Johanna
Moore, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Alexandra
Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition
offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static
maps present in this report.
We do not report in
detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in
Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of
armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity
even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Hayat
Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is attempting to
consolidate HTS’s political and military control in a Assad Syrian
government. The HTS-led military coalition has secured control
over key civil and security services since the interim Syrian Salvation
Government was established on December 9.[1] HTS-led opposition forces
have assumed control over the Syrian state media outlet SANA and local
police forces, which has enabled the HTS-led opposition to disseminate
and enforce official government edicts.[2] HTS has also appointed loyal
members to ministerial positions within the interim government to
guarantee HTS’s role in shaping policies and the new Syrian constitution
during this critical transition period.[3] HTS—and Jolani in
particular—is attempting to impose a fait accompli in which it controls
the Syrian government, thus enabling it to influence Syria for the
foreseeable future.
Jolani and HTS may find it difficult
to subordinate other Syrian groups to the control of the HTS-controlled
interim government. Other Syrian groups, including southern opposition
forces and the SDF, have not yet subordinated themselves to Jolani’s
control. The leaders of the Southern Operations Room, an opposition
group that now controls most of southwestern Syria, met with Jolani on
December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs.[4]
The meeting probably discussed the future of the Syrian government while
focusing on “coordination.” These leaders did not explicitly endorse
the central government, though noted the importance of a “unified
effort” and “cooperation.”[5] The leaders of the Southern Operations
Room previously fought against Jolani and the HTS predecessor and al
Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s as part of the Southern
Front.[6] The SDF also appears to be preparing itself for negotiations
that would create a broader-based Syrian government that is not under
Jolani’s control. The SDF voiced support for a ceasefire but did not
explicitly voice its support for the HTS-led government.[7] The SDF’s
position may harden further as Arab contingents within the SDF defect to
HTS.[8]
More extremist and sectarian groups
within the HTS coalition may not adhere to HTS’s vow to respect Syria’s
religious and sectarian minorities, which would likely trigger sectarian
violence in Syria.[9] A Christian journalist from a formerly
pro-regime radio station said on December 10 that an HTS-led opposition
member asked her about her religious and sectarian background during an
encounter in Damascus and asked if she was “Christian, Alawi, Shiite, or
Druze.”[10] It is unclear which specific organization in the
opposition coalition controlled this member. This type of harassment
could rapidly transform into a way for more extreme and sectarian
organizations to identify and kill religious minorities in Syria. This
particular incident is relatively minor, and CTP-ISW has not yet
observed a well-organized campaign to intimidate, coerce, or kill
religious and sectarian minorities. There have been other reports of
individual revenge killings targeting ”Alawites” and ”Assad loyalists,”
however.[11]
These incidents—though the incidents remain
isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time—create
opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further
religious- or sectarian-based violence to destabilize a future Syrian
government. HTS is an organization consisting of numerous Syrian
Islamist opposition groups formed in 2017 with varying degrees of
representation in the group’s leadership, however.[12] It is unclear
which factions of HTS are involved in these instances of sectarian
violence or if they are coordinated activities amongst several factions.
CTP-ISW will continue to report revenge killings and sectarian-
or religious-based incidents and violence due to the risk that these
events can rapidly destabilize the situation in Syria.
Fateh Mubin fighters seized a Captagon factory at Mezzeh Military Airbase on December 11.[13] The
opposition fighters claimed that they discovered “millions” of Captagon
pills, raw drug materials, and production equipment within an Air Force
Intelligence building on the airbase.[14] The Assad regime and its
Iranian-backed partners mass-produced Captagon in Syria for years and
smuggled it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states through a smuggling
and distribution cartel that has generated billions of dollars in
revenue for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[15] HTS has not explicitly
stated that it will halt Captagon supply lines into Jordan.
