Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, and Kateryna Stepanenko
June 20, 2025, 6:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on June 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine. Putin answered a question after his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about why Russian forces are advancing beyond the territories in Ukraine that Russia has illegally annexed, claiming that he considers Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that "Ukraine is [Russia's]."[1] Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he does not consider Ukraine as an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia, as evidenced by his 2021 "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" essay and his repeated false assertion that Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are all part of one historical people.[2]
ISW has previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing information operation attempting to portray Russians and Ukrainians as one unified nation and culturally and historically homogeneous is one of its most significant information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and justifying the war effort to the Russian people. Putin's commitment to this narrative underscores his ongoing commitment to destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.[3]
Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin claimed on June 20 that it would be better for Ukraine to stop fighting because the battlefield and geopolitical situation will only worsen for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will have to negotiate from a weaker position.[4] Putin attempted to posture Russia as interested in engaging in negotiations to end the war, claiming that Russia is not seeking "Ukrainian capitulation," yet insisted that Ukraine recognize the "realities that have developed on the ground."[5] Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the situation on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering demands.[6]
Putin's claim that Ukraine must recognize the "realities on the ground" and should negotiate before the situation worsens also coheres with Putin's theory of victory, which assesses that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by indefinitely sustaining gradual advances along the frontline despite the high costs of such creeping advances.[7] Putin's statement ignores that the true "realities on the ground" show a complicated and hotly contested frontline situation in which Russian forces are slowly making marginal advances at the cost of significant manpower and materiel losses in the face of significant Ukrainian drone-based defenses.
Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of "buffer zones" to expand Russia's territorial demands in Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russian forces are "ending up" in territories beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed in accordance with the "logic of military actions," then recalled the saying "where the foot of a Russian soldier steps, that is [Russia's]."[8] Putin stated that he does not rule out Russia seizing Sumy City "in principle" but claimed that Russia is not pursuing this objective at the moment.[9] Putin claimed that Russian actions in northern Sumy Oblast are due to Ukraine's shelling of Russian border areas. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 19 in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS at SPIEF that a "buffer zone" should be 20 to 30 kilometers deep to protect occupied Luhansk Oblast from Ukrainian fiber optic drone strikes.[10] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev called on June 18 for Russia to create a buffer zone into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast up to the Dnipro River in order to protect occupied Donetsk Oblast from Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.[11]
Kremlin officials previously justified the Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast as an effort to protect Belgorod City from Ukrainian shelling and MLRS strikes.[12] Pasechnik's and Zhuravlev's envisioned buffer zones would extend into eastern Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed yet. Russian officials have recently made similar calls for Russia to expand its territorial ambitions, asking Putin to seize Sumy City and calling for Russia to take control of the part of the Dnipro River that passes through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[13] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa also stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025 and intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and all of Kharkiv Oblast, by the end of 2026.[14]
The Kremlin continues to demonstrate that it will not be satisfied with the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and will use the guise of buffer zones to justify its territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts.
