Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.
US and Israeli strikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat. The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow, directly targeted points above the centrifuge cascade hall, and likely destroyed all six IR-1 and seven IR-6 cascades that produced nearly 90 percent of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium as of the last IAEA reporting period.[1] IAEA Director Rafael Grossi confirmed on June 26 that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that small vibrations can destroy them.[2] The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that the twelve 30,000lb GBU-57s—over 180 tons of bombs—detonated inside the facility after traveling through the Fordow ventilation shafts.[3] These bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations.
Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles could pose a threat if Iran attempts to rebuild its nuclear program over the following years. Iranian officials have maintained Iran’s stated right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil despite the US and Israeli air campaign. Two unspecified officials told the Financial Times on June 26 that Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile “remains largely intact” following the US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, citing “preliminary intelligence assessments provided to European governments.”[4] The Institute for Science and International Security also noted that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, which Iran would need to enrich further to weapons-grade (90% enrichment).[5] Uranium enrichment is logarithmic, meaning that ”the higher [the concentration of Uranium], the easier it gets” to enrich to higher levels.[6] The destruction of so many centrifuges between June 12 and June 24 will still make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. US and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material, but could not have destroyed the material. Conventional explosives cannot destroy enriched uranium. Iran may have moved some enriched uranium from its nuclear facilities to other locations ahead of Israeli strikes, according to some reports.[7] The White House has rejected reports that suggest Iran relocated enriched material ahead of US airstrikes on June 21.[8]
The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though Iran could enrich to weapons-grade if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility.[9] Iran could attempt to build a simple gun-type nuclear bomb, which is similar to the US atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. A gun-type weapon would need at least 25kg of 90 percent enriched uranium. Iran would only be able to deliver such a weapon using an aircraft or other, more rudimentary delivery weapon, however. Iran would also still require the know-how and facilities to build such a weapon. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel’s decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.[10] A US weapons expert noted that US and Israeli strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to even build a non-missile deliverable weapon, such as a nuclear bomb.[11]
IRGC-affiliated media confirmed on June 27 that the IDF killed another Iranian nuclear scientist, Soleiman Soleimani, in a recent targeted attack.[12] Soleimani was a chemical engineering graduate from the Iranian University of Science and Technology (IUST).[13] The IUST is a Tehran-based technical university closely linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[14] IUST has conducted research relevant to unmanned aerial vehicles, missile propulsion, and satellite technology, and has collaborated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI) on continuous mixer technologies with potential missile propellant applications.[15] Israel’s targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear scientists degrade Iran’s nuclear program by limiting the institutional knowledge available to rebuild the nuclear program following US and Israeli airstrikes.
Key Takeaways
- US and Israeli airstrikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat if Iran chooses to rebuild its nuclear program. The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though it could do so if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility or retains surviving centrifuges at another facility. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel’s decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.
- A top Israeli official said Israel is preparing to resume operations against Iran if necessary. Israel seeks to retain its air superiority over Iranian airspace, prevent reconstruction of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and inhibit Iranian support to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened to conduct retaliatory attacks against a potential Israeli strike.
- The Iranian regime continues to take counterintelligence steps that likely reflect the regime’s paranoia about Israeli infiltration. First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli “spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.
A top Israeli official said Israel is preparing to resume operations against Iran if necessary. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on June 27 that he directed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare plans for additional operations against Iran to preserve Israeli air superiority, prevent reconstruction of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and disrupt Iranian support to members of the Axis of Resistance.[16] Iranian officials have repeatedly maintained that Iran has the right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil and have stated their intent to resume operations at nuclear facilities.[17]
Mossad’s Farsi-language X account warned Iranian civilians to take precautions to ensure their safety during Israeli attacks.[18] Mossad warned Iranians to avoid Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) personnel and bases, and regime vehicles.
