UA-69458566-1

Sunday, February 4, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2024

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Fredrick W. Kagan

February 4, 2024, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on February 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia's reported reserve concentrations throughout Ukraine largely align with Russia’s assessed priorities along the front, although they are not necessarily indicative of future Russian operations. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces currently have 17 regiments, 16 battalions, and two regiment-battalion level tactical detachments in reserve.[1] Mashovets stated that there are about 60,000-62,000 total Russian personnel in reserve units, but Russian forces have only equipped about 20,000 tactical and operational-tactical level reserve personnel with weapons and equipment. Mashovets stated that Russia’s reserves are concentrated in the greatest numbers in the operational zone of the Southern Grouping of Forces, followed by the Western Grouping of Forces, Dnepr Grouping of Forces, the Zaporizhia Grouping of Forces, the Eastern Grouping of Forces, and the Central Grouping of Forces. The Southern Grouping of Forces is responsible for the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions, and Mashovets noted that the reserve concentration in this area aligns with the areas where Russian forces are concentrating their offensive efforts. Mashovets observed that it is not surprising that the Dnepr Grouping of Forces — which operates in occupied Kherson Oblast — has the third highest number of reserves given that Russian forces may be concerned over a Ukrainian threat in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian officials have recently indicated that Russian forces have more than 70,000 personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, but that many are concentrated deeper in the rear.[2] The Dnipro Grouping of Forces’ reserves would likely be able to easily move to the Zaporizhia direction if circumstances so required. Mashovets assessed that the Central Grouping of Forces, which is responsible for the Lyman direction, has the lowest concentration of reserves due to its smaller operational zone that requires fewer troops.[3] ISW additionally assesses that the Central Grouping of Forces has a lower concentration of reserves because Russian operations in the Lyman direction are likely meant to support the Western Grouping of Forces’ operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, as ISW will soon outline in an upcoming operational analysis of the Russian offensive on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis. Russian forces will be able to move their reserve concentrations freely between different sectors of the front as long as Russia holds the strategic initiative across the theater. ISW continues to assess that an active Ukrainian defense throughout the theater in 2024 would cede the strategic initiative to Russia allowing Moscow to determine where, when, and at what scale fighting occurs in Ukraine and to allocate Russian resources appropriately while forcing Ukraine to respond.[4] Ukraine would be able to deny Russia this ability, however, if Ukraine were able to contest the initiative.

The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is unlikely able to fully support Russia’s reserve manpower despite Russia’s ability to sustain its current tempo of operations and ongoing efforts to expand the Russian DIB. Mashovets stated that the operational and strategic reserves are generally not combat-ready, yet the Russian command tends to view its reserve component as a “bottomless barrel.”[5] Mashovets stated that the Russian DIB is able to produce about 250-300 “new and thoroughly modernized” tanks per year. Mashovets stated that Russian forces can also overhaul about 250-300 tanks that have been in long-term storage or sustained battlefield damage per year. Mashovets stated that the situation is similar for armored combat vehicles, suggesting that the Russian DIB can more or less cover Russian forces’ annual vehicle losses. Mashovets stated that the Russian DIB, however, cannot produce enough materiel to equip large Russian reserves should the need suddenly arise. The Latvian Defense Ministry’s State Secretary Janis Garisons stated on December 13 that Russia can “produce and repair” about 100-150 tanks per month.[6] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed in March 2023 that Russia’s DIB could produce 1,500 main battle tanks in 2023, which suggests an average production of 125 tanks per month.[7] Even with these higher estimates the Russian DIB remains unlikely able to support a larger mobilization of manpower and would likely need to expand dramatically to support larger offensive operations that would require the use of more manpower reserves. ISW continues to assess that Russia would have the opportunity to expand its DIB and amass resources if it maintains the theater-wide initiative throughout 2024 although not likely to an extent sufficient to supply great masses of mobilized reservists or conscripts this year.[8]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the frontline near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast and the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on February 4. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi and Ukrainian Commander of the Zaporizhia Group of Forces Brigadier General Volodymyr Horbatyuk reported to Zelensky about Ukrainian defensive operations in the Avdiivka direction, the situation near Robotyne and other areas of the front, and the arrangement of Ukrainian defensive lines.[9] Zelensky also visited the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command and discussed measures to strengthen mobile fire groups and electronic warfare (EW) systems to repel Russian drone strikes, the use of Western and hybrid (Western-Ukrainian) air defense systems, and prospects for strengthening the capabilities of Ukrainian Eastern air defense groups.[10]

