Angelica
Evans, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, George Barros,
and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel
March 13, 2025, 9:00 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on March 13. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the March 14 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir
Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the United States and Ukraine
recently agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and offered an alternative
proposal that undermines US President Donald Trump's stated goal of
securing a lasting peace in Ukraine. Putin claimed on March 13
that he "agrees" with the temporary ceasefire proposal and that the
"idea itself is correct" but that the cessation of hostilities "should
be such that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial
causes" of the war.[1] Putin thus rejected one of the main principles of
the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precede formal
negotiations to end the war.[2] Putin also claimed that there are
questions that "require painstaking research from both sides." Putin
questioned several aspects of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire
proposal. Putin asked what would happen to the remaining Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast and whether Ukraine would be allowed to continue
to mobilize forces, train newly mobilized soldiers, and receive
military aid from its partners and allies. Putin questioned the control
and verification measures of a temporary ceasefire and who would give
the orders to stop fighting. Putin suggested that he may call President
Trump to discuss the "issues" involved in the ceasefire proposal. Putin
postured military strength during his rejection of the ceasefire
proposal, highlighting recent Russian successes in pushing Ukrainian
forces out of Kursk Oblast and claiming that Russian forces are
advancing in "almost all areas of combat."
Putin's
rejection of the ceasefire is consistent with March 12 reports from
Russian insider sources about the Kremlin's likely response to the
proposal.[3] Bloomberg reported on March 12 that sources
familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the situation stated that Putin
will "stretch the timeline" for agreeing to the temporary ceasefire in
order to ensure that his stipulations "are taken into account." A source
close to the Kremlin stated that Russia may demand a halt to weapons
supplies to Ukraine as a condition of the temporary ceasefire. Russian
opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that a source
close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin
would "formally" give a "positive response" to the temporary ceasefire
proposal but would also demand "impossible conditions" to which Ukraine
cannot agree. The source stated that Putin wants to remove Ukraine from
talks so that Russia can engage in negotiations with the United States
alone while also "correcting the situation on the front" to strengthen
Russia's negotiating position. ISW assessed on March 12 that these
Russian insider source leaks may have been intentional and part of a
Russian negotiating strategy that aims to push the United States to
renegotiate its deal with Ukraine on the temporary ceasefire.[4] Putin's
response to the ceasefire offer suggests that they may also have been
at least partially accurate.
Putin is offering an
alternative ceasefire agreement that is contrary to the intentions and
goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. The US-Ukrainian
ceasefire proposal calls for a renewable 30-day cessation of combat
operations along the entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range
missile and drone strikes, and a cessation of operations in the Black
Sea.[5] The proposal allows for Russia and Ukraine to extend the
ceasefire and assumes the continuation of US intelligence sharing and US
and other military assistance to Ukraine. The US-Ukrainian ceasefire
proposal was explicitly aimed at allowing Russia and Ukraine to
demonstrate their willingness to make peace and separates the temporary
ceasefire from future negotiations to end the war.
Putin's
envisioned ceasefire agreement would grant Russia greatly
disproportionate advantages and set conditions for the Kremlin to renew
hostilities on terms extremely favorable to Russia. Putin's
envisioned ceasefire agreement would likely require the United States
and Ukraine's other supporters to pause military assistance to Ukraine
and require Ukraine to stop recruiting and training personnel. Such a
ceasefire agreement would begin to disarm Ukraine if renewed for a long
period of time by preventing its military from reconstituting, training,
and equipping itself and would cause Ukraine and the West to surrender
significant leverage to Russia. Putin did not suggest that Russia would
also cease military recruitment efforts, the production of military
equipment, and the receipt of military aid from Russia's allies.
Russia's ability to continue these measures during a potential ceasefire
while preventing Ukraine from doing so would allow Russia to resume
offensive operations with better manned and equipped units at a time of
its choosing. Russian forces are currently on the offensive across the
theater, as Putin observed, so demands that would prevent Ukrainian
forces from reconstituting can only be intended to preserve or enhance
Russia's ability to resume the offensive at a later date. Such demands
would seem a clear indication that Putin is not, in fact, committed to
making peace.
Putin's attempts to introduce a new
ceasefire agreement on terms that asymmetrically benefit Russia ignore
Trump's stated intention that the ceasefire set conditions for
negotiations toward a more comprehensive peace agreement in the future.
