Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Alison O’Neil, and Karina Wugang of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: March 5, 2025
Key Takeaways
- Taiwan. Recall campaigns against 32 legislators in the KMT opposition advanced to the next stage. Successful recalls could shift the balance of power in the Taiwanese legislature to favor the ruling DPP.
- Taiwan. The PRC launched a sudden military exercise south of Taiwan likely as a coercive show of force. This follows similarly provocative PRC exercises near Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand.
- South Korea. Anti-PRC sentiments have surged in South Korea, following President Yoon Suk-yeol mentioning PRC espionage repeatedly in his impeachment trial. A leading presidential candidate reversed his pro-PRC position in response to this public frustration.
- The Philippines. The Philippines arrested PRC nationals for espionage targeting military and government sites, including the presidential palace. This alleged espionage is part of the PRC’s and United Front’s clandestine activities in the Philippines.
- Russia. PRC President Xi Jinping met Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Beijing. The PRC in the meeting reaffirmed its strategic cooperation with Russia while trying to project an image of neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The Taiwanese Central Election Commission (CEC) advanced 32 recall campaigns targeting Kuomintang (KMT) legislators. Successful recall campaigns against the KMT opposition could shift the balance of power in the Legislative Yuan (LY) in favor of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The CEC announced that 13 recall cases against KMT legislators have moved to the second stage and three recall cases against DPP legislators failed to gather enough signatures.[1] This announcement comes after 19 recall proposals for KMT legislators reached the second stage and nine recall proposals against DPP legislators failed to gather enough signatures at the end of February.[2] KMT legislators face a total of 32 recall motions in the second stage, while DPP legislators have no recall motions in the second stage of recall to date. DPP legislative caucus Chair Ker Chien-ming called for a mass recall campaign against opposition legislators on January 4. The KMT responded by launching its own recall campaigns against the DPP. [3] These results illustrate the low popularity of the KMT-initiated recall campaign in the wake of massive KMT-led government budget cuts. The second stage requires 10 percent of eligible voters in the relevant legislator’s district to sign the recall petition within 60 days — 10 times the number of signatures needed at the first stage — so it is unclear how many of the 32 recall motions will advance further in the coming months. Gathering signatures from 10 percent of eligible voters would trigger a special election in the relevant legislator’s district, providing the DPP an opportunity to win seats that the KMT currently holds.
The DPP would need to flip six seats and maintain its current seats for a simple majority of 57 seats. Winning 12 seats would yield the DPP a firm majority over all opposition parties in the LY. The LY is comprised of 113 members and currently has no majority party; the DPP holds 51 seats, the KMT holds 54 seats (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holds eight seats.[4] The KMT and TPP have recently aligned to gain majority control, obstructing DPP President William Lai Ching-te’s agenda through measures, such as passing a motion to slash the government budget by record levels in January 2025. The motion sought to cut some department budgets by over 90 percent. The large cuts to defense spending and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget in particular undermine the Taiwanese ability to resist PRC coercion and threats.
The PRC launched a sudden live-fire exercise 40 miles south of Taiwan on February 26, likely as a coercive display of force. This exercise follows similarly provocative exercises near Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand. The PRC broadcasted radio warnings that it would conduct live-fire military exercises in an approximately 1,850 square-mile area near Kaohsiung and Pingtung off Taiwan’s southern coast, overlapping with busy international shipping lanes.[5] The PRC gave no advanced warning of the drills through usual channels, such as notices to airmen or mariners, which endangers nearby air and sea traffic. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported at least 32 PRC military aircraft around Taiwan on February 26, 22 of which crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).[6] The aircraft included fighter jets, surveillance planes, and drones. [7] Seven People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships operated within the designated drill zone, which was far outside of Taiwan’s territorial waters.[8] Two unnamed senior Taiwanese officials told Reuters that Taiwan detected no live fire in the drill zone, contrary to what the PRC had announced. [9] Both the MND and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) condemned the military exercise as a “blatant provocation to regional security and stability.” [10] Their PRC counterparts issued dismissive statements downplaying the significance of unannounced live-fire drills. PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) spokesperson Wu Qian called the exercise “routine” and described the Taiwanese reaction as “hype.” [11]
The PRC conducted an unprecedented series of unannounced live-fire drills in the Indo-Pacific in a single week. The PRC first launched live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand on February 21.[12] Australia and New Zealand were provided only a couple of hours of notice instead of the standard Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). Australia’s military notably observed no ships firing even though the PRC declared a live-fire exercise. [13] New Zealand's defense ministry reported a second live-fire drill warning on February 22, again without a NOTAM.[14] The PRC began four days of live-fire drills in the Gulf of Tonkin on February 24 with only a few hours of notice in response to Vietnam announcing a new coastal baseline on February 21.[15] The PRC gave minimal warning instead of the customary 12-to-24-hour notice in all these cases, likely to maximize disruptiveness and intimidation while technically remaining compliant with international law.[16]
The PRC has conducted other major, unannounced exercises around Taiwan in the past year as well — Joint Sword A in May 2024, Joint Sword B in October 2024, and an unnamed exercise in December 2024. The United States notably unfroze 870 million US dollars of military aid to Taiwan on February 26 — the same day as the PLA exercises. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian denounced the resumption of US aid to Taiwan as a violation of the “one-China principle and the three Sino-US joint communiqués.”[17]
PLA aircraft flew into Taiwan's de-facto ADIZ 348 times in February 2025. The PRC has normalized a higher frequency of ADIZ incursions to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness and response threshold. The PRC dramatically increased the frequency of ADIZ incursions after the inauguration of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te in May 2024. The PRC views Lai as a “separatist” due to his administration’s focus on preserving Taiwanese sovereignty in the face of intensifying PRC efforts to advance its goal of annex Taiwan. PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have exceeded 200 every month since Lai took office, whereas this volume was unusual before then.
