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Friday, June 6, 2025

Iran Update, June 6, 2025

Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Ben Schmida, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Nidal Morrison, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

 

Iran is continuing to cooperate with China to replenish its solid-fuel ballistic missile stockpile after Israel destroyed Iranian solid-fuel production sites in October 2024.[1] Israeli strikes in October 2024 damaged three major long-range missile production sites in Iran, including the Shahroud Military Site in Semnan Province and the Khojir and Parchin complexes in Tehran Province.[2] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on June 5 that Iran has ordered thousands of tons of ammonium perchlorate from China in recent months.[3] Ammonium perchlorate comprises around 70 percent of the propellant of solid-fuel missiles.[4] The sources stated that an Iranian firm, Pishgaman Tejarat Rafi Novin Company, ordered the material from a Hong Kong-based company. This report follows several sodium perchlorate transfers from China to Iran in recent months.[5] Sodium perchlorate can be converted into ammonium perchlorate. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels, Golbon and Jairan, delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[6] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), which oversees part of Iran’s missile research and development, took delivery of the cargo.[7] Iran also previously engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire ammonium perchlorate from China.[8]

The sources speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the new ammonium perchlorate shipments could support the production of up to 800 ballistic missiles. Western sources previously estimated that 1,000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can fuel up to 260 medium-range ballistic missiles.[9] If the 800 ballistic missiles that the Wall Street Journal referred to are medium-range missiles, this would suggest that Iran purchased around 3,000 tons of ammonium perchlorate from China.[10] Iran may have purchased this amount of ammonium perchlorate to compensate for the loss of some sodium perchlorate that China recently shipped to Iran. An unspecified source told the Wall Street Journal that the explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas on April 26 destroyed some of the sodium perchlorate that China shipped to Iran in early 2025.[11]

Iran could provide its proxies and partners, including the Houthis and Russia, with new ballistic missiles that it produces or materials that are needed to build ballistic missiles. An unspecified source told the Wall Street Journal that Iran plans to send part of the ammonium perchlorate to Iranian-backed militias, including the Houthis in Yemen.[12] Iran has previously exported ammonium perchlorate to members of the Axis of Resistance. The US Navy intercepted a vessel in the Gulf of Oman that was carrying around 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate from Iran to Yemen in November 2024, for example.[13] The recent shipments may also improve Iran’s ability to provide ballistic missiles to Russia for its war with Ukraine. Iran began sending Fateh-360 ballistic missiles, which are solid-fuel missiles, to Russia in September 2023.[14]

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran at the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9. The resolution will reportedly give Iran time to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared nuclear sites.[15] The IAEA's recent quarterly and comprehensive reports both confirmed Iran’s non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.[16] An unspecified senior Western diplomat told the Associated Press on June 5 that the goal of the planned non-compliance resolution is to “resolve the [Iranian nuclear] issue.”[17] The diplomat stated that the Board of Governors will not immediately refer the non-compliance resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that Iran will have an unspecified amount of time to fulfill its safeguards obligations. The Board of Governors will reportedly hold an extraordinary meeting in the summer to pass a resolution to refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC if Iran fails to cooperate with the IAEA by that time. The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar resolution that declared Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September 2005.[18] The Board of Governors later referred Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC in February 2006, which led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran.[19]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on X on June 6 that Iran would respond “forcefully” to any IAEA Board of Governors resolution.[20] Iran announced that it would install over 6,000 centrifuges at its enrichment facilities in retaliation for the IAEA Board of Governors' November 2024 censure resolution that condemned Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA.[21] It is unclear if Iran would decide to take a similar course of action in response to a non-compliance resolution. Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. The non-compliance resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions.

