Christina
Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov,
George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William
Runkel
March 5, 2025, 6:40 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on March 5. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the March 6 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The Trump administration
suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one of many demands the
Kremlin has made of the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's other supporters. Details
about the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine vary in
different reports, but the Trump administration has suspended some level
of intelligence sharing with Ukraine with some reporting indicating
that the suspension affected all intelligence sharing.[1]
Western media reported that the Trump administration specifically
suspended the sharing of intelligence that Ukraine uses for early
warning systems to protect against Russian long-range missile and drone
strikes, for target designation for HIMARS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
Systems (GMLRS) strikes, and for target designation for long-range
strikes within Russia.[2] British outlet Daily Mail reported that the United States also prohibited the United Kingdom from sharing US intelligence with Ukraine.[3]
The Kremlin has repeatedly insisted on an end to the provision of all
foreign assistance to Ukraine as part of any peace agreement, and
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov March 4 specifically stated on March 4
that the United States provides Ukraine with intelligence data such as
satellite reconnaissance data.[4]
The
suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine will damage
Ukraine's ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks
against military and civilian targets. Ukrainian forces have
leveraged their ability to strike within Russia and destroy significant
amounts of materiel in order to increase pressure on Russia. Ukrainian
forces struck a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near
Toropets, Tver Oblast on the night of September 17 to 18, 2024,
destroying two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply.[5] The Toropets facility also stored Iskander missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition.[6]
Ukrainian forces struck the Tikhoretsk Arsenal just north of Kamenny,
Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 20 to 21, 2024, which at the
time contained at least 2,000 tons of munitions, including munitions
from North Korea.[7]
Russian forces previously leveraged their quantitative artillery
ammunition advantage and glide bomb strikes to facilitate battlefield
gains by destroying settlements before deploying infantry to attack the
area — most notably near Avdiivka in February 2024 during delays in US
military aid to Ukraine.[8]
Ukrainian strikes on Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities
have previously relieved pressure on Ukrainian forces across the
frontline by preventing Russian forces from leveraging their artillery
advantage to secure gains. Ukrainian strikes against military targets in
Russia also pushed Russian aviation operations further from Ukraine
into Russia's rear areas, hindering Russia's ability to conduct glide
bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian frontline positions from
Russian airspace.[9]
Ukraine's inability to conduct ATACMS and HIMARS strikes against
Russian air defense systems within Russia and occupied Ukraine will
likely impact how close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to
operate and expand Russia's ability to effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and near rear Ukrainian cities.[10]
The
suspension of all US intelligence sharing with Ukraine would also allow
Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against the
Ukrainian rear, affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the
growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). US
intelligence has contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against
Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities, allowing Ukrainian authorities
and civilians to prepare once Russian forces launch missiles and
drones.[11]
The suspension of US intelligence on Russian strikes against the
Ukrainian rear, coupled with the US suspension of supplies of Patriot
air defense missiles that Ukraine relies upon to defend against Russian
ballistic missiles, would have severe impacts on the safety of Ukrainian
rear areas.[12]
Russian drone and missile strikes have heavily targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure and DIB.[13]
The likely intensification of these strikes following the US suspension
of military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine will hinder
Ukraine's ongoing progress towards expanding its DIB to be able to
supply the Ukrainian military with all of its materiel needs.[14]
A self-sufficient Ukrainian DIB would allow Ukraine to defend itself
over the long-term with dramatically reduced foreign military
assistance, and it is in America's core national security interests that
Ukraine be able to continue its efforts towards self-sufficiency.
