Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and George Barros
February 1, 2024, 7:40pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on February 1. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the February 2 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Note: ISW added a new section
on Russian air, missile, and drone campaign to track Russian efforts to
target Ukrainian rear and frontline areas, grow its drone and missile
arsenals, and adapt its strike packages.
Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi presented an overarching
strategy to seize the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine and retain it
to facilitate Ukrainian battlefield victories despite Russia’s numerical
advantages in manpower and materiel. Zaluzhnyi’s strategy aims to
offset Ukraine’s existing challenges and pursue advantages over the
Russian military through widespread technological innovation and
adaptation. The Ukrainian Armed Forces published an essay on
February 1 by Zaluzhnyi titled “On the Modern Design of Military
Operations in the Russo-Ukrainian War: In the Fight for the Initiative,”
wherein Zaluzhnyi argued that the requirements for any given war are
unique and that these requirements dictate a unique strategy for
victory.[1]
Zaluzhnyi identified “decisive conditions” for Ukraine to conduct
successful operations, which include achieving absolute air superiority
to enable effective Ukrainian fires, logistics, and reconnaissance;
seizing the initiative by denying Russian forces the ability to conduct
offensive or defensive operations; increasing Ukrainian mobility while
limiting Russian mobility; securing safe access to unspecified key lines
and important terrain; and denying Russian forces any opportunities to
recapture lost positions and increase Russian operational efforts. The
decisive conditions that Zaluzhnyi highlighted would effectively give
Ukrainian forces the theater-wide initiative and set conditions for
Ukraine to conduct operationally significant defensive and offensive
operations. Zaluzhnyi argued that the rapid development of new
technology changes the means by which Ukraine can achieve these
“decisive conditions” and that Ukrainian forces cannot use conventional
methods to achieve these conditions given Russia’s superior ability to
mobilize men. Zaluzhnyi argued that new technological means, such as
drones, unmanned systems, systems integration, and other advanced
technological systems can allow Ukrainian forces to maximize their
combat potential using fewer resources and inflict maximum damage on
Russian forces.
Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian
limitations and geopolitical challenges are incentivizing Ukraine to
pursue the development and institutionalization of these new means.
Zaluzhnyi stated that an “unstable political situation around Ukraine”
has led to reduced international military support for Ukraine, that
Russia will likely try to provoke other conflicts to further draw the
West’s attention away from Ukraine, and that Ukraine’s partners have
depleted their missile and artillery ammunition stocks without the means
to rapidly produce these weapons. Zaluzhnyi argued that ineffective
sanctions allow the defense industrial bases (DIBs) of Russia and its
partners to support a positional war of attrition that benefits Russia
over Ukraine and that Russia has a significant advantage over Ukraine in
the mobilization of human resources. Zaluzhnyi further highlighted
imperfect Ukrainian regulatory frameworks to expand Ukraine’s DIB,
although Ukrainian officials are increasingly prioritizing efforts to
remedy this issue.[2]
Zaluzhnyi notably concluded that the uncertain nature of the war in
Ukraine makes it difficult for Ukraine’s allies to determine specific
security assistance priorities for Ukraine.[3]
Zaluzhnyi stated that the “main option for gaining an advantage is to
master the entire arsenal of relatively cheap, new, and extremely
effective and rapidly developing assets.” Zaluzhnyi specifically
highlighted unmanned systems as an area where Ukraine can leverage new
capabilities since they can provide continuous situational awareness,
support round-the-clock fire and strikes in real-time, provide real-time
intelligence, and produce accurate targeting information for strikes on
the frontline and in rear areas.
