Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
March 10, 2025, 6:00 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on March 10. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the March 11 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Russia continues to publicly
claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in
sharp contrast with the concessions Ukraine has already offered. Reuters reported
on March 9 that two US officials stated that the US is planning to use
the March 11 US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia "in part to determine
whether Ukraine is willing to make material concessions to Russia to end
the war."[1]
One US official stated that Ukraine cannot say both "I want peace" and
"I refuse to compromise on anything" at the upcoming talks. The other US
official stated that the US wants "to see if the Ukrainians are
interested not just in peace, but in a realistic [emphasis added] peace." The Financial Times reported
on March 9 that unspecified officials briefed on the upcoming
US-Ukrainian negotiations stated that Ukraine will propose a partial
ceasefire with Russia for long-range drone and missile strikes and
combat operations in the Black Sea.[2] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported
on March 10 that a source familiar with the Ukrainian delegation's
position stated that Ukraine will also propose a prisoner of war (POW)
exchange.[3]
The Ukrainian source noted that these proposals are "realistic to
implement quickly" and to "control." Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky first suggested a ceasefire in the air and sea on March 5, and
Ukraine is offering the kind of ceasefires that are more straightforward
and do not require extended negotiations or a complex monitoring
process.[4]
A ceasefire along the thousand kilometers of complex front line
characterized by multiple “gray zones” where the lines of opposing
forces are blurred would be extremely difficult to negotiate and
monitor. Zelensky has also indicated several times — including in his
February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make
concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure
in office in order to secure a just and sustainable peace.[5]
Russian
officials, in contrast, continue to reiterate Russian President
Vladimir Putin's 2021 and 2022 demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov claimed in an interview to "New Regions of Russia" magazine
published on March 10 that any future peace settlement must "eradicate"
the "root causes" of the war.[6]
Lavrov defined the "root causes" of the war as the alleged "threats to
Russia's security from the Ukrainian and Western directions in general"
that are due to NATO's eastward expansion and the Ukrainian government's
alleged "extermination" of everything that is "connected with Russia
and the Russian World [Russkiy Mir]," including Russian
language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media. Lavrov similarly defined the
alleged "root causes" of the war in late December 2024, and the
Kremlin's rhetoric on this topic has not changed in the over two months,
even after the start of US-Russian bilateral talks in February 2024.[7]
Russia's repeated rhetoric about the "root causes" of the war and
constant reiteration of its specific unchanged demands contrast sharply
with the flexibility Ukraine has shown.[8]
Russian
officials continue to capitalize on the Trump administration's
statements and actions in an attempt to divide the United States and
Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an
interview to the "New Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10
that US and Russian diplomats voted the same way for the first time in
three years against the Ukrainian- and European-backed United Nations
(UN) resolution on February 24.[9]
This resolution commemorated the third anniversary of Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine, recognized Russia as the aggressor in
the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.[10]
Lavrov claimed that the "ultraliberal ruling elites of the West,"
support Ukraine and that European Union (EU) countries and the United
Kingdom (UK) maintain "predatory, colonial habits." Lavrov notably did
not mention the United States, likely in an attempt to drive a perceived
ideological wedge between the United States and Europe. Lavrov's use of
the "ruling elites" narrative echoes Russian President Vladimir Putin's
February 27 claim that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain
instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or compromise" the
US–Russian dialogue that has begun.[11]
Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on March 10 that
the UK government is prioritizing "undermining Trump's peace efforts"
and has tasked non-governmental organizations with "demonizing" Trump.[12]
The SVR notably made such claims ahead of the UK’s hosting of a virtual
meeting on March 15 with mainly European and British commonwealth
countries to support a ceasefire agreement.[13]
Russian officials are likely attempting to leverage Trump
administration statements and actions to divide the United States and
Europe and will likely continue such efforts to secure maximum
concessions on Ukraine from the US, Europe, and Ukraine as well as to
fracture the US-Europe relationship to Russia’s benefit.[14]
Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Kursk Oblast and likely preparing to attack Sudzha in the coming days. Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[15]
Elements of the Russian 44th Army Corps (AC) (Leningrad Military
District [LMD]) and the 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (subordinated
to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly attacking near
Martynovka.[16]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Agronom and
Kolmakov (both east of Sudzha), Mikhailovka (northeast of Sudzha), and
Bogdanovka (north of Sudzha).[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in Mirny (east of Sudzha) and Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha).[18]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims however. Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are also attacking the outskirts
of Sudzha, north of Sudzha near Ivashkovskiy, east of Sudzha near
