Katherine
Wells, Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore,
Annika Ganzeveld, Alexis Thomas, Faris Almaari, George Ekmekjian, and
Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition
offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static
maps present in this report.
We do not report in
detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in
Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of
armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity
even though we do not describe them in these reports.
US
sanctions on Houthi officials for coordinating with Russia demonstrate
how Russia facilitates Iranian-backed groups’ terrorism in the Middle
East. The United States designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist
organization and sanctioned eight Houthi officials for facilitating
attacks on international shipping and for recruiting Yemenis to fight
for Russia in Ukraine.[1] Houthi officials threatened unspecified military actions in response to US sanctions.[2]
Russia has both provided intelligence for attacks on international
shipping and attempted to recruit Yemenis to fight in Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, according to Western reporting.[3]
The US Treasury stated that Russia and China colluded with the Houthis
to ensure that the Houthis would not attack Russian and Chinese-flagged
vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[4]
The Kremlin reportedly provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis
to support attacks on US and international vessels. This activity, which
includes the provision of intelligence to the Houthis that could
improve the Houthis’ ability to damage US or international vessels and
kill US Navy sailors or third country merchant mariners, demonstrates
how Russia seeks to undermine US interests in the Middle East. Russia,
given its role supporting Iranian-backed Houthi campaigns in the Middle
East, would not help secure US interests in the Middle East as a
mediator between the United States and Iran.[5]
Interim
government forces engaged a militia consisting of former pro-Assad
fighters on February 5 in al Sanamayn, north of Daraa.[6]
Anti-Assad media said that a militia led by Mohsen al Haymed killed two
interim government security personnel in al Sanamayn, which caused the
interim government to deploy forces to al Sanamayn in response[7] Haymed’s faction has operated in al Sanamayn since at least 2018 when the group reconciled with the Assad regime and began collaborating with regime Military Intelligence, according to Syrian opposition media.[8]
HTS-led forces previously deployed to al Sanamayn on January 4 in
response to fighting between Mohsen al Haymed’s armed faction and other
local factions.[9] Haymed’s group turned over heavy weapons to the HTS-led forces but was allowed to retain personal small arms.[10]
Sectarian
Sunni group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah set forest fires that it claimed
targeted Alawites in Qardaha, Latakia Province.[11] Saraya
Ansar al Sunnah has made repeated sectarian statements that warned it
would target Alawites for crimes committed under Assad and that the
group would continue its attacks until the Alawites and Shia were
“eliminated” or displaced from the region.[12] It is not clear whether the group is conducting these attacks itself or if it is falsely claiming security incidents.
Saraya
Ansar al Sunnah is also active in other areas of Syria. Unknown
fighters detonated an explosive that damaged the Nasser Ibrahim Asaad
Shrine in Tel Abdul Aziz, Hama Province.[13]
This is the third sectarian-motivated attack close to Tel Abdul Aziz in
the last month. Unspecified gunmen reportedly executed five Syrians in
al Anz, 11km northwest of Tel Abdul Aziz, on January 27, and Saraya
Ansar al Sunnah executed four Syrians in Tel Dhihab, 5km south of al
Anz, on February 2.[14] The gunmen in al Anz targeted a local mayor responsible for reconciliation in the area with the Assad Regime.
The
Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displaced announced on March 5 that
Iraq will not repatriate Iraqi citizens from al Hol camp in northeastern
Syria for four to six months.[15] Ministry Spokesperson Ali
Abbas said that Iraq will resume repatriating Iraqi citizens once Iraq
rehabilitates 3,500 Iraqi citizens in al Jada camp, Ninewa Province. The Iraqi federal government last repatriated Iraqi citizens from al Hol in early February 2025.[16]
Abbas told Kurdish media on February 15 that the Iraqi government may
suspend repatriation from al Hol due to a lack of US funding as a result
of the USAID funding freeze.[17]
Key Takeaways:
Syria
Residents in southern Syria, including Syrian Druze, have continued to reject Israel’s presence and activities in southern Syria.
