Annika
Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman,
Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry,
and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition
offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static
maps present in this report.
We do not report in
detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in
Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of
armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity
even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Hayat
Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups have begun a campaign to
capture Homs after capturing Hama City on December 5.
HTS-aligned forces seized control of Hama City and Hama military airport
from Syrian Arab Army (SAA) forces on December 5.[1] Fateh Mubin—a
joint operations room led by HTS— announced after it secured Hama that
its forces would advance south to secure Homs.[2] Syrian opposition
media posted footage reportedly showing a convoy of HTS-aligned fighters
prepared to advance south along the M5 highway to Homs.[3] Unverified
reports claim that locals in Talbiseh, approximately 8 kilometers north
of Homs, have started their own localized effort to liberate the town
ahead of the opposition advance.[4]
Syrian opposition groups are using negotiated settlements with localities to rapidly seize territory without fighting. Locals
in two Christian-majority towns north of Hama reportedly negotiated
surrender with advancing opposition forces, avoiding any large-scale
fighting in the towns.[5] Ismaili Shia officials in Salamiyah, southeast
of Hama, also reportedly came to an agreement with opposition forces to
avoid fighting.[6] Regime forces reportedly withdrew from Salamiyah on
December 5 after opposition forces advanced to the town’s outskirts on
December 4.[7] The decision by towns to abandon the regime appears to be
a trend across Hama countryside. This trend may help HTS-aligned forces
approach Homs within the next day without being slowed down by fighting
through country villages.
Opposition groups may also advance rapidly towards Homs due to the rapid collapse of regime forces. The
regime does not appear to have established any defensive line between
Hama City and the Orontes River. Regime forces appear to be collapsing
between Hama City and Homs City. A pro-regime aircraft bombed the Rastan
Bridge over the Orontes River after Opposition forces seized the left,
north bank of the Orontes.[8] A force retreating in good order and not
under significant pressure would have presumably blown the bridge
themselves, rather than relying on aircraft. Airstrikes will usually
fail to damage a bridge sufficiently to prevent a crossing, making
ground-based detonation preferable unless a force is unable to detonate
the bridge. The reported low casualties among Regime forces during the
collapse around Hama suggest that Regime forces were not under
significant pressure.[9] It is also possible that the regime was forced
to rely on aircraft due to a lack of combat engineers to detonate the
bridge. The regime similarly failed to set up strong defensive lines
until well into Hama Governorate after opposition forces seized Aleppo
on November 30.[10] There are other intact bridges and likely fords east
and west of the Rastan Bridge that opposition forces could use to cross
the Orontes, however.
HTS
is establishing alternative political and security institutions in
Aleppo City, consolidating control and support of the local population
and former regime elements. Fateh Mubin, HTS’ joint operations
room, has ordered all Syrian regime army, security, and police
defectors to report to one of two designated processing centers in the
city.[11] HTS has presumably designed this effort to reintegrate former
combatants into civilian life, which in theory ensures stability and
security during the post-conflict transition period.[12] Fateh Mubin has
also sought to prevent its fighters from harassing civilians or coming
into conflict with locals by restricting the activity of fighters in the
city.[13] Fateh Mubin ordered the fighters to report to the front lines
and continue their advance to secure regime-held towns. The group has
also mobilized local quasi-police forces to backfill these military
units.[14] Fateh Mubin released the names and contact information for
new opposition government ministers, effectively establishing HTS and
the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government as the de facto governing
authority of Aleppo.[15] HTS has pursued similar successful
government-building approaches in northwestern Syria by incorporating
local religious and political figures into the governing body to
eliminate rivalry.[16]
HTS is attempting to use
diplomacy to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from bolstering
Syrian regime forces after regime forces retreated south. HTS
leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani asked Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia
al Sudani on December 5 to prevent the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)
from intervening in the Syrian conflict.[17] The PMF is an Iraqi state
security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias.[18] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of
the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[19] Dozens
of PMF fighters have reportedly entered Syria in recent days to help
defend the Syrian regime against opposition forces.[20] Sudani is likely
unable to prevent militias that answer to Iran from intervening in
Syria.
Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim
Qassem said on December 5 that Hezbollah is committed to “sheltering and
rebuilding” in Lebanon and abiding by the ceasefire deal with Israel.[21] Qassem
acknowledged that Hezbollah fighters will withdraw north of the Litani
River in exchange for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, in
accordance with the ceasefire deal.[22] Qassem claimed that Israel
violated the ceasefire deal ”at least 60 ” times since it went into
place on November 26. Qassem stated that it is the responsibility of the
Lebanese government—and not Hezbollah—to address these violations.
Qassem stated that Hezbollah will provide financial assistance, mainly
through Iranian donations, to Lebanese civilians in Beirut to rebuild.
Qassem also stated that Hezbollah ”stands by” the Syrian regime amidst
the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive.
The IDF conducted an airstrike on December 5 targeting a weapons stockpile southeast of Aleppo, Syria.[23] An
Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the SAA previously held the
targeted area, but that Syrian opposition forces had recently seized
the area.[24]
Egypt presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on December 2.[25]
Israel desires to capitalize on Hamas’ ”willingness to be flexible” on
implementing a partial deal due to the ceasefire in Lebanon, former
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death, and the incoming Trump Presidency,
according to two Israeli officials speaking to Axios. Israel’s updated
proposal includes a ceasefire between 42-60 days and the release of all
surviving female hostages, men over the age of 50, and hostages in a
serious medical condition.[26] Hamas has not commented on this proposal
as of the time of this writing. An Israeli official told Ynet on
December 2 that Hamas may be willing to compromise on an IDF presence on
the Philadelphi Corridor.[27] Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu’s
insistence on an Israeli military presence on the Philadelphi Corridor
has been one of the most significant sticking points in the
negotiations.[28] Netanyahu has said that retaining a presence in the
corridor is required to achieve Israeli war aims.[29]
Israeli
officials also told Axios that Egypt is now the “main channel” for
negotiations with Hamas after Qatar announced on November 9 that it
would cease its efforts to mediate a ceasefire-hostage deal until Israel
and Hamas showed a “willingness” to resume negotiations.[30] Reuters
reported on December 4 that Qatar has resumed its role as a
mediator.[31] This news follows reports that Qatari officials had
ordered Hamas’ political leadership to relocate from Qatar. [32] Hamas
denied on November 18 that it had departed Qatar.[33]
Hamas
confirmed that it approved an Egyptian proposal to form a post-war
governance committee in the Gaza Strip on December 5.[34] Hamas
added in a statement that the committee should help implement the
“comprehensive agreements” to “achieve national unity.” This is possibly
about the joint declaration Hamas, Fatah, and other unspecified
Palestinian political factions signed in July 2024 to form a “temporary
national unity government” responsible for governing the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank after the war.[35] Hamas said it met with several
Palestinian figures during post-war governance and ceasefire-hostage
negotiations in Cairo, including the leadership of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).[36] Israeli media reported that
Hamas and Fatah agreed to form an independent civilian committee to
manage post-war governance on November 3.[37] Hamas will almost
certainly attempt to infiltrate or subvert whatever civilian government
emerges to manage the post-war Gaza Strip unless Hamas is prevented from
doing so by force.
Key Takeaways:
- Hama City-Homs City Axis: Hayat
Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups have begun a campaign to
capture Homs after capturing Hama City on December 5. Syrian opposition
groups are using negotiated settlements with localities to rapidly
seize territory without fighting.
- State of Regime Forces: Opposition
groups may also advance rapidly towards Homs due to the rapid collapse
of regime forces. Regime forces appear to be collapsing between Hama
City and Homs City. The regime similarly failed to set up strong
defensive lines until well into Hama Governorate after opposition forces
seized Aleppo on November 30.