Dmitryukov, and south of Sudzha near Melovoi and Guyevo.[19]
Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet),
177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and the 810th Naval
Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and up to two battalions of North
Korean forces are reportedly attacking south of Sudzha near Kurilovka
and Guyevo.[20]
Ukrainian
forces are counterattacking along the international border. Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 10 that
Ukraine is reinforcing its force grouping in Kursk and Sumy oblasts with
additional drone and electronic warfare (EW) units and that Ukrainian
forces are successfully countering the threat of Russian encirclement in
Kursk Oblast and along the international border.[21]
Ukrainian State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated
that Ukrainian forces are working to repel Russian attacks in the
direction of Novenke and Zhuravka (both northeast of Sumy City) and
noted that Russian forces are trying to cut Ukraine's main ground line
of communication (GLOC) along the Sumy City-Sudzha H-07 highway.[22]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking
near Novenke, Zhuravka, and Basivka (also northeast of Sumy City).[23] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are operating in Zhuravka.[24]
Demchenko stated that Russian forces do not currently have the capacity
to conduct a significant cross border operation into other areas of
northern Ukraine.[25]
Ukraine continues to expand its domestic production of drones and air defense systems to support its war effort. Ukrainian
Defense Minister Rustem Umerov signed a memorandum of understanding
with German defense manufacturer Diehl Defense on March 9 to triple the
supply of IRIS-T air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine and
establish longer-term industrial projects that will strengthen Ukraine's
air defense.[26]
Director of the Procurement Policy Department of Ukraine's Ministry of
Defense (MoD) Hlib Kanevsky reported on March 10 that the MoD plans to
purchase approximately 4.5 million first-person view (FPV) drones from
domestic producers in 2025 — the projected limit of Ukrainian domestic
drone production for 2025.[27]
The MoD announced that it will allocate an estimated 102 billion
Ukrainian hryvnia (approximately $2.4 billion) to this initiative.
Ukrainian Armor LLC CEO Vladyslav Belbas announced on March 10 that the
company is on track to produce at least 50 percent more Novator armored
vehicles in 2025 compared to 2024 and that the company aims to provide
Ukrainian forces with several hundred armored vehicles.[28] Belbas noted that the company delivered over 100 armored vehicles to Ukrainian forces as of August 2024.[29]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia
continues to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no
concessions of its own in sharp contrast with the concessions Ukraine
has already offered.
- Russian officials continue
to capitalize on the Trump administration's statements and actions in
an attempt to divide the United States and Europe.
- Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Kursk Oblast and likely preparing to attack Sudzha in the coming days.
- Ukraine continues to expand its domestic production of drones and air defense systems to support its war effort.
- Ukrainian
forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin approved a list on March 10 of instructions
for the Russian government and the Defenders of the Fatherland
Foundation aimed at increasing social benefits to Russian veterans,
which will likely put further strain on the Russian budget and economy.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of March 8 to 9.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the
Ryazan oil refinery, which provides fuel for the Russian military,
causing an explosion.[30]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ryazan oil refinery
produces fuel for Russian jet engines. Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel
Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses downed drones over Ryazan
Oblast on the night of March 8 to 9.[31]
Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Samara Oblast on the night of March 9 to 10. The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the
Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery, which provides fuel via a pipeline and
railways line to Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[32]
Head of Ukraine’s Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant
Andriy Kovalenko stated that the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery is one of
the 10 largest oil refineries in Russia and has a refining capacity of
8.8 million tons of oil per year.[33] A source in Ukraine's special services told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery produces fuel for supersonic aircraft jet engines.[34]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot
down three drones over Samara Oblast on the night of March 9 to 10.[35]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 10.[36]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction
stated that Russian forces conduct infantry assaults in the area because
Ukrainian drones have created a "red zone" behind the frontline where
Russian forces cannot operate armored vehicles.[37
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 10 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced 7.87
square kilometers northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, but Ukraine's
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov refused to
comment on this claim and noted that the frontline remains "dynamic."[38]
A Russian milblogger responded to the Ukrainian source's claim and
indicated that Ukrainian forces could have advanced in the contested
"grey zone" near Synkivka because the Russian defensive line is brittle
and understaffed.[39]
Russian
forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of
Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on March 9 and 10.[40]
Trehubov
reported on March 10 that some Russian infantry groups managed to cross
the Oskil River but are struggling to establish a bridgehead on its
west (right) bank before the river melts.[41]
Trehubov noted that Russian forces have been attempting to cross to the