Syrian state media reported that “national, political, and social
forces” met in Suwayda City on March 5 to affirm support for the Syrian
national project and reject any attempts that would undermine unity.[18]
This meeting follows an incident in which Suwayda City residents tore
down and burned an Israeli flag that unknown individuals had raised over
the city’s northern entrance.[19]
Suwayda City is a Druze-majority city, and Syria’s Druze population has
been the focus of recent Israeli interest to ”demilitarize“ three
provinces of southern Syria and “defend“ the Druze community.[20]
Protests erupted across Syria following Netanyahu's comments,
particularly in majority Druze areas, and several prominent Druze
leaders have denounced his statements.[21]
Opposition to Israeli activity in southern Syria is not limited to
Druze-majority areas, however. A southern Syria-based journalist
reported that Quneitra residents rejected an Israeli unit’s offer of
food, gas, and other aid in Dawaya and Suwaysa on March 5.[22]
A
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) founding member re-affirmed the PKK’s
support for a ceasefire with Turkey and called for imprisoned PKK leader
Abdullah Ocalan’s release. PKK executive council member Mustafa Karasu confirmed that the PKK would abide by Ocalan’s call and “end the armed struggle.”[23] This follows the PKK’s executive committee’s March 1 announcement of an immediate ceasefire with Turkey.[24]
Karasu said it is important that Turkey release Ocalan so that he can
participate in the PKK’s “dissolution congress” but did not predicate
the PKK’s cooperation on Ocalan’s release.[25] Ocalan’s message called upon the PKK to convene a ”congress” to discuss and plan its dissolution. [26]
Erdogan and his Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) have repeatedly
stressed that they will not negotiate with the PKK and that PKK
disarmament is a unilateral process.[27]
Pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party co-chairs Tulay
Hatimoglullari and Tuncer Bakrhan announced that the party will meet
with Turkish political parties in Turkey and begin negotiations for the
next stages of the peace process.[28] The DEM Party has met repeatedly with Ocalan in recent months as part of the talks to disarm the PKK.[29]
Turkey has appointed a military attaché to Syria. The Turkish embassy confirmed that Lieutenant Colonel Hasan Goz began work as Turkey’s military attaché to Damascus on March 4.[30]
Goz‘s appointment comes amid recent efforts by both Syria and Turkey to
strengthen Turkey’s involvement in Syrian defense and security.[31]
Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson Rear Admiral Zeki Akturk
announced on February 27 that Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara’s
visit to Ankara in early February added a ”new and important dimension”
to Syria-Turkey relations and that a military attaché would be assigned
to Damascus.[32] A technical delegation from the Turkish Defense Ministry is also expected to visit Syria soon.[33]
Turkey
and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to strike
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces
on March 4 and 5.[34]
Anti-SDF media reported that Turkish airstrikes and SNA artillery
shelling killed six SDF fighters near the Tishreen Dam and Ain Issa
frontlines in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces on March 5.[35] Turkish aircraft separately struck SDF positions in Sarrin, southeast of Qara Qozak Bridge in eastern Aleppo.[36] SNA artillery also shelled SDF positions along Highway 4, near al Tabqa, west of Raqqa, on March 4.[37]
An
anti-SDF journalist reported on March 5 that the SDF maintains control
over several towns and villages west of the Tishreen Dam. The
journalist said that the SDF still controls Mahshiyet al Sheikh, Mustafa
al Hamada, Hajj Hussein, Khirbet Tueni, Khirbet Khalid, Khirbet Zamala,
and Shash al Bubna and parts of its surrounding mountains, near the
Tishreen Dam.[38] Mahshiyet al Sheikh is located around 4.6 km west of the Tishreen Dam.
