By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola
Russia shifted its airstrikes in Syria
to concentrate along the Turkish border following the downing of a Russian jet by Turkish warplanes on November 24 in
an effort to reassert its freedom of action inside Syria. Russian airstrikes focused
on the rebel-held Bab al-Hawa and Bab al-Salam border crossings as well as the
ISIS-held Jarablus border crossing from November 25 - 29. The Russian Ministry
of Defense (MoD) announced the arrival of its advanced S-400
long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system at the Bassel al-Assad International
Airport in Latakia on November 26 in an effort to deter Turkey from conducting
future attacks on Russian warplanes. Additionally, the Russian MoD announced
that Russian Su-34 bombers are newly equipped with air-to-air missiles “for providing
security of the aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces.” Russo-Turkish
relations have deteriorated considerably since the incident as Russian Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev approved an official list of economic sanctions against Turkey on December 1. Turkish officials
maintain that Turkey will not offer an apology, asserting that the Turkish
Armed Forces took “defensive action” and responded appropriately to the
unwarranted Russian airspace violations. Both Russian and Syrian presidents have openly accused Turkey of supporting terrorism
in Syria in the wake of the incident. Russian President Vladimir Putin went as
far as accusing Turkey of downing the Russian warplane in order to “defend its supplies” of oil from ISIS-held territory in Syria.
The Russian air campaign in Syria otherwise
continues to prioritize the preservation of the Assad regime. Russian strikes
engaged several civilian targets from November 25 to November 29, emulating the
regime’s use of its air power to punish civilian populations. Russia’s strikes
along the Turkish border notably struck civilian targets, accomplishing
multiple Russian objectives. Russian warplanes conducted at least six rounds of
airstrikes targeting convoys of humanitarian aid trucks entering Syria from Turkey in the
border town of Azaz in northern Aleppo Province on November 25 and another
convoy in the vicinity of the Bab
al-Hawa border crossing
in northern Idlib on November 28. Local sources claimed that Russian airstrikes
also targeted a bakery in Idlib province on November 29, which was reportedly responsible for
the distribution of bread to over 45,000 IDPs.
Russia continues to present itself as a decisive actor
against ISIS to the international community despite
the relative low number of Russian airstrikes targeting ISIS in Syria. Russian airstrikes targeted ISIS-held oil infrastructure
in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour in addition to targeting core ISIS terrain in the northern
Aleppo countryside and eastern Homs. Putin asserted that Russia remains “ready
to cooperate” with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS
coalition on intelligence-sharing measures and other battlefield cooperation in
Syria. Putin stated that France and Russia agreed upon bilateral measures to
coordinate battlefield activities and share intelligence regarding legitimate
targets for airstrikes in Syria following a meeting with French President
Francois Hollande on November 26. Putin reportedly requested
a map of “forces that are not terrorists and
fighting ISIS” during the meeting and pledged to avoid targeting these groups. Such
a map would enable Russia to better target the Syrian opposition to the
ultimate benefit of the Assad regime.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.
High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.
High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.
