Avery Borens, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Nidal Morrison, Ben Schmida, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.
The Syrian transitional government has quickly responded to several false reports of insurgent activity in coastal Syria over the last week. The government’s rapid response demonstrates that the government remains concerned about violence in coastal Syria despite low levels of Alawite insurgency activity there. Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support for insurgent groups, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity in coastal areas. The transitional government deployed several General Security Services (GSS) and Defense Ministry units to Daliyah, Latakia Province, on June 4 following false reports about an Assadist insurgent attack in the town.[1] The “attack” was reportedly a personal verbal dispute between two people that local officials overstated.[2] Alawite militia “Coastal Shield Brigade” denied that any insurgent attack targeted Daliyah on June 4.[3] The local transitional government officials likely responded to the rumored attack with force and urgency, given that neighboring areas participated in the March attacks against the GSS.[4] Government forces imposed a curfew on Daliyah and arrested alleged “outlaws.“[5] Some of the defense ministry units that deployed to Daliyah committed atrocities targeting Alawite communities on June 4 and 5.[6] 50th Division soldiers reportedly killed three men and burned cars and homes in the neighboring villages of Daliyah.[7] The transitional government arrested the soldiers on June 9, however.[8] This incident underscores the threat posed by the government’s continued discipline issues within certain MoD units. Poorly disciplined units that are deployed to areas in times of crisis could increase the risk of minor incidents devolving into widespread sectarian violence, like that seen in coastal Syria in March 2025.
The transitional government does not appear to be similarly concerned about small-scale insurgent activity in other areas of Syria.[9] Likely ISIS fighters detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting GSS positions in Deir ez Zor province, and unspecified militants detonated IEDs targeting other GSS positions in Daraa from June 4 to June 10, but Damascus had a minimal response.[10] Part of the transitional government’s reaction to incidents in coastal Syria may be linked to continued threats from organized groups and former militia leaders in coastal Syria.[11] Syrian businessman and the maternal cousin of Bashar al Assad, Rami Makhlouf, claimed in late May 2025 that June 2025 will mark the “beginning” of anti-government activity and that this activity will accelerate in July 2025.[12]
Iran is preparing a counter-proposal for the United States that includes terms for an interim deal. Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States will delay or prevent snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi told Iranian state media on June 10 that Iran is still preparing its response to the recent US nuclear proposal but described the counter-proposal as offering a "framework for an agreement.”[13] Ravanchi stated that Iran is not currently interested in presenting a "very long...comprehensive" proposal. Ravanchi added that Iran and the United States can engage in "more detailed negotiations" after they agree on a framework agreement. A senior US official told Axios on June 10 that the United States has received indications that Iran will reject the recent US proposal while signaling interest in continuing the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[14] Iran likely wants to continue negotiations in order to delay snapback sanctions or strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action snapback mechanism expires in October 2025, which may give Iran an incentive to prolong negotiations. Iran's push for a framework agreement and continued negotiations also comes ahead of US President Donald Trump's 60-day deadline, which expires on June 12, for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[15] The United States and Iran will reportedly hold a sixth round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations this week. Axios reported on June 10 that the United States and Iran will hold the sixth round of nuclear talks in Oslo on June 13 or in Muscat on June 15.[16]
Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing domestic drone production in order to reduce its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons.[17] Israeli media reported on June 9 that Hezbollah has shifted its rehabilitation budget to focus on domestic production of explosive-laden and attack drones over missiles and rocket procurement.[18] These drones are reportedly simpler, faster, and cheaper to produce because they use readily available civilian parts.[19] The Houthis similarly produce some drones domestically and rely upon readily available civilian parts.[20] These Houthi drones were used to sustain a year-long campaign against Saudi Arabia that targeted southern Saudi provinces just over the Yemeni border.[21] Israeli media reported that these drones are harder for Israeli air defense systems to immediately detect and classify.[22] Some of Hezbollah’s most lethal attacks against Israel have used these drones, including the October 2024 drone attack targeting an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) training camp in Binyamina that injured at least 67 Israelis.[23]
Hezbollah likely seeks to prioritize domestic drone production after recent setbacks that have complicated its ability to procure and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon.[24] The Israeli Air Force officer responsible for overseeing efforts against Hezbollah’s covert aerial unit stated that Hezbollah wants to achieve “greater self-sufficiency and less reliance on Iran.”[25] Hezbollah has historically relied on land, air, and maritime smuggling routes to procure weapons from Iran into Lebanon.[26] The new Syrian government has affirmed that it will not allow Iran to re-establish its activities and influence in Syria, which it previously used to provide financial support and military equipment to Hezbollah.[27] The Syrian transitional government has also continued to dismantle smuggling networks between Iraq and Syria that previously served as a key node in the ground line of communication between Iran and Hezbollah during the Assad regime.[28] Lebanese authorities also tightened security and control at Beirut’s International Airport in May 2025 to curb Hezbollah-linked smuggling.[29] Iran has used civilian flights traveling to Beirut airport to traffic weapons to Hezbollah since at least 2018.[30] The IDF has also continued to target Hezbollah weapons production and storage facilities in recent months.[31] The IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah drone production and storage facilities in Beirut’s southern suburbs on June 5.[32]
Hezbollah may be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms through Syria into Lebanon, but Hezbollah will find it far more challenging to smuggle in missile or missile production components. Hezbollah previously used Syria as a rear area where it could produce very sophisticated solid-fuel ballistic missile systems, for example.[33] It will not be possible for Hezbollah to rebuild similar production capabilities. Many missile components, such as engines, are also much larger and difficult to transport compared to small arms or dual-use drone components.