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian authorities’ failure to properly equip Russian forces with drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems in response to a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on February 4 that Russian drone production is poorly managed, limiting Russia’s ability to innovate.[11] One milblogger claimed that poor management leads to unjustified Russian losses and will be the “scourge” of Russia’s victory against Ukraine.[12] Moscow Duma Deputy Andrei Medvedev previously criticized Russia’s mass production of drones as leading to the production of a large number of drones that lack the technological adaptations necessary to compete with Ukrainian drones on the battlefield.[13] Another Russian milblogger responded to the January 30 footage of Ukrainian drones striking advancing Russian armored vehicles and tanks near Novomykhailivka by claiming that it was “negligent” for Russian commanders to allow Russian armored vehicles to go into battle without proper EW equipment.[14] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces should “abandon” the idea of deep mechanized breakthroughs until Russian forces are adequately equipped with EW systems and should conduct small infantry-led assaults with drone support in the meantime.[15] Russian milbloggers have recently fixated on this event as indicative of the Russian military’s struggle to innovate and break out of the current positional warfare in Ukraine.[16]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to face the authoritarian’s dilemma, whereby his authoritarian regime is itself systematically preventing him from receiving accurate information about military-political realities in Russia. A prominent Russian milblogger — who previously appeared on state media outlets and was temporarily detained in March 2022 — published a rant accusing the Russian bureaucracy and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of deliberately withholding information from Putin, likely in response to recent Russian propagandists’ efforts to conceal Russian military failures near Novomykhailivka.[17] The milblogger claimed that Russia has a culture in which local authorities closely work with regional media outlets to censor and conceal from the Kremlin any negative reports. The milblogger argued that Putin created a consultative civil society institution called the Russian Civic Chamber in 2004 whose members would monitor local governments' activities in order to provide negative, but accurate, information “to the top,” but the chamber failed to do so because the chamber’s representatives decided to remain silent — just like the officials that they were elected to monitor. The milblogger observed that Putin then created the All-Russian People’s Front in 2011 to target the same problem and that the initiative was successful until representatives began to follow in the Russian Civic Chamber’s footsteps. The milblogger argued that the Russian MoD engages in similar, secretive efforts to those of regional officials to conceal its failures from Putin and resents voices that undermine these efforts. The milblogger stated that the Russian MoD made it nearly impossible for milbloggers and government officials to visit frontlines and claimed that there are rumors that the Russian military command deploys generals to Syria if they start to have frequent communication with Putin. The milblogger argued that the Kremlin can only see honest discussions about Russia’s battlefield realities from the milblogger and volunteer accounts outlined in its media monitoring reports and noted that the lack of transparency is a systematic problem among Russian government structures. The milblogger later forecasted that bureaucrats will attempt to block Telegram and arrest milbloggers following the Russian presidential election in March 2024 in response to another milblogger’s observation that Russian Telegram channels remain the only source of constructive opposition in Russia.[18]

Putin’s recent efforts to address milbloggers’ concerns over Russian drone shortages and failures to repel Ukrainian forces from east (left) bank Kherson Oblast indicate that he continues to see value in having milbloggers serve as a constructive opposition that checks Russian government and military officials.[19] Putin’s past creations of the All-Russian People’s Front and the Russian Civic Chamber, and his relatively lenient treatment of milbloggers throughout the full-scale invasion, indicate that he is unlikely to decisively censor the milblogger and volunteer communities because he likely values the ability to check on his government. Putin is unlikely to pursue a mass censorship campaign against milbloggers on his own unless select factions within the Kremlin successfully convince him that milbloggers pose an immediate threat to his regime’s stability. Kremlin officials appear to have been successful in convincing Putin to eliminate and neutralize some milbloggers and information space actors such as former Russian officer Igor Girkin and media networks affiliated with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Kremlin officials, however, have likely been unsuccessful in turning Putin against a vast community of milbloggers that criticizes the bureaucracy while avidly supporting Putin and his war effort in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

  • Russia's reported reserve concentrations throughout Ukraine largely align with Russia’s assessed priorities along the front, although they are not necessarily indicative of future Russian operations.
  • The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is unlikely able to fully support Russia’s reserve manpower despite Russia’s ability to sustain its current tempo of operations and ongoing efforts to expand the Russian DIB.
  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the frontline near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast and the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on February 4.
  • Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian authorities’ failure to properly equip Russian forces with drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems in response to a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to face the authoritarian’s dilemma, whereby his authoritarian regime is itself systematically preventing him from receiving accurate information about military-political realities in Russia.
  • Russian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
  • Kremlin newswire TASS reported on February 4 that Vladimir Oblast will be a patron of the new Knyaz Pozharsky Borei-A class nuclear submarine.
  • Ukrainian officials continue international efforts aimed at returning Ukrainian citizens whom Russian authorities illegally deported to Russia.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
  • Russian Information Operations and Narratives
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

A Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group reportedly unsuccessfully attempted to cross the international border in Sumy Oblast on February 3. Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev reported on February 4 that Ukrainian forces engaged in a small arms and artillery engagement with a group of 10 Russian servicemen on the outskirts of the Hlukhivska hromada on the Ukrainian-Russian international border in Sumy Oblast and successfully pushed the group back into Russia.[20]

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyask-Kreminna line on February 4 and did not result in confirmed changes on the battlefield. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Ivanivka, and southeast of Kupyansk in and near Tabaivka.[21] Positional engagements also continued northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Bilohorivka.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made a “serious breakthrough toward a key [Ukrainian] logistics point” in the direction of Terny and seized unspecified heights around Krokhmalne (southeast of Kupyansk) over the past week and that control over Tabaivka remains contested.[23]

Spokesperson for the Ukrainian “Steel Border” border detachment Ivan Shevtsov observed that Russian forces have nearly doubled their artillery fire along the Kupyansk-Lyman line since late 2023 because weather conditions on the frontline allowed for the intensive use of artillery and drones.[24] Shevtsov added that Russian forces are unlikely to be experiencing ammunition shortages given the increase in shelling and are largely attacking in the Kupyansk direction with infantry. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash, however, stated on February 2 that Russian forces have almost halved their daily rate of artillery fire in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions due to poor weather conditions and other unspecified issues.[25]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Bakhmut amid continued positional engagements near Bakhmut on February 4. Geolocated footage published on February 3 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 4 that Russian forces advanced near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and captured unspecified positions north of Klishchiivka.[27] Positional engagements continued northeast of Bakhmut near Fedorivka, northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Pivdenne.[28] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces have advanced five to seven kilometers closer to Chasiv Yar over an unspecified time period and that Russian forces recently began conducting mechanized assaults in the area.[29] Elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division and the Russian “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Bakhmut.[30]

 

Russian forces recently advanced east of Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 4. Geolocated footage published on February 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the H-20 highway east of Avdiivka.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the Avdiivka Coke Plant on Avdiivka’s northwestern outskirts.[32] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction stated that Russian forces have not advanced near Stepove (northwest of Avdiivka) or the Avdiivka Coke Plant, however.[33] Positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Stepove, near the Avdiivka Coke Plant on Avdiivka’s northwestern outskirts, near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant area on Avdiivka’s southeastern outskirts, west of Avdiivka near Tonenke and Sieverne, and southwest of Avdiivka near Opytne, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[34]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Marinka amid continued positional engagements west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 4. Geolocated footage published on February 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Marinka (just west of Donetsk City).[35] Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces may be conducting a “tactical pause” southeast of Novomykhailivka.[37] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating northwest of Marinka.[38]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagements continued southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Zolota Nyva and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pryyutne, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[40]

 

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[41] Elements of the Russian 35th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction, elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Verbove, and elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[42]

 


Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including in Krynky, on February 4.[43] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes on Krynky.[44] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 337th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division), elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (40th Army Corps, 18th CAA, SMD), and elements of the 17th Tank Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions in Krynky in the past few days.[45] Mashovets stated that Russian forces simultaneously attacked Ukrainian positions, conducted artillery strikes on Ukrainian positions in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast, and conducted electronic and aerial reconnaissance, suggesting that Russian forces have improved their command and control (C2) and coordination between units in this area.

