Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel
March 2, 2025, 7:45 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on March 2. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the March 3 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Recent Russian official
statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate
that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through narratives
targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The Kremlin is claiming that
this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that
Russia can make a better offer to the United States, indicating that
Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its objectives. Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on February 23 to a question about
the US-Ukraine mineral deal and whether US pressure would push Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky to "finally sell out all of Ukraine,"
including Russia's illegally annexed territories in Ukraine.[1]
Peskov claimed that the people in occupied Ukraine decided "long ago"
that they wanted to join Russia so "no one will ever sell off these
territories" — implying that Zelensky may "sell out" other areas of
Ukraine. Russian state television evening news program Vesti claimed on February 24 that the United States is "blackmailing" Ukraine with the mineral deal.[2]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 22 that
"there is nothing good for Kyiv" in a new version of the US-Ukraine
mineral deal.[3]
The milblogger claimed that the mineral deal is "humiliating" for
Ukraine and that Zelensky would be "selling the benefits of his country
for nothing" should he sign the deal.
Kremlin officials
are also trying to prevent the United States and Ukraine from concluding
a mineral deal by making competing offers. Russian President Vladimir
Putin claimed to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 that
Russia has an "order of magnitude" more rare earth materials than
Ukraine and stated that Russia can cooperate with both the US government
and US companies in capital investment projects for rare earth
materials.[4]
Putin referred to mineral reserves both within Russia and within
occupied Ukraine in his attempts to appeal to the United States to
invest in "Russian" rare earth minerals (claiming minerals in occupied
Ukraine as Russia's own). Putin also offered to conclude deals with the
United States on the supply of Russian aluminum. CEO of the Russian
Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential
Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign
Countries Kirill Dmitriev told CNN on February 24 that Russia is open to
economic cooperation with the United States, that the first stage of
cooperation would be in the energy sphere, and that such cooperation is
key for a "more resilient global economy."[5]
Russian
state media is delaying coverage of select Kremlin statements in order
to exploit changing dynamics in the US-Ukrainian relationship and drive
wedges between Ukraine and the United States. Zarubin and Russian state
media outlets TASS and RIA Novosti amplified
on March 2 a previous statement from Peskov about the US decision on
February 24 to vote alongside Russia against a Ukrainian- and
European-backed UN resolution that recognized Russia as the aggressor in
the war.[6]
Peskov claimed on February 26 that the Trump administration is "rapidly
changing" all of its foreign policies in ways that "largely coincide
with [Russia's] vision," but TASS, RIA Novosti, and Zarubin only reported Peskov's statements on March 2.[7]
Russian state media headlines on March 2 deliberately misrepresented
Peskov's statements such that they appeared to be in response to the
February 28 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky.[8]
The
Kremlin has a vested interest in preventing the United States and
Ukraine from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the United
States to a long-term investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty. The
Kremlin is investing significant time and effort into undermining and
misrepresenting the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, indicating that the
Kremlin views the deal as an impediment to accomplishing Russian
President Vladimir Putin's objectives in Ukraine.[9]
The mineral deal, even one that does not include text about an American
security guarantees for Ukraine, will represent a long-term US economic
investment in Ukraine and could be a building block towards additional
US assistance or military sales to Ukraine in the future, as US
Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent observed in an interview to CBS on March 2.[10]
Any agreement that ties the United States to an independent and
sovereign Ukraine is contrary to Russia's long-term goals of isolating
and conquering Ukraine. Putin likely assesses that preventing the
US-Ukrainian mineral deal is a necessary step towards pushing the United
States into stopping military assistance to Ukraine and abandoning
Ukraine altogether. Putin's articulated theory of victory in Ukraine —
which assumes that Russia can continue slow, gradual advances in
exchange for significant personnel and materiel losses — rests on the
assumption that Russia can outlast and overcome US and European security
assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize its economy and
population to support its defense.[11]
Putin is likely attempting to undermine the US-Ukrainian mineral deal
in order to prevent deepening US-Ukraine ties in the hope that Russia
will be able to destroy or extract significant territorial concessions
from Ukraine during future negotiations before Russia's own wartime
economic and force generation issues begin to significantly impede
Russia ability to advance on the battlefield in 2025 and beyond.[12]
Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions
between the United States and the EU about the possible deployment of
European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace
settlement in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime
change in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed on March 2 that plans to
introduce European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine in the future are a
continuation of European leaders' supposed efforts to "incite" Ukraine
to "war against [Russia]."[13]
Lavrov claimed that the West brought Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky to power using "bayonets" and will use future peacekeeping
forces as "bayonets" to "prop up" Zelensky. Lavrov claimed that Europe
wants to continue the war in Ukraine through these peacekeeping forces