Key Takeaways:
- Syrian Insurgencies: The Syrian transitional government has quickly responded to several false reports of insurgent activity in coastal Syria over the last week. The government’s rapid response demonstrates that the government remains concerned about violence in coastal Syria despite low levels of Alawite insurgency activity there. The transitional government does not appear to be similarly concerned about small-scale insurgent activity in other areas of Syria.
- Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is preparing a counter-proposal for the United States that includes terms for an interim deal. Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States will delay or prevent snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.
- Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing domestic drone production in order to reduce its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons. Hezbollah likely seeks to prioritize domestic drone production after recent setbacks that have complicated its ability to procure and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon. Hezbollah may be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms through Syria into Lebanon, but Hezbollah will find it far more challenging to smuggle in missile or missile production components.
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
Iran continued to reiterate its commitment to the Axis of Resistance and its strategic objective to destroy the Israeli state. Senior Iranian officials met with Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Deputy Secretary General Jamil Mazhar in Tehran to discuss regional developments.[34] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Mazhar on June 9 and reaffirmed Iran’s support for Palestinian militia groups in their efforts to ”resist” Israel.[35] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Hossein Salami and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately met with Mazhar on June 9.[36]
Iran continues to emphasize air defense modernization amid potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Artesh Northwest Air Defense Region Deputy Commander Brigadier General Jafar Saleh inspected the Shahid Tohidi radar station in Bileh Savar, Ardabil Province, on June 10, to evaluate defense capabilities at the site.[37] Advisor to the Artesh Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Abazar Jokar separately highlighted the domestic development of the Iranian-made Bavar-373 system. Jokar confirmed that Iran developed Bavar-373 after Russia failed to deliver S-300s.[38] Israeli airstrikes on Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four S-300 air defense systems inoperable. CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that Russia can supply Iran with new S-300 components, given Russia’s need for S-300s for its war with Ukraine.[39]
The Iranian rial appreciated from 825,000 rials to one US dollar on June 9 to 820,500 rials to one US dollar on June 10.[40]
Syria
There were several engagements between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian army’s 66th Division that clashed in several areas east of Raqqa on June 9.[41] Syrian media reported that the SDF and 66th Division engaged each other near Madan, Abu Hamad, and al Maghla Bridge in the eastern Raqqa countryside on June 9.[42] The new Syrian army sent military reinforcements to its positions in Madan, Raqqa province, following the fighting.[43] The SDF and Syrian transitional government previously agreed on March 10 that the SDF would integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[44] The SDF and Syrian transitional government have not yet reached an agreement on outstanding issues that the March 10 agreement did not resolve, however.[45]
The United States conducted two separate drone strikes that killed three people in Idlib Province on June 10.[46] The first drone strike killed two unidentified men on a motorcycle in the town of Dana, Idlib Province.[47] The second strike killed the driver of a car and wounded four nearby civilians in the town of Atmeh, Idlib Province.[48] This is the first US strike in territory controlled by the Syrian transitional government since the February 23, 2025, strike, which targeted a former leader of Hurras al Din, a Salafi-jihadi militant group allied to al Qaeda.[49] The US has previously shared secret intelligence with the Syrian transitional government, and it is possible these strikes involved similar intelligence cooperation.[50]
The large number of Assad regime members in government custody is creating challenges for the Syrian transitional government as it attempts to balance the pursuit of transitional justice with the reintegration of low-level regime members. The Syrian Ministry of Interior’s (MoI) spokesperson, Noureddine Baba, held a joint press conference with Supreme Committee for Civil Peace spokesperson Hassan Soufan on June 10 that focused on transitional justice and maintaining order in Syria.[51] The conference was held following the transitional government’s release of prominent Assad regime members, including the head of the National Defense Forces (NDF), Fadi al Saqr, who is implicated in human rights violations perpetrated by the pro-Assad militia throughout the Syrian conflict.[52] Baba said that approximately 123,000 MoI personnel during the Assad regime are implicated in war crimes and that the MoI is coordinating with Interpol to pursue violators outside of Syria.[53]