An agreement along the lines Putin appears to be offering would
undermine the Trump administration's stated objective of bringing about a
sustainable peace in Ukraine, would reinforce Putin's belief that
Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine, and would incentivize Putin to
resume military operations against Ukraine rather than making any
concessions in formal negotiations to end the war.
Putin
is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract
preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war. Putin
refused to accept the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on its own terms
and is instead demanding additional conditions that would contribute
directly to the Kremlin's war aims. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio
stated on March 11 that the US will "know what the impediment is to
peace" in Ukraine if Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal.[6] ISW
continues to assess that Putin is disinterested in good faith peace
negotiations to end the war.[7] Putin remains committed to accomplishing
his long-term goals of installing a pro-Russian puppet regime in
Ukraine, undermining Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future
Russian aggression and preventing Ukraine's accession to NATO. Putin's
rejection of the ceasefire proposal underscores Putin's commitment to
securing his objectives in Ukraine, particularly Ukraine's
demilitarization, and disinterest in any pause in fighting that does not
result in Ukrainian capitulation or at least set conditions for a
successful renewal of Russian offensive operations in the future.
Russian
forces continue to clear Ukrainian forces from Sudzha and its environs
as Russian troops advance closer to the border in Kursk Oblast slowed on
March 13 compared to recent days. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief
General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 12 that he ordered Ukrainian
forces to withdraw from some unspecified positions within the Kursk
salient and move to more advantageous defensive positions in Kursk
Oblast in order to save Ukrainian lives.[8] The Russian Ministry of
Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and
Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, claimed that
Russian forces seized and cleared Sudzha and are attacking the remaining
settlements along the international border.[9] Russian sources claimed
that Russian forces are clearing Sudzha and seized Podol (immediately
south of Sudzha), Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha), Zaoleshenka (just
northwest of Sudzha), Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), and Molovoi (south
of Sudzha).[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are
advancing towards Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha immediately on the
Russian-Ukrainian border) and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions
in Oleshnya, Gogolevka (northeast of Oleshnya), Guyevo (south of
Sudzha), and Gornal (southwest of Guyevo immediately on the
Russian-Ukrainian border).[11] A Russian milblogger continued to claim
that renewed Ukrainian HIMARS strikes are slowing the rate of Russian
advances south of Sudzha.[12] Drone operators from the "Rubikon" Center
for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near
Sudzha.[13]
Russian forces also marginally advanced in
northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates
that Russian forces advanced northwest of Basivka (northeast of Sumy
City).[14] Syrskyi stated that Russian airborne (VDV) and Spetsnaz
forces are attacking along the international border and attempting to
advance further into Sumy Oblast.[15] Ukraine's State Border Service
Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on March 12 that Russian forces are
attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs)
along the international border near Novenke (northeast of Sumy
City).[16] A Ukrainian source affiliated with Ukrainian military
intelligence stated on March 13 that Russian forces are using
all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in northern Sumy Oblast and are attempting
to leverage their manpower advantage to advance in the area.[17] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near
Zhuravka, Basivka, and Novenke (all northeast of Sumy City).[18]
Russian
milbloggers theorized on March 13 that Russian forces may launch an
organized offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast in the coming
weeks and months and may also attack into Chernihiv Oblast — in line
with Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 12 statements.[19] One
Russian milblogger claimed that an offensive into Sumy Oblast would
significantly strengthen Russia's position in future peace
negotiations.[20] Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff General
Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian command post in Kursk
Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a security
zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border.[21] Putin and
other Kremlin officials previously justified Russia's offensive
operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast as an attempt to establish a
"buffer zone" to protect Belgorod City from Ukrainian shelling.[22]
Putin may assess that Russian forces can make significant advances into
northern Ukraine following their relatively quicker advances in Kursk
Oblast over the previous week, despite the fact that Russian forces have
failed to make significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast over the
last ten months.
Kremlin officials continue to
use narratives similar to those that the Kremlin has used to justify its
invasions of Ukraine to set informational conditions to justify future
aggression against NATO member states. Russian Presidential
Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in
an interview with Russian national security-focused magazine National Defense published
on March 13 that NATO "traditionally" uses threats as its main
instrument in interstate relations and that NATO's "European wing" is
continuing its policy on "blocking" Russia in the Baltic region.