The
Trump administration has been applying considerable pressure on
Ukraine, whose leaders continue to offer concessions and publicly
declare their interest in achieving a lasting end to the war. These
Trump administration policies are undermining the leverage that the
United States needs to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept
any peace agreement that is in the interests of the United States,
Ukraine, and Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
stated on March 4 that "Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating
table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer."[15]
Zelensky also offered to exchange Ukrainian and Russian prisoners of
war (POWs), to ban missile and long-range drone strikes against energy
and civilian infrastructure, and to reach an immediate truce in the
Black Sea.[16]
Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox
News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory,
Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in office in order to
secure a just and sustainable peace.[17] Russian
President Vladimir Putin and numerous Kremlin officials have, in
contrast, offered no meaningful concessions. They continuously repeat
demands that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation as well as the
rolling back of NATO from Eastern Europe.[18]
Russia's
war effort in Ukraine has brought about a series of materiel, manpower,
and economic challenges for Moscow that will worsen in the coming
months if Ukraine is able to sustain its defensive military operations.[19]
The United States should leverage these Russian challenges in order to
secure concessions necessary to achieve a just and sustainable peace. US
policies suspending military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine
reduce the leverage US President Donald Trump's needs to achieve his
stated policy objective of bringing about an end to the war in Ukraine
on acceptable terms, a task that requires increasing pressure on Russia,
not Ukraine.[20]
Kremlin
officials announced their intention of taking advantage of the
suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to make
additional battlefield gains. Russian Security Council Deputy
Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on March 5 that US weapons supplies
to Ukraine will "most likely resume" but that Russia's "main task"
remains "inflicting maximum damage" on Ukraine "on the ground."[21]
Medvedev's statement is consistent with ISW assessment that Russian
forces will likely attempt to take advantage of the pause in US aid in
order to make further gains in eastern and southern Ukraine to justify
Russia's territorial claims to the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk,
Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[22]
Medvedev also indicated that Russia is aware that it may have a limited
time frame in which to leverage the US suspension of aid to "inflict
maximum damage" on Ukrainian forces. Russian forces exploited the
previous suspension of US military aid in early 2024, including by
trying to seize Kharkiv City in May 2024 before US military aid resumed
flowing to Ukrainian forces on the frontline.[23]
Russian
officials continue inaccurately to place the blame on Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky — and not Russian President Vladimir Putin —
for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations. Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov responded to a question about Zelensky's
willingness to negotiate, claiming that Lavrov cannot "get into
[Zelensky's] head" and that Zelensky "is not human."[24]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova continued to claim that Zelensky's
2022 ban on negotiating with Russia is a prominent roadblock to
negotiation progress — the latest in Kremlin efforts to portray Zelensky
— not Putin — as unwilling to negotiate.[25]
Both Zelensky and the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) have
explicitly and publicly declared Ukraine's willingness to engage in
good-faith negotiations and presented substantive ceasefire proposals —
in stark contrast to the Kremlin.[26]
Kremlin
officials continue to use business incentives to make further demands
of the United States and to push the United States to de facto recognize
Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory. Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 4 that Russia is open to
working with US companies, including in areas of occupied Ukraine.[27] Peskov questioned, however, how Russia could cooperate with US companies while the US continues to sanction Russia.[28]
Peskov is likely setting conditions for Russia to demand that the
United States remove its sanctions before Russia would conclude any of
the economic cooperation deals that American and Russian delegations
have discussed in recent meetings.[29]
Peskov's inclusion of Russia's illegally annexed areas of Ukraine in
potential future US-Russian economic cooperation deals is part of
Russian efforts to coerce the United States into de facto recognizing
these territories as Russian. Peskov's rhetoric mirrors the Kremlin's
strategy of leveraging international organizations such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to legitimize Russian control
over Ukrainian territories.[30] The Kremlin has used discussions with IAEA officials about the ZNPP to assert that the facility lies on Russian territory.[31]
Key Takeaways:
- The
Trump administration suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one
of many demands the Kremlin has made of the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's
other supporters.
- The suspension of US
intelligence sharing with Ukraine will damage Ukraine's ability to
defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks against military and
civilian targets.
- The suspension of all US
intelligence sharing with Ukraine would also allow Russian forces to
intensify their drone and missile strikes against the Ukrainian rear,
affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's
defense industrial base (DIB).