Israeli officials informed the United States that Israel will not strike Iran unless US President Donald Trump signals that the US-Iran nuclear negotiations have failed, according to two unspecified Israeli sources.[22] An unspecified Israeli source told Axios on June 5 that Israeli officials said that Israel will not "surprise" the United States with a military strike on Iran. A separate Israeli source added that Israeli officials said that there is “no logic” in attacking Iran if a "good diplomatic solution” is reached. Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call on May 22.[23] US officials told Axios that the next round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations is not expected to take place this weekend.[24]

Key Takeaways:

  • Chinese Support for the Iranian Ballistic Missile Program: Iran is continuing to cooperate with China to replenish its solid-fuel ballistic missile stockpile after Israel destroyed Iranian solid-fuel production sites in October 2024. Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on June 5 that Iran has ordered thousands of tons of ammonium perchlorate from China in recent months. Ammonium perchlorate comprises around 70 percent of the propellant of solid-fuel missiles. This report follows several sodium perchlorate transfers from China to Iran in recent months. Sodium perchlorate can be converted into ammonium perchlorate. The sources speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the new ammonium perchlorate shipments could support the production of up to 800 ballistic missiles. Iran could provide its proxies and partners, including the Houthis and Russia, with new ballistic missiles that it produces or materials that are needed to build ballistic missiles.
  • US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran at the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9. The resolution will reportedly give Iran time to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared nuclear sites. An unspecified senior Western diplomat stated that the Board of Governors will not immediately refer the non-compliance resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that Iran will have an unspecified amount of time to fulfill its safeguards obligations. The Board of Governors will reportedly hold an extraordinary meeting in the summer to pass a resolution to refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC if Iran fails to cooperate with the IAEA by that time. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on X on June 6 that Iran would respond “forcefully” to any IAEA Board of Governors resolution.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The United States sanctioned over 30 individuals and entities on June 6 for their involvement in Iran's "shadow banking" network.[25] These sanctions mark the first time that the United States has targeted Iranian shadow banking infrastructure since the start of the US “maximum pressure” campaign in February 2025.[26] The Iranian regime uses shadow banking to move revenue from its oil and petrochemical exports, which helps Iran fund its nuclear and missile programs and proxy network.[27] The sanctioned entities include Hong Kong and UAE-based companies.

The Iranian rial appreciated from 836,500 rials to one US dollar on June 5 to 835,500 rials to one US dollar on June 6.[28]

Syria

A Syrian armed group warned the Syrian transitional government on June 6 against integrating former Assad regime officers into the Syrian government.[29] The group, “Burkan al Furat,” appears to be comprised of former Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Syrian National Army (SNA) fighters from northeastern Syria, according to Syrian and Lebanese media.[30] Burkan al Furat claimed an attack on Russian forces at Hmeimem Airbase in May 2025, but does not appear to have been active since that attack.[31] Burkan al Furat Commander Abu Ibrahim al Suri warned Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab that the government must reverse its appointments of former regime officers or else “the free people will start a war against you.”[32] Suri claimed that the integration of former regime officers would cause SNA and FSA fighters to defect from the Syrian army and join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[33] Burkan al Furat may be responding to the Syrian government's recent efforts to incorporate former regime officers into new state structures. The Interior Ministry recently met with defected officers to discuss ministry reform.[34] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra separately announced on May 26 that the Defense Ministry will integrate former defected officers into the new Syrian army.[35] These officers include both individuals who served in Assad regime military units during the civil war and individuals who have not been involved in military affairs in recent years.[36] These officers could have fought against the FSA and SNA for several years during the Syrian Civil War. The integration of former officers who may have fought on the side of the Assad regime in the civil war will probably continue to create tension between former opposition groups and the new government.

The Syrian Supreme Fatwa Council issued a fatwa on June 6 that prohibits “retaliation and revenge” outside of the judicial and legal framework.[37] It is unlikely that this decree will significantly reduce the rate of extrajudicial revenge killings across Syria. The Syrian Supreme Fatwa Council includes 15 Sunni scholars whom President Ahmed al Shara appointed to oversee and implement religious rulings.[38] Various armed groups have conducted extrajudicial revenge killings against Assadist remnants across Syria since the fall of Assad in December 2024.[39] The council issued the fatwa in response to questions from the public about the legitimacy of revenge killings.[40] The Fatwa Council emphasized that the implementation of punishments and retaliation is the responsibility of the judiciary and competent authorities and that individuals cannot implement punishments and retaliation on their own.[41] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack said that the fatwa represents “great first steps for a new Syrian government moving towards a new Syria.”[42] 

Revenge killings stem in part from a lack of effective transitional justice mechanisms in Syria. The transitional government must try, prosecute, and sentence individuals who committed crimes and atrocities under Assad in order to demonstrate its commitment to transitional justice. Only by taking meaningful steps to punish Assadist remnants will the transitional government be able to prevent further revenge killings. Some Salafi-jihadi groups that conduct revenge killings, such as Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, view the Supreme Fatwa Council as heretical and are unlikely to respect its rulings, moreover.[43]