whereas the United States is openly stating its desire to end the war.[14] Lavrov claimed that the introduction of peacekeepers to Ukraine would not eliminate the "root causes" of the war.[15]
Lavrov has previously defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's
alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the
Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians
and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[16]
The Kremlin has recently attempted to use this phrase to justify its
calls for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov is exploiting the ongoing
discussions in the West about the deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine
in the future to make yet another argument for Russia's longstanding
demand for regime change. Lavrov and other Kremlin officials have
recently engaged in rhetoric similarly attempting to exacerbate
US-European divisions and falsely portraying European countries as
wanting to continue the war in Ukraine.[17]
The Kremlin is likely attempting to drive a wedge between the United
States and Europe to extract concessions in Russia's favor in future
peace negotiations and other talks.[18]
European leaders demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2. The
United Kingdom (UK) hosted leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany,
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Canada, Finland,
Sweden, Czechia, and Romania as well as the Foreign Minister of Turkey,
Hakan Fidan, NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, President of the
European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European
Council Antonio Costa.[19]
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced at the summit that the UK and
France, along with other unspecified countries, have expressed their
commitment to develop a "coalition of the willing" that will deploy
peacekeepers to defend a peace agreement in Ukraine.[20]
Starmer revealed at the summit a plan aimed at assisting Ukraine:
keeping military aid flowing while the war continues and increasing
economic pressure on Russia; ensuring that any peace deal upholds
Ukraine's sovereignty and security and that Ukraine is at the
negotiating table; and committing European leaders to aim to deter any
future invasion of Ukraine.[21]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the defense summit
was dedicated to Ukraine and a common European future and noted that
"European unity is at an extremely high level."[22]
Zelensky stated that Ukraine is continuing discussions about security
guarantees and conditions for a just peace with partner states and is
working with Europe to create a "reliable basis of cooperation" with the
United States about Ukrainian peace and guaranteed security. Zelensky
met with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on the sidelines of the
summit to discuss the development of a joint action plan to end the war
in Ukraine.[23]
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov also met with UK Defense
Secretary John Healey on the sidelines to discuss the UK's readiness to
increase military assistance to Ukraine, the prospect of purchasing
weapons with profits from frozen Russian assets, and the UK's role in
the Ramstein format.[24]
European
countries announced additional military assistance packages for Ukraine
before and during the summit. The UK announced on March 1 a loan worth
2.6 billion pounds (roughly $3.2 billion) to bolster Ukraine's defense
backed by profits from frozen Russian assets.[25]
The UK stated that the first tranche of the loan will arrive later next
week. Zelensky stated that the UK loan will fund Ukrainian weapons
production.[26]
Starmer announced on March 2 an additional 1.6 billion pound (roughly
$2 billion) deal that will allow Ukraine to purchase 5,000
lightweight-multirole missiles from the UK.[27]
The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 1 that it
will allocate 20 million euros (roughly $20.7 million) to purchasing
Ukrainian-produced weapons for Ukraine and to develop a joint weapons
production facility in Lithuania.[28]
Key Takeaways:
- Recent
Russian official statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine
mineral deal indicate that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal
through narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The
Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine
while also claiming that Russia can make a better offer to the United
States, indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its
objectives.
- The Kremlin has a vested interest
in preventing the United States and Ukraine from signing a mineral deal,
as the deal will commit the United States to a long-term investment in
Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty.
- Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions
between the United States and the EU about the possible deployment of
European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace
settlement in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime
change in Ukraine.
- European leaders demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian
forces continued offensive operations within the Ukrainian salient in
Kursk Oblast on March 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 2 that Russian forces
seized Nikolskiy and advanced near Novaya Sorochina and Malaya Loknya
(all northwest of Sudzha).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not fully seized Lebedevka.[30]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Sudzha near Staraya Sorochina, Malaya
Loknya, Lebedevka, and Viktorovka; northeast of Sudzha near Russkoye
Porechnoye and Martynovka; southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya
Konopelka and Agronom; south of Sudzha near Makhnovka; and southwest of
Sudzha near Kurilovka.[31]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[32]
Artillery elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian
Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo (southwest of Sudzha).[33]
Elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army
[CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near
Malaya Loknya.[34]
Russian
sources continued to claim on March 2 that Russian forces are operating
in northern Sumy Oblast near the international border.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 2 that Russian forces
seized Zhuravka and advanced to Novenke (both along the international
border in Sumy Oblast).[35]
Russian milbloggers claimed on March 2 that Russian forces attacked towards Novenke and Basivka (immediately east of Zhuravka).[36]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Zhuravka (west of Sudzha).[37]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 2.