- The Trump
administration has been applying considerable pressure on Ukraine, whose
leaders continue to offer concessions and publicly declare their
interest in achieving a lasting end to the war. These Trump
administration policies are undermining the leverage that the United
States needs to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept any peace
agreement that is in the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and
Europe.
- Kremlin officials announced their
intention of taking advantage of the suspension of US military aid and
intelligence sharing to make additional battlefield gains.
- Russian
officials continue inaccurately to place the blame on Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky — and not Russian President Vladimir Putin —
for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations.
- Kremlin
officials continue to use business incentives to make further demands
of the United States and to push the United States to de facto recognize
Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
- Over
50,000 Russian servicemembers are reportedly listed as having abandoned
their units and are absent without leave (AWOL) between February 2022
and mid-December 2024.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on March 5 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized
Kurilovka (southwest of Sudzha), Loknya, and Okhochiy (both northwest of
Sudzha) and advanced east of Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha) and
west of Kurilovka.[32]
A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in southern Sudzhansky Raion.[33]
Order
of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad
Military District [LMD]) and elements of the Russian 83rd and 106th
airborne (VDV) divisions are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[34]
Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined
Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly
operating near Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[35]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations near the international border in
Sumy Oblast on March 5 but did make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Novenke.[36]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 5 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the
Nekhoteyevka international border crossing checkpoint east of Kozacha
Lopan (near the international border north of Kharkiv City).[37]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 4 and 5.[38]
An
officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction
stated that Russian forces are attacking about once per week in groups
of six-to-seven personnel and are "practically" not using heavy
equipment.[39]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced
southwest of Kalynove and toward Kindrashivka (both north of Kupyansk),
to support Russian forces’ ongoing effort to interdict the Ukrainian
ground line of communication (GLOC) between Kupyansk and Velykyi Burluk.[40]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk toward
Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of
Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on
March 4 and 5.[41]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov
reported on March 5 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attempts
in an unspecified area to cross to the west (right) bank of the Oskil
River.[42]
Ukraine's
Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 5 that warming
temperatures and the thinning of ice on the Oskil River are complicating
Russian efforts to cross the river, resulting in a recent failed
Russian river-crossing attempt.[43]
A Russian milblogger claimed on March 4 that Russian forces are trying
to connect Russia’s separate bridgeheads near Topoli (northeast of
Kupyansk) and Dvorichna (southwest of Topoli).[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 4 that Russian forces
advanced 1.5 kilometers toward Bohuslavka and Zahryzove (both northeast
of Borova).[45]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near
Bohuslavka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of
Borova near Hrekivka on March 4 and 5.[46]
A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are introducing reserves
and intensifying attacks in the Zahryzove direction in order to conduct
offensive operations against the southern flank of the Ukrainian force
grouping near Kupyansk.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 4 that Russian forces
expanded their bridgehead on the right (west) bank of the Zherebets
River in Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman) and advanced north of Kolodyazi
(northeast of Lyman) and roughly 1.5 kilometers to the dam northwest of
Ivanivka.[48] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields southeast and northeast of Torske (northeast of Lyman).
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near
Kolodyazi, Novomykhailivka, Nove, Novolyubivka, Yampolivka, and Torske
and east of Lyman near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area on March
4 and 5.[49]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction
reported on March 4 that Russian forces are having problems supplying
forward positions with food and water.[50]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on March 5.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 5 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south
of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Oleksandro-Shultyne on
March 4 and 5.[52]
A
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar
direction reported that Russian forces are more active in snowy, foggy,
and rainy weather conditions as such weather conditions impair Ukrainian
drone operators' ability to detect Russian forces.[53]
An officer of the same Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces
are changing their tactics from trying to attack in small infantry
groups that are instead now leveraging poor weather conditions and
low-visibility conditions and to accumulate equipment to attack.[54]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th
VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55]
Elements of the Russian "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault
Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near
Orikhovo-Vasylivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[56]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 3 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Promeneva Street in
southwestern Toretsk.[57]
Russian
forces attacked in Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne and
Dyliivka; and east of Toretsk near Druzhba on March 4 and 5.[58]
The
commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction
stated on March 5 that Russian forces conducted rotations and are
attacking on motorcycles, buggies, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and
civilian vehicles.[59] The commander also noted that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the area.