Zaluzhnyi called on
Ukraine to introduce a new “philosophy” for the preparation and conduct
of military operations that would allow Ukrainian forces to cohesively
employ these new methods in pursuit of a cohesive objective. Zaluzhnyi
stated that new technological means will also expand the types of
operations Ukraine can conduct in support of the war, which may include
operations to reduce Russia’s economic potential, operations aimed at
Russia’s complete isolation and exhaustion, robotic search and strike
operations, robotic operations to control a crisis area, psychological
operations, and defensive “contactless” operations. Zaluzhnyi also
called on Ukrainian forces to systematically advance separate lines of
effort to generate “necessary effects” in developing a coherent “digital
field”; controlling the radio-electronic (the cyber-electromagnetic
domain) situation along the frontline; combining attacks with unmanned
and cyber assets; and improving logistics. Zaluzhnyi specifically
suggested that retooling operations to integrate unmanned systems may
allow Ukrainian forces to conserve personnel, weapons, and equipment
while inflicting massive strikes on Russian military assets and
infrastructure.
Zaluzhnyi called on Ukraine to overhaul
its war effort to create “a completely new state system of technological
reequipment" to master new assets and their operation. Zaluzhnyi
advocated for Ukraine to retool state systems to support Ukrainian
research, development, scientific support, production and maintenance,
personnel training and the generalization of combat experience, the
employment of forces, flexible financing, and logistics in order to
prioritize the development and employment of rapidly developing
technology. Zaluzhnyi added that Ukraine could create the system he
envisions, with a sufficient volume of production, within five months.
Zaluzhnyi concluded that this new system, alongside a new approach to
military operations, can enable Ukraine to stop Russia’s current
aggression and protect Ukraine in the future.
Ukrainian
forces successfully struck and sunk a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF)
vessel in the Black Sea near occupied Crimea on the night of January 31
to February 1. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) published footage on February 1 showing Ukrainian
maritime drones striking the Ivanovets Tarantul-class corvette (41st Missile Boat Brigade) near Lake Donuzlav in occupied Crimea.[4] The Ukrainian Navy reported that the sinking of the Ivanovets is
a significant loss to the BSF since the BSF has only three ships of its
project 1241.1 (Tarantul) class and noted that Ukrainian forces
previously damaged a project 1239 Bora-class corvette in the 41st
Missile Boat Brigade.[5] The Ukrainian Navy stated that the Ivanovets is usually staffed with 40 personnel, and the GUR stated that Russian search and rescue operations were unsuccessful.[6]
ISW continues to assess that successful Ukrainian strikes on BSF
vessels and infrastructure have limited the BSF’s ability to operate in
the western part of the Black Sea.[7]
A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that
Ukrainian forces launched 12 Western-provided SCALP or Storm Shadow
missiles against occupied Crimea on the night of January 31 to February
1.[8]
The milblogger claimed that Russian forces downed five missiles near
Belbek Air Base in occupied Sevastopol and six missiles over Yana Kapu,
Hvardiske, and northwest of Sevastopol and that one missile struck the
ground near Belbek Air Base but did not damage it.[9]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian officials confirmed these claims.