west bank when it is frozen. Trehubov assessed that Russian forces will
need to use boats to transport manpower to the west bank of Oskil River
once ice on the river melts, which will further complicate Russia's
efforts to establish a bridgehead.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations the Borova direction on March 10 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Borova near Lozova, Zahryzove, Nova
Kruhlyakivka, and Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on
March 9 and 10.[43]
The
chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Borova
direction reported on March 10 that Russian forces have intensified air
strikes, aerial reconnaissance, and drone strikes in the area since
March 3 after the weather improved.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 10 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 10 that Russian forces
recently advanced to the fields southwest of Zhuravka (northeast of
Lyman, formerly Nevske).[45]
Russian
forces reportedly intensified attacks in the Lyman direction and
attacked northeast of Lyman near Torske, Nove, Novomykhailivka,
Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Novolyubivka, Myrne, Balka Zhuravka (formerly
Nevske), and Ivanivka on March 9 and 10.[46]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian
General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near
the Serebryanske forest area (east of Lyman).[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 10 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and in the
direction of Serebryanka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on
March 9 and 10. [48]
Ukraine's
Khortytsia Grouping of Forces reported on March 10 that Russian forces
are unsuccessfully attacking with armored vehicles including tanks in
the Siversk direction.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 10 but did not advance.
Russian
forces continued attacks near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv
Yar near Hryhorivka, south of Chasiv Yar towards Stupochky and Bila
Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on March 9 and 10.[50]
Ukrainian
Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro
Zaporozhets speculated on March 10 that Russia may replace the commander
of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division because Russian forces failed to
seize Chasiv Yar by March 1, 2025.[51] Zaporozhets noted that this information is unconfirmed.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer
Corps) and the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are
reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[52]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced along Tobolenka Street in western
Toretsk.[53]
The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on March 10 indicating that
Russian forces recently advanced south of Krymske (north of Toretsk).[54]
Russian
forces attacked in Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne,
Krymske, and Druzhba; west of Torestk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest
of Toretsk near Valentynivka on March 9 and 10.[55]
Zaporozhets
stated on March 10 that Russia has transferred elements of the 150th
Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern
Military District [SMD]) from the Kurakhove direction and unspecified
Russian units from the Pokrovsk direction to Toretsk.[56]
An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction
also stated that Russian forces transferred unspecified units from the
Pokrovsk direction to Toretsk.[57]
ISW has not previously observed claims of Russian forces redeploying
from the Pokrovsk to Toretsk direction and has not observed indications
of such a redeployment as of this report. The officer stated that
fighting is intensifying in the Toretsk direction and that Russian
forces are using more light and armored vehicles in the area.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle
regiments and the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the
150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[58]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 9 and 10
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Shevchenko
(south of Pokrovsk) and in eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced to Moskovska Street in southern
Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[60]
The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on March 10 indicating that
Russian forces recently advanced north and northeast of Hrodivka
(southeast of Pokrovsk).[61]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 9 that Russian forces advanced east of Shevchenko.[62]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained lost
positions in Shevchenko and are pushing Ukrainian forces out of the
northern and northeastern outskirts of the settlement.[63] A Russian source claimed that reports that Ukrainian forces occupy almost half of Shevchenko are inaccurate.[64]
Russian
forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near
Tarasivka and Oleksandropil; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and
Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; south of
Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Vidrozhenya (formerly Novyi Trud), and Zelene;
and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne,
Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Novooleksandrivka on March 9 and 10.[65]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking
near Nova Poltavka, Tarasivka, Yelyzavetivka, Malynivka (northeast of
Pokrovsk), Oleksandropil, Pishchane, Shevchenko, Udachne, and Kotlyne.[66]
A
senior Ukrainian officer in an artillery battery operating in the
Pokrovsk direction stated on March 10 that Russian forces have not been
using heavy equipment recently, possibly due to armor shortages, and
that Ukrainian strikes are preventing Russian advances near Kotlyne.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are sometimes using armored vehicles near Udachne and Kotlyne.[68]
A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating more
drones in the Pokrovsk direction and are preventing Russian forces from
transporting reinforcements and ammunition to the front and that Russian
forces are exhausted due to several months of continuous assaults.[69]