The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability. Putin claimed during SPIEF on June 20 that Russia's debt is not growing and refuted claims that Russia's economy is declining.[15] Putin claimed that the idea that Russia's economy is only tied to raw materials and is dependent on hydrocarbon exports is "outdated," but that Russia aims to increase its non-oil and gas exports.[16] Putin claimed that inflation in Russia decreased to 9.6 percent as of June 16 and that he expects inflation to fall to seven percent by the end of 2025.[17] Putin used his speech to focus on reductions in the poverty level in Russia.[18] Putin also highlighted Russia's low unemployment rate, claiming that the rate has stabilized around 2.3 percent since October 2024. Putin did not speak about Russia's labor shortages that are causing this low employment rate, however, in contrast to his 2024 SPIEF speech in which he acknowledged that Russia was suffering from labor shortages and highlighted the need for skilled migrant labor to increase Russia's economic growth.[19] Putin may be attempting to gloss over his ongoing efforts to leverage migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages amid increasing anti-migrant sentiments in Russia.[20]
The Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to posture the Russian economy as strong and stable, claiming in recent months that inflation was between nine and 10 percent when the actual figure was likely closer to 20 percent.[21] Putin's June 20 claim that Russian inflation is 9.6 percent is likely also false. ISW has observed reports that domestic consumers in Russia continue to face rising prices for staple food items, such as potatoes and butter.[22] Putin also failed to acknowledge the growing detrimental effects of high interest rates of 20 percent on the Russian industrial sector. Russian steel company Severstal head, Alexander Shevelev, warned on June 19 that metallurgical production facilities are at risk of shutting down due to low consumer demand and high interest rates.[23] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at SPIEF on June 19 that Russia's economy grew at a high rate for two years because Russia was using "free resources," including Russia’s workforce, production capacity, import substitution, the liquid assets of the National Welfare Fund, and the banking system’s capital reserve, but that Russia has exhausted many of these resources and needs to think of a new growth model.[24] ISW previously assessed in early June 2025 that the Russian government was likely pressuring Nabiullina to lower Russia’s key interest rate to reduce the impact of high interest rates on the Russian budget and civilian industries.[25]
Putin's efforts to frame the Russian economy as stable and growing are part of his efforts to balance social support programs with Russia's military needs and maintain his support among the Russian population despite the growing economic costs of his war in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering the key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability may backfire and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.[27]
Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia's civilian economic sectors. Putin stated during his speech at SPIEF that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) has increased by over four percent annually over the last two years, but claimed that Russia's GDP growth is not solely due to Russia's oil and gas or defense industrial sectors.[28] Putin claimed that Russia's agricultural, construction, logistics, financial, and information technology (IT) sectors have also expanded over the last two years. ISW reported in September 2024 that Russia's 2025 federal budget allocated 13.5 trillion rubles ($145 billion) toward "National Defense" expenditures and another 3.5 trillion rubles ($37 billion) toward "National Security," meaning that Russia committed about 41 percent of its 2025 expenditures to defense and security expenses.[29] Russia allocated 6.4 trillion rubles ($69 billion) to its 2025 "Social Policy" budget in comparison, which underscores the disparity between Russia's investment in its defense industrial sectors compared to its civilian sectors.
Putin highlighted Russia's DIB growth during his speech and called for further integration of civilian and defense industrial sectors in order to facilitate greater innovation and increase dual-use goods production.[30] Putin claimed that Russia's DIB has increased its output "many times over" and is "mastering" new equipment and weapons. Putin called for Russia to move away from dividing companies between the defense industrial and civilian sectors of the economy and to quickly implement innovations from the civilian sector into Russia's defense and security. Putin called for Russia to decrease the time between formulating an idea and its implementation and called for Russian military commanders and heads of defense industrial enterprises to be more involved in production decision-making processes. Putin pointed to drones, which Putin called the most effective means to destroy expensive military equipment, as an area where Russia can increase efficiency to ensure Russia's security and solve problems in Russia's DIB. Putin framed Russia's investments in artificial intelligence (AI) as purely focused on economic development and civilian sectors during his speech at SPIEF, although Russia is already working to integrate greater AI and machine learning (ML) capabilities into drones along the frontline.[31] Russia undertook a concerted campaign to centralize Russian drone units and drone production efforts in late 2024, but Putin appears to be acknowledging that Russia's new drone production and testing mechanisms must retain a rapid innovation cycle.[32]
Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities. Georgia-based open-source intelligence organization Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported on June 20 that an unnamed "reliable analytical source" stated that Russia's annual production rate of T-90M tanks was roughly 280 T-90M tanks as of 2024.[33] The CIT noted that Russia has been undertaking systemic efforts to increase tank production since before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and estimated that pre-war production rates and Russia's transition to a constant production schedule since 2022 have likely allowed Russia's primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod to produce 60 to 70 T-90M new tanks in 2022; 140 to 180 new tanks in 2023; and 250 to 300 new tanks in 2024. The CIT noted that Russia is currently using fewer tanks and armored vehicles on the battlefield in Ukraine and that Russia's armored vehicle and tank loss rates have been decreasing since late 2024, which is consistent with a recent assessment from a social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery.[34] The CIT assessed that Russia will likely be able to maintain its current armor levels throughout the Russian military for "at least several more years," assuming that Russia's tank production and consumption rates remain at their current levels.