Patrushev claimed that the United Kingdom (UK) is "orchestrating" NATO's
"aggravation of the situation" as part of efforts to disrupt
negotiations on Ukraine and Russian and American attempts to normalize
their bilateral relations. Patrushev also claimed that the Finnish
population, unlike Finnish authorities, is friendly to Russia and that
the UK has approved Finnish authorities to "do everything to deprive
their country [Finland] of its sovereignty." Patrushev threateningly
claimed that the Gulf of Finland has a historical "geographic
affiliation with Russia" and that "it should not be forgotten that
Finland was part of the Russian Empire." Patrushev claimed that the
Russian Empire "respected" and "preserved" the Finnish people and
language in the Grand Duchy of Finland. Patrushev appeared to try to
compare Russia's current war against Ukraine to the Soviet-Finnish
Winter War in 1939–1940. Patrushev claimed that Finnish attempts to
seize Soviet lands and "actively militarize" created a threat to the
USSR and that Finland was "indiscriminately exterminating" the Slavic
population in Karelia. Patrushev claimed that the West is "again turning
[Finland] into a springboard" for aggression against Russia. The
Kremlin has used similar false narratives about the Ukrainian
government's discrimination of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine
and the military threats that Ukraine supposedly poses to Russia in
order to justify Moscow's invasions of Ukraine. Patrushev's claims that
the UK is "orchestrating" Finland's and the Baltic states' allegedly
threatening behavior are likely part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to
drive wedges between the United States and Europe and to weaken
NATO[23] The Kremlin appears to be using the same general narrative
playbook that it has used against Ukraine and other former Soviet states
but is adjusting its narratives to exploit any tensions among Western
states.
Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in violation of international law. Ukrainian
Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on March 13 that there is footage of
Russian forces allegedly executing five unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an
unspecified area.[24] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported
on March 13 that there is footage reportedly filmed near Kazachya Loknya
(north of Sudzha in Kursk Oblast) showing five deceased Ukrainian
POWs.[25] ISW has observed and reported on numerous instances of Russian
servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs along the frontline in Ukraine
and Kursk Oblast and continues to assess that this is a systemic trend
in the Russian military and that Russian commanders are either complicit
in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct such
atrocities.[26]
Russia will likely expand its
permanent military basing in Belarus to enhance Russia’s force posture
against NATO’s eastern flank. Russian President Vladimir Putin
and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met in Moscow on March 13
and ratified the Russian-Belarus Union State treaty on security
guarantees.[27] The treaty permits Russia to establish military bases
and infrastructure in Belarus.[28] Putin noted that the treaty on
security guarantees defines Russia's and Belarus' mutual allied
obligations to ensure their defense and security using "the entire
available arsenal of forces and means." Putin noted that Russia has
deployed a joint Regional Group of Forces, modern Russian defense
systems, and tactical nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory — all of
which Putin claimed "reliably covers" the western borders of Belarus and
Russia. ISW forecasted in 2021 that Russia may deploy a permanent
Russian force presence in Belarus in order to increase Russia's capacity
to threaten NATO's eastern flank and continues to assess that the
Kremlin is using the Union State framework to advance its strategic
effort to de facto annex Belarus.[29]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the
United States and Ukraine recently agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
and offered an alternative proposal that undermines US President Donald
Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine.
- Putin
is offering an alternative ceasefire agreement that is contrary to the
intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.
- Putin's
envisioned ceasefire agreement would grant Russia greatly
disproportionate advantages and set conditions for the Kremlin to renew
hostilities on terms extremely favorable to Russia.
- Putin
is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract
preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war.
- Russian
forces continue to clear Ukrainian forces from Sudzha and its environs
as Russian troops advance closer to the border in Kursk Oblast slowed on
March 13 compared to recent days.
- Russian
milbloggers theorized on March 13 that Russian forces may launch an
organized offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast in the coming
weeks and months and may also attack into Chernihiv Oblast — in line
with Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 12 statements.
- Kremlin
officials continue to use narratives similar to those that the Kremlin
has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine to set informational
conditions to justify future aggression against NATO member states.
- Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in violation of international law
- Russia
will likely expand its permanent military basing in Belarus to enhance
Russia’s force posture against NATO’s eastern flank.
- Ukrainian
forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently
advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.
- Russia
continues its crypto-mobilization efforts against the backdrop of US
efforts to start the negotiation process to end the war.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for reports on Russian activity in Kursk Oblast and northern Sumy Oblast.
Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported
on March 13, citing sources in Ukrainian intelligence, that drone
operators of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
struck the Kaluga Aerated Concrete Plant in Kaluga City.[30] The sources
stated that Russia set up a temporary drone production line at the
facility. Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha stated that debris
from downed drones struck an industrial enterprise in Dzerzhinsky Raoin,
causing a fire.[31]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 13 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 12 and 13.[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 13 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces
advanced 700 meters from bridgeheads in the Fyholivka-Novomlynsk area
towards Krasne Pershe and 600 meters in the Topoli direction towards
Kamyanka (all northeast of Kupyansk).[33] Ukrainian military observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 13 that Ukrainian forces maintain
defensive positions in western Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and in
northwestern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) despite Russian attempts
to entirely seize these settlements.[34] Mashovets also stated that
Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area west of Synkivka and the
Oskil River’s east (left) bank and north of Kupyansk near eastern
Zapadne and successfully pushed Russian forces back east of the
Kupyansk-Dvorichna P-79 road between Zapadne and Doroshivka (west of
Zapadne).[35]
Russian forces continued conducting ground
attacks north of Kupyansk near Doroshivka; northeast of Kupyansk near
Topoli and Krasne Pershe along the Oskil River as part of Russian
efforts to establish a new bridgehead on the river’s west (right) bank;
east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near
Stepova Novoselivka on March 12 and 13.[36] Russian forces are
reportedly increasing their operational tempo in the Kupyansk direction.
Ukrainian military officials operating in the Kupyansk and Lyman
directions reported that Russian forces recently increased their
activity in the area and that Russian forces are attacking with
mechanized equipment and large numbers of personnel.[37] Khortytsia
Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian
forces used previous icy weather to transfer equipment and infantry
across the frozen Oskil River to the west (right) bank.[38]
Order
of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 25th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military
District [LMD]) are operating near Synkvika.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 13, but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces
advanced west of Kolisnykivka and southwest of Kruhlyakivka (both
northeast of Borova) in the direction of Bohuslavka (south of
Kruhlyakivka).[40]
Russian forces conducted ground attacks
northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near
Hrekivka on March 12 and 13.[41] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted
counterattacked east of Borova near Nadiya.[42]
Order of
Battle: Elements of Russia’s 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd
Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) are
reportedly operating in the vicinity of Bohuslavka and southern
Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[43] Elements of the 752nd Motorized
Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are
reportedly operating near Nadiya.[44]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 13 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Novolyubivka
(northeast of Lyman).[45]
Russian
forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman toward Nove, Zelena
Dolyna, and Novomykhailivka and northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka,
Myrne, and Kolodyazi on March 12 and 13.[46] Russian forces are
reportedly attacking in the direction of Nove and south of Yampolivka
against organized Ukrainian defenses.[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced to the T-0513 Siversk-Bakhmut
highway northwest of Sakko i Vantsetti (southeast of Siversk).[48]
Additional geolocated footage published on March 13 indicates that
Russian forces recently advanced to eastern Vasyukivka (west of Sakko i
Vantsetti).[49]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers in the forested area
south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near
Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of
Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 12 and 13.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 13 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and
southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ozaryanivka on March 13.[52]
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian airborne
(VDV) elements advanced within Chasiv Yar.[53]
A Russian
milblogger claimed that difficult terrain and Ukrainian first-person
view (FPV) drone activity are complicating Russian advances near
Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[54] The milblogger claimed that Russian
forces are using FPV drones with fiber-optic cables in order to
overcome Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems in the Chasiv Yar
direction.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 13 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced along Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street
in northern Toretsk.[55]
ISW recessed assessed Russian
advances from its map in northwestern Toretsk and Shcherbynkivka (west
of Toretsk), as ISW has not observed evidence of an enduring Russian
presence in these areas, and because ISW has observed limited Ukrainian
counterattacks in central Toretsk. These changes did not occur in the
past 24 hours. Russian milbloggers have recently claimed that Ukrainian
forces have counterattacked and seized positions in the area.[56]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; east of
Toretsk near Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on March
12 and 13.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are
counterattacking within and near Toretsk.[58]
Ukrainian
Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro
Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces have recently significantly