Deputy
Chairperson of the State Duma Committee on Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) Affairs, Eurasian Integration, and Relations with
Compatriots Viktor Vodolatsky claimed that Russian forces entered
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from the southern side of the Pokrovsk direction
in an unspecified area, while a Russian source claimed to Kremlin
newswire TASS that Russian forces have "practically" come "very close" to the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast[70][71]
ISW has only observed geolocated footage confirming that Russian forces
are roughly 3.5 kilometers from the administrative border.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th
Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near
Tarasivka.[72]
Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central
Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko.[73]
Drone operators of the 1st Slovyansk Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st
DNR Army Corps [AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk
direction.[74]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakove direction on March 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west and
southwest of Kostyantynopil and near Bahatyr (both west of Kurakhove)
and Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[75]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Kurakhove near Andriivka, west of
Kurakhove near Ulakly and Kostyantynopil, and southwest of
Kostyantynopil near Rozlyv on March 9 and 10.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Bahatyr and Rozlyv.[77]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th
CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and elements of the 1486th
Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) are
reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil, and elements of the 200th
Artillery Brigade (29th CAA) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General
Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Rozlyv. [78]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 10 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Vesele;
northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka
near Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 9
and 10.[79]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific
Fleet) are reportedly operating near Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka
Novosilka).[80]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on March 10.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade (35th Combined
Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly
operating near Hulyaipole.[81]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 10 that Russian forces
are advancing towards Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[82]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near
Stepove, Shcherbaky, Nesteryanka, and Pyatykhatky and north of Robotyne
near Novodanylivka on March 9 and 10.[83]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military
District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[84]
Drone operators of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV
Division) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[85]
Drone operators of the Russian ”Gepard” Battalion (71st Motorized Rifle
Regiment, 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly
operating near Novodanylivka.[86] [87]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Dnipro direction in Kherson Oblast on March 9 and 10 but did not advance.[88]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of March 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces
launched 176 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and
Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast;
Primorsko-Akbtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[89]
The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 130 Shahed
and decoy drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv,
Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk,
Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts and that 42 decoy drones were
“lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.
Ukrainian officials reported that drones struck Kharkiv, Poltava, and
Kyiv oblasts.[90]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
President Vladimir Putin approved a list on March 10 of instructions
for the Russian government and the Defenders of the Fatherland
Foundation aimed at increasing social benefits to Russian veterans,
which will likely put further strain on the Russian budget and economy.[91]
Putin called to extend the "Defenders of the Fatherland" Foundation's
fund to family members of Russian servicemembers who are missing in
action (MIA) in the war in Ukraine; to support combat veterans'
entrepreneurial activities and increase funding for state social
assistance programs; to classify participants of Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine as combat veterans; and to consider extending social
support to the brothers and sisters of deceased Russian servicemembers
if the siblings are under 18 years old and to unadopted children of the
deceased servicemember. Putin also signed a decree on March 10 creating a
commission in the State Council to support combat veterans and their
families.[92]
Russian Presidential Aide and Secretary of the State Council Alexei
Dyumin stated that the new commission will coordinate federal and
regional government efforts to support Russian veterans.[93]
A Russian insider source claimed that the Defenders of the Fatherland
Foundation does not have unlimited resources so expanding its functions
will require increased state funding.[94]
The insider source claimed that the proposal about supporting veterans'
entrepreneurship is aimed at increasing Russia's economic development
but will require subsidies, preferential lending programs, business
training, and tax breaks. The insider source noted that there is an
imbalance among Russian federal subjects, with some regions providing
veterans with significant benefits, while others offer minimal aid. The
source claimed that Kremlin attempts to unify support measures across
Russia will put extra burdens on the budgets of the federal subjects.