A Russian milblogger claimed on March 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Lypsti.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Kupyansk toward Novoosynove on March 1 and 2.[39]
Ukrainian
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated
that Russian forces are taking advantage of freezing soil and bodies of
water in order to deploy more equipment and aircraft in the Kupyansk
direction as compared to previous weeks.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 2 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near
Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Makiivka on March 1 and 2.[41]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd
Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military
District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Makiivka.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 2 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[43]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near
Yampolivka and toward Nove, Novomykhailivka, and Katerynivka on March 1
and 2.[44]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Siversk direction on March 2.
A
Ukrainian battalion operating in the Siversk direction reported on
March 1 that the battalion repelled a four-pronged, company-sized
Russian motorized assault near Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) on an
unspecified date.[45] The battalion did not specify whether the Russian assault was mechanized.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian
forces continued ground attacks in Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near
Hryhorivka, and south of Chaisv Yar near Oleksandro-Shultyne on March
2.[46]
Ukrainian
Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro
Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are concentrating personnel in
northern Chasiv Yar for additional offensive operations and that
improved weather conditions are allowing both Russian and Ukrainian
forces to increase drone operations.[47]
Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are decreasingly shelling Chasiv
Yar, suggesting that Russian forces may be preparing for larger attacks
in the future in different areas of the settlement.
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th
Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating
near Predtechyne.[48] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[49]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Toretsk.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 1 and 2
indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced within northern and central
Toretsk, respectively.[50]
Russian
forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk itself; west of Toretsk
near Shcherbynivka; and north of Toretsk near Krymske, Dachne, and
Dyliivka on March 1 and 2.[51]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces, chiefly elements of
the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA],
formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military
District [SMD]), are defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in
Toretsk.[52]
The milblogger claimed that sustained and successful Ukrainian
counterattacks may force Russian forces to commit additional manpower to
the Toretsk direction. ISW has recently observed reports that the
Russian military command is transferring elements of the 20th and 150th
motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) to the Toretsk
direction, likely for offensive efforts in Spring-Summer 2025, and some
of these elements may have to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive
operations in Toretsk instead.[53]
Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are only
intermittently advancing in central Toretsk but that Russian positions
in the area are fragmented.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 2 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia forces advanced one
kilometer south of Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55]
Russian
forces continued attacks northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Nova
Poltavka; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Malynivka, Yelyzavetivka,
and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk
near Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, Bohdanivka, and
Kotlyarivka on March 1 and 2.[56]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking
near Zelene Pole (east of Pokrovsk), Tarasivka, Malynivka, and Nova
Poltavka.[57]
Ukraine's
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated
that Ukrainian forces recently pushed Russian forces from Pishchane and
Kotlyne and that Russian forces are attempting to retake these
settlements.[58]
Trehubov noted that Russian forces are suffering significant losses in
the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
systems are interfering with Russian glide bomb navigation systems.
Trehubov stated that Russian forces are leveraging frozen ground
conditions and water features to use more heavy equipment and armored
vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions, but that Russian
forces are still struggling to advance in these areas. A Ukrainian
military observer also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are better
integrating drone and artillery systems with ground operations in the
Pokrovsk direction and that improved integration is contributing to
improved Ukrainian defensive operations in the area.[59]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th
Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are
reportedly operating near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk in the
Russian near rear).[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 2 but did not advance.