Syrian
Interim President Ahmed al Shara met with Lebanese President Joseph
Aoun on the sidelines of the emergency “Palestine Summit” in Cairo on
March 4.[39] Syrian Interim Foreign Minister Assad al Shaibani
separately discussed the issue of Syrian detainees held in Roumieh
Prison in Lebanon with his Lebanese counterpart Youssef Rajaji on the
sidelines of the summit on March 4.[40]
Iraq
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The Ninewa Provincial Council voted on March 5 to remove its chairman, Ahmed al Hasoud.[41] Hasoud is a member of the National Contract Bloc, which is led by Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[42] The United Ninewa Bloc, which is an alliance of Sunni parties, spearheaded the effort to remove Hasoud.[43]
The United Ninewa Bloc includes the Azm Alliance (led by Muthanna al
Samarrai), Sovereignty Alliance (led by Khamis al Khanjar), and Progress
Party (led by Mohammad al Halbousi).[44]
Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish groups have long vied for control in Ninewa
Province, and many Sunni and Kurdish residents resent Shia groups’
presence and influence in areas of the province.[45]
Iraqi
media reported on March 5 that Turkish forces clashed with PKK fighters
near Amedi district, Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan.[46]
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The Houthis claimed on March 4 that they shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Hudaydah Governorate, Yemen on March 3.[47]
Houthi military spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea claimed that
it was the fifteenth US drone the Houthis have shot down since the
start of the October 7 war.[48]
Houthi media published footage from the shootdown on March 4, the same
day the United States designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization. CTP-ISW cannot verify the Houthi claim.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
The Iranian rial appreciated from 906,800 rials to one US dollar on March 4 to 887,900 rials to one US dollar on March 5.[49]
Senior Iranian regime officials continue to emphasize sectarian divisions in Syria. Supreme
Leader’s International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati stated that
there are sectarian divisions in Syria, which could lead to a civil war
“at any moment,” in an interview with Iranian media on March 4.[50] Velayati added that Israeli presence in southern Syria is worsening these divisions.
Anti-Iranian
regime media reported that Iranian security forces injured four
civilians when they reportedly opened fire and beat Takab Municipality
workers protesting wages in Takab, West Azerbaijan Province.[51]
Iran
and Turkey continue to cooperate over energy trade in central Asia, but
it is unclear if Turkey is looking for alternative regional partners
for energy imports. Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad
confirmed on March 5 that Iran’s National Iranian Gas Company signed a
contract permitting Turkmenistan to export gas to Turkey through Iranian
territory.[52]
Iranian media also circulated Turkish officials’ announcement of the
plan on March 4 and included Turkish comments about the cheap price of
Turkmen gas.[53] Iranian media added that it is unclear whether Turkey is replacing Iranian gas exports to Turkey with Turkmen gas exports.
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the
“Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has
cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power
in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state,
and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective
interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and
its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of
financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree
of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies
that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are
partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the
Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which
include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the
Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://www.state.gov/designation-of-ansarallah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/?utm_source=homepage&utm_medium=news_bar&utm_campaign=ansarallah; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0041
[2] https://x.com/osamasari77/status/1896700958756757774, https://x.com/M_N_Albukhaiti/status/1896752197901381678, https://x.com/ahmedalmaneey/status/1896756971765903521, https://x.com/hussinalezzi5/status/1896765266626761215,
[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b; https://www.ft.com/content/da966006-88e5-4c25-9075-7c07c4702e06
[4] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0041
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-4-2025
[6] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1897189228515303673
[7] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897223940709433548
[8] www dot npasyria.com/en/120576
[9] https://x.com/abdulrahmanpho/status/1875864787839791475 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937
[10] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937
[11] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897244524575162407
[12] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1888905513032732761