increased the number of artillery strikes and assaults in the Toretsk
direction and have increased the size of their infantry assault groups
from two-to-five personnel to up to 10 personnel.[59]
Order
of Battle: Zaporozhets stated that elements of the Russian 150th
Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern
Military District [SMD]) are operating in the Toretsk direction.[60]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 11 and 13
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to the southern
outskirts of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk) and have seized most of the
settlement.[61] ISW cannot confirm that Ukrainian forces have entirely
liberated Shevchenko at this time, however.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of
Nadiivka toward Kotlyarivka and south and southeast of Sribne (all
southwest of Pokrovsk).[62] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian
forces marginally advanced in southern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk)
and that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces to the northern
outskirts of Shevchenko.[63]
Russian forces attacked
northeast of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near
Yelyzavetivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka,
Novotroitske, and Dachenske; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and
Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Kotlyne, Uspenivka,
Sribne, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, Kotlyarivka, Zvirove,
Novoukrainka, Yasenove, and Nadiivka on March 12 and 13.[64] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near
Shevchenko and Udachne.[65]
The spokesperson for a
Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on March 13
that Russian activity in the area has decreased compared to the start
of March 2025, that Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry
groups, and that Russian forces are using fewer light armored vehicles
in the area.[66] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces conduct more
assaults when the weather is cloudy - likely due to the decreased risk
of Ukrainian drone strikes and reconnaissance - and do not use vehicles
during clear weather. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces attack
along the same route and at the same time and that the first group of
Russian forces often attack without weapons. Ukrainian military observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 13 that Ukrainian forces occupy
Preobrazhenka (southwest of Pokrovsk), which is hampering Russian
advances in Nadiivka (north of Preobrazhenka) and along the
Sribne-Troitske line (southwest of Pokrovsk and south of
Preobrazhenka).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
occupy roughly 50 percent of Shevchenko.[68] A Russian source claimed
that Russian forces are trying to regain lost positions in Udachne,
Pishchane, Shevchenko, and Zelene.[69]
Order of Battle:
Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th
Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near
Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), and elements of the 400th Artillery
Regiment, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both reportedly of the 90th
Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 589th
Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD)
are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 13 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces
advanced west of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[71]
Russian
forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and
Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 12 and
13.[72]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air
Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern
Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr (west of
Kurakhove).[73] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th and
114th motorized rifle brigades (both 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk
People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are operating near Andriivka
and that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD),
39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD), and 57th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are operating in the Kurakhove direction.[74]
Russian
Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko and DNR
Head Denis Pushilin visited Russian-occupied Kurakhove on March 13, and
Kiriyenko spoke with soldiers of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st
CAA).[75]
Russian forces continued offensive
operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 13 but did not
make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims:
A Russian milblogger claimed on March 13 that Russian forces advanced
east of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka) and north and west of
Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[76]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske; west of
Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka
Novosilka near Novopil and Novodarivka on March 12 and 13.[77]
Mashovets
stated on March 13 that Ukrainian counterattacks forced Russian forces
to withdraw eastward from Novosilka and from the area between Burlatske
and Pryvilne.[78]
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that
elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet);
336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet); 60th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (5th CAA); 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD); 5th
Tank Brigade (36th CAA); and 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA,
SMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[79]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle
Division are operating on the Shevchenko-Burlatske-Pryvilne-Vilne Pole
line (northwest of Velyka Novosilka). Elements of the Russian 394th
Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are
reportedly operating near Burlatske.[80]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 13 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized
Pyatykhatky (northwest of Robotyne) and advanced north of Pyatykhatky,
southeast and southwest of Mali Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne), and
in southern Mali Shcherbaky.[81]
Russian forces conducted
ground attacks northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatky, Stepove,
Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka on March 12 and
13.[82]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne
(VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the
Zaporizhia direction, and elements of the Chechen "Vostok-Akhmat"
Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novodanylivka
(north of Robotyne).[83]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Kherson direction on March 13.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