This new normal of ADIZ incursions represents one of the many elements of intensifying PRC coercion against Taiwan and Lai’s administration. The normalization of more frequent ADIZ incursions by PLA aircraft raises the threshold of coercive activity that would trigger a Taiwanese response, making it more difficult for Taiwan to detect and respond to a real threat in time. Taiwan must put personnel on standby to respond to ADIZ incursions, which strains resources and exhausts the personnel.
The PRC calibrates its military activities around Taiwan to intimidate and deter it from practicing policies that the PRC perceives as supportive of Taiwanese sovereignty. PLA aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s de-facto ADIZ are a near daily occurrence that typically serve as a barometer for the PRC’s reactions to political developments regarding Taiwan. Spikes in ADIZ incursions often correspond to political incidents in Taiwan that the PRC opposes, including high-level meetings between Taiwanese and foreign officials or expressions of Taiwanese sovereignty by ROC leaders.
The United States sanctioned six entities based in the PRC and Hong Kong for procuring unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components for Iran. US sanctions have targeted multiple instances of PRC support for Iranian drone and ballistic missile programs. The sanctioned firms include Dingtai Industrial Technology Co Limited, Yonghongan Trade Limited, Hong Kong Tianle International Co Limited, DDC Develop Industry Hong Kong Limited, Shenzhen Zhiyu International Trade Co Ltd, and JP Oriental International Holdings Limited. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) accused these entities of acting as front companies for the OFAC-sanctioned Iranian firm Pishtazan Kavosh Gostar Boshra (PKGB) and its subsidiary Narin Sepehr Mobin Isatis (NSMI), which support the Iranian ballistic missile and UAV programs.[37]
Northeast Asia
South Korea
President Yoon Suk-yeol's repeated mentions of PRC espionage during his final impeachment trial on February 25 have fueled anti-PRC sentiment across the political spectrum in South Korea. Presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung has reversed his pro-PRC stance, aligning with many public sentiments. This comes as the PRC was working to cultivate friendlier ties with South Korea in order to suppress anti-PRC attitudes and influence South Korea’s upcoming presidential election. Yoon argued that declaring martial law on December 3 was necessary to raise public awareness about espionage activities by anti-state actors, such as North Korea and the PRC, and inability to prosecute them under the current law during his final impeachment trial.[41] Yoon said, “Last year, PRC nationals were repeatedly caught flying drones to photograph our military bases” and “industrial spies leaking national key technologies have surged. . . with two-thirds of it flowing to the PRC,” referencing past instances of PRC interference and industrial espionage.[42] Yoon argued that the opposition-led National Assembly has blocked the passage of legislation aimed at punishing foreigners arrested on espionage charges. South Korea’s current espionage law prevents the prosecution of foreign suspects except those from North Korea. The law specifies that anyone who engages in espionage, aids enemy spies, or leaks military secrets to an enemy could face death or life imprisonment (Article 98 of the Criminal Act).[43] The Constitutional Court precedents have limited the definition of an “enemy country” to North Korea.[44] The opposition Democratic Party (DP) had postponed the revision of the Criminal Act in the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee, where the DP holds the majority, in December 2024.[45] The DP denied opposing the bill, claiming that Yoon’s martial law declaration disabled them from processing the bill.[46][47]
Yoon argued that declaring martial law falls within the scope of presidential power and that the opposition's obstruction of necessary legislation for the national security equates to a national emergency. The constitution allows for the declaration of a state of emergency “in times of war, invasion, or a national emergency equivalent to these, when the country is in a state of combat with the enemy or when social order is severely disrupted, making the execution of administrative and judicial functions significantly difficult” (Article 77, Section 1 of the Constitution).[48] The Constitutional Court is expected to decide by mid-March whether to impeach or reinstate Yoon. The constitution mandates that a presidential election be held within 60 days of an impeachment, meaning an early election could be held by mid-to-late May.