Iraq

State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki urged the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) and the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) on June 6 to investigate candidates and parties for suspected Baath Party links.[44] Maliki’s call for the AJC to review candidate backgrounds could be an attempt to sideline political opposition ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections. Iraqi law bans Baath Party members from running in local or national elections.[45] The AJC replaced the De-Baathification Committee in 2008 to prevent “the return of the Baath’s ideology, power, or practices,” but has been weaponized by Iranian-backed actors, including Maliki, to sideline political opposition.[46] Maliki argued on February 1 that the Iraqi government must prevent attempts by “sectarians” and “Baathists” to overthrow the Iraqi government after Sunni politicians made a concerted effort to advance long-held Sunni political demands.[47]

An IHEC spokesperson told Iraqi media on June 6 that IHEC will bar any candidates convicted of bribing Iraqis for votes from participating in the upcoming elections.[48] This statement comes after Shia Coordination Framework members accused Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely in an attempt to damage Sudani’s electoral prospects in the elections.[49]

A parliamentarian aligned with Sudani told al Araby al Jadeed on June 5 that Sudani is facing opposing pressures from multiple actors, including Iranian-backed political parties and the United States, on how to address the Iraqi federal government’s current dispute with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).[50] The Iraqi Finance Ministry announced on May 29 that the Iraqi federal government will stop transferring funds to the KRG due to the KRG’s failure to transfer oil and non-oil revenue to the Iraqi federal government.[51] The Iraqi federal government’s transfer of funds to the KRG is a frequent point of contention between the federal government and the KRG. The federal government’s decision to stop transferring funds on May 29 came after the KRG signed a multi-billion-dollar oil and gas deal with two US-based companies on May 20.[52] Unidentified political parties, Parliament, Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid, and the United States have reportedly urged Sudani to reverse the federal government’s decision to stop transferring funds to the KRG.[53] The Sudani-aligned parliamentarian added that unidentified Shia Coordination Framework leaders have pressured Sudani to maintain the federal government’s decision.[54] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The parliamentarian implied that Sudani’s decision regarding the dispute could influence political alliances in the upcoming elections.[55] The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which governs the KRG, previously allied with former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr in the 2021 parliamentary elections in an attempt to exclude Iranian-backed parties from the government.[56] Shia Coordination Framework leaders may be pressuring Sudani to abide by the federal government’s decision in an attempt to create fissures between the KDP and political parties that the KDP could ally with in the upcoming elections, such as Sudani’s coalition.

The commander of the 3rd Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigade, which is controlled by the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, denied claims on June 4 that unspecified actors recently “exploit{ed]” PMF members for political purposes.[57] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The militias answer, on paper, to the Iraqi prime minister, but in reality, many of the militias answer to Iran.[58] The 2016 PMF Commission Law, which formalized the PMF as an independent security force, prohibits PMF members from being affiliated with or participating in political activities.[59] The PMF has participated in voter intimidation and election interference in past election cycles, however.[60] The 26th PMF Brigade commander recently accused unspecified actors on June 4 of imprisoning and interrogating PMF members for political purposes.[61] The 26th PMF brigade is affiliated with Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani.[62]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on June 5 as part of the Houthi campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel.[63] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted the Houthi missile.[64] Some international airlines have suspended flights to Israel through September 2025 due to concerns about Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport.[65]

European Union (EU) Aspides Naval Mission Commander Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis told Western media on June 5 that Red Sea maritime traffic has increased by 60 percent since August 2024.[66] Maritime traffic in the Red Sea has not returned to pre-October 2023 levels, however.[67] The Houthis began attacking international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in November 2023, which led to a significant decline in maritime traffic.[68] Gryparis stated that maritime traffic has increased from around 20-23 ships per day in August 2024 to around 36-37 ships per day in June 2025.[69] Approximately 72-75 ships transited the Red Sea per day before the start of the Houthi attack campaign in November 2023.[70] Gryparis also noted that the number of merchant ships transiting the Bab el Mandeb Strait has increased since May 6, when the Houthis agreed to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el Mandeb Strait as part of a ceasefire with the United States.[71]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah drone production and storage facilities in Beirut’s southern suburbs on June 5.[72] The IDF said that Hezbollah’s drone unit, Unit 127, used the facilities to produce “thousands” of drones with Iranian guidance and funding.[73] Western media reported that the IDF conducted at least 10 airstrikes targeting facilities in Beirut’s southern suburbs.[74] The IDF issued evacuation warnings before conducting the strikes.[75] The IDF also struck a Unit 127 facility that Hezbollah used to manufacture attack and reconnaissance drones in Ain Qana, southern Lebanon.[76]