Russian
forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove near Oleksiivka, Andriivka,
Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, and Rozlyv on March 1 and 2.[61]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction posted footage
on March 1 showing Ukranian forces repelling a reinforced platoon-sized
Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area of this direction.[62]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets
stated on March 2 that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle
Division (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently seized
Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[63]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north
and northeast of Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and a Russian
source claimed that Russian forces seized Pryvilne (northwest of Velyka
Novosilka) and advanced 4.5 kilometers towards Shevchenko (northwest of
Pryvilne).[64]
Russian
forces continued assaults north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and
Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and
Pryvilne on March 1 and 2.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole (just west of Pryvilne).[66]
Mashovets
estimated that the Russian force grouping in the Velyka Novosilka
direction is comprised of no more than 50,000 troops, 280 tanks, 630
armored vehicles, 360 tube artillery systems, 85 multiple-launch rocket
systems (MLRS), and a unit of missile forces equipped with 6-8 missile
launchers.[67]
Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command is currently
holding elements of at least the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA)
and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) in reserve in this direction.[68]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian sources claimed on March 2 that
Russian forces advanced six kilometers in the Orikhiv direction and
advanced towards Shcherbaky and near Mali Shcherbaky (northwest of
Robotyne).[69]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Robotyne toward
Charivne and northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske, Pyatykhatky, Mali
Shcherbaky, and Nesteryanka on March 1 and 2.[70]
[71]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division,
including its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the
Orikhiv (north of Robotyne) and Stepnohirsk (northwest of Robotyne)
directions.[72]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on March 1 and 2 but did not advance.[73]
A
Russian milblogger claimed on March 2 that both Russian and Ukrainian
forces attacked near the floodplains of the Dnipro River Delta.[74]
Russian
authorities continue efforts to leverage international organizations to
legitimize Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of Ukrainian
territory. Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom
claimed on March 1 that a group of International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) observers recently arrived at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia
Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as part of a delayed rotation and that the
group traveled through "Russian territory" (occupied Ukrainian
territory) to get to the ZNPP for the first time.[75]
The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the group's
travel through occupied Ukraine as a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty
and territorial integrity and stated that Russian forces have recently
purposefully prevented the IAEA from conducting a personnel rotation via
Ukrainian-controlled territory.[76]
Ukrainian authorities reported in early February 2025 that Russian
forces disrupted a scheduled rotation of IAEA observers to the ZNPP
several times.[77]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Odesa Oblast on
March 1 targeting port infrastructure and civilian shipping. Ukrainian
officials reported that Russian forces hit Odesa City with an
unspecified ballistic missile on March 1, damaging port infrastructure, a
Panama-flagged civilian container ship, and a Sierra Leone-flagged
vessel transporting over 21,000 tons of corn and soybeans for export.[78]
Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister for the Reconstruction of Ukraine Oleksiy
Kuleba noted on March 2 that this is the 29th civilian ship that has
sustained damage from Russian strikes, presumably since the start of the
full-scale invasion.[79]
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of March 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces
launched 79 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and
Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai on the night of March 1 to 2.[80]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 63
drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad,
Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson
and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 16 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to
Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials
stated that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, and
Zaporizhia oblasts.[81]
The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian force shot down six Kh-101
cruise missiles and 665 Shahed drones between February 24 and March 2.[82]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3704 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23219787
[2] https://smotrim dot ru/brand/58500?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=vesti2-mixed2&utm_campaign=vesti-smotrim
[3] https://t.me/rybar/68243
[4] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76331
[5] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/24/europe/putin-russia-us-cooperation-economy-rare-earths-intl-latam/index.html
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://tass dot ru/politika/23283771; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3727
https://t.me/tass_agency/303433; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3726 ; https://ria dot ru/20250302/peskov-2002549094.html
[7] https://tass dot ru/politika/23283771; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3727
[8] https://ria dot ru/20250302/peskov-2002549094.html; https://tass dot ru/politika/23283771;
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024
[10] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/scott-bessent-treasury-secretary-face-the-nation-03-02-2025/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024
[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[13] https://t.me/MID_Russia/53182; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2000799/; https://archive.ph/g6YNP
[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/23284439
[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/303463
[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125
[19] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-londoni-rozpochavsya-samit-prisvyachenii-ukraini-96429
[20] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-remarks-at-international-leaders-summit-press-conference-2-march-2025
[21] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy4vevpv14vo
[22] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13453
[23] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13452
[24] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/12022
[25] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-reinforces-support-for-ukraine-with-226-billion-loan-to-bolster-ukrainian-defence-capabilities
[26] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13451
[27] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/historic-16bn-deal-provides-thousands-of-air-defence-missiles-for-ukraine-and-boosts-uk-jobs-and-growth#:~:text=Deal%20will%20create%20200%20jobs,defence%20missiles%20missiles%20to%20Ukraine