Yoon’s consistent references to PRC espionage are contributing to rising anti-PRC sentiment, with protesters holding anti-PRC demonstrations, including in front of the PRC embassy. Protesters have held signs that read “No China” and “CCP OUT.”[49] One of Yoon’s supporters attempted to break into the PRC embassy on February 14, allegedly stating that his goal was to “give people a chance to experience anti-PRC sentiment firsthand.”[50] A petition calling for a revision of the “National Security Act to punish foreign spies, such as those from the PRC” has garnered 42,733 signatures--85 percent of its target to be referred to the National Assembly’s standing committee.[51]
DP leader Lee Jae-myung — a leading candidate for the potential presidential election — has distanced itself from pro-PRC positions likely in response to the growing anti-PRC sentiments. Lee stated his support for strengthening ties with Japan and continuing trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan in an interview with the Economist on January 30.[52] Public backing for the revision bill and Lee’s shift in foreign policy, coupled with mass protests by Yoon supporters, indicate that Yoon’s campaign on anti-PRC rhetoric has successfully generated strong public momentum across the political spectrum.
The PRC is signaling its intent to restore relations with South Korea despite the growing anti-PRC rhetoric in the country. South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on February 10, and a PRC official hinted at the possibility of lifting the “K-Culture ban” that the PRC imposed in 2017.[53] Xi will likely visit South Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, reflecting the PRC’s continued desire to improve bilateral relations.[54] The PRC is seeking ways to decrease anti-PRC sentiment by offering cultural and economic opportunities and influence voter sentiment ahead of the expected early election in May.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The Philippine government has arrested multiple PRC nationals on espionage charges targeting military camps and the presidential palace as part of its expanded campaign against PRC espionage and United Front activity throughout the country. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) announced on February 25 that it had arrested two suspected PRC spies accused of targeting the Presidential palace, Camp Aguilando, Camp Crane, Villamor Air Base, and the US Embassy in Manila with the assistance of three Philippine citizens.[55] The NBI stated that the two PRC nationals employed the Filipinos to drive around targeted areas in vans equipped with surveillance, data theft, and network disruption technology, collecting “thousands” of pieces of data before being apprehended.[56]
Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. identified PRC espionage and influence in Philippine politics as a major issue following the arrest of five PRC nationals conducting “illegal intelligence gathering” on Philippine Navy and Coast Guard facilities, ports, and ships near the South China Sea on January 24.[57] The five individuals targeted areas and equipment that have been utilized in Philippine military operations in the South China Sea and joint exercises with the United States and Australia. The NBI announced on February 28 that four of the arrested individuals led the Philippine China Association of Promotion of Peace and Friendship and Qiaoxing Volunteer Group--civic groups that are overseen by the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC), which is a CCP-led organization engaged in United Front work.[58] United Front Work Department officials have previously spoken at meetings for the Philippine-based groups, with the latest event occurring in May 2024. The two Philippine-based groups advertised their affiliation with the CCP, and leaders stated that the groups would focus on promoting Chinese culture and expanding Chinese-Philippine friendships.[59] The groups also made donations of cash and patrol vehicles to local police and city government officials, likely an effort to ingratiate themselves with local officials and increase their standing in local Philippine communities.[60]
Europe
Russia
PRC rhetoric beyond official readouts echoes these statements and indicates the PRC’s intent to position itself as an international leader amid the Ukraine crisis. Fudan University professor Shen Yi reportedly wrote in PRC news outlet Guancha that “clinging to the U.S. comes with risks” and that “if one sees the risks of relying on the US but finds Moscow unappealing, then there is another path.”[69] The PRC’s public affirmations of support for Russia aim to retain a key diplomatic and security partner, all while attempting to abnegate responsibility for the Russian war effort and cast the PRC as an ideal leader among “Global South” states.
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[8] https://x.com/MoNDefense/status/1894918623296196903
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[22] https://apnews.com/article/fentanyl-border-mexico-trump-tariffs-drug-canada-3b7f4b39aaa1c9e2ca9a2b1c4cb40715
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[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-will-work-firmly-advance-reunification-with-taiwan-premier-2025-03-05/
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[32] https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/03/at-the-2024-two-sessions-in-beijing-china-talks-tough-on-taiwan/
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-7-2024
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[37] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0031
[38] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1331
[39] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2510
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[41] https://news.kbs dot co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8185571&ref=A
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[43]https://elaw.klri.re dot kr/eng_service/lawViewTitle.do?hseq=28627
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