The Syrian transitional government must balance the prosecution of former Assad regime members who committed crimes with disarming and reintegrating low-level former Assad regime members. Soufan stated that Saqr and other former Assad regime members were released as part of a political decision to preserve civil peace.[54] The lack of an effective transitional justice system has driven revenge-based attacks targeting individuals with ties or suspected ties to the former Assad regime. These attacks, in turn, discourage cooperation between Alawite communities who could effectively reintegrate into society and the transitional government. The Syrian transitional government must prosecute, charge, and imprison perpetrators of crimes committed under the former Assad regime through fair trials to effectively gain the trust of the Syrian population. The Supreme Committee for Civil Peace’s decision to release Saqr could further undermine confidence in these transitional justice institutions.[55]
Iraq
The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) General Directorate of Security and Discipline announced on June 9 that it had arrested an unspecified number of PMF members for using their authority under the PMF for electoral fraud.[56] The PMF Directorate announced that the arrests are part of an ongoing investigation into PMF members illegally obtaining voter cards or intimidating voters, following directives from Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Popular Mobilization Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[57] The 2016 PMF Commission Law, which formalized the PMF as an independent security force, prohibits PMF members from being affiliated with or participating in political activities.[58] The PMF General Directorate of Security and Discipline aims to prevent PMF members from engaging in criminal activities.[59] These arrests follow reports of the PMF being exploited for electoral purposes ahead of the November 2025 elections.[60] Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political actors have used the PMF for illegal voter intimidation and election interference in past election cycles.[61] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias who nominally report to the prime minister but actually report to their respective commanders, many of whom have political wings.[62] The head of the PMF General Directorate of Security and Discipline, Abu Zainab al Lami, is a member of Iranian-backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah.[63] Lami could either conduct a phony investigation or abuse his investigative powers to support the electoral interests of the Hoquq Movement, which is KH’s political wing, or its allies.
Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politicians continue to try to discredit Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ahead of the upcoming elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs.[64] Sudani’s Special Envoy to Syria, Izzat Shabandar, met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on June 9.[65] Shabandar posted on X (Twitter) that the visit was in Iraq’s interest.[66] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated parliamentarian claimed on June 9 that unspecified Syrian officials gave Shabandar Assad regime Iraq-related documents. The parliamentarian claimed that Sudani will use these documents in his election campaign.[67] The parliamentarian did not indicate the content of the alleged documents. Iranian-backed Iraqi figures may seek to cast Sudani’s meeting with Shara in a negative light as part of a broader effort to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. They previously criticized Sudani’s invitation to Shara to attend the May 2025 Arab Summit in Baghdad.[68] Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Sudani also recently accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage his electoral prospects in the upcoming elections.[69]
Arabian Peninsula
The Houthis have launched two separate ballistic missile attacks on Israel since June 9.[70] The Houthis launched one ballistic missile on June 9 that landed outside Israeli territory.[71] The Houthis conducted a second ballistic missile attack on June 10, targeting Ben Gurion Airport.[72] The IDF intercepted the missile.[73]
The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on the Hudaydah port on June 10 in retaliation for Houthi drone and missile attacks.[74] The IDF stated that the airstrike was intended to impede military use of the port.[75] UKMTO stated on June 9 that commercial ships should reconsider docking at Hudaydah port.[76]
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
See topline section.
CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/58604 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/58605 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1930299901348348152 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930699934908748231 ;
[2] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930698372538867720 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930698375021871289
[3] https://t.me/almougahid313/1075
[4] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930698375021871289
[5] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1930530921783963872
[6] https://t.me/almougahid313/1075 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930698375021871289
[7] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1932177587658441161 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930699934908748231 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1930569790281724192
[8] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1932177587658441161
[9] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1932103456141250992 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1931357457974186027 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1931344714290057389 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144022
[10] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1932103456141250992 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1931357457974186027 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1931344714290057389 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144022
[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025
[12] https://www.facebook.com/RamiMakhloufSY/posts/pfbid02cY9cCMpGbu1hidos2PvPY7E4HudBbVkqWWq4x9B52N4H5JEKrDkbRP3vcmtyobcMl?locale=ar_AR
[13] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85857415
[14] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/10/trump-camp-david-iran-gaza-meeting
[15] https://www.mako.co dot il/news-diplomatic/2025_q2/Article-9c5624fb7461691026.htm
[16] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1932178309514662036
[17] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl
[18] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl
[19] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl
[20] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/46283842630243379f0504ece90a821f ; https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2019/08/houthi-uav-strategy-in-yemen/
[21] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/46283842630243379f0504ece90a821f ; https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2019/08/houthi-uav-strategy-in-yemen/
[22] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl
[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-13-2024 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wg7qJiORo0E
[24] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/dont-assume-irans-supply-lines-hezbollah-are-cut ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hjjxlco1xl ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-targets-hezbollah-weapons-manufacturing-storage-site-in-lebanons-beqaa-valley/
[25] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl
[26] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/dont-assume-irans-supply-lines-hezbollah-are-cut
[27] https://www.npr.org/2025/02/04/g-s1-46361/syrias-new-leader-denounces-iran-calling-its-proxies-a-regional-threat ; https://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria
[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-25-2023 ; https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/03/the-transformation-of-the-iraqi-syrian-border-from-a-national-to-a-regional-frontier?lang=en¢er=middle-east ; https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/life-returns-to-al-bukamal-after-iranian-militias-flee/
[29] https://www.jns.org/tehrans-use-of-beirut-airport-to-smuggle-arms-is-major-threat-to-region/ ; https://www.jns.org/lebanese-govt-wresting-control-of-main-airport-from-hezbollah/
[30] https://www.jns.org/tehrans-use-of-beirut-airport-to-smuggle-arms-is-major-threat-to-region/ ; https://www.jns.org/lebanese-govt-wresting-control-of-main-airport-from-hezbollah/
[31] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hjjxlco1xl ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-targets-hezbollah-weapons-manufacturing-storage-site-in-lebanons-beqaa-valley/
[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1930753541846487369
[33] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rjshezmikx ;
[34] https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1932411907660484637 ;
https://x.com/KhosroIsfahani/status/1932135274852892740 ;
https://x.com/ghalibaffans/status/1932056320548516197
[35] https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1932411907660484637
[36] https://x.com/KhosroIsfahani/status/1932135274852892740 ;
https://x.com/ghalibaffans/status/1932056320548516197
[37] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85857734/
[38] https://farsnews dot ir/Mahdi128/1749544206455400527
[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-strike-on-iran-took-out-radar-sets-to-guide-ballistic-missiles-report/
[40] www.bon-bast.com
[41] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1932403481630966090
[42] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144123 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1932403481630966090 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144134
[43] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144128
[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025
[45] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1922997343885943053 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-15-2025
[46] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1932334771767533640 ; https://x.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1932376867979325448 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1932357848685785574
[47] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1932334771767533640
[48] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1932376867979325448
[49] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-24-2025 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1894381228645654933
[50] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/us-withdrawal-syria-will-reinvigorate-isis-terror-threat
[51] https://www dot enabbaladi.net/758575/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%b6-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b6%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b7-%d8%aa%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a7-%d8%ae%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%b1/
[52] https://syrianobserver dot com/syrian-actors/public-outrage-over-settlements-with-war-criminals-fadi-saqr-back-in-the-spotlight.html
[53] https://www dot enabbaladi.net/758575/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%b6-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b6%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b7-%d8%aa%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a7-%d8%ae%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%b1/
[54] https://en dot zamanalwsl.net/news/article/69785/
[55] https://en dot zamanalwsl.net/news/article/69786/
[56] https://almadapaper dot net/404931
[57] https://almadapaper dot net/404931
[58] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2016/11/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A
[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf
[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025
[61] https://alarab.co dot uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A3%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86 ; https://www.aa.com dot tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A8/1161063
[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces
[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf , pg. 34 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF
[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025
[65] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144100
[66] https://x.com/IAlshabandar/status/1932419030654079075
[67] https://x.com/Y_B_Alkilaby/status/1932492115352932451 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1932165229187944498 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/khlaf-byn-sayb-ahl-alhq-w-mnzmt-bdr-hwl-alsytrt-ly-alryys-aljdyd-lmjls-alnwab ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/aljnah-alarhaby-dakhl-alhkwmt-alraqyt-yard-zyart-alshr
[68] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051625 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate022725
[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025
[70] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rja11ie1bll ; https://t.me/army21ye/3089?single
[71] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rja11ie1bll
[72] https://t.me/army21ye/3089?single
[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1932484340555919473
[74] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1932313149534826697
[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1932313149534826697
[76] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1931770861650092279