The
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) did not face resistance when it seized
Syrian outposts outside of the disengagement zone in Syria. An Israeli
Army Radio correspondent reported on December 11 that the IDF 101st
Paratrooper Battalion (35th Paratroopers Brigade) did not fire a single
bullet when seizing outposts.[16] SAA soldiers abandoned their positions
amid the collapse of the regime. Israeli media also noted on December
11 that the IDF is conducting defensive operations in the disengagement
zone.[17] Israeli media reported that the IDF seized several former SAA
tanks in the disengagement zone. Israeli media also reported that the
IDF 810th Mountain Brigade recently seized a cache of former SAA weapons
on Mt. Hermon. The army radio correspondent added that the IDF forces
deployed to the Syrian front are preparing for a “long stay in the
field.”[18] Geolocated imagery posted on December 11 and local Syrian
sources confirmed IDF presence in Hader military base and Hader town,
which are both in the disengagement zone.[19] Local Syria media claimed
that the IDF had also paved a road that extended out of the
disengagement zone from the Golan Heights to Marbah, western Daraa
Province.[20]
An anonymous senior Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the height of the IDF campaign on the Syrian Front is over.[21]
CTP-ISW has not recorded any IDF airstrikes in Syria since the last
data cutoff at 2pm on December 10. The IDF’s intense air campaign on
December 9 and 10 destroyed approximately 70-80 percent of the former
Assad regime’s military capabilities to prevent "terrorist elements”
from seizing the weapons, including dozens of anti-ship missiles at al
Bayda and Latakia ports on December 9.[22] Russian news outlet Sputnik
reported that the IDF destroyed radar systems on the outskirts of
Tartus, where a Russian naval base is located.[23] Satellite imagery
posted on X on December 11 showed the aftermath of IDF airstrikes on
December 9 and 10 on ammunition depots at Yafour Base, in Rif Dimashq
Province, the air defense systems at Damascus International Airport, and
an air defense site in Izraa, Daraa Province.[24]
The HTS-led operations room seized full control of Deir ez Zor City from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on December 10.[25]
Local opposition groups demonstrated in Deir ez Zor City on December 9,
calling for the HTS-led transitional government to take control of the
city from the SDF.[26] HTS-affiliated leaders addressed locals in the
street and locals came out in support of the opposition forces.[27] The
fighters also seized an oil field near Deir ez Zor and the Deir ez Zor
military airport.[28] The HTS-led operations room also claimed to seize
Deir ez Zor’s eastern and western countrysides, although it remains
unclear at this time what territory the operations room is referring
to.[29]
Arab forces within the SDF are also
defecting to the HTS-led transitional government in Damascus as HTS-led
forces seize more ground on the right bank of the Euphrates.
The leader of the Busayrah Military Council, an Arab formation in the
SDF, declared allegiance to the Fateh Mubin operations room on December
11.[30] Fateh Mubin is the coordinating body for HTS-led forces. Two
other Arab military leaders defected on December 10.[31] These military
leaders live on the left, eastern bank of the Euphrates River. The
Euphrates serves as a defensive line protecting SDF-held territory from
the remainder of Syria. The SDF deployed reinforcements to the areas
where Arab forces had defected and reportedly retaliated against a
commander by burning his home.[32]
HTS has not yet
assisted Arab defectors from the SDF with additional forces. Opposition
forces across Syria—except the SNA-SDF fighting—have so far attempted to
resolve their issues without resorting to fighting. The SDF and the
HTS-affiliated operations room have thus far avoided major armed
conflict, and HTS support for the Arab groups in Deir ez Zor would
likely undermine reconciliation and transition government negotiations.
The emergence of the transitional government is liable to pose a serious
problem for the SDF, however, because the SDF has had a difficult
relationship with local Arab residents. The existence of the regime—and
the risk that Arab areas in northeastern Syria could fall back under
regime control—acted as a dampener against large-scale uprisings against
the SDF.
SDF
Commander Mazloum Abdi confirmed that his forces withdrew from Manbij
after reaching a settlement with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army
(SNA).[33] Abdi said that the United States helped broker the
deal to preserve the security of civilians in the town.[34] The SNA sent
civil authorities and military police to Manbij to begin managing the
city and the surrounding areas on December 9. [35]Abdi said that the SNA
attempted to advance on Kobani along the Turkish border on December
10.[36]
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Commander Major General Hossein Salami claimed on December 10 that all
Iranian military forces have withdrawn from Syria.[37] Iranian-backed
militias reportedly withdrew from Syria as the Syrian opposition forces
advanced.[38] Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated
that 4,000 Iranian civilians have also returned from Syria, with plans
to continue evacuation efforts "until the departure of the last
Iranian."[39] Iran maintained forces in Syria since shortly after the
start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.[40]
Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized the role of Syrian youth in
reclaiming the “occupied area[s]” in Syria in a speech on December 11. Khamenei
stated that "undoubtedly the occupied area[s] of Syria will be
liberated by the zealous Syrian youth,” implying that some of the areas
