Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 13, 2024, 7:10pm ET
Key Takeaways:
- The US Senate passed a supplemental appropriations bill that would provide roughly $60 billion of security assistance to Ukraine, the vast majority of which would go to US companies and personnel.
- Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to restore maneuver to the battlefield through Soviet deep battle theory but are struggling with implementing Soviet deep battle so far due to current Ukrainian capabilities.
- The current Ukrainian battlefield capabilities that are denying Russian forces the ability to restore maneuver to the battlefield on Russian terms largely depend on the provision of Western military assistance in key systems, many of which only the US can provide at scale.
- Ukrainian forces will not be able to retain these advantages and deny Russian forces the ability to restore maneuver to the battlefield on Russian terms without further assistance from the United States and its partner countries in the near and medium term.
- Russian sources are purposefully exaggerating Ukrainian casualties in a Russian strike near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast on February 13.
- The Kremlin appears to be asserting the right to enforce Russian Federation law on officials of governments in NATO member states over actions taken in the performance of their official duties within the territories of their own countries.
- US sanctions are reportedly constraining Russian efforts to skirt the G7 oil cap amid continued indications that India may be rethinking its growing position as a customer of Russian oil.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
- The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank stated on February 12 that Russia is likely able to sustain its current rate of vehicle losses for at least two to three years by producing new vehicles and reactivating vehicles from storage.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to solidify control of occupied Ukraine through institutionalizing social benefits and services.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian forces recently advanced west of Kreminna amid continued positional fighting on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 13. Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows that Russian forces recently advanced in a field east of Torske (west of Kreminna).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 12 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters further into eastern Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna) and seized a segment of the Shypylivka-Bilohorivka road, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[38] Positional fighting continued on February 13 northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southeast of Kupyansk near Tymkivka and Tabaivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and near Bilohorivka.[39]
Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 13. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Bakhmut area stated that Russian forces are partially advancing near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and are capturing whole windbreaks or forest areas near the settlement.[40] The Ukrainian spokesperson stated that Russian milbloggers are falsely claiming that Russian forces have advanced within two kilometers of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 12 and 13 that elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of its 331st VDV Regiment, advanced towards Bohdanivka, west of the O0506 (Khromove-Chasiv Yar) highway, and towards Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[42] Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Bilohorivka and Vesele, northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and south of Bakhmut near Shumy and Pivdenne.[43] Elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade and the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction.[44]
Russian forces reportedly continued to advance within Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 13. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and central Avdiivka and on the southeastern and southern outskirts of the settlement, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of further Russian gains within Avdiivka.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Avdiivka near Lastochkyne and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims either.[46] Positional fighting continued within and near Avdiivka, west of Avdiivka near Tonenke, and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[47] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are intensifying assaults in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) and conducted their highest number of air and artillery strikes in the area since the start of 2024.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 13 that Russian forces conducted up to 60 glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka over the past day.[49] Elements of the Russian 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk Peoples Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[50]
Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 13. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[51] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka and elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[52]
Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 13 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked south of Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and north of Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53] Elements of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) reportedly continue to operate in the Vuhledar direction (east of Velyka Novosilka).[54]
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements on February 13. Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Robotyne.[55] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Robotyne, northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Novoprokovka, east of Robotyne near Verbove, and south of Robotyne near Novoprokopivka.[56] Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) reportedly continue to operate near Robotyne.[57]
Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky.[58] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian Storm-Z, Naval Infantry, Airborne (VDV), and mobilized units conduct two-to-three assaults in left bank Kherson Oblast per day.[59] Humenyuk also reported that Russian forces are increasingly using first-person view (FPV) drones in assaults in left bank Kherson Oblast and that Russian assault units lose up to 70 percent of their personnel in such attacks.