ISW previously assessed that Russia's 2023 and 2024 vehicle loss rates were unsustainable in the medium- to long-term, given the limitations of Russia's defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks.[35] Ongoing Russian efforts to offset and limit tank and armored vehicle losses by increasingly relying on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and other motorized vehicles may enable Russia to sustain its war effort in Ukraine in the medium term.[36]
Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs on June 20.[37]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June 19.[38] Shapovalov most recently served as the Ukrainian representative to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) center in Germany and served as the Commander of Ukraine's Southern Operational Command in 2024.[39]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine.
- Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine.
- Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of "buffer zones" to expand Russia's territorial demands in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability.
- Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia's civilian economic sectors.
- Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities
- Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June 19.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 19 and 20.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and near Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[41]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[42] Elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[43]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 20.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 20 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the forest north of Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[45]
Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and toward Varachyne and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on June 19 and 20.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka (all north of Sumy City), and Yunakivka.[47]
Ukraine's Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on June 20 that the number of Russian small group infantry assaults with quad bikes and motorcycles along the Sumy Oblast border has decreased recently.[48] A servicemember of a Ukrainian regiment operating in Sumy Oblast reported that Russian forces are deploying five to seven first-person view (FPV) drone crews on a small section of the front of an unspecified width.[49]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[50]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on June 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Ohirtseve on June 19 and 20.[51]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 20 that Russian forces intensified assaults toward Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[52] Shamyshyn stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the Aggregate Plant in Vovchansk.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Dovhenke (northeast of Kupyansk).[53]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 20 that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Moskovka (just northeast of Kupyansk).[54]
Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorchina, Kamyanka, and Stroivka, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 19 and 20.[55]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 20 that Russian forces are trying to expand their bridgehead along the Oskil River near Dvorchina but will need to establish pontoon crossings over the river in order to threaten Kupyansk from the north along the west (right) bank of the river.[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 19 and 20.
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on June 20 that Russian forces used motorized vehicles to move assault groups to positions near Olhivka (southeast of Borova).[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Hlushchenkove; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 19 and 20.[58]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northeastern Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[59]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 19 and 20.[60]
Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces in the Siversk direction are attacking using armored vehicles and tanks.[61] ISW has observed reports indicating that Russian forces have been largely utilizing motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in assaults across the theater since late Fall 2024, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian strike drones and dwindling Russian vehicle supplies, and reports that Russian forces are fielding armored vehicles are notable.[62] A platoon commander operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces recently conducted a reduced-platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), but that Russian forces are constantly attacking in small infantry groups or even lone infantrymen.[63] The platoon commander reported that Russian infantry are attacking at night while wearing anti-heat cloaks to evade detection and Ukrainian drones.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 20 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and on the southern outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[64]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations within and near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 19 and 20.[65]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces are regrouping, accumulating forces, and concentrating new "battalion-tactical groups" (BTGs) in the area.[66] Russian forces have not operated in BTGs since late 2022, and it is unclear if the Ukrainian spokesperson is referencing BTGs specifically or battalion-sized units more generally.[67] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces may be preparing for larger-scale assault operations in the Kramatorsk direction in the near future and assessed that elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment and 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and unspecified "Storm-V" or "Storm-Z" assault units already operating in the area are the most likely units to conduct these future operations. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are operating both northwest and southwest of Toretsk, and the spokesperson may be referring to an area inclusive of both the Chasiv Yar direction and part of the Toretsk direction.[68]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment and 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[69]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 19 and 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and in central Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[70]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk).[71]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Pleshchiivka and Katerynivka; and west of Toretsk near Novospaske and Shcherbynivka on June 19 and 20.[72]
Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the Toretsk direction.[73] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces conducted assaults with 23 pieces of equipment, 13 motorcycles, and more than 100 personnel in waves of 20-minute intervals in the past day.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th AA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[74]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 19 that Russian forces advanced west of Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk), to western Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and south of Udachne.[75]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Koptieve, Malynivka, Myrne, and Myrolyubivka and toward Volodymyrivka and Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne on June 19 and 20.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne.[77]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 9th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[78] Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Rubizhne (north of Pokrovsk).[79]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka), east and south of Zaporizhzhia, north of Komar, and west of Fedorivka (all south of Novopavlivka).[80]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and toward Novopidhorodne; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Sribne, Horikhove, Oleksiivka, Odradne, Novoukrainka and Bahatyr; and south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Komar, Dniproenerhiya, and Perebudova on June 19 and 20.[81] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and Zaporizhzhia.[82]
A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are conducting rapid assaults with up to five soldiers or in pairs on motorcycles in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian drone operators.[83] The servicemember added that Russian motorcyclists typically shelter in forested areas and then infiltrate areas one or two at a time, and that Russian forces have a manpower advantage in the Novopavlivka direction.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne, Fedorivka, and Komar.[84]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 19 that Russian forces advanced south of and within Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[85]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on June 19 and 20.[86]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet unit) and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shevchenko.[87]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[88]
Russian forces continued ground assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 19 and 20.[89]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 20 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon using "several" armored vehicles in Malynivka a few days ago, but that this was an isolated mechanized assault.[90] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces continue to primarily attack near Malynivka using motorcycles, buggies, and quad bikes that are more maneuverable in order to quickly overcome the "death zone" - likely referring to the area of the frontline saturated by drones.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka on June 20.[91]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including from the "Nemets" group of its 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[92]
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on June 20 but did not advance.[93]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 86 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast: Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 34 drones and that 36 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[95]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Russian and Belarusian authorities continue economic and industrial cooperation through the Union State framework. Tver Oblast Governor Igor Rudenya and Belarusian State Committee for Standardization Chairperson Elena Morgunova signed an agreement on trade, economic, and industrial cooperation during a meeting at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20.[96] Rudenya emphasized the importance of bilateral cooperation in high-tech industries, including microelectronics and mechanical and machine tool building.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b
[2] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425
[4] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b
[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/24302651
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2012%2C%202025%20PDF-compressed%20%281%29.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024
[8] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b
[9] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24303197
[10] https://tass dot ru/politika/24286957
[11] https://news dot ru/vlast/nado-byt-gotovymi-v-gd-zayavili-o-novyh-celyah-posle-udara-vsu-po-donecku
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125
[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025
[15] https://aif dot ru/politics/putin-citatoy-marka-tvena-prokommentiroval-sluhi-o-problemah-v-ekonomike-rf
[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222; https://t.me/tass_agency/321499
[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/321499; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222; https://t.me/tass_agency/321499
[18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222; https://t.me/tass_agency/321499
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024
[20] https://isw.pub/ForceGen052125
[21] https://swedenherald.com/article/svantesson-wants-to-expose-russian-economic-bluff ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025
[22] https://meduza dot io/cards/tseny-na-kartofel-v-rossii-za-god-vyrosli-pochti-vtroe-do-istoricheskogo-maksimuma-pochemu-produkt-tak-silno-podorozhal-i-kogda-podesheveet ; https://ura dot news/news/1052936283 ; https://72 dot ru/text/economics/2025/06/02/75524336/ ; https://agroreview dot com/ru/novosti/czeny-kartofel-rossyy-vyrosly-rekordnogo/
[23] https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1032064
[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925
[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025
[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625
[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024
[30] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77222
[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone
[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025
[33] https://notes.citeam dot org/eng_t90; https://x.com/CITeam_ru/status/1935941181671981438
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625 ; https://notes.citeam dot org/eng_t90; https://x.com/CITeam_ru/status/1935941181671981438
[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625
[37] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14789 ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13262 ; https://suspilne dot media/1047439-vidbuvsa-novij-etap-obminu-miz-ukrainou-ta-rf/ ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1936023512734388291 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1936023508837916826 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1936038074464846125
https://t.me/mod_russia/53950 ;
[38] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/4122025-55385
[39] https://kyivindependent dot com/zelensky-appoints-brigadier-general-shapovalov-as-new-ground-forces-commander/
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681;
[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37512; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30265; https://t.me/rybar/71486 ; https://t.me/rybar/71487; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343
[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169487
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30265
[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94077; https://t.me/rybar/71486;