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that the
January 31 Ukrainian strikes on Belbek Air Base damaged “several
objects” but noted that Ukrainian authorities need more satellite
imagery to confirm what objects Ukrainian forces struck.[10]
Russian
milbloggers continued to voice frustrations about Russian forces’
continued tactical blunders during offensive operations in western
Donetsk Oblast. Several Russian milbloggers criticized the
Russian military command on January 31 and February 1 for failing to
account for the “[drone] factor” when planning tactical assaults in
response to footage posted on January 30 showing Ukrainian forces
striking a column of advancing Russian vehicles and tanks near
Novomykhailivka.[11]
A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that Ukrainian minefields are
canalizing Russian routes but argued that the Russian military command
still needs to stop attacking in mechanized columns due to consistently
taking high equipment losses.[12]
The milblogger also criticized the Russian command for failing to
account for Ukrainian drone operations and to equip Russian armored
vehicles with electronic warfare (EW) systems to counter Ukrainian
drones.[13]
Another Russian milblogger questioned how Russian commanders can fail
to account for Ukrainian drones in attack plans and afford to lose so
much equipment and manpower, accusing the Russian commanders of
“complete stupidity and incompetence.”[14]
Other Russian milbloggers seized on the discourse to advocate for
continued domestic support for drone and EW production in Russia and to
argue that Russian sources should not have to censor themselves if they
have constructive criticism for Russian commanders.[15]
The Russian military command has actively censored some Russian
milbloggers in recent months for criticizing the military likely to
encourage and enforce self-censorship among other Russian milbloggers.[16]
Russian
milbloggers have previously argued that Russian forces need to improve
their planning and coordination at the tactical and operational levels
to break out of the current positional warfare in Ukraine.[17]
Russian forces in Ukraine have proven capable of successfully learning
lessons and adapting while conducting defensive operations and have
shown limited offensive adaptation on certain sectors of the front.[18]
Russian forces conducted a series of unsuccessful mechanized assaults
near Avdiivka in October 2023 after analogous costly mechanized assaults
along several different axes over the course of 2022 and 2023, and the
recent footage of similar unsuccessful mechanized assaults near
Novomykhailivka from January 30, 2024 suggests that Russian forces’
success in adapting their tactical planning and execution of assaults
varies by unit-to-unit or commander-to-commander, however.[19]
The European Union (EU) unanimously approved a financial support package for Ukraine for 2024 – 2027. European
Council President Charles Michel announced on February 1 that all 27 EU
member states approved a support package for Ukraine worth 50 billion
euros (about $54 billion), including 33 billion euros (about $35.8
billion) of loans and 17 billion euros (about $18.4 billion) in
“non-repayable support” that could potentially come from frozen Russian
assets.[20]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that continued EU
financial support will strengthen Ukraine’s long-term economic
stability.[21]
EU
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph
Borrell stated that the European Union (EU) will not be able to send the
promised one million shells to Ukraine by March 2024, but is planning
to fulfill this promise by the end of 2024. Borrell stated on
February 1 that the EU delivered 330,000 rounds of artillery ammunition
to Ukraine between March 2023 and January 2024 and that he expects the
EU to deliver a total of 524,000 rounds by March 2024.[22]
Borrell stated that the EU plans to deliver an additional 630,000
shells to Ukraine by the end of 2024. European Commission President
Ursula von der Leyen stated that the European defense industrial base
(DIB) has increased its production by 40 percent over an unspecified
time frame and that the EU member states are working to deliver
munitions to Ukraine by drawing from national stockpiles, concluding new
orders, or redirecting other orders.[23]
Von der Leyen stated that the European Commission will soon present a
new defense and industrial strategy that will create greater coherence
and coordination throughout the EU from planning to procurement.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant
General Kyrylo Budanov stated in an interview with CNN that ammunition is “one of the most decisive factors” in the war and that the quantity of rounds is more important than quality.[24]
Chechen
Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed another one of his children to a
senior position in the Chechen government as of January 31. Kadyrov
appointed his 24-year-old daughter Khadizhat Kadyrova as First Deputy
Head of the Chechen Republic Head’s Administration from her prior post
leading the Grozny City Department of Preschool Education.[25]
Kadyrov previously appointed his now-26-year-old daughter Aishat
Kadyrova and 17-year-old-son Adam Kadyrov to similarly senior positions.[26]
In
accordance with its policy against speculating about future Ukrainian
actions, ISW is not covering reported leaks concerning possible changes
in the Ukrainian command structure. ISW will continue to report official
statements by Ukrainian government officials and organizations as they
are made.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi presented an overarching
strategy to seize the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine and retain it
to facilitate Ukrainian battlefield victories despite Russia’s numerical
advantages in manpower and materiel. Zaluzhnyi’s strategy aims to
offset Ukraine’s existing challenges and pursue advantages over the
Russian military through widespread technological innovation and
adaptation.
- Ukrainian forces successfully
struck and sunk a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel in the Black Sea
near occupied Crimea on the night of January 31 to February 1.