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian General Staff clarified on February 4 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 10 Shahed-136/131 drones and a Kh-59 missile on February 3.[46] The Ukrainian Air Force reported as of 0300 local time on February 3 that it shot down nine Shahed drones and one Kh-59 missile, and the February 4 report suggests that Ukrainian forces shot down one more drone later in the day on February 3.[47] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russia’s February 3 strikes against energy infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast were one of the most massive strike series on the Ukrainian energy sector in 2024.[48] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during a visit to Ukrainian East Air Command in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is the main target of Russian drone and missile campaigns because of the oblast’s enterprises and economic potential.[49]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on February 4 that Vladimir Oblast will become a patron of the new Knyaz Pozharskiy Borei-A class nuclear submarine.[50] Vladimir Oblast’s Ministry of Regional Security reported that it met with the Russian Northern Fleet’s leadership to establish its patronage of the Knyaz Pozharskiy and discuss deepening cooperation with the Northern Fleet.[51] Vladimir Oblast officials attended the ceremony of the Knyaz Pozharskiy leaving the boathouse in Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast.[52] TASS reported on January 10 that the Russian military would receive the Knyaz Pozharskiy at an unspecified date in 2024.[53]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell stated on February 3 that the EU maintains strong support for Ukraine following the Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers and expressed hope that the EU will agree upon the Ukraine Assistance Fund within the framework of the European Peace Facility within the next several days.[54] Borrell also stated that the EU still needs to decide how to implement its military support bilaterally and through the European Peace Facility framework.[55] The Gymnich meeting also discussed Borrell’s proposal to create a 20-billion-euro (about $21.5 billion) aid fund for Ukraine for the next four years within the framework of the European Peace Facility, implying 5 billion (about $5.4 billion) annual aid allocations.[56]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian officials continue international efforts aimed at returning Ukrainian citizens whom Russian authorities illegally deported to Russia. Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin, Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets, and Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova participated in a meeting of the US Helsinki Commission on January 31 and discussed Russia’s forced deportation of Ukrainian children and illegal detention and torture of civilians.[57] Participants discussed the “Oleksandr’s Act,” which is proposed US legislation aimed at helping to introduce sanctions to counter Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children. The US Helsinki Commission stated that the Ukrainian government has documented about 20,000 cases of deported children and estimates that Russian authorities may have subjected up to 10,000 citizens to detention or forced labor.[58] The BBC’s Russian Service reported on January 8 that Russian authorities are illegally deporting Ukrainian civilians to Russia and holding them in penal colonies and pre-trial detention centers without charges, investigations, trials, access to lawyers, or designated release dates.[59]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

A Russian occupation official resumed a false Kremlin narrative on February 4 that Poland is preparing to seize western Ukraine after a potential Russian victory in Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov told Russian state news agency Ria Novosti that Poland is preparing to lay claim to lands belonging to “Western Rus” in a “post-Ukrainian space,” citing Polish President Andrzej Duda’s recent statement about Crimea as evidence for his claim.[60] Duda stated on February 2 that he was not sure about Ukraine’s ability to liberate Crimea because of Russia’s “historic” control over the region, before reiterating his condemnation of Russian aggression against internationally recognized Ukrainian borders on February 3.[61] Rogov argued that Poland is trying to establish similar historic ties to western Ukraine to seize Ukrainian territories and compare it to Crimea’s “return” to Russia — a phrasing that Russian propagandists use to misrepresent Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. Rogov similarly discussed the partition of Ukraine with Russian state-run Komsomolskaya Pravda radio.[62]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

 

[1] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1606

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024

[3] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1606

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024

[5] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1607

[6] https://vs dot lv/raksts/pasaule/2023/12/13/garisons-krievija-spej-sarazot-un-saremontet-ap-100-150-tankiem-menesi ; https://lasi dot lv/par-svarigo/aktuali/garisons-krievija-spej-sarazot-un-saremontet-ap-100-150-tankiem-menesi.9433

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2023

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024

[9] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/04/na-zaporizhzhi-prezydent-proviv-naradu-z-vijskovym-komanduvannyam-shhodo-sytuacziyi-na-fronti/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/04/prezydent-vidvidav-peredovi-pozycziyi-ukrayinskyh-zahysnykiv-na-zaporizhzhi-2/ ; https://suspilne dot media/676728-volodimir-zelenskij-vidvidav-peredovi-pozicii-ukrainskih-zahisnikiv-u-rajoni-sela-robotine-zaporizkij-oblasti/ ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-vidvidav-peredovi-poziciyi-ukrayinskih-zahisnikiv-88749 ; https://suspilne dot media/676498-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-vid-estonii-v-rf-rozstrilali-komandira-tu-95-711-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707067827&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[10] https://suspilne dot media/676498-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-vid-estonii-v-rf-rozstrilali-komandira-tu-95-711-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707064935&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/9357 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/04/prezydent-vidvidav-povitryane-komanduvannya-shid-ta-obgovoryv-zastosuvannya-zahidnyh-system-ppo/

[11] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/9342 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/15385

[12] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/9342

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011824

[14] https://t.me/bayraktar1070/1849 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1754160402517119069

[15] https://t.me/bayraktar1070/1849 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1754160402517119069