[28] https://kam dot lt/lietuva-ir-ukraina-sutare-del-bendros-gynybos-pramones-gamybos-pletros-lietuvoje/
[29] https://t.me/rusich_army/21295 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21491 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24698
[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24698
[31] https://t.me/rusich_army/21295 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21491 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24712 ; https://t.me/rybar/68470 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65707 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24698
[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156324
[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/65730
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24712
[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156320 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21491 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/143007
[36] https://t.me/rybar/68470 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65707 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24698
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24698
[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24699
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5901
[40] https://suspilne
dot
media/donbas/960633-armii-rf-ne-vdaetsa-pererizati-trasu-pokrovsk-dnipro-situacia-na-napramku/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8
[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5901
[42] https://t.me/sashakots/52250
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24710
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5901
[45] https://t.me/k_2army/443 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1896149567458156828
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl
[47]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8
; https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/960689-rosijski-vijska-nakopicuutsa-na-pivnoci-mista-casiv-ar/
[48] https://t.me/sashakots/52246
[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24683
[50] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1896219653632114792; https://x.com/small10space/status/1895799988795654297; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1896187957637534004; https://t.me/KykyshkaBpLA/750
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5901
[52] https://t.me/yurasumy/21487
[53] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33031
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24687
[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5901 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62529
[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62529
[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/960633-armii-rf-ne-vdaetsa-pererizati-trasu-pokrovsk-dnipro-situacia-na-napramku/
[59] https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/pfbid0uzuqqdx5RUHy8kLoRg2TAj1YVkTEurJ59svVJDcQ3qRzNWBaPkT9H9QZ9M4tTKfhl
[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/25065
[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5901 ; https://t.me/rybar/68470; https://t.me/dva_majors/65707 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25057 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21485 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24687 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62530
[62] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5904 ; https://t.me/odshbr79/512 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1895918549337809111
[63] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2598
[64] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62526 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24694 https://t.me/wargonzo/25057
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5901 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12159 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21484
[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62526
[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2597
[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2598
[69] https://t.me/tass_agency/303429 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21483
[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02uYbGYooL6Q248sosR56CtBDQyryBjqRpiWDRizo8srycZ5XP3BfLyonm1y1aED25l ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12159 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21483 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20725 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25057 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65707 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02uYbGYooL6Q248sosR56CtBDQyryBjqRpiWDRizo8srycZ5XP3BfLyonm1y1aED25l?__cft__[0]=AZWptW15AVOEcLC2NOkXKWE609IQWUM4JTwp_Ze960jcYMnPKpc7KXSW3w9Bv831Cm3EpX0CRaNQWp4_Jb9o9vr3EVgbuVnkiXNfGh-4mCoEodnvf6stlkwW9Uh8N863VrfmNsVDwHkKCVMuk3W3BoERBsxggk1490-rLcgqFczfdw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[71]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02uYbGYooL6Q248sosR56CtBDQyryBjqRpiWDRizo8srycZ5XP3BfLyonm1y1aED25l ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12159 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21483 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20725 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25057 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65707 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02uYbGYooL6Q248sosR56CtBDQyryBjqRpiWDRizo8srycZ5XP3BfLyonm1y1aED25l?__cft__[0]=AZWptW15AVOEcLC2NOkXKWE609IQWUM4JTwp_Ze960jcYMnPKpc7KXSW3w9Bv831Cm3EpX0CRaNQWp4_Jb9o9vr3EVgbuVnkiXNfGh-4mCoEodnvf6stlkwW9Uh8N863VrfmNsVDwHkKCVMuk3W3BoERBsxggk1490-rLcgqFczfdw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[72] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6792
[73]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wBc54MKRD1fPdv97qrpPc4wD2CN1131D1TLV1eFq3z3NDJkxTCWFz6uWb8GCoD4sl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UtV8kroegr7bNrdEpKn1DujJS9BzEo1ppieX4FwwvYzUWSbVovJ52ED9EdPnjnLWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023niM4qecFV1S8dXkewkGjm1aj3MxJBFVYzFsJznkpsHkATEdW2T2qfJrrRx542cWl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02uYbGYooL6Q248sosR56CtBDQyryBjqRpiWDRizo8srycZ5XP3BfLyonm1y1aED25l ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12159
[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/65707
[75] https://t.me/tass_agency/303387; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1011537; https://meduza
dot
io/news/2025/03/02/na-zaporozhskoy-aes-sostoyalas-rotatsiya-nablyudateley-magate-ih-marshrut-vpervye-proshel-po-kontroliruemoy-rossiey-territorii
[76] https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/komentar-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-pidrivu-rosiyeyu-avtoritetu-ta-nezalezhnosti-magate; https://t.me/bbcrussian/77274
[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025
[78] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/5565; https://t.me/truonline/4590; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12152; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02uYbGYooL6Q248sosR56CtBDQyryBjqRpiWDRizo8srycZ5XP3BfLyonm1y1aED25l ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8807
[79] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/5565
[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/29752
[81] https://t.me/kpszsu/29752; https://t.me/synegubov/13319; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12153; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/16837
[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/29763