Russian
federal subjects continue to increase financial incentives to Russian
military personnel to boost recruitment. Irkutsk Oblast Governor Igor
Kobzev stated on March 10 that the oblast increased its one-time payment
to people who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry
of Defense (MoD) by a factor of 2.5 to one million rubles (about
$11,400).[95]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
The
All-Russian People's Front's "Kulibin Club" claimed on March 7 that
engineers created the Q10 drone with artificial intelligence (AI) that
makes the drone responsive to the operator's commands, reduces the
drone's energy consumption, and stabilizes the drone's flight.[96] Russian forces on the frontlines are reportedly testing 30 Q10 drones.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian
authorities continue to integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian
banking system. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky
claimed on March 10 that occupation authorities in occupied Zaporizhia
Oblast will launch the Zaporizhia Oblast Resident Card, a project of
Russia's Mir payment system.[97]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-assess-ukraines-peace-stance-saudi-arabia-meeting-2025-03-09/
[2] https://www.ft.com/content/842692b9-ffa3-422d-9343-0d7cd0b2392d
[3] https://suspilne dot media/967193-u-saudivskij-aravii-ukraina-proponuvatime-rezim-tisi-u-nebi-ta-na-mori-dzerelo/
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2025;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525;
https://www.foxnews.com/media/zelenskyy-speaks-out-after-public-spat-trump-vance-dustup-bad-both-sides
[6] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2002214/
[7] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1989213/
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024
[9] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2002214/?lang=ru https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2002214/?lang=en
[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725
[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/304874
[13] https://www.ft.com/content/24282a5c-2d4d-460c-956f-24f03c7fc911
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625
[15] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1898794396553773151; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8587; https://t.me/readovkanews/93865
[16] https://t.me/rybar/68726 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87615 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66257 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66258
[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/66345; https://t.me/yurasumy/21694
; https://t.me/rybar/68704; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33270 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157232; https://t.me/dva_majors/66294;
https://t.me/bazabazon/35599; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87647; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25116 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21739
[18] https://t.me/rybar/68704; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87622; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33276 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66279 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87647 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25190 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21706 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21739
[19] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87632 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21739 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66249 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66251 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87647 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62725 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21495 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21520
[20] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/18077 ; https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/pfbid02WnFCnuT6W4MAJchLQVeTRpSsARQvZaHeAVk75fet8Jk8NyWMxeintfXn3uXDYefil ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87633 ; https://t.me/rybar/68704
[21]
https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02We47eUCu2zQ3hggmu9m19CFG3XeJc2NnkL47Q1j3EEeErRYKugYVKxLtAA3W1qDFl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0265xKsgTm6Rfa9voQ5AV3ekA85JU55yUe7NSAHRrCgkcMQB1WfV5BpjacQzBLuLgSl
[22]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/10/parni-vystupy-na-pivnichnomu-kordoni-na-sumshhyni-rosiyany-atakuyut-kordon-nevelychkymy-grupamy/
; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne
dot
media/sumy/966711-vijskovi-rf-namagautsa-zajti-na-sumsinu-abi-pererizati-logisticni-slahi-v-dpsu-rozpovili-pro-situaciu-na-kordoni/
[23] https://t.me/yurasumy/21706 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21728 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62725
[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25091
[25] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne
dot
media/sumy/966711-vijskovi-rf-namagautsa-zajti-na-sumsinu-abi-pererizati-logisticni-slahi-v-dpsu-rozpovili-pro-situaciu-na-kordoni/
[26] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid0NM6SgNthmMVSZpT6fy6aJGHdw7DJ49LQPaDYYm5q16ywFPmZ5qafhZJ1hyTM95qSl
[27] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/u-2025-roczi-minoboroni-planuye-zakupiti-4-5-mln-fpv-droniv-glib-kanyevskij
[28] https://mil.in dot ua/en/news/ukraine-contracts-hundreds-of-novator-armored-vehicles/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=jtNxpzX40Vo&t=1s&fbclid=IwY2xjawI7k3xleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHSHaijr895DMtm-0ME9PvoP49g8GlA8ef7WvPZW8QGji3y4bcuyQzj7Kyw_aem_IMezr0rz-U6BfQfb1zrihQ
[29] https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-ramps-up-novator-armored-vehicle-production/
[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0yjUnHszAmyAcBT8UVJG5FueCitn39TgoDNpuLPMfYawWS1gy7T8B1nQiZWbgPw9al
[31] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/3957
[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0yjUnHszAmyAcBT8UVJG5FueCitn39TgoDNpuLPMfYawWS1gy7T8B1nQiZWbgPw9al
[33] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8951
[34] https://suspilne dot media/966583-droni-atakuvali-novokujbisevskij-npz-cpd/
[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/49931
[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840
