey: Mansur Yavas Becomes New Ankara Mayor,” Anadolu Agency, April 8, 2019, https://www.aa.com(.)tr/en/politics/turkey-mansur-yavas-becomes-new-ankara-mayor/1445244.

Turkey Brief: January 23 - March 18, 2019

Turkey Brief is an intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Turkish government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them.

Reporting Period: January 23 - March 18, 2019

Authors: Elizabeth Teoman with Monica Ma, Matti Suomenaro, Darina Regio, and Michael Land

Key Takeaway: Turkey is deepening its strategic cooperation with Russia as the U.S. draws down its forces in Syria. Turkey is strengthening its naval coordination with Russia in the Black Sea and negotiating to expand bilateral economic ties. In Syria, Turkey and Russia agreed to create a joint coordination center to conduct joint military patrols along frontlines in Northern Syria on March 14. They are also working together to begin trade from Turkey into regime-held parts of Aleppo Province. Turkey’s deepening cooperation with Russia undermines the cohesion of NATO and jeopardizes the prospects for a deal between the U.S. and Turkey to stabilize Eastern Syria.

Turkey is expanding its strategic cooperation with Russia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly chosen to fortify his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the expense of Turkey’s alliance with NATO. Erdogan has taken a number of major steps toward a strategic realignment with Russia in 2019.

• Military: Erdogan has decided not to meaningfully challenge Russia’s increasingly assertive posture in the Black Sea. Turkey conducted a joint naval drill with Russia in the Black Sea on March 8 despite mounting international pressure on Russia after its escalation against Ukraine in the Kerch Strait in November 2018. The exercise marked only the second joint maneuver between the two countries since Russia formally suspended its participation in the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group in response to the downing of a Russian Su-24 ‘Fencer’ fighter jet by Turkey in November 2015.[1] Erdogan likely seeks to avoid disrupting the final constructions stages of the joint TurkStream Pipeline which runs under the Black Sea from Russia through Turkey.

• Commercial: Russia agreed to double import quotas for agricultural products from Turkey after a meeting between Erdogan and Putin in Moscow on January 23. The deal will help Erdogan stabilize rising food prices, which he has also attempted to mitigate through nationwide subsidies ahead of local elections in Turkey scheduled for March 31. Turkey and Russia may separately be nearing a milestone agreement to resume visa-free travel for Turkish citizens to Russia. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu announced a possible breakthrough after months of negotiations on March 1.[2] The Kremlin punitively suspended visa-free travel agreement with Turkey in November 2015. Erdogan and Putin will hold their next meeting on bilateral trade and economic ties in Moscow on April 15.

• Defense: Erdogan reaffirmed his intent to purchase the Russian-made S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile System (SAMS) throughout February 2019 despite significant pressure from the U.S. that included threats of possible sanctions. Erdogan also rejected an counteroffer from the U.S. to provide the Patriot SAMS to Turkey. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe / U.S. EUCOM Commander Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti recommended against providing the F-35 ‘Lightening’ fighter jet to Turkey due to risks to NATO on March 5. Erdogan subsequently stated that Turkey could purchase the Russian S-500 SAMS in addition to the S-400 in a signal of his determination to pursue closer defense ties with the Kremlin on March 6.

Turkey is also deepening its cooperation with Russia in Syria even as the U.S. executes a partial drawdown in Eastern Syria. Russia and Turkey have taken steps to slowly negotiate an expansion of their coordination in Syria. Putin, Erdogan, and Rouhani met under the auspices of the Astana Process on February 14, where they likely agreed to the contours of future cooperation in Northern Syria. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu previously reached a “mutual understanding” on cooperation in Idlib Province on February 11.[3] Russian and Turkish military officials held a series of meetings on March 11 to discuss the developing situation around Idlib Province as well as possibly the status of the contested town of Manbij, which likely produced a deal on the specific routes of future joint patrols near Tel Rifaat north of Aleppo City. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov similarly planned to discuss bilateral issues including Syria in a meeting in Turkey on March 12 that has been delayed twice due to reported scheduling difficulties.