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324

[17] https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/56200 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33945      

[18] https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/56212; https://t.me/rusengineer/2698

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423

[20] https://t.me/SerhiyNaiev/192 ; https://t.me/SerhiyNaiev/194 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/04/bij-tryvav-pivtory-godyny-rosijski-dyversanty-namagalys-pronyknuty-v-ukrayinu/ ; https://suspilne dot media/676620-na-sumsini-teroborona-zupinila-rosijsku-drg-so-vidomo/

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QQfvQfUd4ZaJkwaHtXMMzf5ZWZH1js7RRdMYKYGppf8cYMphaMkXN19MSmK85RN1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LC9jn7XPshCcvPtdQtgVqmc9hXuKpXTT3E2KhDcru4q3fT2xcENqqGJisSeRj4q6l; https://t.me/mod_russia/35323; https://t.me/wargonzo/17981  

[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/35323 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17981; https://t.me/rybar/56710 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33943 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038CNWzUJvNN9AeLz2bCb5wKv2cVDg1HP9YJW9udQh1QV8j2V2kTgDmxzmQP5YPRHxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QQfvQfUd4ZaJkwaHtXMMzf5ZWZH1js7RRdMYKYGppf8cYMphaMkXN19MSmK85RN1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LC9jn7XPshCcvPtdQtgVqmc9hXuKpXTT3E2KhDcru4q3fT2xcENqqGJisSeRj4q6l; https://t.me/mod_russia/35323 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35318

[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/17988

[24] https://suspilne dot media/676498-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-vid-estonii-v-rf-rozstrilali-komandira-tu-95-711-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707066856&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2024

[26] https://t.me/Liniya_fronta6/253 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4276

[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/33942  ; https://t.me/rybar/56710 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33943 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7013

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038CNWzUJvNN9AeLz2bCb5wKv2cVDg1HP9YJW9udQh1QV8j2V2kTgDmxzmQP5YPRHxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QQfvQfUd4ZaJkwaHtXMMzf5ZWZH1js7RRdMYKYGppf8cYMphaMkXN19MSmK85RN1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LC9jn7XPshCcvPtdQtgVqmc9hXuKpXTT3E2KhDcru4q3fT2xcENqqGJisSeRj4q6l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35323  ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17981  

[29] https://suspilne dot media/676568-armia-rf-nablizilas-do-casovogo-aru-na-5-7-kilometriv-ta-be-po-mistu-artilerieu-vijskova-brigadi-ngu-rubiz/

[30] https://suspilne dot media/676568-armia-rf-nablizilas-do-casovogo-aru-na-5-7-kilometriv-ta-be-po-mistu-artilerieu-vijskova-brigadi-ngu-rubiz/ ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61493  

[31] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/10517 ; https://t.me/flyingskull/102

[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/33943 ; https://t.me/rybar/56710 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17981 ; https://t.me/sashakots/44808 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53758

[33] https://suspilne dot media/676618-vijsko-rf-ne-prosunulos-na-pivnic-vid-avdiivki-natomist-vtracae-tehniku-ta-ludej-lazutkin/

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038CNWzUJvNN9AeLz2bCb5wKv2cVDg1HP9YJW9udQh1QV8j2V2kTgDmxzmQP5YPRHxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QQfvQfUd4ZaJkwaHtXMMzf5ZWZH1js7RRdMYKYGppf8cYMphaMkXN19MSmK85RN1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LC9jn7XPshCcvPtdQtgVqmc9hXuKpXTT3E2KhDcru4q3fT2xcENqqGJisSeRj4q6l ; https://t.me/rybar/56703 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33943 ; https://t.me/rybar/56710 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/7864 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17988 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7012 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53758

[35] https://t.me/nm_dnr/11704 ; https://x.com/VigorousFalcon/status/1754162837184983134?s=20

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038CNWzUJvNN9AeLz2bCb5wKv2cVDg1HP9YJW9udQh1QV8j2V2kTgDmxzmQP5YPRHxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QQfvQfUd4ZaJkwaHtXMMzf5ZWZH1js7RRdMYKYGppf8cYMphaMkXN19MSmK85RN1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LC9jn7XPshCcvPtdQtgVqmc9hXuKpXTT3E2KhDcru4q3fT2xcENqqGJisSeRj4q6l ; https://t.me/rybar/56710 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33943  ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17981  

[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/17981  

[38] https://t.me/nm_dnr/11704 ; https://x.com/VigorousFalcon/status/1754162837184983134?s=20