[13] https://www.facebook.com/hiba.ajeep.7/posts/1695321031390464?__cft__[0]=AZXpjgrPdsRPvpUimzo_5uU9mOvi6gkWyHGsVcoYxM_tFfVJWJdEGEkF-o-YbI5EFYFXofEz56knpkZKPURzRMy3kC0ZfgMfUrzocB_GP3yyYretaFuCjx63yVLO-d5EEuWxZuRSJ8CYRESKaQRtqiEWRhMue8IlvAKxNCKyLojj8w&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/bassamhannahanna1983/posts/1126096159185628?__cft__[0]=AZUorf754LML5PjBnP-YV4arscnNVEkz1-jpVgcrinWqn9gK5z8p_R3YJ-PZBpPfBx_Pu5vUGvyeXbHhu8E8lIW1-N-xlSD9WkiiyHFSVGZaq6JZFvPHjFB3bX2cwnEt3UO2L3jcTafwarR6fmoTb8RPe5KJjfNGGmTMgVVuO03y-Q&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897242407730864431
[14] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1885990607065096542; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883858514197823715; https://www.facebook.com/groups/317546613058070/permalink/1176681763811213/?_rdr
[15] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/050320251
[16] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Al-Hol-repatriation-155-families-sent-to-Iraq
[17] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/150220252
[18] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1897339413413105802
[19] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1896873279400681755 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1896758373141582247; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1896696237451247902
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2025
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2025;
https://www.facebook.com/100064794576009/videos/957713133009298/?__so__=watchlist&__rv__=video_home_www_playlist_video_list
;
https://apnews.com/article/israel-syria-druze-jumblatt-lebanon-jaramana-assad-eec72b1477cf5ac337e85c0a1152036b
[22] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1897211035104502162; https://x.com/almodononline/status/1897211016389575151
[23] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/kurdistan/050320252
[24]
https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895120510109000176 ;
https://anfenglishmobile dot
com/features/pkk-we-will-comply-with-leader-Ocalan-s-call-we-declare-a-ceasefire-78180
[25]
https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895120510109000176 ;
https://anfenglishmobile dot
com/features/pkk-we-will-comply-with-leader-Ocalan-s-call-we-declare-a-ceasefire-78180
[26] https://anfenglishmobile dot com/features/pkk-we-will-comply-with-leader-Ocalan-s-call-we-declare-a-ceasefire-78180
[27] https://www dot dailysabah.com/politics/top-turkish-official-denies-talks-with-pkk-says-group-must-lay-down-arms/news ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kurdish-pkk-militia-says-it-will-heed-jailed-leaders-peace-call-declare-2025-03-01/
[28] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/turkey/050320251
[29] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/2/27/jailed-pkk-leader-calls-for-end-to-decades-long-conflict-with-turkiye
[30] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-s-military-attache-begins-duty-at-embassy-in-syrian-capital-/3500491
[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025
[32]
https://www.iha dot
com.tr/ankara-haberleri/msb-kaynaklari-kuvvet-komutanlarimizin-sahsini-ve-genel-olarak-bakanligimizi-hedef-alan-aciklamalar-kabul-edilemez-tum-yasal-haklar-kullanilacaktir-198269466
[33]
https://www.iha dot
com.tr/ankara-haberleri/msb-kaynaklari-kuvvet-komutanlarimizin-sahsini-ve-genel-olarak-bakanligimizi-hedef-alan-aciklamalar-kabul-edilemez-tum-yasal-haklar-kullanilacaktir-198269466
[34] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1897029662087504062 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137193
[35] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1897355293002228064 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137193
[36] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1897286599022670105
[37] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1897026990819172564
[38] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1897213462691918232
[39] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/579
[40] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/471
[41] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/050320253
[42]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9
[43]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9
[44] https://www.mawazin dot net/Details.aspx?jimare=241052
[45] https://thenewregion.com/posts/401/shiite-majority-in-sunni-dominated-nineveh ;
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-ninevehs-municipal-council-reveals-about-iran-turkey-power-struggle-iraq ;
https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/iraqs-provincial-council-elections-way-forward-nineveh-province ;
https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraqs-competition-control-local-administrations-goes-national
[46] https://www.shafaq
dot
com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83
[47] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1897036854534550004
[48] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1897004715776565521
[49] https://www.tgju dot org/currency; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-4-2025
[50] https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir/news/929769
[51] https://iranwire.com/fa/news-1/139524-%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%AA%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%A8/
[52] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4470922/
[53] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/14/3269180/