Russia and Turkey are expanding cooperation in three key geographic areas in Syria:

• Greater Idlib Province: Turkey and Russia are implementing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Erdogan and Putin on September 18, 2018, which called for coordinated patrols and enhanced functions for a joint Iranian-Russian-Turkish Coordination Center. Both countries formally agreed to create a bilateral joint coordination center on March 14 to oversee their deepening military cooperation in Idlib Province after Turkey announced plans for joint military patrols with Russia on March 8 and conducted a patrol on the same day along the strategic M-5 Highway south of Aleppo City. Turkey subsequently conducted a second frontline patrol in Idlib Province without Russia on March 17. Joint patrols will likely follow in coming weeks. The Turkish Armed Forces deployed additional reserves into Greater Idlib Province to prepare for expanded coordination throughout February and March 2019.[4] Turkey and Russia’s coordinated military operation in Idlib Province will likely set conditions for the resumption of traffic along the key M-4 and M-5 Highways, a goal stipulated in the September 2018 MoU.

• Greater Idlib Province: Turkey may also be providing targeting intelligence for Russian and Syrian airstrikes against al Qaeda-linked forces in Northern Syria despite denials of such coordination from Turkey. Turkey may be attempting to gain greater freedom of maneuver in Greater Idlib Province and circumvent constraints imposed by al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS accompanied the initial deployments of the Turkish Armed Forces to frontlines in Idlib Province that began in October 2017 and may have delayed at least one of the frontline patrols conducted by Turkey in March 2019. Turkey may also have agreed to provide intelligence on HTS as a concession to Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that HTS was attempting to collapse the implementation of the Russo-Turkish MoU on Northern Syria in November 2018. Putin later announced that Turkey and Russia would take additional steps to stabilize Idlib Province against al Qaeda following a meeting with Erdogan on January 23.

• Aleppo Province: Turkey and Russia are negotiating a similar cooperation agreement in Northern Aleppo Province. Both countries seek to reopen trade between Turkey and Syria by creating a suitable security environment along the highway between Aleppo City and the opposition-held town of Azaz on the Syrian-Turkish Border. Erdogan aims to stimulate Turkey’s faltering economy by integrating his domestic market with markets in Northern Syria. The Kremlin aims to use renewed trade to boost its narrative of normalization under Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkish and Russian Armed Forces conducted their first joint patrol near Tel Rifaat north of Aleppo City on February 14. Turkey later announced the re-opening of the key Bab al-Salama Border Crossing north of Aleppo City on March 5.[5] Turkey and Russia will likely conduct additional such patrols. The Turkish Defense Ministry confirmed ongoing efforts for further joint patrols near Tel Rifaat on March 12.

• Manbij: Turkey may agree to a takeover of the contested town of Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province by Russia as the U.S. reduces its footprint in Northern Syria. Erdogan is dissatisfied with progress on a roadmap between the U.S. and Turkey to remove the Syrian Kurdish YPG from Manbij. Erdogan may thus seek a separate deal with Russia to supplant the U.S. in Manbij regardless of withdrawal ordered by the Trump Administration. Turkish Presidential Spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin stated that Russia agreed to implement the Manbij Roadmap on February 4. The Kremlin reportedly reached a verbal agreement with Manbij Military Council Co-Chair Abu Adel on March 9 to protect Manbij from Turkey in the event of a withdrawal by the U.S. The Russian Armed Forces previously began joint patrols with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) west of Manbij on January 7.

Turkey’s growing cooperation with Russia undermines NATO cohesion and jeopardizes the prospects for a deal between the U.S. and Turkey to stabilize Eastern Syria. The Kremlin’s cooptation of Turkey could disrupt the consensus-driven decision-making of the NATO North Atlantic Council. Russia could ultimately use Turkey’s dissent to obtain a de facto veto on the application of force through Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty. Erdogan has pursued separate negotiations between the U.S. and Russia over Eastern Syria since the U.S. announced its intent to withdraw in December 2018. He likely seeks to identify which actor will provide a more advantageous option to advance his interests in Syria.

