Johanna Moore and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 5:00 AM ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.
Key Takeaways
- Israel continued its strike campaign targeting Iranian air defenses, missile forces, and nuclear sites. These sites include one in Esfahan that produced centrifuges.
- Israel struck and killed senior officers in the IRGC Aerospace Force and Quds Force, which may impose a temporary disruption upon Iranian command-and-control.
- An Iranian drone struck a populated area in Israel for the first time during this war. This is not indicative of a systematic breakdown in Israeli air defenses. Integrated air defense systems are not perfect, and some projectiles will impact their targets.
- Iran conducted another ballistic missile attack targeting Israel. It consisted of five missiles, all of which the IDF intercepted.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a new wave of airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center on June 21 as part of Israel’s campaign to “degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat” of Iranian weaponization of its nuclear program.[1] The IDF struck two centrifuge production facilities present at the compound and additional unspecified military targets in the surrounding area.[2] The IDF reported that its June 21 strikes on the facility caused “significant damage” to the Iranian centrifuge production capabilities.[3] Centrifuges are critical components used to enrich uranium.[4] Israeli strikes that damage or destroy centrifuges could severely inhibit Iran’s ability to further enrich uranium for weaponization, which makes the destruction of centrifuges a key line of effort for Israel as it tries to accomplish its objectives. Israel previously struck the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center on June 13 and damaged the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility on site.[5]
The IDF has continued its air campaign on Iran’s ballistic missile program to further degrade Iran's ability to retaliate. The IDF Air Force launched a new wave of airstrikes on ballistic missile storage and launch infrastructure since CTP-ISW's June 20, 5:00PM EST data cut off.[6] Social media users and anti-regime media claimed that Israel struck an IRGC-owned area near the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Imam Ali Training Command in Shiraz, Fars Province.[7] Geolocated footage posted on June 20 showed the aftermath of an Israeli airstrike on a missile launcher in Azan Ozan, Kermanshah Province.[8]
The IDF has killed two senior IRGC and Quds Force commanders since CTP-ISW's June 20, 5:00 PM EST data cut off. The IDF killed IRGC Unit 190 commander Behnam Shahriari.[9] Unit 190 is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran to other members of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, particularly Hezbollah.[10] Shahriari used personal connections in Turkey and Lebanon to operate a network of front companies, currency exchanges, and money couriers to transfer money to members of the Axis for operations.[11] The IDF estimates that Shahriari transferred approximately ”hundreds of millions of dollars” annually to members of the Axis of Resistance.[12] Shahriari‘s death is particularly notable because Iran has been reduced to sending Hezbollah cash rather than large shipments of weapons after the collapse of Assad.[13] The IDF also killed IRGC Quds Force Palestine Corps commander Saeed Izadi.[14] Izadi served as a liaison between Iran and Hamas and facilitated Iranian funding to Hamas.[15] The IDF reported that Izadi was one of the ”architects” of the October 7 attack on Israel.[16] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that while Iran was involved with the development of strategic plans and operational concepts, it was not aware of the timing or Hamas’ planning on a tactical level.[17]
The IRGC and Quds Force are the main Iranian forces used to project force into the region and externalize threats to the regime. The IRGC has a traditional military hierarchy that will enable it to survive decapitation campaigns without major, long-term disruptions to operations. There will be temporary disruptions to Iranian operations and planning. Shahriari and Izadi’s deaths are unlikely to affect Iran’s ability to continue operations, but are indicative of the nodes Israel would seek to impact to reduce the Iranian threat posed to Israel.
The IDF announced it had killed IRGC Aerospace Force 2nd Drone Regiment commander Amin Pour Joudaki.[18] Joudaki replaced the former commander of the 2nd Drone Regiment, Mohammad Bagher Tahrerpour, on June 13 after Tahrerpour was killed in an Israeli airstrike.[19] Joudaki directed “hundreds” of drone attacks on Israel since assuming command.
The IDF reported that Israel has intercepted 99% of the 470 drones launched by Iran at Israel since June 12.[20] The IDF reported that an Iranian drone struck a home in Beit Shean, Northern Israel, on June 21.[21] This is the first confirmed instance of a successful Iranian drone strike since June 12, however.[22] The IDF has intercepted at least three drones launched from Iran since CTP-ISW's June 20, 5:00 PM EST data cut off.[23] A fourth drone launched from Iran landed in an unspecified area of the Golan Heights.[24]
The IDF's failure to intercept all munitions launched by Iran is not indicative of a breakdown in Israeli air defense systems or capabilities. Air defense systems are not perfect, and enemy projectiles and aircraft can usually penetrate even the best air defense systems. The fact that Israeli air defenses can intercept 99% of drones is noteworthy and abnormal; many Iranian-designed Houthi drones managed to penetrate Saudi air defenses during the Saudi involvement in the Yemeni Civil War. Israeli air defense systems similarly suffered occasional failures in intercepting drones during the October 7 War. These failures did not represent a systematic failure in Israeli air defenses. Iran has continued to fire drones at Israel, but these attacks are relatively ineffective due to the amount of time Israel has to react to Iranian drone attacks and effective Israeli combat air patrols. The drones employed by Iran to target Israel take roughly nine hours to reach Israel, which enables Israel to scramble aircraft or direct aircraft on combat air patrol to intercept incoming projectiles.
Iran has launched one ballistic missile attack on Israel since CTP-ISW's June 20, 5:00 PM EST data cut off.[25] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Iran launched five missiles in the attack.[26] The IDF intercepted the missile, and fragments damaged an apartment building in central Israel.[27]
[1] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933420882162016634
[2] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23396 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1936333778550423740 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1936327141320261722 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1936412075506672124 ; https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-war-nuclear-talks-geneva-news-06-21-2025-a7b0cdaba28b5817467ccf712d214579
[3] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936318077064409178
[4] https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html
[5] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1933580390780055726 ; https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran
[6] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936215757626446037
[7] https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1936201933607301360 ; https://x.com/pouriazeraati/status/1936414567233618390 ; https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1936428010195820977
[8] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936189448758128997
[9] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936319813875270128
[10] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936318095460593736
[11] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936318095460593736 ; https://x.com/IDF/status/1936323398595994024
[12] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936318095460593736
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2025
[14] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936325124736549103 ; https://x.com/IDF/status/1936319815418843316 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936318086308626777
[15] https://x.com/IDF/status/1936319815418843316
[16] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936325124736549103
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-12-2024
[18] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936303903487783315
[19] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936303903487783315
[20] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936383068841124283
[21] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936332549627789357 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936339907007442961
[22] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936332040141725813
[23] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936329204955513243 ; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936302451000254530
[24] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23392
[25] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936207830656164290
[26] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936300438690664898
[27] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936300438690664898