[37] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/966435-znisenij-tank-ta-obmanuti-rosijski-kontraktniki-hartia-pro-situaciu-na-harkivskomu-napramku-frontu/
[38]https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/966789-situacia-bila-sinkivki-na-kupanskomu-napramku-dinamicna-osuv-hortica/
[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33293
[40]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGll;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178
[41]https://suspilne
dot
media/966475-armia-rf-prosuvaetsa-u-kurskij-oblasti-minoboroni-pidpisalo-ugodu-pro-postacanna-ppo-1111-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1741604572&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
[42] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12632
[43]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGll;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178
[44]https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/10/armiya-rf-zalyshayetsya-nepunktualnoyu-syly-oborony-uspishno-nyshhat-logistyku-okupantiv/
[45]https:// t [dot] me/DnevnikDesantnika/25106
[46]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178
[47]https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/5872
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178
[49] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25190 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178
[51]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/10/skorishe-za-vse-znimatymut-komandyra-dyviziyi-oboronczi-chasovogo-yaru-polamaly-karyeru-chergovomu-rosijskomu-nachalnyku/
[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/304802 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25085
[53] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1898995399622299862; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13520
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178
[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2025/03/10/skorishe-za-vse-znimatymut-komandyra-dyviziyi-oboronczi-chasovogo-yaru-polamaly-karyeru-chergovomu-rosijskomu-nachalnyku/
[57]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/966339-sturmovi-grupi-jsli-dekilka-raziv-na-den-na-odnu-poziciu-28-brigada-pro-boi-pid-toreckom/
[58] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87624 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22736
[59]
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1898786922345976032;
https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1898779182684938510; https://
t.me/creamy_caprice/8589; https://t.me/YourVaccineZ/13424 ;
https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1899010915992994109; https://
t.me/ukr_sof/1503; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1899014814279536955
[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8593 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66332
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840
[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33273
[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62714
[64] https://t.me/yurasumy/21713
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178 ; https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1899058379651273022 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66332 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62722 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33273 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62714
[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/66279 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25190 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66332 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62722 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62731 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62714 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62722
[67]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/10/kontrbatarejka-borotba-z-lanczetamy-ta-safari-na-rashystiv-caesar-byut-okupanta-pid-pokrovskom/
[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62714
[69] https://t.me/milinfolive/143604
[70] https://t.me/tass_agency/304805
[71] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23353131 ; https://tass
dot
ru/armiya-i-opk/23353875?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Finstory%2F48201849-a717-5131-aa6c-e56579799676
[72] https://t.me/yurasumy/21738 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66332
[73] https://t.me/yurasumy/21713
[74] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157260
[75] https://t.me/tass_agency/304804 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25190 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/304891 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/304884
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178
[77] https://t.me/wargonzo/25190
[78] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33292 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13815 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33293
[79] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6178 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12208
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/13823
[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/13808
[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/66279
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21840; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12208; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l; https://t.me/dva_majors/66279; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25085
[84] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/39747
[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25088
[86] https://t.me/vrogov/19471
[87] https://t.me/vrogov/19471
[88] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05g9ZKxU9ypm2qTy7UD64J5jkTLWgrqB714gkcGv1rQ63fyacfngfBm187LFmh8G1l
[89] https://t.me/kpszsu/30334
[90] https://t.me/kpszsu/30334 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13406 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/966525-rosijski-bpla-atakuvali-kiiv-ta-oblast-v-regioni-e-poskodzenna/
[91] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/76427
[92] https://t.me/mod_russia/49943; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202503100014?index=1
[93] https://t.me/tass_agency/304895
[94] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17135
[95] https://t.me/kobzevii/10139
[96] https://ria dot ru/20250307/dron-2003526329.html
[97] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/4844