• U.S.-Turkey Track: The U.S. is proposing the establishment of safe zone in Northern Syria secured by a residual force drawn from the U.S. and Europe. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar met with U.S. officials to negotiate the terms of this zone in Washington, D.C. on February 22. Erdogan nonetheless publicly rejected an international presence in any safe zone along the Syrian-Turkish Border the day after the meeting between Dunford and Akar. U.S. Presidential Advisor Jared Kushner was similarly unable to assuage Erdogan during a meeting in Ankara on February 27. The current status of the negotiations is unclear although U.S. officials have broadly characterized them as productive. U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford stated that the U.S. and Turkey are refining an “initial concept” for Turkey’s security concerns in Syria on March 18. Dunford may be referencing the original proposal or a narrower agreement between the U.S. and Turkey that could include provisions for a greater monitoring presence for Turkey along the Syrian-Turkish Border.

• Turkey-Russia Track: Putin may currently be providing a more preferable option to Erdogan in Syria. Putin signaled his openness to possible military operations by Turkey in Northern Syria after a bilateral meeting with Erdogan in Moscow on January 23. Putin referenced the Syrian-Turkish 1998 Adana Agreement, which allegedly authorized Turkey to conduct counterterrorism operations up to five kilometers inside Syria if Damascus fails to eliminate safe haven for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliates inside of Syria.[6] Erdogan and Putin could agree to conduct simultaneous operations against the SDF in Eastern Syria, exploiting the vulnerabilities of the remnant force left by the U.S.

Turkey and Russia’s alignment over Syria may still falter, however. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad aims to limit the expanding economic integration and political influence held by Turkey in Northern Syria in order to retain leverage in future negotiations to end the Syrian Civil War. Assad continues to conduct airstrikes against Idlib Province in an attempt to assert its continued independence in the face of deals between Russia and Turkey. He also could exploit an influx of trade to spoil an agreement by siphoning off goods at a sufficient rate to provoke reprisals from Turkey. Pro-regime forces have systematically confiscated goods from Turkey along frontlines in Northern Hama Province since February 2019. Al Qaeda in Idlib Province could also spoil the agreement by attacking future joint patrols or commercial trade to impose cost on Turkey.

The U.S. is currently unlikely to achieve a change in Erdogan’s behavior and close the widening strategic gap with Turkey. The U.S. has not publicly rebuked Turkey’s military cooperation with Russia in Syria. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan discussed the situation in Idlib Province ahead of the release of a statement by the U.S. State Department condemning airstrikes against civilians in Northern Syria on March 14. The statement reiterated the Trump Administration’s opposition to a pro-regime offensive into Idlib Province, which strengthens Erdogan’s leverage with Putin but does not fundamentally alter the current trajectory of Turkey’s relationship with Russia. Erdogan’s recent steps toward deeper alignment with Russia are emboldening Putin. Putin invited Erdogan to the opening ceremony of a mosque in the occupied Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine scheduled for March 22. If Erdogan accepts the invitation, it would mark a major inflection in Turkey’s long-standing opposition to Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 and a major victory for Russia against NATO.

---
[1] “Russia Suspends Participation in BLACKSEAFOR Drills After Turkey’s Downing of Russian Jet,” TASS, November 27, 2015, http://tass(.)com/defense/839869.
[2] Deniz Acik, “Turkey Seeking End to Need for Visas with Russia,” Anadolu Agency, March 1, 2019, https://www.aa.com(.)tr/en/politics/turkey-seeking-end-to-need-for-visas-with-russia/1406513.
[3] [“Meeting Between Minister Akar and Russian Defense Minister Shoigu,”] Turkish Ministry of Defense, February 11, 2019, https://www.msb.gov(.)tr/SlaytHaber/1122019-06508.
[4] [“Military Shipments to the Syrian Border,”] Anadolu Agency, February 2, 2019, https://www.aa.com(.)tr/tr/turkiye/suriye-sinirina-askeri-sevkiyat/1381863.
[5] Izzet Mazi, “Turkey Reopens Key Border Crossing with Syria,” Anadolu Agency, March 5, 2019, https://www.aa.com(.)tr/en/economy/turkey-reopens-key-border-crossing-with-syria/1409698.
[6] “Minutes of the Agreement Signed by Turkey and Syria in Adana (Unofficial Translation) - 20 October 1999,” October 20, 1998, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mafhoum(.)com/press/50P2.htm.