A
Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on March 4
that the Russian military command recently transferred several units of
the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA],
Southern Military District [SMD]) to stabilize the situation in Toretsk
as the combat capabilities of elements of the Russian 51st CAA's
(formerly 1st Donetsk Pople's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) in the
area are depleted.[60]
The milblogger claimed that several areas within Toretsk are contested
"gray zones" and that these areas change hands frequently.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment
(150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating
in the Toretsk-Shcherbynivka (just west of Toretsk) area.[61] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[62]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 5 shows
Russian forces striking several Ukrainian armored vehicles in eastern
Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces
recently advanced in the area.[63]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used up to a
battalion's worth of armored vehicles in the assault against Shevchenko,
but ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[64]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced within
Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and north (right) bank of the Solona
River in western Novoserhiivka (north and west of Uspenivka).[65]
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced
northeast and east of Kotlyne and in northeast Pishchane (both southwest
of Pokrovsk).[66]
Russian
forces continued attacking northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and
Bohdanivka; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe,
Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; southwest
of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Uspenivka, Preobrazhenka, Kotlyne, and
Udachne and toward Horikove; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on
March 4 and 5.[67]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka
direction (southwest of Pokrovsk) stated that Russian forces operate in
small groups of four to five personnel and dismount infantry four to
five kilometers from the frontline in an effort to protect armored
vehicles from Ukrainian drone strikes.[68]
Ukrainian
military expert Petro Chernyk stated on March 5 that the tempo of
Russian offensive operations near Pokrovsk has decreased.[69]
Chernyk stated that Russian forces previously conducted 40 to 60
assaults per day in the Pokrovsk direction but have recently been
conducting only 18 to 20 assaults per day. Chernyk stated that Russian
forces were able to recruit up to 50,000 personnel per month while
suffering roughly 40,000 losses per month in the last several months of
2024. Chernyk stated that Russian forces have only been able to recruit
roughly 40,000 personnel per month, presumably in January and February
2025, which has slowed the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the
Pokrovsk direction. Chernyk noted that Ukrainian forces currently
destroy almost 85 percent of Russian targets in the Pokrovsk direction
with first-person view (FPV) drones, whereas Ukrainian forces destroyed
roughly 50 percent of Russian targets with FPV drones in the area in
Summer 2024.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian
"Atlant" Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in
the Pokrovsk direction.[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 5 but did not advance.
Russan
forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Andriivka,
Kostyantynopil, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozdolne
on March 4 and 5.[71]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction
on March 5 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 5 that
Russian forces seized Pryvilne (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[72]
A Russian milblogger attributed the seizure of Pryvilne to elements of
the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle
Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]).[73]
Russian
forces continued ground attacks northwest of Velyka Novosilka near
Burlatske, Pryvline, Skudne, and Vilne Pole on March 4 and 5.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pryvilne.[75]
An
officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velyka Novosilka
direction reported on March 5 that Russian forces are concentrating
their efforts toward Skudne and Burlatske and that the Russian military
command redeployed elements of three brigades and one motorized rifle
regiment to the area.[76]
The officer noted that Russian forces have few armored vehicles in the
area and conduct infantry attacks in groups of five to 10 people after
which a group of 20 personnel reinforce and consolidate in areas where
Russian forces attacks were successful.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating near Burlatske.[77]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 5 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 5 that elements of the
Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA],
Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced northeast of Robotyne.[78]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near
Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Nesteryanka and Kamyanske
on March 4 and 5.[79]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction in Kherson Oblast on March 5 but did not advance.[80]