- Russian
milbloggers continued to voice frustrations about Russian forces’
continued tactical blunders during offensive operations in western
Donetsk Oblast.
- The European Union (EU) unanimously approved a financial support package for Ukraine for 2024 – 2027.
- EU
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph
Borrell stated that the European Union (EU) will not be able to send the
promised one million shells to Ukraine by March 2024, but is planning
to fulfill this promise by the end of 2024.
- Chechen
Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed another one of his children to a
senior position in the Chechen government as of January 31.
- Russian
forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and
Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line
of contact on February 1.
- Turkish banks have reportedly started closing Russian companies’ accounts due to the threat of US secondary sanctions.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian plans to integrate
occupied territories of Ukraine into Russia over the next six years.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk amid continued
positional engagements in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage
published on February 1 indicates that Russian forces advanced to a
section of the P07 Kupyansk-Svatove highway east of Tabaivka (southeast
of Synkivka).[27]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Synkivka
(northeast of Kupyansk) and west of Tabaivka and that Russian forces
entered Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and are advancing towards
Kyslivka.[28]
ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however.
Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements
continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman and
southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka, Berestove, Krokhmalne, and
Tabaivka.[29]
Positional
engagements continued near Kreminna on February 1, but there were no
confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian
sources stated that positional fighting continued west of Kreminna near
Terny, Torske, Yampolivka, and Dibrova and south of Kreminna near
Bilohorivka.[30]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Terny and
Yampolivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[31]
Elements of the Russian 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly
formed during partial mobilization in fall 2022) are reportedly
operating near Kreminna, and elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz
“Aida” detachment reportedly continue to operate near Bilohorivka.[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Positional
fighting continued near Bakhmut on February 1, but there were no
confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced west of Bakhmut near
Bohdanivka and from Khromove towards Ivanivske, although ISW has not
observed visual confirmation of this claim.[33]
Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued
west of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka and Ivanivske and southwest of Bakhmut
near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[34]
Elements of the Russian “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer
Corps) are reportedly operating in the Bohdanivka-Chasiv Yar area, and
elements of the “Brodyaga” Spetsnaz group are reportedly operating near
Klishchiivka.[35]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka amid continued
positional fighting in the area on February 1. Geolocated imagery
published on February 1 indicates that Russian forces recently
marginally advanced in the dacha area on the northern outskirts of
Avdiivka.[36]
A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces
advanced along Sportyvna, Soborna, and Chernyshevskoho streets in
southernmost Avdiivka and on Avdiivka’s southern outskirts, although ISW
has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[37]
Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements
continued northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove; near the Avdiivka Coke
Plant on Avdiivka‘s northwestern outskirts; near the “Tsarska Okhota”
restaurant area in the southeastern outskirts of Avdiivka; west of
Avdiivka near Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Opytne,
Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[38]
The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Avdiivka
direction stated that Russian forces are not changing their tactics in
the Avdiivka direction and continue constant infantry assaults in the
area.[39]
Elements of the Russian 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms
Army, Central Military District) are reportedly operating near
Avdiivka.[40]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued
positional engagements west and southwest of Donetsk City on February
1. Geolocated footage published on February 1 indicates that Russian
forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Heorhiivka (west of
Donetsk City).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Heorhiivka and Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[42]
Positional fighting continues west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka
and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and
Novomykhailivka.[43]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area
amid continued positional engagements in the area on February 1.