Turkey Brief: November 27 - December 12, 2018

Turkey Brief is a biweekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Turkish government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them.

Reporting Period: November 27 - December 12, 2018

Authors: Elizabeth Teoman with Paul Becker and Kieran Hatton

Key Takeaway: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is unlikely to meaningfully challenge Russia’s increasing aggression in the Black Sea despite its harm to the interests of both Turkey and NATO. He is instead remaining effectively neutral in order to preserve a cooperative relationship with the Kremlin that provides him economic benefits and freedom of action in Syria. Erdogan’s effective neutrality in the Black Sea is a boon to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is currently prepared to launch a renewed ground offensive against Ukraine.

Turkey is unlikely meaningfully to contest Russia’s recent aggression in the Black Sea. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been muted in response to Russia’s illegal attack against the Ukrainian Navy in the Kerch Strait on November 25. Russia’s aggression is a threat to the sovereign rights of Turkey in the Black Sea. Erdogan has nonetheless prioritized high-level diplomatic engagement over a military response. He urged de-escalation in separate phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, and U.S. President Donald Trump on November 28. He later attempted but failed to mediate the release of the Ukrainians detained by the Kremlin.[1] Erdogan also ordered small-scale military exercises to reassure his population. The Turkish Navy began a limited three-day naval drill in the Black Sea on December 11.[2] It also will hold recurring small-scale exercises in the Dardanelles Strait throughout December 2018. These maneuvers are too limited in scope and scale to deter Russia.

Erdogan is likely unwilling to jeopardize his deepening bilateral relationship with the Kremlin by counter-escalating in the Black Sea. Turkey and Russia are jointly constructing the TurkStream natural gas Pipeline under the Black Sea. TurkStream grants greater leverage to Erdogan as a key energy transit hub to Europe while diversifying the export options available to Putin. Turkey also has a vested economic interest in the continued flow of commercial shipping to Ukraine and Russia via the Kerch Strait. Turkey remains heavily dependent on trade and tourism from Russia. Turkey similarly relies upon Russia to protect its freedom of action against the Syrian Kurdish YPG in Syria as well as to uphold a delicate demilitarized zone in al Qaeda-dominated Idlib Province. Erdogan may also doubt that NATO will fully support him in a confrontation with Russia in the Black Sea. His effective neutrality in the latest crisis is a boon for Putin, who is currently prepared to launch a renewed ground offensive against Ukraine.

Erdogan nonetheless hopes to retain a growing relationship with Ukraine despite his unwillingness to confront Russia over the Kerch Strait. Erdogan has forged closer economic, diplomatic, and defense ties with Ukraine since 2014. He has repeatedly reaffirmed support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine.[3] Erdogan seeks to expand his indigenous defense industry through greater technology exchange with Ukraine. He also likely supported the recent decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to grant autonomy to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on October 11. The Russian Orthodox Church in response severed ties with Constantinople. He has also preserved a historic cultural patronage of Ukraine’s Turkic Crimean Tatars - a population resistant to Russia’s illegal occupation of the Crimean Peninsula. Erdogan actively intervened to secure the release of two leading Crimean Tatars from Russia in October 2017. His government also plans to construct a Crimean Tatar Cultural Center in Kiev by 2019. Erdogan will likely sustain these lines of effort in order to counterbalance against Russia in the Black Sea.