[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94077
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94130; https://t.me/rybar/71486; https://t.me/rybar/71487
[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/27343; https://t.me/rusich_army/24269 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169570; https://t.me/rybar/71487; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94077
[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vorog-prytyh-prykordonnyky-fiksuyut-zmenshennya-sprob-proryvu-na-sumshhyni/
[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ormmShy2BtY ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/tak-korejczyamy-voyuvaly-tak-i-svoyimy-voyuyut-na-sumshhyni-taktyka-rosiyan-zalyshayetsya-nezminnoyu/
[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169514
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514
[52] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vovcha-oskil-i-berlin-try-garyachi-tochky-na-mapi-harkivshhyni/
[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9425; https://t.me/viddmaks/209
[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/53945 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321385; https://t.me/mod_russia/53948
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792
[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vovcha-oskil-i-berlin-try-garyachi-tochky-na-mapi-harkivshhyni/
[57] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1935793736115798262; https://t.me/ombr_63/1257
[59] https://x.com/klinger66/status/1936093212424180182 ; https://t.me/umftteam/524
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514
[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/pobyly-rosiyan-i-zabraly-motoczykly-yak-voyuyut-syly-oborony-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/
[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2025
[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ormmShy2BtY ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/zaborona-poodynokogo-shturmu-na-siverskomu-napryamku-prodovzhuyut-peremelyuvaty-rosijskyh-pihotyncziv/
[64] https://t.me/rybar/71487 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321334 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/rybar/71487 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343
[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/nevypadkovi-gosti-vijny-z-kryminalnym-bagazhem-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-v-polon-berut-perevazhno-kolyshnih-vyazniv/
[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29
[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2025
[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30260
[70] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1935830910106030518 ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1222 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9428 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73831 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936031932003107088
[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169566
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73792
[73] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/pobyly-rosiyan-i-zabraly-motoczykly-yak-voyuyut-syly-oborony-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/
[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/73831
[75] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65277 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30252 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30252
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/rybar/71477 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274
[77] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274
[78] https://t.me/wargonzo/27361
[79] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169488
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/15581 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65279 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169566
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65274 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343
[82] https://t.me/wargonzo/27343 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30252
[83] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/nashi-vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-vynahid-dlya-borotby-z-motoshturmamy-okupantiv/
[84] https://t.me/rybar/71490 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20679
[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65279
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12514 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27343
[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/15580
[88] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9430 ; https://t.me/banditskiy_nestor/5125
[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bM2b21W3a9q9CwFgrDzXfqkj7xrA4iXBxdG9nruwbfj9rTpE2A8Tb5Jzg1FeeeCkl
[90] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/20/motobanda-letyt-u-mertvu-zonu-v-stepah-pid-gulyajpolem-spravzhnye-kladovyshhe-rosijskyh-bajkeriv/
[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25704
[92] https://t.me/dva_majors/73789 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27341 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27341 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/19439
[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25683 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bM2b21W3a9q9CwFgrDzXfqkj7xrA4iXBxdG9nruwbfj9rTpE2A8Tb5Jzg1FeeeCkl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25681
[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/36671
[95] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1935984999385170389 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15161 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14778 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44666 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/20/vybuhy-u-harkovi-postrazhdalo-chetvero-lyudej-sered-yakyh-dity/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15149 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15150 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15151 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15152 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2691 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2692 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2697 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15157 ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/51912 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15157 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25698 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25699 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10142 ; https://t.me/suspilnenews/51911 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44644 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/44687 ; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1151161637050650&id=100064704725226&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=TVd6vuq8ubwXmbON ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bM2b21W3a9q9CwFgrDzXfqkj7xrA4iXBxdG9nruwbfj9rTpE2A8Tb5Jzg1FeeeCkl ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7037 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/44118
[96] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/318695 ; https://belta dot by/society/view/belarus-i-tverskaja-oblast-na-pmef-opredelilis-s-perspektivnymi-napravlenijami-sotrudnichestva-721956-2025/