Geolocated footage published on February 1 indicates that Ukrainian
forces recently advanced southwest of Staromayorske (south of Velyka
Novosilka).[44]
Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting occurred
southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Zolota Nyva; south of Velyka
Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine, and southwest of Velyka
Novosilka near Pryyutne.[45] A Russian milblogger noted that Russian infantry groups are attacking with armored vehicle and tank support north of Pryyutne.[46]
Elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms
Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 14th Spetsnaz
Brigade (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of
the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are reportedly operating near
Staromayorske.[47]
Positional
fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 1, but
there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian
milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a forest area
northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed
confirmation of these claims.[48]
Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting occurred
near Verbove, Robotyne, and Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne).[49]
Positional fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on February 1.[50]
A Russian milblogger continued to stress that Ukrainian drone
operations pose a significant threat to Russian forces on the east bank
of the Dnipro River.[51]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a limited series of strikes against targets in Ukraine
on February 1. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian
forces launched four Shahed-136/131 drones and two missiles at targets
in Ukraine.[52]
Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted
two of the Shaheds in Kharkiv Oblast and that a Kh-59 missile struck
Myrnohrad, Donetsk Oblast.[53]
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that
Russian forces routinely change the number of Shahed drones that they
use in strikes to test Ukrainian air defense capabilities.[54]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Turkish
banks reportedly have started closing Russian companies’ accounts due
to the threat of US secondary sanctions. Unnamed Russian business
owners, financial consultants, and business representatives told Russian
outlet Vedemosti in a February 1 article that some Turkish
banks are closing multiple accounts of Russian companies and have
stopped working with Russian companies that became clients after
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[55] Vedemosti’s
sources stated that the Turkish banks began closing Russian businesses’
accounts and tightening restrictions after the US authorized secondary
sanctions on financial institutions that support Russia’s war effort on
December 22, 2023.[56] ISW recently observed Russian reports that Turkish banks have ”universally” begun to refuse to work with Russian banks.[57]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that “overt and aggressive
US pressure” caused Turkish banks to close Russian companies’ accounts.[58]
The Washington Post
reported that a Russian company has imported over $20 million in
precision machine tool equipment made in Taiwan since January 2023.[59] The Washington Post stated
that the Russian company imported Taiwanese-made computer numerical
control (CNC) machine tools in 63 separate shipments since January 2023
according to trade records and Russian tax documents.[60] Russia uses CNC tools in defense manufacturing, and the Washington Post reported that the Russian company explicitly aimed to sell the machine tools to Russian defense enterprises.[61] ISW cannot independently confirm the Washington Post’s report.
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 1 that “intelligence
confirms that Russia will receive a million shells from North Korea” by
an unspecified date.[62]
It is unclear whether Zelensky’s count of one million shells was
referring to entirely new ammunition deliveries from Russia or included
previous North Korean ammunition deliveries from Russia. Ukrainian Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym
Skibitskyi stated that North Korea delivered one million rounds of
artillery ammunition to Russia from September to November 2023.[63]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Chechen
Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov-linked firm Tallamkho Design Bureau
designed a new automatic optical guidance system for robotic combat
platforms. Tallamkho told Kremlin newswire TASS that the new
guidance system can automatically identify targets, including by
detecting the glare from enemy thermal imagers, aim at targets, and open
fire.[64] Tallamkho stated that it will work with unspecified Russian turret developers to design the robotic combat platform.[65]
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian
objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more
self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
Ukraine continues efforts to streamline
and strengthen its domestic defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian
Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on February 1 that the Ukrainian
Cabinet of Ministers approved three resolutions to strengthen Ukraine’s
DIB.[66]
The first resolution deregulates ammunition production to allow new
enterprises to begin production quickly; the second resolution caps
drone profit margins to 25 percent to prevent drones from becoming too
expensive; and the third resolution establishes a procedure for the
competitive procurement of defense items with transparent pricing and
protections against information leaks.
Ukraine continues
efforts to galvanize its domestic drone production. Ukrainian Defense
Minister Rustem Umerov and Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov met
with more than 120 companies involved with the Brave1 defense platform,
and Umerov stated that Ukraine codified 67 new drone models and signed
state contracts for 58 new drone models and that over 200 Ukrainian
companies are currently working to increase domestic drone production.[67]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian
President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian plans to integrate
occupied Ukrainian territories into Russia over the next six years.