---
[1] [“Response from Peskov to Erdogan: We Are Grateful But There Is No Need,”] Sputnik, November 29, 2018, https://tr(.)sputniknews.com/rusya/201811291036386530-peskov-erdogan-sorusuna-yanit/.
[2] [“Safety of Navigation,”] Turkish Naval Forces Office of Navigation, Hydrography, and Oceanography, December 10, 2018, http://www(.)shodb.gov.tr/shodb_esas/index.php/en/safety-of-navigation/navigational-warnings/all-stations/20-all-stations/samsun-navtex-station/1712-turnhos-n-w-1252-18.
[3] [“Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu in Milan to Attend OSCE 25th Council of Ministers Meeting, 6-7 December 2018,”] Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 7, 2018, http://www(.)mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-mevlut-cavusoglu-nun-agit-25-inci-bakanlar-konseyi-toplantisi-na-katilimi-6-7-aralik-2018.tr.mfa.

Turkey Brief: November 10 - 27, 2018

Turkey Brief is a biweekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Turkish government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them.

Reporting Period: November 10 - 27, 2018

Authors: Elizabeth Teoman with John Dunford, Paul Becker, and Kieran Hatton

Key Takeaway: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is accelerating his efforts to consolidate power both in Turkey and Northern Syria. Erdogan is tightening security in response to escalating internal threats in areas of Northern Syria occupied by Turkey. He also advanced his domestic consolidation ahead of the March 2019 Turkish Local Elections by successfully pressuring his main nationalist ally into concessions that likely ensure victory for his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Erdogan likely still intends to attack the Syrian Kurdish YPG in Eastern Syria. However, ISW has previously assessed that conditions are not yet set for such an operation and a decision by the U.S. to establish observation points along the Syrian-Turkish Border will likely further deter imminent action by Turkey.

Turkey took direct action to counteract deteriorating security in occupied Northern Syria. The Turkish Police Special Operations Department announced the deployment of a Syria Task Force to secure the Afrin Region of Northern Aleppo Province on November 15.[1] Turkey seized the majority-Kurdish Afrin Region in March 2018 as part of a cross-border intervention against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). It has since struggled to control the region. The YPG is waging an escalating guerrilla campaign targeting security and governance infrastructure in Afrin. Meanwhile, infighting between opposition groups backed by Turkey in Northern Syria has also contributed to increased lawlessness in Afrin since June 2018. Opposition groups most recently engaged in heavy clashes on November 18, destabilizing large parts of Northern Syria. The Syria Task Force will attempt to address these issues by directly securing critical infrastructure and training a new opposition-led police force for the Afrin Region.

Turkey is also attempting to further consolidate control over its proxies in Northern Syria. Military Police units linked to the Syrian National Army - an opposition proxy of Turkey - implemented a curfew and launched a so-called ‘anti-corruption campaign’ in the border town of Jarabulus in Northern Aleppo Province on November 21. The curfew later expanded to include other key population centers in Northern Syria on November 23 including Azaz, Suran, Marea, and Akhtarin. The crackdown largely targeted opposition factions accused of lawlessness or otherwise refusing to consolidate under the command-and-control of the Syrian National Army and Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is likely using these operations to bolster his control over the proxy institutions built by his administration in occupied Northern Syria.

Erdogan acted decisively to bolster his political alliance with domestic nationalists in Turkey. Erdogan likely coerced the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to maintain an alliance with his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) ahead of the 2019 Turkish Local Elections. MHP Chairman Devlet Bahceli stated on November 24 that his party will not nominate candidates for open races in the key urban centers of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.[2] This decision opens the door for gains in all three cities by Erdogan and the AKP. The MHP and its splinter Good (IYI) Party performed well in snap Turkish Parliamentary Elections in June 2018. Further gains in the major cities could have strengthened the MHP at the expense of the AKP and degraded Erdogan’s chances to win a future majority in the Turkish Parliament.