- Aleppo: HTS is
establishing alternative political and security institutions in Aleppo
City, consolidating control and support of the local population and
former regime elements.
- HTS Diplomacy: HTS is
attempting to use diplomacy to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias
from bolstering Syrian regime forces after regime forces retreated
south. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Jolani asked Iraqi Prime Minister
Mohammad Shia al Sudani on December 5 to prevent the Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) from intervening in the Syrian conflict.
- Lebanese Hezbollah: Secretary
General Naim Qassem said on December 5 that Hezbollah is committed to
“sheltering and rebuilding” in Lebanon and abiding by the ceasefire deal
with Israel.
Gaza Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations: Egypt
presented an Israeli-proposed ceasefire-hostage deal to Hamas on
December 2. Israel desires to capitalize on Hamas’ ”willingness to be
flexible” on implementing a partial deal due to the ceasefire in
Lebanon, former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death, and the incoming
Trump Presidency, according to two Israeli officials speaking to Axios.
Gaza Strip:
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The IDF continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on December 5.
Commercially available satellite imagery captured on December 5 shows
that Israeli forces recently cleared areas north of Beit Lahia. An
Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 5 that 18,000
Palestinians evacuated Beit Lahia in the past day.[38] The correspondent
reported that the IDF has killed around 20 Palestinian fighters in the
past day and noted that the IDF has killed fewer Palestinian fighters in
Beit Lahia in recent days.[39] The correspondent added that Israeli
forces have not engaged in close-quarter combat with Palestinian
fighters in Beit Lahia in recent days, which he assessed might indicate
“the strengthening of IDF operational control” in the area.[40] This
statement is consistent with recent comments from IDF officials that the
IDF will conclude its clearing operations in Jabalia in the coming
weeks.[41] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) conducted attacks targeting Israeli forces and armor in Jabalia
refugee camp.[42]
Israeli forces have continued
operations near Tal al Hawa, southwest of Gaza City, since CTP-ISW's
last data cutoff on December 4. A local Palestinian journalist
reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles south of Tal al Hawa on December
4.[43] PIJ and Hamas detonated improved explosive devices (IED)
targeting Israeli forces and armor in Tal al Hawa on December 5.[44]
Israeli forces continued operations in the central Gaza Strip on December 5.
Commercially available satellite imagery captured on December 5 shows
that Israeli forces recently cleared areas southeast of the Maghazi
refugee camp. A local Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from
Israeli vehicles north of the Nuseirat refugee camp on December 5.[45]
The
IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting senior Hamas members in
the al Mawasi humanitarian zone near Khan Younis in the southern Gaza
Strip on December 4.[46] The IDF detected secondary explosions
following the airstrike, indicating the presence of weapons in the
targeted area. The airstrike killed a senior member of Hamas’ internal
security apparatus, Osama Ghanim.[47] The IDF reported that Ghanim had
committed several human rights violations and "suppressed” Hamas
opponents.[48] The strike sparked a fire and killed 21 people, according
to the head of a nearby hospital.[49]
The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces and armor east of Rafah City on December 5.[50]
The IDF announced multiple efforts to increase the size and effectiveness of the IDF on December 5.[51] An
Israeli Army Radio Correspondent reported that these efforts include
expanding the IDF’s engineering capabilities, regular and reserve
officer courses, the reserve system as a whole, and pilot programs for
recruiting female soldiers to new IDF units. These announced efforts
follow the IDF publishing data on November 14 showing that it only has
83 percent of the combat manpower that it requires.[52]
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Nothing significant to report
Northern Israel and Lebanon
Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:
The IDF 769th Territorial Brigade (91st Division) continued activity in southeastern Lebanon over the past week.[53] IDF
forces located Hezbollah weapons and killed numerous Hezbollah fighters
in the area. The IDF reiterated that it is operating in southern
Lebanon to ensure the safety of the Israeli towns in the upper Galilee
region. The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire permits IDF forces to operate in
southern Lebanon until January 25, 2025.[54]
Lebanese media reported that the IDF destroyed a road linking Chebaa and Birket al Naqqar, south of Chebaa.[55]
It is not clear why the IDF destroyed the road, and certain military
activities allowed under the ceasefire--such as the controlled
detonation-in-place of improvised explosive devices--could destroy a
road, depending on the size of the IED. The IDF has operated in Chebaa
to destroy Hezbollah's infrastructure in recent days.[56]
Syrian
media reported that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) sent reinforcements
to an unspecified area on the Lebanon-Syria border following the Syrian
opposition offensive.[57]
Lebanese media
reported on December 5 that the IDF advanced into Ain Arab Marjayoun,
approximately 3 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border. Lebanese