Ukraine’s
Southern Operational Command posted footage on March 5 of Ukrainian
forces striking a Russian training ground in an unspecified location in
Kherson Oblast.[81]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
on the night of March 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from
Voronezh Oblast; one S-300 air defense missile from Kursk Oblast; and
181 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and
Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar
Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[82]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 115
drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv,
Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts and that 55 decoy
drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
interference. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian missiles
damaged industrial enterprises and civilian infrastructure in
Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts and that Russian drones struck critical
energy infrastructure facilities and civilian infrastructure in Odesa
Oblast and Kharkiv and Kyiv cities.[83]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Over
50,000 Russian servicemembers are reportedly listed as having abandoned
their units and are absent without leave (AWOL) between February 2022
and mid-December 2024. A Ukrainian OSINT community reported that
Ukrainian hackers gained access to an internal Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) presentation showing the number of criminal cases that
Russian authorities had initiated against Russian servicemembers listed
as AWOL as of December 15, 2024.[84]
The OSINT community noted that the figures in the presentation do
include instances when Russian commanders have listed servicemembers who
went missing during assaults as AWOL. Ukraine-based open-source
intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight used the presentation
data to calculate that there were the largest number of AWOL cases -
22,577 - in the Southern Military District [SMD].[85]
There were 13,769 AWOL cases in the Central Military District; 7,178
cases in the Moscow Military District; 3,052 cases in the Leningrad
Military District; and 3,378 cases in the Eastern Military District – a
total of 50,554 documented AWOL cases. A leaked document detailing the
AWOL personnel in the SMD reportedly indicated that personnel from the
51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic
Army Corps [DNR AC]) and 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic
[LNR] AC) made up 58.8 percent of the SMD's AWOL cases, with most of
the SMD's AWOL cases occurring between 2023 and 2024 and relatively few
in 2022.
The Kremlin continues to appoint regional leaders
who focus on strengthening Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Alexander Dronov as the
acting governor of Novgorod Oblast on March 4.[86]
Dronov emphasized his commitment to developing radio electronics and
drones in the oblast and emphasized Novgorod Oblast's role in
contributing to Russia's objectives in its war in Ukraine. Dronov
highlighted the production of the locally developed “Prince Vandal
Novogorodsky” kamikaze drone as a priority during his governorship. The
“Prince Vandal Novogorodsky” kamikaze drone is controlled via a
fiber-optic cable, making it resistant to electronic warfare (EW)
systems.[87]
Kremlin
officials continue to leverage legislative measures in an effort to
legitimize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukraine and present future
threats to NATO member states. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian
State Duma's Committee on Agrarian Issues, Oleg Nilov, stated on March 5
that he submitted a bill proposing that the Russian government provide
veterans of the war in Ukraine and families of those killed in combat
free plots of land in the Republic of Karelia, which borders NATO member
Finland, as both a defensive measure and a means for social
rehabilitation.[88]
Putin previously issued a decree in 2022 to allocate plots of land in
occupied Crimea and Sevastopol to Russian veterans who had served in the
war and Russian occupation officials prepared up to 1,000 plots of land
in occupied Kerch Raion, Crimea in July 2024 to distribute among
volunteers who signed military contracts with the Russian Ministry of
Defense.[89]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarusian
officials continue to highlight the deployment of Russian nuclear
weapons in Belarus. Belarusian Security Council State Secretary
Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich claimed on March 5 that
Russian-Belarusian military cooperation is currently at its "peak."[90]
Volfovich emphasized that the recently-ratified Russian-Belarusian
Union State security framework defines the deployment of Russian nuclear
weapons on Belarusian territory and the use of nuclear weapons to
defend the interests of Belarus and the Union State. ISW continues to
assess that Russia is very unlikely to authorize the use of nuclear
weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.
Note: ISW does
not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly
available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and
Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available
satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these
reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of
each update.