Erdogan has likely set conditions to win another electoral victory within the rigged political system of Turkey. Erdogan remains willing to apply state pressure against both opponents and allies in order to shape political outcomes in Ankara. Bahceli declared his intent to end his electoral alliance with Erdogan on October 23. The Turkish National Police later arrested two dozen individuals affiliated with Alaattin Cakici - an associate of Bahceli - in a nationwide operation on November 16. Cakici is a leader within the right-wing youth movement linked to the MHP and an outspoken critic of the ties between Erdogan and Bahceli. Erdogan and Bahceli met two days later and agreed to reaffirm the political partnership they formalized in February 2018. Erdogan likely directed the arrests as well as ongoing investigations of reported criminality within the MHP in order to force a reversal by Bahceli. This action along with ongoing purges of political opponents are likely sufficient conditions for Erdogan to win the 2019 Turkish Local Elections.

Erdogan’s current focus on foreign and domestic consolidation does not preclude a future cross-border military incursion into Syria. Erdogan likely intends to make good on his election promises to pursue interventionist policies against the YPG. This sustained threat has prompted a defensive reaction from the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in Syria. U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that the U.S. will establish several observation points along the Turkish-Syrian Border on November 21. Mattis claimed that these posts are meant to prevent incursions by the YPG. In reality, these posts aim to deter any new cross-border operation by Turkey in Syria. Erdogan nonetheless affirmed that Turkey will take “all necessary measures” to eliminate the YPG from Eastern Syria in a scheduled Turkish National Security Council Meeting on November 27.

---
[1] Cankut Tasdan, “Syria Task Force to Provide Security in Afrin,” Anadolu Agency, November 15, 2018, https://www(.)aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/syria-task-force-to-provide-security-in-afrin/1312288.
[2] Ayşe Yıldız and Süleyman Elçin, [“MHP Head Bahceli: We Will Not Nominate in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir,”] Anadolu Agency, November 24, 2018, https://www(.)aa.com.tr/tr/gunun-basliklari/mhp-genel-baskani-bahceli-istanbul-ankara-ve-izmirde-aday-gostermeyecegiz/1320071.

Turkey Brief: Erdogan Ramps Up Pressure on the U.S.

Turkey Brief is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Turkish government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them.

Reporting Period: October 20 - November 6, 2018

Authors: Elizabeth Teoman with Jennifer Cafarella, John Dunford, Paul Becker, and Kieran Hatton

Key Takeaway: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is attempting to pressure U.S. President Donald Trump into making new concessions in Syria by threatening an offensive against the primary partner of the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in Northern Syria. Erdogan has not yet set the military conditions required to follow through on this threat. He most likely intends to use the threat of violence to win political concessions that roll back the gains won by Syrian Kurds along the Syrian-Turkish Border. He is nonetheless setting long-term conditions to challenge security and governance structures established by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in Eastern Syria by exploiting seams between local Arabs and Kurds.

Turkey is escalating its attacks against the primary partner of the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in Syria. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) began cross-border shelling of military positions held by the majority-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northern Syria on October 28. The shelling targeted positions near a number of urban centers along the Syrian-Turkish Border including Kobani, Tel Abyad, Ras al-Ayn, and Qamishli. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned that the strikes represented the first phase of a “more extensive and effective” operation on October 30. Opposition groups backed by Turkey have also warned of upcoming attacks against the SDF in Northern Syria. Hamza Division Commander Saif Polat - a Syrian Turkmen - claimed ongoing preparations for a campaign east of the Euphrates River on November 6.[1] The Hamza Division is a former partner of the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. It is currently backed by Turkey and participated in past offensives against the SDF in Northern Syria.

Turkey has not yet set conditions for a major cross-border intervention in Northern Syria. The ongoing shelling is not yet concentrated enough to represent effective condition-setting for an offensive by the Turkish Armed Forces. It remains much more limited than the bombardment that preceded the start of ground operations by Turkey in the majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton in Northern Syria in January 2018. Other typical indicators of an upcoming ground campaign have also not yet emerged in openly-available sources as of November 8. The Turkish Air Force has not engaged in airstrikes against the SDF in Eastern Syria as it did ahead of operations to seize Afrin Canton. The Turkish Armed Forces also have not yet sent reinforcements to the Syrian-Turkish Border east of the Euphrates River or removed portions of the border wall in Northern Syria. Turkey has instead deployed additional military units into Idlib Province in Western Syria, suggesting that it remains focused on the preservation of a de-escalation zone brokered with Russia and Iran in September 2018. Turkey has never conducted cross-border ground operations without some participation from the Turkish Special Operations Forces or Turkish Army.