Putin stated that Russia plans for occupied areas of Ukraine to be on
par with Russia in unspecified “key areas” by 2030, further indicating
that Russia is commencing long-term plans and does not foresee any
territorial concessions.[68]
Putin urged Russian banks to not fear Western sanctions and to increase
their work in occupied areas and noted that Russian federal subjects
have established patronage networks with occupied Ukrainian regions.
Russian
officials continued to implicate themselves in the illegal deportation
of Ukrainian children to Russia. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights
Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated that Ukraine has been able to return
388 Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities illegally deported to
Russia.[69]
Lubinets stated that Russia has been more willing to return deported
Ukrainian children following the International Criminal Court’s warrants
for the arrest of Russian President Vladimir Putin and
Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova.
Lvova-Belova continued to admit that Russia deported Ukrainian children
to Russia, stating that Russian authorities took Ukrainian children from
occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to “rehabilitation centers” near
Moscow or placed them in foster families in Russia.[70]
The Russian Embassy in the United States claimed that US statements
about how Russia is forcibly deporting Ukrainian children are
“blasphemous and groundless” and falsely compared Russia’s actions to
American families adopting Ukrainian children legally through
international adoption programs.[71]
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian
officials attempted to undermine and intimidate the European Union (EU)
likely in an effort to prevent the EU from providing further military
assistance to Ukraine and set informational conditions to later oppose
EU expansion. Russian Acting Permanent Representative to the EU Kirill
Logvinov published an essay with state newswire TASS on February 1 in
which Logvinov accused the EU of eroding member states’ sovereignty and
expanding its security role in a way that is tantamount to it merging
with NATO.[72] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused the EU of “demonizing” Russia in order to justify raising taxes.[73]
The
Kremlin continues efforts to informationally punish Armenia for
distancing itself from Russia. Russian Ambassador-at-Large for
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Affairs Viktor Vasilyev
claimed on February 1 that the West is attempting to interfere in CSTO
affairs and that Armenia’s participation is necessary to ensure security
throughout CSTO member states.[74]
A
Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Moldova’s decision
not to open polling stations for the Russian presidential election in
separatist Transnistria disenfranchises Russian citizens and separatist
Transnistria.[75]
The milblogger and other Kremlin mouthpieces have recently attempted to
spread information operations about Moldova in order to internally
destabilize the state and set information conditions to justify future
operations against Moldova.[76]
Significant Activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Russian Ambassador to
Belarus Boris Gryzlov announced on February 1 that Russia and Belarus
agreed to create a Russian-Belarusian Commission on History and that
Russia and Belarus will use a unified history textbook for schools and
universities which will “eliminate discrepancies in the understanding of
a number of important historical events.”[77]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.zsu.gov
dot
ua/2024/02/stattya-golovnokomaduvacha-zs-ukrayiny-generala-valeriya-zaluzhnogo-shhodo-suchasnogo-dyzajnu-vijskovyh-operaczij-u-rosijsko-ukrayinskij-vijni-v-borotbi-za-inicziatyvu/?fbclid=IwAR3m7L2j_9UtxsDMFnsxKgSZ_BgpV-xamllwCOno4BBM4qkZYdeXJZCpTQc
; https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/01/opinions/ukraine-army-chief-war-strategy-russia-valerii-zaluzhnyi/index.html ; https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400154/ukraine-valerii-zaluzhnyi-essay-design-of-war.pdf
[2]
https://www.zsu.gov dot
ua/2024/02/stattya-golovnokomaduvacha-zs-ukrayiny-generala-valeriya-zaluzhnogo-shhodo-suchasnogo-dyzajnu-vijskovyh-operaczij-u-rosijsko-ukrayinskij-vijni-v-borotbi-za-inicziatyvu/?fbclid=IwAR3m7L2j_9UtxsDMFnsxKgSZ_BgpV-xamllwCOno4BBM4qkZYdeXJZCpTQc
; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base
;
https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/01/opinions/ukraine-army-chief-war-strategy-russia-valerii-zaluzhnyi/index.html
;
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400154/ukraine-valerii-zaluzhnyi-essay-design-of-war.pdf
[3]
https://www.zsu.gov dot
ua/2024/02/stattya-golovnokomaduvacha-zs-ukrayiny-generala-valeriya-zaluzhnogo-shhodo-suchasnogo-dyzajnu-vijskovyh-operaczij-u-rosijsko-ukrayinskij-vijni-v-borotbi-za-inicziatyvu/?fbclid=IwAR3m7L2j_9UtxsDMFnsxKgSZ_BgpV-xamllwCOno4BBM4qkZYdeXJZCpTQc
;
https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/01/opinions/ukraine-army-chief-war-strategy-russia-valerii-zaluzhnyi/index.html
;
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400154/ukraine-valerii-zaluzhnyi-essay-design-of-war.pdf