on the night of March 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Kursk
Oblast and 117 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and
Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian
forces shot down 74 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv,
Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa, and
Mykolaiv oblasts and that 38 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to
Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials
stated that Russian forces struck critical and civilian infrastructure
in Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia
oblasts.[85]
Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported
on March 13 that the Ukrainian public organization Independent
Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) stated that Russia is increasing its
production of guided glide bombs with at least 26 factories in Russia
involved in the production of glide bomb components.[86] NAKO noted that
not all of these factories are linked to the Russian government. NAKO
noted that Russia recently improved the bombs' "Comet" navigation
system, which Russia also installs on drones and missiles. NAKO senior
researcher Viktoria Vyshnivska stated that Russia increased the number
of antennas in the "Comet" navigation system from eight to twelve to
decrease the chances of Ukrainian forces interfering with the
projectiles. Vyshnivska noted that it is impossible to completely
isolate Russia with sanctions as NAKO reported that Russia uses hundreds
of shell and offshore companies to purchase significant amounts of
microelectronics for glide bombs. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson
Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that destroying Russian aircraft capable of
launching glide bombs is one of the best ways to counter Russian glide
bomb strikes and an advisor on electronic intelligence and
countermeasures of the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industry, Ilya
Kukharenko, noted that Ukrainian electronic countermeasures against
glide bombs include spoofing Russian onboard aircraft radars and using
electronic warfare (EW) systems to influence the navigation of each
individual aerial bomb.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russia
continues its crypto-mobilization efforts against the backdrop of US
efforts to start the negotiation process to end the war. Russian
opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 13 that a source in
Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin's office stated that Moscow City is
continuing to recruit volunteer servicemembers (dobrovoltsi) to
fight in Ukraine and that Russian authorities have issued no guidance
to slow military recruitment efforts.[87] Another source based in Moscow
City stated that Russian authorities are continuing to distribute
advertisements for military recruitment "as usual." A source from an
unspecified regional government told Verstka that there are "no
signs" that Russia is "even close" to winding down its military
recruitment efforts, and another source in a military registration and
enlistment office in Siberia cited the threat of a future war with NATO
as one justification to continue recruitment efforts. Another government
source based in Russia's Far East told Verstka that Russian
authorities will continue recruitment efforts quietly in the background
until they receive further instruction from the Kremlin.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko
highlighted Russian-Belarusian economic and defense industrial
cooperation efforts during a joint press conference on March 13.[88]
Lukashenko stated that Putin approved the construction of another plant
to produce unspecified drones in Belarus. Putin highlighted
Russian-Belarusian cooperation in aircraft manufacturing and the
development of artificial intelligence (AI), and Lukashenko claimed that
Western sanctions against Russia and Belarus have pushed the two states
to develop their microelectronics manufacturing industries. Lukashenko
stated that Russia and Belarus closely cooperate on import substitution
as Belarus exports components for cars and aircraft to Russia.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76450
[2]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025;
https://www.president dot
gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-za-pidsumkami-zustrichi-delegacij-ukrayini-ta-96553
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025
[5] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-za-pidsumkami-zustrichi-delegacij-ukrayini-ta-96553
[6] https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-and-national-security-advisor-mike-waltz-remarks-to-the-press/
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025
[8]
https://t.me/osirskiy/1099 ;
https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid025r61S7otPWTBG25KHou1h35LKAwFfx9FzJgWsFp3y4drgUr562XZRzcP71nPL3cBl
[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/305445
[10]
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62808 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157762 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62808 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22796 ;
https://t.me/mod_russia/50045 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21652 ;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/31114 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87868 ;
https://t.me/yurasumy/21805 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21828 ;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87885 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33479
[11]
https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/50897; https://t.me/dva_majors/66604 ;
https://t.me/yurasumy/21828 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21829
[12] https://t.me/rusich_army/21652 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225
[13]
https://t.me/tass_agency/305383 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50043 ;
https://t.me/milinfolive/143899; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/133;
https://t.me/milinfolive/143951; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/134 ;
https://t.me/rusich_army/21623
[14] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1899945820172279951; https://x.com/Raver__/status/1899910179300278618;
[15]
https://t.me/osirskiy/1099 ;
https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid025r61S7otPWTBG25KHou1h35LKAwFfx9FzJgWsFp3y4drgUr562XZRzcP71nPL3cBl
[16]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/13/myaso-kydayut-vmyraty-abo-zakriplyatysya-na-kordoni-z-sumshhynoyu-tryvayut-zhorstki-bojovi-diyi/
;
[17] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21458
[18] https://t.me/rusich_army/21623 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25258
[19]
https://t.me/wargonzo/25274; https://t.me/wargonzo/25279 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25237 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12653