[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024 ; https://www.senate.gov/legislative/floor_activity_pail.htm ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/senate-approves-ukraine-israel-foreign-aid-package/
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024
[3] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1623; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1624; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1625
[4] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA232954.pdf; https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/images/LSCO%20DeepOps%20book%20interactive%20with%20cover%20spread%2012Nov21.pdf
[5] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA232954.pdf; https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/images/LSCO%20DeepOps%20book%20interactive%20with%20cover%20spread%2012Nov21.pdf
[6] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1623; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1624; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1625
[7] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1623; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1624; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1625
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/it%E2%80%99s-time-west-embrace-ukraine%E2%80%99s-way-war-not-doubt-it; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-sustained-counteroffensive-denying-russia%E2%80%99s-prolongation-war
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023 ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea
[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2024
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/putin-vows-to-press-on-with-ukraine-invasion-despite-heavy-russian-losses; https://apnews.com/article/putin-russia-press-conference-moscow-ukraine-ef4e88fda50e6ad75b8a1979b95d9fcc; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023
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[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1623; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1624; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1625
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win
[16] https://t.me/dva_majors/34522 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/14785 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7789; https://t.me/milinfolive/116241 ; https://t.me/vrogov/14289 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/62002 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34524 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34529
[17] https://t.me/yuzhny_front_ZOV/4126 ; https://t.me/rybar/57072
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[20] https://t.me/zsu35obrmp/2239
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[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2023
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[26] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1931679/
[27] https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/7078
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[29] https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/analysis-of-the-2007-cyber-attacks-against-estonia-from-the-information-warfare-perspective/
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[32] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-13/tankers-tied-to-the-russian-oil-trade-grind-to-a-halt-following-us-sanctions
[33] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-13/tankers-tied-to-the-russian-oil-trade-grind-to-a-halt-following-us-sanctions
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724
[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012024
[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120623
[37] https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1757198213717647464; https://t.me/zsuSMILE/96; https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1757198218788511894
[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7272
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl; https://t.me/mod_russia/35601 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35605; https://t.me/mod_russia/35597; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7269; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7307; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/16991; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl
[40] https://suspilne dot media/683158-armia-rf-prosunulasa-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-aka-situacia-poblizu-bogdanivki-i-u-napramku-casovogo-aru/
[41] https://suspilne dot media/683158-armia-rf-prosunulasa-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-aka-situacia-poblizu-bogdanivki-i-u-napramku-casovogo-aru/
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7273 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7300 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7309 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112755 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61961
[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35595 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34489
[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/35610 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/116226
[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18152 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61983 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1320 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1321 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112721 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7293 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7311 ; https://t.me/rybar/57048
[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61968 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53953
[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; . https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61983 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1320 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34489 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7293 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7311 ;
[48] https://t.me/otarnavskiy/486
[49] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/14783 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/62015 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/116249 ; https://t.me/rybar/57066 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/10144 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34526
[50] https://t.me/fronttyagach82/341 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34479
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ;
[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/7010 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/8060 (Novomykhailivka) ;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61996; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11751; https://t.me/kubanArta/610 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/116227 (Heorhiivka)
[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18140
[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/7014 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/7009
[55] https://t.me/ombrstarichi65/67; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1757178798292766981; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1757178802755538989
[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ; https://t.me/vrogov/14277
[57] https://t.me/ombrstarichi65/67; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1757178798292766981; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1757178802755538989 ; https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1757151848224477682
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34489 ; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/2200; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/18366
[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/13/vorog-prodovzhuye-myasni-shturmy-na-hersonshhyni-na-2-3-za-dobu-nashkryabuyut-nataliya-gumenyuk/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/12/gumenyuk-nazvala-vidsotok-vtrat-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-na-livomu-berezi/
[60] https://t.me/kpszsu/10662
[61] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/6240 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/6235
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[64] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/02/equipment-losses-in-russias-war-on-ukraine-mount/
[65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021124
[66] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/73431
[67] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6508794 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/02/13/genprokuratura-potrebovala-natsionalizirovat-tri-chelyabinskih-zavoda-ih-yakoby-nezakonno-privatizirovali-v-1990-e
[68] https://www.kmu dot gov.ua/news/promova-premier-ministra-ukrainy-denysa-shmyhalia-na-zasidanni-uriadu-13022024?fbclid=IwAR1zwtxhGXG2-9YKwnVhgpC8e1qi2xn5WbpoNDZ_prjyznvBuY4rWqRb7-o
[69] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-produce-thousands-long-range-drones-2024-minister-says-2024-02-12/
[70] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/02/12/ukraines-pokrova-spoofing-system-tells-shaheds-to-get-lost/?sh=28715a5ffea7 ; https://www.newscientist.com/article/2415318-ukraine-will-spoof-gps-across-the-country-to-stop-russian-drones/
[71] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/02/12/ukraines-pokrova-spoofing-system-tells-shaheds-to-get-lost/?sh=28715a5ffea7
[72] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/73431
[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf
[74] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19966267