Turkey has mobilized some of its existing opposition proxies in Northern Syria. These efforts do not yet seem focused on preparations for a major offensive against the SDF. Activists sources reported that Turkey relocated up to 1,200 Syrian opposition fighters to frontline areas near the contested town of Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province in early November 2018. Manbij is the largest outpost of the SDF west of the Euphrates River and a historic source of friction between the U.S. and Turkey. Erdogan likely intends to apply military pressure on Manbij in order to contest the area and generate local instability that discredits the SDF-affiliated Manbij Civil Council. He nonetheless remains unlikely to launch a direct attack against Manbij that could result in casualties from U.S. forces.

Turkey is likely attempting to use the threat of military escalation to extract concessions from the U.S. on the political future of Northern Syria. Erdogan is scheduled to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump in Paris on November 11.[2] He may seek to win direct concessions on the final status of Manbij. The U.S. and Turkey reached a roadmap for tactical de-escalation over Manbij on June 4. The deal included coordinated and later combined joint patrols along frontlines north of Manbij. The first such joint patrol occurred on November 1. This agreement has nonetheless failed to temper the wider dispute between Turkey and the SDF. Erdogan threatened to conduct additional military operations across Northern Syria during negotiations over Manbij in March 2018. He also continues to claim that the Syrian Kurdish YPG – the dominant faction of the SDF - has not abided by promises to withdraw from Manbij. [3]

Erdogan may alternately use the threat of escalation to extract other near-term demands from the U.S. in Syria. He could demand that the U.S. support an effort to build and install a border security force led by opposition groups backed by Turkey east of the Euphrates River. The U.S. announced plans to establish a similar “border security force” with the SDF in January 2018, fueling Erdogan’s decision to launch ground operations in the Afrin region and threaten further action in Eastern Syria. Erdogan may also seek additional investment from the U.S. in reconstruction projects by Turkey in Northern Aleppo Province as an alternative to the SDF. Erdogan nonetheless remains unlikely to change his long-term goal to dismantle and otherwise eliminate the SDF in Northern Syria. He regards the SDF as an outgrowth of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and thus an existential threat to the territorial cohesion of Turkey.

Turkey is nonetheless setting long-term conditions to challenge the SDF in Eastern Syria. Turkey is currently testing its ability to exploit seams between local Arabs and the SDF along the Syrian-Turkish Border, particularly in majority-Arab Tel Abyad in Northern Ar-Raqqa Province. The SDF seized Tel Abyad from ISIS in June 2015. It rapidly installed formal governance structures that alienated local Arabs. It has also faced accusations of the forced displacement of Arabs near Tel Abyad. Turkey is attempting to exploit this seam. Hamza Division Commander Saif Polat posted a message calling on Arabs in Tel Abyad to participate in a protest against the SDF on November 11. Turkey is also reportedly recruiting opposition fighters from Tel Abyad who could potentially act as a future proxy force in Ar-Raqqa Province. The degree of success experienced by this effort thus far remains unclear.

Turkey is also attempting to degrade the stability of majority-Arab Deir ez-Zour Province under the SDF. Harakat al-Qiyam - a militant group likely backed by Turkey - announced its intent to assassinate the current head of the SDF-affiliated Deir ez-Zour Military Council (DMC) on November 5. The group has previously claimed a number of assassination attempts targeting the SDF including an attack on Manbij Military Council (MMC) Chair Mohammad Abu Adel in November 2017. Turkish media also recently highlighted claims by Imed Said - a former leader of the DMC - that local populations will not support governance by the SDF in Eastern Syria. Turkey is currently conducting active propaganda and tribal outreach efforts in Deir ez-Zour Province. It may ultimately intend to organize militant proxy forces for an insurgent campaign against the SDF in Eastern Syria. These efforts could be particularly effective after the end of ongoing operations by the DMC and SDF against ISIS in Southern Deir ez-Zour Province.