recently recaptured from the Assad Regime are now “occupied.”[41]
Khamenei stated that Syrian youth "will definitely rise up and overcome
the situation...just as brave Iraqi youth [after Iraq’s] occupation by
the United States, were able to...with the help" of former IRGC Quds
Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, in reference to Iran’s
support to Iraqi militias against US forces in Iraq between 2003 and
2011. This comparison suggests that Iran may pursue efforts to support
similar militias in Syria to combat opposition forces and US-Israeli
“interference” while undermining any new government in Syria. Khamenei's
repeated praise of Soleimani and his leadership while refraining from
any mention of the role that current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier
General Esmail Ghaani has played in institutionalizing the Axis of
Resistance in the last four years suggests Khamenei may be disenchanted
with Ghaani’s approach. The Telegraph reported on December 10 that there
is discontent within the IRGC with Ghaani and “calls” for Khamenei to
remove him.[42]
Khamenei criticized the "obvious role"
that “a neighboring government”—almost certainly a reference to
Turkey—played in the developments in Syria.[43] Senior Iranian officials
and state media previously criticized Turkish policy in Syria amid the
ongoing Syrian opposition offensive.[44] Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan approved HTS launching its surprise offensive on November 27 and
expressed support for the HTS-led drive toward Damascus from the
north.[45] These statements probably suggest an increasingly hostile
relationship between Iran and Turkey. Media affiliated with the IRGC
suggested that Iran might refrain from supporting Erdogan during future
crises--like coups against Erdogan--if the Syrian opposition weakens the
Axis of Resistance.[46] CTP-ISW assessed that the fall of Assad marks
the end of this phase of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for
the foreseeable future.[47] The sudden loss of Assad will severely
undermine future Iranian efforts to rebuild Hamas and Hezbollah, key
actors within the Axis of Resistance.
Four
unspecified Israeli security sources told Reuters on December 11 that
Iran has intensified its effort to recruit Israelis susceptible to
recruitment over the past two years.[48] Israel has recently
arrested 30 individuals operating as a part of nine covert cells across
Israel. The recruited assets were responsible for tasks such as
sabotage, intelligence gathering on military facilities, and
assassination plots against high-profile Israeli figures, such as
nuclear scientists and government officials.[49] These intelligence
assets have likely supported Iranian-backed efforts to target key
Israeli assets.[50] The October 13, 2024, Hezbollah attack targeting an
IDF training base‘s dining facility would have required familiarity with
pattern-of-life and habits on base to target the dining facility and
cause casualties.[51]
Key Takeaways:
Gaza Strip:
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on December 11. The
IDF 162nd Division directed an airstrike that killed the commander of
the Hamas Paragliding unit in Jabalia last week.[52] Footage posted by
Palestinian journalists showed the IDF conducting controlled demolition
of infrastructure in Jabalia.[53] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) and fired mortar
shells targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia refugee camp.[54]
The
IDF reported on December 11 that the 143rd Division directed an
airstrike that killed a commander of Hamas’ Nukhba Forces in Zaytoun,
northern Gaza Strip.[55] The IDF reported that the Hamas
commander was operating from a building in a school complex in Zaytoun.
The Hamas commander carried out attacks on an IDF position near a
kibbutz in southern Israel that killed 14 Israeli soldiers during the
October 7 attack, according to the IDF.[56]
Palestinian militias claimed four attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on December 11.[57]
The IDF continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 10. Footage posted by a Palestinian journalist showed Israeli bulldozers operating near the Nuseirat refugee camp.[58]
The IDF continued clearing operations in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip on December 11. Geolocated
footage posted on December 11 showed the IDF conducting controlled
demolition of infrastructure in eastern Rafah City.[59] PFLP claimed two
attacks targeting Israeli forces in Rafah on December 11.[60]
Palestinian militias claimed two rocket attacks targeting southern Israel on December 11.[61] PFLP
fired rockets targeting a kibbutz in southern Israel on December
11.[62] The IDF said that it detected two rockets fired from the central
Gaza Strip and that both rockets struck open areas.[63] PFLP also
fired rockets targeting an unspecified location in southern Israel and
the IDF reported that it intercepted two rockets fired from the central
Gaza Strip.[64]
The
IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation orders for parts of
the Maghazi refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip on December 11.[65]
The IDF said that Palestinian militias are firing rockets from those
areas towards Israel. The orders requested residents to immediately
evacuate to the IDF-designated humanitarian zone.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Unspecified
fighters shot at an Israeli civilian vehicle that illegally entered
Joseph's Tomb in Nablus overnight between December 10 and 11.[66] The
Israeli Police later detained the Israelis for questioning for entering
Area A in the West Bank. Israelis are prohibited from entering Area A.
No militia has claimed the attack at the time of this writing.