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QQfvQfUd4ZaJkwaHtXMMzf5ZWZH1js7RRdMYKYGppf8cYMphaMkXN19MSmK85RN1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LC9jn7XPshCcvPtdQtgVqmc9hXuKpXTT3E2KhDcru4q3fT2xcENqqGJisSeRj4q6l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17988 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038CNWzUJvNN9AeLz2bCb5wKv2cVDg1HP9YJW9udQh1QV8j2V2kTgDmxzmQP5YPRHxl

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/17988 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33943 ; https://t.me/rybar/56710  

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038CNWzUJvNN9AeLz2bCb5wKv2cVDg1HP9YJW9udQh1QV8j2V2kTgDmxzmQP5YPRHxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QQfvQfUd4ZaJkwaHtXMMzf5ZWZH1js7RRdMYKYGppf8cYMphaMkXN19MSmK85RN1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LC9jn7XPshCcvPtdQtgVqmc9hXuKpXTT3E2KhDcru4q3fT2xcENqqGJisSeRj4q6l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33943 ; https://t.me/rybar/56710

 

[42] https://t.me/voin_dv/6882 (35th CAA); https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61497 (7th VDV Division); https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7445 (71st Regiment)

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038CNWzUJvNN9AeLz2bCb5wKv2cVDg1HP9YJW9udQh1QV8j2V2kTgDmxzmQP5YPRHxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QQfvQfUd4ZaJkwaHtXMMzf5ZWZH1js7RRdMYKYGppf8cYMphaMkXN19MSmK85RN1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LC9jn7XPshCcvPtdQtgVqmc9hXuKpXTT3E2KhDcru4q3fT2xcENqqGJisSeRj4q6l; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7007

[44] https://t.me/rybar/56717 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111729 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/14462 ; https://t.me/uniannet/124712 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/32865 https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/2084 ;

[45] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1605

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QQfvQfUd4ZaJkwaHtXMMzf5ZWZH1js7RRdMYKYGppf8cYMphaMkXN19MSmK85RN1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LC9jn7XPshCcvPtdQtgVqmc9hXuKpXTT3E2KhDcru4q3fT2xcENqqGJisSeRj4q6l

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2024

[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/04/ataka-na-energetyku-u-kryvomu-rozi-bula-najmasovishoyu-za-rik-ukrenergo/ ; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/2617

[49] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/04/volodymyr-zelenskyj-rosiya-rozglyadaye-dnipropetrovshhynu-yak-odnu-z-osnovnyh-mishenej-dlya-terorystychnyh-atak/ ; https://suspilne dot media/676498-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-vid-estonii-v-rf-rozstrilali-komandira-tu-95-711-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707064935&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/9357 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/04/prezydent-vidvidav-povitryane-komanduvannya-shid-ta-obgovoryv-zastosuvannya-zahidnyh-system-ppo/

[50] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19896685

[51] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19896685

[52] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19896685

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024

[54] https://www.eeas.europa dot eu/eeas/informal-foreign-affairs-council-gymnich-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-after_en

[55] https://www.eeas.europa dot eu/eeas/informal-foreign-affairs-council-gymnich-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-upon-0_en

[56] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-polytics/3822415-eu-may-approve-military-aid-facility-for-ukraine-over-next-few-days-borrell.html; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/04/zhozep-borrel-anonsuvav-zatverdzhennya-fondu-vijskovoyi-dopomogy-ukrayini-najblyzhchym-chasom/; https://suspilne dot media/676460-borrel-spodivaetsa-so-es-pogodit-fond-vijskovoi-dopomogi-dla-ukraini-protagom-nastupnih-dniv/; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/informal-foreign-affairs-council-gymnich-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-after_en  

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/04/generalnyj-prokuror-obgovoryv-z-uchasnykamy-gelsinskoyi-komisiyi-ssha-zapobigannya-deportacziyi-ukrayinskyh-ditej/ ; https://www.gp.gov dot ua/ua/posts/andrii-kostin-onlain-vistupiv-na-zasidanni-gelsinskoyi-komisiyi-ssa ; https://www.csce.gov/hearings/hearing-eyewitness-accounts-ukrainian-children-and-adult-civilians-abducted-by-russia-2/

[58] https://www.csce.gov/hearings/hearing-eyewitness-accounts-ukrainian-children-and-adult-civilians-abducted-by-russia-2/

[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2024

[60] https://t.me/vrogov/14137

[61] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-president-says-he-doesnt-know-if-ukraine-can-retake-crimea-2024-02-03/

[62] https://t.me/vrogov/14136

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