[4] https://t.me/DIUkraine/3403
[5] https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/5013
[6] https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/5013 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3403
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea
[8] https://t.me/rybar/56611
[9] https://t.me/rybar/56611
[10] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/01/yurij-ignat-rf-vykorystovuye-blyzko-5-aerodromiv-v-krymu-dlya-udariv-po-ukrayini/
[11] https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1752334884511601064; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1752334887997051065; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1752359034563301480; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1752359314667319411; https://t.me/voenacher/60267 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33764; https://t.me/rybar/56615 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/6831 ; https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/3375
[12] https://t.me/rybar/56615
[13] https://t.me/rybar/56615
[14] https://t.me/voenacher/60267
[15] https://t.me/dva_majors/33765 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/6831
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/July%2021%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/July%2022%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF_0.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2023
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2024 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1170 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Nov%206%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Nov%206%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2023-0 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2023-0 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110322 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar1115422 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110722 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110622 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102223
[20] https://twitter.com/CharlesMichel/status/1753001809268920719 ; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/69866/20240201-special-euco-conclusions-mff-ukraine-en.pdf ; https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/01/europe/eu-ukraine-funding-deal-intl/index.html
[21] https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1753009817768075690
[22]
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/informal-foreign-affairs-council-defence-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-press-1_en
[23] https://suspilne
dot
media/674912-do-berezna-es-dostavit-520-tisac-artilerijskih-snaradiv-prezidentka-ek/
;
https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/opening-remarks-president-von-der-leyen-joint-press-conference-president-michel-following-special-2024-02-01_en
[24] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/31/europe/budanov-ukraine-russia-war-intl/index.html
[25] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4415; https://t.me/tass_agency/229391
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20November%2029%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf;
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20November%205%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29_0.pdf
[27] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4233; https://t.me/ssternenko/24922; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/10378
[28] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7328 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6937 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17917
[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fHkyss8MsuXQ65EZ31K3jjvDmkhMPqhceyC1mMUFysQ4QvXbUyRvh3MPvdKvEMxol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35218 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35226 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35212 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17917
[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/35218 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35226; https://t.me/mod_russia/35227 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35212 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17917 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fHkyss8MsuXQ65EZ31K3jjvDmkhMPqhceyC1mMUFysQ4QvXbUyRvh3MPvdKvEMxol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l
[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/25915 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111461
[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61327 (348th Regiment) ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7333 (Aida detachment)
[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6924 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6939
[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fHkyss8MsuXQ65EZ31K3jjvDmkhMPqhceyC1mMUFysQ4QvXbUyRvh3MPvdKvEMxol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35218 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17917 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33763 ; https://twitter.com/Majakovsk73/status/1752983780564844668 ; ttps://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6924 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6939