media reported IDF artillery fire and clearing operations in Ain Arab
Marjayoun.[58] Lebanese media reported IDF troops advancing to the
“center” of the town on December 5.[59]
Lebanese
media reported that the IDF conducted an airstrike along the Litani
River, adjacent to the towns of Yohmor and Zawtar, Nabatieh Governorate,
on December 4.[60] The IDF briefly operated along the Litani River on November 26.[61]
The
IDF reported on December 5 that the 188th Armored Brigade (36th
Division) located and destroyed Hezbollah tunnel infrastructure in
southern Lebanon over the past week.[62] The tunnel
infrastructure was “tens” of meters long, according to the IDF. The IDF
said that one of the exits of the tunnel network led to a rocket
launcher that was aimed at Israeli civilian and military sites in
northern Israel. The IDF also located several weapons, including rockets
and mortars, inside the tunnel system.[63]
The IDF continued to operate near Maroun al Ras in southwestern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on December 4. Lebanese
media reported that Israeli forces conducted controlled demolition of
civilian infrastructure in Yaroun, near Maroun al Ras.[64] Lebanese
media reported that Israeli soldiers stationed in Maroun al Ras fired
small arms toward Bint Jbeil.[65] Israeli forces also conducted
artillery shelling in Naqoura, according to Lebanese media.[66]
Lebanese media reported that the IDF Air Force struck unspecified sites in Yaroun, in southwestern Lebanon.[67] The
IDF also struck Majdal Zoun and Aitaroun, according to local media
reports.[68] The IDF has not commented on these airstrikes at the time
of this writing.
Hezbollah has not claimed any attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 4.
Hezbollah-affiliated sources reported on December 5 that a drone exploded in Kibbutz Shoval, near Beersheba.[69]
The Lebanese sources did not specify if it was an attack and who
launched the drone. Israeli media have yet to acknowledge the incident.
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
Iraqi
nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr called on Iraqi forces and
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias not to intervene in the Syrian conflict on
December 5.[70] Sadr emphasized that only the Syrian people can “determine their destiny.”
The
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, Army, Border Guards, and Emergency
Response Division conducted a joint operation in Anbar Province on
December 5 to increase security along the Iraq-Syria border.[71] The Iraqi Army has deployed armored units to the al Qaim-Albu Kamal border area in Anbar Province in recent days.[72]
An
Iranian parliamentarian focused on Syria, Abbas Golrou, was
intentionally vague about how it will support Syria in a December 4
interview. Golrou stated that Iran will not reveal what it is
pursuing in Syria but Iran has previously “responded to the Syrian
government's request and will enter,” Syria if needed in an interview
with Iranian media on December 4.[73] Golru is a member
of Parliament’s National Security Committee, the head of Parliament’s
Foreign Relations Committee, and the deputy head of the Iran-Syria
parliamentary friendship group. Golrou claimed that Iran focused its
support for Syria on ”counterterrorism,” which is a euphemism for
Iranian support for Syria against opposition groups as well as ISIS.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also met with his
Egyptian counterpart Badr Abdelatty and Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry
Senior Adviser for Policy Ali Asghar Khaji separately spoke with UN
special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen on December 4.[74]
Iranian
Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem
Gharibabadi met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu in Beijing
on December 5 to discuss nuclear negotiations and sanctions.[75]
Gharibabadi emphasized his recent discussions with the E3 (the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany) in Geneva on "resuming sanctions lifting
and nuclear talks."[76] The officials probably discussed the impact of
the incoming Trump Administration’s "maximum pressure" sanctions on
Iranian oil exports, although this was not explicitly stated in the
meeting summary.[77] Iranian oil exports to China are extremely
important to the Iranian economy, and sanctions would increase the cost
of China’s imports.[78]
The Iran Update provides
insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It
also covers events and trends that affect the stability and
decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project
(CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the
Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional
events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance”
as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle
East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This
transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state
actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran
considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran
furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and
political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control
over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly
responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which
Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance
are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding
and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East,
destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and
supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones
of Iranian regional strategy.