Mossad specifically warned civilians to avoid IRGC personnel who receive calls or messages on their personal devices, which could make IRGC officials less likely to use their communication devices. Israel detonated personal pagers and radios in a coordinated attack on Hezbollah communication systems in September 2025, which resulted in 1,000s of Hezbollah casualties and disruptions to its command and control.[19] Mossad’s warning poses a dilemma for the IRGC by being forced to either disrupt their communications network or accept the risk of such an attack. Mossad’s warning could cause IRGC personnel to disrupt their own communications network by abandoning regular systems to adopt safer but less efficient ways of communicating.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned that Iran would retaliate against a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Araghchi stated that Iran would respond to any Israeli violation of the ceasefire and noted that “Iran is not Lebanon.”[20] Israel has conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah across Lebanon since November 2025 as part of a stated effort to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting and threatening Israel under the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[21] Araghchi is suggesting that Israel will attempt to conduct similar strikes in Iran to prevent Iran from reconstructing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was reportedly not informed of the Israel-Iran ceasefire agreement prior to the Supreme National Security Council’s (SNSC) decision to accept the agreement. The SNSC does contain one official whom the supreme leader appoints as a personal representative, however.[22] Unspecified officials cited by IranWire on June 22 claimed that Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Larijani, and former head of the Iranian judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, were unable to contact Khamenei to advocate for renewed negotiations with the United States.[23] Unspecified Iranian officials cited by the New York Times on June 23 reported that Khamenei relocated to a secure bunker and only communicated with senior officials via courier.[24] Khamenei’s seclusion very likely inhibited effective communication between senior Iranian officials and Khamenei. Unspecified sources cited by Iranian opposition media on June 27 claimed that the SNSC was unable to reach Khamenei to discuss the ceasefire. The sources added that the SNSC was forced to decide whether or not to accept the US-brokered ceasefire without Khamenei’s input due to time constraints.[25]
The IDF struck internal security and social control centers in Tehran during its air campaign and targeted the Basij headquarters and Evin Prison.[26] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei issued a statement on June 27 confirming the death of Judge Ali Ghena'at Kar and several judiciary staff members during the Israeli strike on Evin Prison on June 23. [27] The statement also confirmed the deaths of multiple administrative and prison staff alongside Ghena'at Kar. Evin Prison is Iran’s main detention facility for political prisoners and regime dissidents.[28]
The IDF destroyed or damaged Iranian missile and drone storage facilities during the Iran-Israel war. The IDF conducted airstrikes on June 13 targeting missile storage facilities at the IRGC Aerospace Force Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) Missile Base in Kermanshah Province. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 17 showed severe damage to an above-ground munition storage facility at the site as well as six bunker entrances.[29] The Bakhtaran Missile Base contained over 80 missile storage bunkers, an underground facility with two entrances, and two above-ground munition storage facilities, according to an Israeli think tank.[30] The missile base reportedly stored Qiam-1 and Fateh-110 ballistic missiles, and Iran used it as a ballistic missile launch site targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Iraq in 2020.[31] Large earthen berms, which can be used to contain accidental explosions, surround the munition storage facility. The satellite imagery also shows that Israeli airstrikes collapsed six bunker entrances, which render the bunkers and their contents temporarily inaccessible to IRGC forces and prevent further ballistic missile launches from these sites until the collapse is fixed.
The IDF conducted an airstrike on a drone storage facility at the IRGC Navy’s 1st Saheb ol Zaman Regional base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on June 21.[32] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 26 shows that the airstrike destroyed the drone warehouse. Commercially available maritime tracking data shows that an IRGC-linked landing craft, the Baneh, traveled from this base to Abu Musa and Kish islands in late April, which was a few weeks before CTP-ISW observed IRGC deployments to the Nazirat Islands, of which Abu Musa is a part.[33]
The Iranian regime continues to take counterintelligence steps that likely reflect the regime’s paranoia about Israeli infiltration. First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli “spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.[34] Iranian media reported on June 25 that Iranian security forces have arrested at least 700 Iranians on political or security charges since the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[35] The arrests include several individuals whom the regime characterized as "Mossad spies."[36] CTP-ISW assessed on June 25 that such arrests likely reflect Iranian recognition of the scale of Israeli infiltration and covert operations in Iran, which was revealed during Israel’s opening attacks on Israel.[37] Iran has continued to arrest alleged Mossad spies across Iran. Iran’s concern about Israeli infiltration and covert operations in Iran may be used as a justification for broader crackdowns on society.
The IDF estimated on June 27 that it killed between 200-300 IRGC and Basij members in strikes targeting IRGC headquarters in Tehran in the 24 hours before the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET on June 24.[38] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that recruits and organizes regime loyalists and uses them to produce and disseminate propaganda, suppress internal dissent, and conduct civil defense operations.[39] The IDF struck the Basij headquarters, the IRGC Ground Forces Sarallah Operational Base, and other IRGC headquarters in Tehran on June 23.[40] The IRGC Sarallah Operational Base is responsible for security in Tehran and oversees the 10th Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Division in Karaj, Alborz Province, and the 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division in Tehran City.[41] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 23 that the IDF estimated that it had killed many IRGC personnel in its strikes on IRGC facilities.[42]
China reportedly imported 1.8 barrels per day of Iranian crude oil between June 1 and June 20, according to ship tracking data from Vortexa.[43] Vortexa reported that Iranian oil exports accelerated in early June ahead of the Israeli airstrike campaign. US-Iran nuclear negotiations reached a stalemate in early June. Iran may have sought to rapidly export oil to protect itself from potential US or Israeli strikes. Israel concentrated strikes on Iranian energy facilities related to domestic Iranian consumption, rather than Iranian exports. CTP-ISW assessed on June 15 that Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure would likely worsen Iran’s ongoing energy crisis by causing more frequent electricity shortages, which could spark popular protests. China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which helps Iran circumvent US sanctions.[44] Reuters reported on June 17 that Iran has around 27.5 million barrels stored in tankers outside of the Persian Gulf, which almost certainly allowed Iran to continue exporting oil to China despite the Israel-Iran War.[45]
The IDF reported on June 27 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched approximately 40 drones into Israeli territory between June 12 and 24.[46] The IDF intercepted more than ten drones “from the east” between June 16 to 24.[47] The IDF has referred to drones launched by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias towards Israel during the October 7 War as originating “from the east.”[48] Iraqi media reported that drones crashed in multiple areas of Iraq throughout the war, including Maysan, Dhi Qar, al Muthanna, and Anbar provinces.[49] It is unclear if these were Iranian drones en route to Israel or Iraqi militia drones en route to Israel that crashed due to technical malfunctions or electronic warfare.
Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias condemned Israel’s strikes on Iran but did not claim any drone attacks against Israel between June 12 and 24.[50] CTP-ISW assessed on June 20 that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias were attempting to deter US participation in the war by threatening to expand the conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias were also likely seeking to avoid the negative political repercussions of Iraqi involvement in the war ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[51] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically organized and announced kinetic campaigns through operational rooms. The lack of public acknowledgement suggests that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have suffered from a lack of discipline among lower-ranking fighters who attempted to independently launch drone attacks on Israel. Militia leadership also could have passively allowed lower-ranking fighters to conduct the attacks.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/26/us/politics/iran-nuclear-program-uranium.html ;
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf ;
https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20250626-iran-nuclear-sites-suffered-enormous-damage-iaea-chief-tells-rfi ;
https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Israel-Iran-Post-Attack-Battle-Damage-Assessment_FINAL.pdf
https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities ; https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/1937547337917669404
[2] https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20250626-iran-nuclear-sites-suffered-enormous-damage-iaea-chief-tells-rfi
[3] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities
[4] https://www.ft.com/content/0808eeb8-341c-4a4e-8ccf-0db07febef91
[5] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities ; https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1937556394766450949
[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/science/09enrich.html#:~:text=It%20is%20also%20illustrating%20one,scientists%20like%20to%20say%2C%20nonlinear.
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/26/us/politics/iran-nuclear-program-uranium.html
[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/26/us/politics/iran-nuclear-program-uranium.html
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-26-2025
[10] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1938435528954941775 ;
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/06/3343442; https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities
[11] https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1937556394766450949
[12] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/06/3343442
[13] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/06/3343442
[14] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-university-science-and-technology
[15] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-university-science-and-technology
[16] https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/1938601559526359157
[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-is-looking-restore-its-nuclear-industry-irans-nuclear-chief-says-2025-06-24/ ;
[18] https://x.com/MossadSpokesman/status/1938570846722756989
[19] https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/27/middleeast/israel-pager-attack-hezbollah-lebanon-invs-intl
[20] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1938344092951298457
[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/27/israel-lebanon-strike/
[22] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/government-institution/supreme-national-security-council-snsc
[23] https://iranwire.com/en/news/142494-exclusive-senior-officials-cannot-reach-khamenei-ali-larijani-wants-to-rescue-iran/
[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html
[25] https://www.iranintl.com/202506265565
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-15-2025-evening-edition ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-evening-edition ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-23-2025-morning-edition
[27] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/06/3343731/ ;
https://x.com/IsraelPersian/status/1937137395926728885
[28] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/06/3343731/
[29] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-14-2025-evening-edition ; https://x.com/BabakTaghvaee1/status/1933385329223819731
[30] https://israel-alma dot org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Islamic-Revolutionary-Guard-Corps-Aerospace-Force-IRGC-ASF.pdf
[31] https://israel-alma dot org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Islamic-Revolutionary-Guard-Corps-Aerospace-Force-IRGC-ASF.pdf
[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936499518507503734 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-21-2025-evening-edition
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025; Maritime data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence
[34] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/758110/%D8%AE%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF
[35] https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir/news/958092/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-turns-internal-crackdown-wake-12-day-war-2025-06-25/ ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/1937764451450810488 ; https://x.com/PressTV/status/1938368789491466419
[36] https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir/news/958092/ ; https://www iribnews dot ir/fa/news/5500196/ ; https://www irna dot ir/news/85863471/ ; https://www irna ir/news/85862962/ ; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/233279/5-Mossad-spy-arrested-in-Iran-s-Lorestan
[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-25-2025
[38] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23784
[39] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces
[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-23-2025-morning-edition
[41] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf
[42] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23588
[43] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-iran-oil-imports-surge-june-rising-shipments-teapot-demand-2025-06-27/
[44] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/april-2025-iran-tanker-tracker
[45] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/israel-iran-war-already-takes-toll-oil-gas-sector-2025-06-17/
[46] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23784
[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934526725305643025 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934530789909188989 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934535170738078035 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934543856860594485 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934637667989246378 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934891724117299406 ; https://x.com/DanLinnaeus/status/1934965131546591727 ; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1935123234376061226 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935175112304574791 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935670435498127776
[48] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1521 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856790269343006730
[49] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-3-طا-رات-مسيرة-جنوبي-العراق ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/وسط-تكرار-خرق-اجوا-العراق-وزارة-الدفاع-تنتظر-تزويدها-بمضادات-في-غضون-شهر ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/localnews/531112/قبل-قليل-سقوط-ثلاث-طائرات-في-العراق
[50] https://t.me/s/PlatformB ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/العصا-ب-تنضم-للكتا-ب-وتهدد-امريكا-ارواحنا-فدا-لنا-ب-الامام-المهدي ; https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1934724552795254855
[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-evening-edition