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz visited an unspecified location on the “eastern front” on December 11.[67] Katz
emphasized that Israel will build a border wall with Jordan to prevent
Iranian weapons smuggling to Palestinian militias in the West Bank via
Jordan.[68] This border has been the site of frequent drug and weapons
smuggling attempts throughout the past decade.[69] Katz announced on
November 26 that the Israeli government granted the Defense Ministry
approval to construct a high-tech border fence, and Israel has since
begun preliminary work on the project.[70]
Northern Israel and Lebanon
Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:
The
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) backfilled the IDF 7th Armored Brigade in Khiam after the
brigade withdrew on December 11. The LAF confirmed it stationed
troops with UNIFIL forces in five locations in Khiam and will use
special engineering forces to conduct a survey of the town to identify
unexploded ordinances.[71] The LAF stated that this action followed
coordination with the five-member Israel-Lebanon ceasefire enforcement
committee. Lebanese media reported on December 11 that LAF military
vehicles and bulldozers accompanied by UNIFIL forces moved southward and
entered the town of Khiam.[72] The IDF stated that it remains deployed
in southern Lebanon and will continue to operate against any threats to
Israel.[73] Israeli forces can operate in southern Lebanon until the end
of January 2025, according to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire
agreement.[74]
Hezbollah-affiliated media reported
that the LAF began on December 11 to deploy to its former positions in
Ain Arab Marajaayoun and to unnamed areas south of Khiam.[75]
Lebanese media reported on December 10 that the IDF demolished houses in multiple towns on the Israel-Lebanon border.[76] The
IDF confirmed in a post on X that it conducted ”controlled explosions”
of unspecified targets in southwestern Lebanon as part of routine
activity.[77]
Lebanese media reported on December
11 that the IDF conducted a drone strike targeting an unspecified target
in Ainata, northeastern Lebanon.[78]
Lebanese media reported on December 11 that Israeli forces demolished a house in Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon.[79]
The IDF Home Front Command eased restrictions in the Upper Galilee region, northern Israel, on December 11.[80] The
IDF Home Front Command increased activity guidelines from partial to
full activity permitted in this region following a situational
assessment on December 11 by Northern Command Commander Major General
Ori Gordin.[81]
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
US
Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on December 10 that the Houthis
attacked two US Navy destroyers that were accompanying three US-flagged
commercial vessels.[82] CENTCOM stated that US Navy destroyers USS Stockdale and USS O’Kane
successfully defeated an unspecified number of Houthis weapons while
transiting the Gulf of Aden between December 9 and 10. CENTCOM added
that the destroyers were escorting three US-owned, operated, and flagged
merchant vessels. CENTCOM reported no injuries or damage to the vessels
from the Houthi attack. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea
claimed that the Houthis launched an unspecified number of drones and a
missile targeting three merchant vessels and two US destroyers on
December 10.[83] This is the second time CENTCOM confirmed that the USS Stockdale and USS O’Kane intercepted a Houthi attack on commercial vessels in the past 10 days.[84]
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of
Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in
the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This
transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state
actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran
considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran
furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and
political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control
over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly
responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which
Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance
are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding
and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East,
destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and
supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones
of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-9-2024
[2]
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/11/world/middleeast/aleppo-syria-rebel-government.html
; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency ;
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/after-ousting-assad-syrian-rebels-rush-to-impose-order-in-damascus-1c4f5fab?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3
[3] https://t.me/damascusv011/25991
[4] https://t.me/damascusv011/26063
[5] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1866853326253375549
[6]
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg9z3r2xp9o ;
https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1866853326253375549 ;
https://www.enabbaladi dot
net/637198/%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4-%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85/
[7] https://x.com/MazloumAbdi/status/1866615394238116008
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-10-2024
[9] https://www.dw.com/en/syria-hts-islamists-pledge-to-show-tolerance-for-minorities/a-70959165
[10] https://x.com/RamiJarrah/status/1866618302673379597
[11] www.npasyria dot com/200041
[12] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels-idUSKBN15C0MV; www dot jpost.com/middle-east/article-831390
[13] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1866574249663537209; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1866851708355162256
[14]
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1866792622871941361;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1866574249663537209
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXM460behUc;
https://t.me/damascusv011/26055
[15]
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/how-captagon-trade-impacts-border-communities-lebanon-and-syria
; https://www.aljazeera dot
com/news/2023/12/12/jordian-army-kills-several-drug-runners-amid-soaring-captagon-trade
[16] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1866910238567436414 ;
https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1866875787472966110
[17]
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/idf-troops-captured-syrian-tanks-seized-weapons-cache-at-former-syrian-army-post/
[18] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1866875787472966110
[19] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1866755621678391556
; https://x.com/clashreport/status/1866749713061494950;
https://x.com/a_shorshan/status/1866740399278264447;
https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1866766939332415558; https://x.com/thesyrianlions/status/1866895199194280135 ;
https://x.com/zcjbrooker/status/1866860575902327241; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1866803255692628364 |
[20] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1866567002359468189
[21] https://x.com/Lazar_Berman/status/1866818971200045406
[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-10-2024 ;