[20] https://t.me/yurasumy/21814
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324
[23]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025
[24] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/8181
[25] https://t.me/astrapress/76430; https://t.me/gefestwar/4586
[26]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar112024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar111024 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024
[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76448; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76450
[28]https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/international_contracts/2_contract/62699/
[29]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russia-opens-permanent-training-center-belarus-and-sets-conditions;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar120624
[30] https://suspilne dot media/969589-droni-gur-atakuvali-virobnictvo-bpla-v-kaluzkij-oblasti-rosii-dzerela/
[31] https://t.me/Shapsha_VV/13734
[32]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql
[33] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62834
[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2617
[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2617
[36]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6281; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25264
[37] https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/13/zmyty-yih-vsih-yak-biblijnyh-yegyptyan-na-harkivshhyni-tryvayut-boyi-za-placzdarm-na-richczi-oskil/;
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/13/pochynayut-vtaranyuvatys-padaty-lamatys-okupanty-atakuyut-korydoramy-na-motoczyklah-ta-bagi/
[38]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/03/13/zmyty-yih-vsih-yak-biblijnyh-yegyptyan-na-harkivshhyni-tryvayut-boyi-za-placzdarm-na-richczi-oskil/
[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2617
[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25264
[41]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql
[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/50055
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33464
[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/50055
[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8639; https://t.me/ombr66/1598
[46]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql;
https://t.me/dva_majors/66607
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/66607
[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8628; https://t.me/osirskiy/1098
[49] https://t.me/komandavaluy/146; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26410
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25276
[51]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25295
[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25252
[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25295
[55] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1900141376429310231; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/739
[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157710; https://t.me/rybar/68763; https://t.me/wargonzo/25255
[57]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql
[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/25274; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25242
[59] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/969759-na-toreckomu-napramku-zrosla-kilkist-boezitknen-ta-obstriliv/
[60] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/969759-na-toreckomu-napramku-zrosla-kilkist-boezitknen-ta-obstriliv/
[61]
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1900174599880347873;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8640 ;
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1900184064834879542;
https://t.me/btr80/25899 ; https://t.me/freeukrainianrepublic/993
[62] https://t.me/yurasumy/21821 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31120
[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62811
[64]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql
; https://t.me/yurasumy/21821 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66607 ;
https://t.me/yurasumy/21822 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22795
[65] https://t.me/wargonzo/25274 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33478 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62811
[66]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/969641-pramolinijna-taktika-u-37-j-brigadi-rozkazali-ak-okupanti-sturmuut-pokrovskomu-napramku-za-odnim-marsrutom/
[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2618
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33478
[69] https://t.me/yurasumy/21822
[70] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2618 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66660 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/143936
[71] https://t.me/yurasumy/21819
[72]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940 ;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966
[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/13854
[74] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2619
[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87883 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/305469 ; https://ria dot ru/20250313/pushilin-2004787796.html
[76] https://t.me/yurasumy/21819
[77]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940 ;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/1224
[78] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2619
[79] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2619
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/13865
[81] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31105 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20824
[82]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21966
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21940 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyoz2XxhKhfuBKoQSSxe3idijjTL8X7VVPNdg45t5xJU3mzgQa5X53XbhE3xAc8ql
; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12240
[83] https://t.me/rusich_army/21640 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157646
[84] https://t.me/kpszsu/30555
[85]
https://t.me/kpszsu/30555; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20071 ;
https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20069;
https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20070; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6623 ;
https://t.me/dsns_telegram/39502; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17196
[86]
https://suspilne dot
media/969923-kerovani-aviacijni-bombi-ak-rosia-ih-vdoskonalue-ta-obhodit-sankcii-dla-zakupivel-elektroniki-dla-cogo-ozbroenna/
[87] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6498
[88] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76448; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76450