The U.S. has taken tentative steps to realign itself with Turkey but remains dedicated to its partnership with the SDF in Northern Syria. The U.S. announced multimillion-dollar rewards for information leading to the location of senior leaders of the PKK following the visit of a high-level delegation to Turkey on November 6. The Turkish Foreign Ministry welcomed the decision as a “positive development” but stressed its continued desire for “concrete action” with respect to the YPG in Syria.[3] The U.S. has thus far taken no serious action in Eastern Syria to address the fundamental concerns held by Turkey regarding the SDF. This effort thus is unlikely to generate a serious rapprochement with Erdogan.

The U.S. also remains dependent on the role played by the SDF in the Anti-ISIS Campaign in Syria. The SDF announced a temporary pause in its campaign against ISIS in Southern Deir ez-Zour Province on October 31 in protest against the cross-border shelling by Turkey. The U.S. later conducted joint patrols with the SDF in all of the major towns shelled by Turkey along the Syrian-Turkish Border. These patrols have thus far failed to deter further shelling but have thus far provided sufficient reassurance to preclude a major counter-escalation or redeployment to the border by the SDF.

Implications

The Trump Administration is right to focus on a wider realignment with Turkey. Its policy reorientation will nonetheless likely prove insufficient to repair the relationship unless they include meaningful change to the structure and composition of the SDF. Turkey’s efforts to challenge the SDF will likely prompt the SDF to become even less tolerant of its political opponents and persist in its marginalization of local Sunni Arabs, which will in turn create conditions conducive to ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist Groups. ISIS already appears to be resurgent in Ar-Raqqa City. The issue is urgent.

The U.S. nonetheless cannot wholesale accede to Turkey. The U.S. must recognize that Turkey’s threat to the SDF in Eastern Syria poses a serious risk to the overall success of the Anti-ISIS Campaign. Turkey’s efforts to destabilize the SDF will generate security and governance gaps that could be exploited by ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The Russo-Iranian Coalition is simultaneously conducting its own tribal outreach in Eastern Syria with the intent to undermine the SDF and U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. Turkey is thus advancing the strategic objectives of multiple fundamental adversaries of the U.S. and NATO.

The status quo is not tenable in Northern Syria. The U.S. faces the looming risk of a wider war between Turkey and the Kurds. The YPG has thus far refrained from participating directly in domestic attacks in Turkey. It would likely recalculate if abandoned by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. Turkey’s opposition proxies meanwhile are vulnerable to infiltration by Al-Qaeda and thus are not a viable candidate for unconditional support by the U.S. and NATO. The Trump Administration must chart a new course forward in Northern Syria that prioritizes the needs of local populations ravaged by ISIS and sustains our partnership with the SDF even as it creates opportunities for constructive involvement by Turkey. The alternatives invariably lead to further instability and long-term damage to the interests of the U.S. in Syria.


---
[1] Goksel Caglav, [“FSA is Preparing for East of the Euphrates,”] Yeni Akit, November 6, 2018, https://www(.)yeniakit.com.tr/haber/oso-firatin-dogusuna-hazirlaniyor-540796.html.
[2] [“We Are Ranked 17th in National Income in the World and 13th in Terms of Purchasing Parity,”] Turkish Presidency, November 6, 2018, https://www(.)tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/99550/-dunyada-mill-gelir-siralamasinda-17-nci-satin-alma-paritesine-gore-13-uncu-siradayiz.
[3] Fatih Hafiz Mehmet, “Erdogan Calls on Terrorists to Leave Syria's Manbij,” Anadolu Agency, November 3, 2018. https://www(.)aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/erdogan-calls-on-terrorists-to-leave-syrias-manbij/1302135.
[4] [“Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding a Decision Taken by the U.S. State Department,”] Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2018, http://www(.)mfa.gov.tr/sc_-72_-abd-disisleri-bakanliginin-aldigi-karara-iliskin-sc-7-11-18.tr.mfa.