An unspecified Israeli security source told Saudi media that Israel contacted the Lebanese army through the United States about the drone facilities in Beirut before conducting the strikes.[77] A Lebanese security source confirmed to Reuters that the Lebanese army received a message from Israel about a site, but determined hours before the Israeli strikes that the site did not contain drone equipment.[78] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have historically lacked the capability and political will to challenge Hezbollah in its strongholds, which include Beirut’s southern suburbs.[79] The LAF has so far been successful in disarming Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, but this success may reflect Hezbollah’s willingness to cooperate with the LAF in the south.[80] The LAF condemned the Israeli airstrikes on Beirut as a ceasefire violation and warned that the LAF may suspend its cooperation with the ceasefire monitoring committee.[81]

 

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/iran-orders-material-from-china-for-hundreds-of-ballistic-missiles-1e874701

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy7dkgz71x6o

[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/iran-orders-material-from-china-for-hundreds-of-ballistic-missiles-1e874701

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-30-2025

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-14-2025 ;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2025

[6] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/13/middleeast/iran-is-rearming-its-missile-program-and-a-ship-of-supplies-just-arrived-from-china-western-sources-say/index.html ;

https://www.ft.com/content/f0bc9fcc-11b3-4615-bd24-163f8938f2a5 ;

https://maritime-executive.com/article/shipload-of-rocket-fuel-arrives-in-iran

[7] https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-announces-new-iran-related-sanctions/

[8] https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-xi-jinping-china-russia-in-secret-talks-to-supply-iran-missile-propellant/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-12-2023

[9] https://www.ft.com/content/f0bc9fcc-11b3-4615-bd24-163f8938f2a5

[10] https://www.ft.com/content/f0bc9fcc-11b3-4615-bd24-163f8938f2a5

[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/iran-orders-material-from-china-for-hundreds-of-ballistic-missiles-1e874701

[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/iran-orders-material-from-china-for-hundreds-of-ballistic-missiles-1e874701

[13] https://apnews.com/article/iran-united-states-dubai-arab-emirates-saudi-arabia-6e8c6bf72b9304c5bfcc3196478b2ecd

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-send-russia-launchers-short-range-missiles-sources-say-2025-05-09/ ;
https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-tells-allies-iran-has-sent-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-9558f4c4?mod=hp_lead_pos2 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2024

[15] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-resolution-board-9967699da494571d415a510b48b44313 ; https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1930636191629463746 ; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/31/middleeast/iran-nuclear-weapons-watchdog-report-intl ; https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0?taid=683ae0271dc7320001739354&utm_campaign=TrueAnthem&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter

[16] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/31/middleeast/iran-nuclear-weapons-watchdog-report-intl ; https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0?taid=683ae0271dc7320001739354&utm_campaign=TrueAnthem&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter

[17] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-resolution-board-9967699da494571d415a510b48b44313

[18] https://www.iranwatch.org/library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-board-governors-vote-tally-9-24-05

[19] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R40094#:~:text=IAEA%20in%201974.-,2,concerns%20about%20its%20nuclear%20program

[20] https://x.com/araghchi/status/1930901917695197307

[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-plans-uranium-enrichment-expansion-natanz-fordow-iaea-report-says-2024-11-28/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-15-2024

[22] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/05/israel-wont-bomb-iran-nuclear-talks

[23] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/27/trump-netanyahu-not-bomb-iran-nuclear-talks

[24] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/05/israel-wont-bomb-iran-nuclear-talks

[25] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0159

[26] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-restores-maximum-pressure-on-iran/

[27] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0159

[28] https://www.bon-bast.com/

[29] https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1930884400180252724

[30] https://t.me/nahermedia/46833 ; https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1913527417320206649/photo/1 ; https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/210185/اشتباك-حي-القدم-يكشف-عن-فصيل-يريد-إسقاط-الشرع