[1]
https://www.ft.com/content/c58fccea-00c4-4fad-bc0a-0185b7415579 ;
https://news.sky.com/story/trump-zelenskyy-ukraine-putin-russia-starmer-summit-war-minerals-deal-live-sky-news-latest-12541713?postid=9220223#liveblog-body
;
https://www.axios.com/2025/03/05/us-ukraine-weapons-intelligence-sharing-pause-russia-talks
;
https://news.sky.com/story/trump-zelenskyy-ukraine-putin-russia-starmer-summit-war-minerals-deal-live-sky-news-latest-12541713?postid=9220673#liveblog-body
; https://x.com/haynesdeborah/status/1897299212284375345?s=46 ;
https://news.sky.com/story/trump-zelenskyy-ukraine-putin-russia-starmer-summit-war-minerals-deal-live-sky-news-latest-12541713?postid=9221152#liveblog-body
; https://x.com/jenniferjjacobs/status/1897279223494000836
[2] https://news.sky.com/story/trump-zelenskyy-ukraine-putin-russia-starmer-summit-war-minerals-deal-live-sky-news-latest-12541713?postid=9220223#liveblog-body ; https://www.ft.com/content/c58fccea-00c4-4fad-bc0a-0185b7415579 ; https://x.com/yarotrof/status/1897368545224483169
[3] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14461597/Washington-BANS-Britain-sharing-US-military-intelligence-Ukraine.html
[4] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1011948 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024 ;
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2024
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110224
[11] https://www.ft.com/content/c58fccea-00c4-4fad-bc0a-0185b7415579
[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-russian-strikes-more-effective-ukraine-exhausts-defenses ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2024
[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base
[15] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1896948147085049916
[16] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1896948147085049916 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025
[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2025;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525;
https://www.foxnews.com/media/zelenskyy-speaks-out-after-public-spat-trump-vance-dustup-bad-both-sides
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lessons-minsk-deal-breaking-cycle-russias-war-against-ukraine; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025
[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625; https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukrainian-official-suggests-us-mineral-deal-terms-improved/story?id=119199649;
[21] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7552458
[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025
[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025
[24] https://t.me/MID_Russia/53300
[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/304115 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/304076 ;
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025
[27] https://tass dot ru/politika/23306339
[28] https://tass dot ru/politika/23306339
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2025
[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2025
[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2025
[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62591 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24830 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31003 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24814 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62590
[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/304058
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24821 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21359 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25093
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24814
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24814 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31003
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24826
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kij35qv4BdcSD52RNBuUBrQEBqjb5rqqo773TaG8zi1mqvTqhx7b22HHMkNV44XYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996
[39] https://armyinform
dot
com.ua/2025/03/05/dvoh-dvohsotymo-a-reshta-rozbigayetsya-v-rajoni-vovchanska-vidbyvayut-ataky-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc
[40]https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62582
[41] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62582; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kij35qv4BdcSD52RNBuUBrQEBqjb5rqqo773TaG8zi1mqvTqhx7b22HHMkNV44XYl
[42]https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996
[43]https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996
[44]https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62582
[45]https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62581
[46]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996; https://t.me/tass_agency/304034
[47]https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62581
[48] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62584; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62589
[49]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kij35qv4BdcSD52RNBuUBrQEBqjb5rqqo773TaG8zi1mqvTqhx7b22HHMkNV44XYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62589
[50]https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2025/03/04/sydyat-u-svoyih-norah-golodni-ta-znevodneni-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-rosiyanam-ne-do-shturmiv/
[51] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/25024
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kij35qv4BdcSD52RNBuUBrQEBqjb5rqqo773TaG8zi1mqvTqhx7b22HHMkNV44XYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996