[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61323 (Bohdanivka/Chasiv Yar) ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61322 (Klishchiivka)
[36] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1753043778477129930?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1753043782512070979?s=20
[37] https://t.me/rybar/56614
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fHkyss8MsuXQ65EZ31K3jjvDmkhMPqhceyC1mMUFysQ4QvXbUyRvh3MPvdKvEMxol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17917 ; https://t.me/rybar/56614 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6910 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53679
; https://suspilne dot
media/674618-avdiivskij-koksohim-pid-kontrolem-ukrainskih-vijskovih-linia-zitknenna-v-rajoni-mista-fakticno-ne-ruhaetsa/
[39]
https://suspilne dot
media/674618-avdiivskij-koksohim-pid-kontrolem-ukrainskih-vijskovih-linia-zitknenna-v-rajoni-mista-fakticno-ne-ruhaetsa/
[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/33802
[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4243; https://t.me/bochkala_war/17508
[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/33763 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111461 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/25917
[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fHkyss8MsuXQ65EZ31K3jjvDmkhMPqhceyC1mMUFysQ4QvXbUyRvh3MPvdKvEMxol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35218 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17917 ;
[44] https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1753093804817789015?s=20; https://t.me/voin_dv/6824
[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fHkyss8MsuXQ65EZ31K3jjvDmkhMPqhceyC1mMUFysQ4QvXbUyRvh3MPvdKvEMxol ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35218 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33763
[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61368
[47] https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1753093804817789015?s=20; https://t.me/voin_dv/6824
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6913 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33757 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33763
[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/17917 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fHkyss8MsuXQ65EZ31K3jjvDmkhMPqhceyC1mMUFysQ4QvXbUyRvh3MPvdKvEMxol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fHkyss8MsuXQ65EZ31K3jjvDmkhMPqhceyC1mMUFysQ4QvXbUyRvh3MPvdKvEMxol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6912
[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/33763
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fHkyss8MsuXQ65EZ31K3jjvDmkhMPqhceyC1mMUFysQ4QvXbUyRvh3MPvdKvEMxol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l ; https://t.me/kpszsu/10283
[53]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Twz7myTcsm76kXZp38E2jd7n5xqRYy4yMxUo12Y53gyNuabC9uLeQmbC9GLpweTvl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028KoCkXyMa4vakq8S3B2tzK7mXSH6T5YCMgavrDeiHtcY7DWSDEjEeE23hSDweWL2l
[54]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/02/01/u-povitryanyh-sylah-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-variyuyut-kilkist-shahediv-dlya-svoyih-atak/
[55]
https://www.vedomosti dot
ru/economics/articles/2024/02/01/1017833-turetskie-banki-nachali-zakrivat-scheta-rossiiskim-kompaniyam
[56]
https://www.vedomosti dot
ru/economics/articles/2024/02/01/1017833-turetskie-banki-nachali-zakrivat-scheta-rossiiskim-kompaniyam
[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024
[58] https://t.me/tass_agency/229503
[59] https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2024/02/01/taiwan-russia-sanctions-cnc/
[60] https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2024/02/01/taiwan-russia-sanctions-cnc/
[61] https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2024/02/01/taiwan-russia-sanctions-cnc/
[62]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/02/01/rozvidka-pidtverdzhuye-rosiya-otrymaye-miljon-artsnaryadiv-vid-phenyana-prezydent-ukrayiny/
[63] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011124
[64] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19872157
[65] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19872157
[66] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/6894 ; https://suspilne dot media/674962-kabmin-zatverdiv-postanovi-sob-posiliti-ukrainskij-opk/
[67] https://www.mil.gov dot ua/news/2024/02/01/rustem-umerov-na-zustrichi-z-virobnikami-bpla/
[68] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73357
[69] https://www.holosameryky.com/a/dmytro-lubinets-interview/7465290.html
[70] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34576; https://t.me/malvovabelova/2769
[71] https://t.me/tass_agency/229590
[72] https://tass dot ru/opinions/19870349
[73] //t.me/tass_agency/229503
[74] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34585 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/229599
[75] https://t.me/rybar/56612
[76] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024
[77] https://t.me/er_molnia/9953