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-23-2025

[32] https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1930884400180252724

[33] https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1930884400180252724

[34] https://sana.sy/en/?p=356819

[35] https://alikhbariah dot com/وزير-الدفاع-للإخبارية-نعيد-تشكيل-الجي

[36] https://alikhbariah dot com/وزير-الدفاع-للإخبارية-نعيد-تشكيل-الجي

[37] https://www dot enabbaladi.net/758126/%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d9%81%d8%aa%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d9%8a%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%91%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab%d8%a3%d8%b1-%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%ac-%d8%a5%d8%b7/ ; https://www.facebook.com/100064378101827/posts/1131852592304000/?mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=SKmdPARoCpvdylqx

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-31-2025 ; https://levant24 dot com/news/2025/03/syria-appoints-grand-mufti-establishes-independent-fatwa-council/

[39] https://syriaaccountability.org/revenge-killings-targeting-assad-regime-affiliates-december-2024-may-2025/

[40] https://www dot enabbaladi.net/758126/%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d9%81%d8%aa%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d9%8a%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%91%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab%d8%a3%d8%b1-%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%ac-%d8%a5%d8%b7/

[41] https://www dot enabbaladi.net/758126/%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d9%81%d8%aa%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d9%8a%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%91%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab%d8%a3%d8%b1-%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%ac-%d8%a5%d8%b7/

[42] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/58748

[43] https://t.me/sraia8/250

[44] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/528880/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A8 ; https://x.com/nourialmalikiiq/status/1930941480144711692 ; https://www.al-mirbad dot com/detail/182243

[45] https://www.unodc.org/uploads/icsant/documents/Legislation/Iraq/Iraq/English/Law_No._32_of_2016.pdf

[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/publications/commentaries/iraqi-parliament-passes-accountability-and-justice-law ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf, pg. 28 - 32

[47] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/010220253 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-1-2025

[48] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/060620254

[49] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate060425

[50] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/economy/%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86

[51] https://mof dot gov.iq/Pages/MOFBannerHeadlineDetail.aspx?BannerNewsID=1668 ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/kurds-threaten-leave-baghdad-govt-over-salary-oil-disputes

[52] https://www.offshore-technology.com/news/krg-energy-deals-american-companies/ ; https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1929051918891909620

[53] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/economy/%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86

[54] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/economy/%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86

[55] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/economy/%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86

[56] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly

[57] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/528741/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%87%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA0

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[59] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2016/11/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A 

[60] https://alarab.co dot uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A3%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86 ; https://www.aa.com dot tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A8/1161063

[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf, p. 47  

[63] https://t.me/army21ye/3079

[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1930699542619627560

[65] https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/06/05/flight-cancellations-to-israel-extended-by-major-airlines/

[66] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/red-sea-marine-traffic-up-60-after-houthis-narrowed-targets-eu-commander-says-2025-06-05/

[67] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/red-sea-marine-traffic-up-60-after-houthis-narrowed-targets-eu-commander-says-2025-06-05/

[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/red-sea-marine-traffic-up-60-after-houthis-narrowed-targets-eu-commander-says-2025-06-05/ ; https://www.gtreview.com/news/mena/red-sea-attacks-causing-steep-drop-in-port-calls-canal-traffic-data-shows/

[69] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/red-sea-marine-traffic-up-60-after-houthis-narrowed-targets-eu-commander-says-2025-06-05/

[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/red-sea-marine-traffic-up-60-after-houthis-narrowed-targets-eu-commander-says-2025-06-05/

[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-us-will-stop-bombing-houthis-after-agreement-struck-2025-05-06/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2025

[72] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1930753541846487369

[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1930753541846487369

[74] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-issues-evacuation-warning-residents-beiruts-southern-suburbs-2025-06-05

[75] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1930680595887042759

[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1930753541846487369; https://t.me/moriahdoron/22443; https://t.me/moriahdoron/22445

[77] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1930997282750497102

[78] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-issues-evacuation-warning-residents-beiruts-southern-suburbs-2025-06-05

[79] https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/843590/; https://www.reuters.com/world/lebanons-hezbollah-aims-rebuild-longer-term-despite-israeli-blows-us-intel-says-2024-12-04

[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-29-2025

[81] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1930883998705717404