https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1866516063804113099
[23] https://x.com/kann_news/status/1866629671900635502
[24] https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1866721324611035333 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-10-2024
[25]
https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/119154 ;
https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/119154 ;
https://t.me/aleamaliaat_aleaskaria/334
[26] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1866150421498114225 ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1866113862321266807
[27]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_N7xVAp00AU&ab_channel=%D9%86%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7-NaherMedia
; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/129378 ;
https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/129374
[28]
https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1866588378193375483 ;
https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1866722789111238988 ;
https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/119154
[29] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/119154
[30] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1866837046326690242
[31] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1866494605300318514 ; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1866528191072158103
[32]
https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1866549850755698843 ;
https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1866538909435564275 ;
https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1866811415983432169 ;
https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/129366
[33] https://x.com/MazloumAbdi/status/1866615394238116008
[34] https://x.com/MazloumAbdi/status/1866615394238116008
[35] https://t.me/Dawn_of_Freedom1/266 ; https://t.me/Dawn_of_Freedom1/4
[36] https://x.com/MazloumAbdi/status/1866577081330741674
[37]
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/20/3216620 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-power-undiminished-after-assads-fall-syria-revolutionary-guards-commander-2024-12-10/
[38]
https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%85-%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84
; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1865011140398301456
[39] https://www.barrons.com/news/tehran-says-4-000-iranians-returned-from-syria-since-assad-s-fall-b2684dda
[40]
https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria
;
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-iranian-influence-and-presence-in-syria/
[41] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58551
[42] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/09/iran-armed-forces-at-war-with-themselves-fall-assad-syria/
[43] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58551
[44] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-3-2024
[45]
https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/07/politics/assad-regime-syrian-civil-war/index.html
; https://www.aa dot
com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-wishes-syrian-oppositions-march-to-continue-without-accidents-president-erdogan/3416234
[46] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/13/3212086
[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-reshaping-of-irans-axis-of-resistance
[48] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-jews-who-spied-iran-biggest-infiltration-decades-2024-12-11/
[49] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-jews-who-spied-iran-biggest-infiltration-decades-2024-12-11/
[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024
https://www.timesofisrael dot com/hezbollah-drone-targets-netanyahus-house-in-caesarea-pm-wife-not-home-no-injuries/
[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024 ;
https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845579620189606395
[52] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1866825198550519871
[53] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1866558700389056535 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/317322
[54]
https://alqassam dot
ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8334/%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A5%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD
; https://t.me/sarayaps/18918
[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1866825192598540590
[56] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1866835223406608498
[57] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14883 ; https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14893 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4492 ;
https://t.me/darebmojahden/5402
[58] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1866585399998427262
[59] https://x.com/SinjoroMoseo/status/1866806007864631353
[60] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14897 ; https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14893
[61] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14883 ; https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14884
[62] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14883
[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1866719316931952785
[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1866730827796844559
[65] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1866772820073623970
[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1866734636199743641
[67] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1866826027520921871
[68]
https://x.com/kann_news/status/1866825744632152245 ;
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/world/middleeast/iran-west-bank-weapons-smuggling.html
[69]
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-26-2024#_edn54e4a2c20bee3337fa2b3d7f12ee5abf58
;
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/09/10/israel-intercepts-weapons-cache-smuggled-from-jordan/
[70]
https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-830779 ;
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/israel-announces-preliminary-work-on-fence-along-entire-border-with-jordan/
[71] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1866872318837850522
[72] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108998
[73] https://x.com/IDF/status/1866937679755067789
[74] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/full-text-the-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-deal/
[75] https://x.com/TVManar1/status/1866723086260732254
[76] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108935 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108942
[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1866834780358090792
[78] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108977 ; https://x.com/mayadeenlebanon/status/1866799217672388800
[79] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124755
[80] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/home-front-command-eases-restrictions-in-the-northern-golan-heights/
[81] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1866868127008690220 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1866876221277290710
[82] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1866595084730266011 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-10-2024
[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-10-2024
[84] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-2-2024