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[12] https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf
[13] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1864620742458904942
[14] https://warontherocks.com/2024/12/the-patient-efforts-behind-hayat-tahrir-al-shams-success-in-aleppo/
[15] https://t.me/aleamaliaat_aleaskaria/212
[16]
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[18] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces
[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces
[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pro-iranian-militias-enter-syria-iraq-aid-beleaguered-syrian-army-2024-12-02/
[21] https://almanar dot com.lb/12876789
[22] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/full-text-the-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-deal/
[23] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1864644939583201385
[24] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1864644939583201385
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[26] https://www.axios.com/2024/12/04/israel-hamas-gaza-hostage-ceasefire-deal-updated-trump v
[27] www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/yokra14170832
[28] https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/23/politics/gaza-ceasefire-israel-right-resume-fighting/index.html
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-30-2024
[30]
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[34] https://hamasinfo dot info/2024/12/05/4696/
[35] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate072324
[36] https://hamasinfo dot info/2024/12/05/4696/
[37] https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/831779
[38] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1864684432541536558
[39] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1864684432541536558
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[41] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-3-2024
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https://alqassam
dot
ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8327/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%83%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-50-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AC%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9
[45] https://t.me/hamza20300/315985
[46] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1864397249616245040
[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1864707204823056652
[48] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1864707207893221424
[49] https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-gaza-war-news-12-04-2024-efb344dafb1ef0d6d2ec55a17a292ad4
[50] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4475
[51] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17198
[52] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate111424
[53] https://www.idf dot il/253627 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1864614550529585490
[54] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/full-text-the-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-deal/
[55] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108101
[56] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-4-2024
[57] https://t.me/damascusv011/25602
[58] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124176 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124207
[59] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124207
[60] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124150 ; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1864518718157463735
[61]
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/idf-troops-reach-key-litani-river-for-first-time-since-2000-israeli-withdrawal-from-lebanon/
[62] https://www.idf dot il/253627
[63] https://www.idf dot il/253627
[64] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124154 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108087 ;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108090
[65] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124153
[66] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124170
[67] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108094 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108109
[68] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108226 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124196
[69] https://x.com/MayadeenEnglish/status/1864661113696063867 ;
https://t.me/dahieh4all/48126
[70] https://x.com/Mu_AlSadr/status/1864706570304487433
[71] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/107006
[72] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-2-2024
[73] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1403091410337
[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/15/3213630/;
https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1833379335311864839/Iran's-Diplomat-Urges-Regional-States-to-Adopt-Measures-in-Anti-Terror-Fight
[75] https://x.com/Gharibabadi/status/1864636403902005358
[76]
https://x.com/Gharibabadi/status/1864636403902005358 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-europeans-test-diplomacy-with-trump-term-looming-2024-11-29/
[77] https://x.com/Gharibabadi/status/1864636403902005358
[78] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-cheap-iranian-oil-supply-risk-tighter-trump-sanctions-2024-11-06/