[53] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/04/meteozalezhni-vorozhi-shturmy-v-chasovomu-yaru-protyvnyk-atakuye-pid-pogodu/
[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/05/okupantiv-ubyvaye-yasna-pogoda-v-chasovomu-yaru-ne-shturmuyut-koly-nebo-chyste/
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24821
[56] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/44210
[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8537 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13494 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1897287605966004334; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1897290216551162182; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1897288736209297633
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kij35qv4BdcSD52RNBuUBrQEBqjb5rqqo773TaG8zi1mqvTqhx7b22HHMkNV44XYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24855
[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/05/maroderski-shturmy-na-tavriyah-i-zhygulyah-u-toreczku-zahysnyky-stochuyut-kontratakamy-brygady-rf/
[60] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2151
[61] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13494
[62] https://t.me/epoddubny/22695
[63] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8538; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4320
[64] https://t.me/yurasumy/21548
[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62608 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24864
[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62586
[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kij35qv4BdcSD52RNBuUBrQEBqjb5rqqo773TaG8zi1mqvTqhx7b22HHMkNV44XYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62586 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62608 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62609 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62597 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62598
[68] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/05/syurpryz-dlya-optovolokonnyh-droniv-tavrijski-desantnyky-aktyvno-zbyvayut-vorozhi-bpla-na-kotushczi/
[69]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/05/40-tysyach-mobilizovanyh-rosiyan-sakralni-daty-ta-5-kg-vybuhivky-ekspert-pro-sytuacziyu-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[70] https://t.me/epoddubny/22699
[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kij35qv4BdcSD52RNBuUBrQEBqjb5rqqo773TaG8zi1mqvTqhx7b22HHMkNV44XYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2154
[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/49657;
[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/13721
[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kij35qv4BdcSD52RNBuUBrQEBqjb5rqqo773TaG8zi1mqvTqhx7b22HHMkNV44XYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oZJh1FZUq1yDe9U7h17aQm3C8y1aJbkHvi56saPb1uMoUtYH3c9aQanu3Uqb5KBnl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5996; https://t.me/yurasumy/21547
[75] https://t.me/rybar/68534
[76] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/05/cherez-malenkyj-resurs-bronetehniky-poblyzu-velykoyi-novosilky-vorog-atakuye-nogamy/
[77] https://t.me/epoddubny/22697
[78] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31006
[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kij35qv4BdcSD52RNBuUBrQEBqjb5rqqo773TaG8zi1mqvTqhx7b22HHMkNV44XYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oZJh1FZUq1yDe9U7h17aQm3C8y1aJbkHvi56saPb1uMoUtYH3c9aQanu3Uqb5KBnl
[80] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CDehxpLP2Yj7otQdLLn23Y8x5Hxk1MoQJbStSbryzY35JZ5FSc1Cqy343zKGaZ3cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QymSMptpuqs2VNiyp7QxgQsgjtwbz9qywnnGqX7a3eTdr2cJNr3A3PiHrhiUfvACl;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oZJh1FZUq1yDe9U7h17aQm3C8y1aJbkHvi56saPb1uMoUtYH3c9aQanu3Uqb5KBnl
[81] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12180
[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/29926
[83]https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/19883 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2171 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2172%20;%20https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2173 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/25893 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oZJh1FZUq1yDe9U7h17aQm3C8y1aJbkHvi56saPb1uMoUtYH3c9aQanu3Uqb5KBnl ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8859 ; https://t.me/astrapress/75815 ; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/29043 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13344 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=960100216269042&rdid=eoc5kR1noXvwqAjk ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/05/shahediv-letily-j-vpaly-vijskovo-morski-syly-znyshhyly-desyat-droniv-kamikadze-rf/
[84] https://t.me/informnapalm/23872
[85] https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/desertions-and-loss-ratios-trends
[86]
https://t.me/tass_agency/303952; https://t.me/tass_agency/303954;
http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76405;
https://t.me/tass_agency/304043
[87] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2024
[88] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2025/03/05/uchastnikam-voini-v-ukraine-predlozhili-vne-ocheredi-razdavat-zemlyu-na-granitse-s-nato-a157167
[89] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19
[90] https://t.me/modmilby/45633 ; https://t.me/modmilby/45636 ; https://t.me/modmilby/45638
