Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition
offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static
maps present in this report.
We do not report in
detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in
Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of
armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity
even though we do not describe them in these reports.
An
explosion from a former SAA position in Homs City suggests that HTS
does not yet have full control on the ground and that local groups and
individuals can access and repurpose unexploded ordinance. Syrian media reported a large explosion near a former SAA barracks in Homs City on December 27, injuring nine people.[1]
The Homs Police Commander Colonel Alaa Omran told state media that
former regime elements rigged and detonated ordinance in a missile
warehouse in the city to target a passing civilian.[2]
A Syrian source contradicted the police commander’s statement, however,
and claimed that the explosion was the result of Syrians attempting to
remove parts from old air defense missiles to sell them.[3]
Taking apart and repurposing explosives inside of munitions is one way
military organizations can build rudimentary improvised explosive
devices. The incident demonstrates that HTS does not control all former
SAA weapons stockpiles and that locals can still access some of these
stockpiles. This incident also suggests that the HTS-led security forces
have not fully established total control over Homs City if these
positions are easily accessible.
The HTS-led
interim government has thus far failed to prevent individual opposition
fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community. Unspecified
opposition fighters have looted homes and stolen vehicles belonging to
Alawites in Lattakia Province—a former regime stronghold—since the fall
of the Assad regime.[4]
An Alawite sheikh in Damascus told Reuters on December 26 that there
have been multiple instances of “[Alawites] being beaten at a
checkpoint.”[5]
The HTS-led interim government has established several checkpoints
across Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, but it is unclear who
has attacked Alawite citizens at the checkpoint in Damascus.[6]
An HTS fighter in Damascus separately told Reuters that unspecified
individuals offloaded a bus and beat Alawite passengers on December 26.[7]
These Alawite community members are framing these events as
sectarian-motivated, underscoring the mistrust and fear that is
permeating Alawite communities at this time. These instances of
sectarian violence have caused some Alawites to refuse to hand in their
weapons to the interim government, highlighting how the Alawite
community currently distrusts the interim government to guarantee their
security.[8]
The
HTS-led interim government deployed forces to the Christian town of al
Masmiyah in Daraa Province on December 27 to maintain security in the
town during Christmas celebrations.[9] The
deployment of forces to al Masmiyah comes after members of the
Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria, a member of the HTS-led military
coalition with links to al Qaeda, set fire to a Christmas tree in
Suqaylabiyah, Hama Governorate, on December 23.[10]
The HTS-led interim government is continuing to pursue and detain former members of the Bashar al Assad regime.
HTS forces have pursued Assad regime remnants in areas of Hama, Homs,
Lattakia Tartous, Deir ez Zor, and Damascus provinces since CTP-ISW's
last data cutoff on December 26.[11] HTS forces arrested a large number of former Assad regime members, including:
HTS-led security forces engaged alleged former regime fighters in several villages west of Homs on December 26.
HTS-led security forces entered Balqassa village, west of Homs City, on
December 26, reportedly to pursue regime-affiliated official Shuja al
Ali.[16]
Ali was the leader of a regime-supported armed group that operated near
the Lebanese border and was accused of kidnapping and torture. [17]Syrian media reported that HTS-led security forces clashed with alleged former regime-affiliated fighters in Balqassa.[18] HTS killed Ali and former regime elements killed two HTS-led security force members in the fighting.[19]
A Deir ez Zor-focused social media user stated that the HTS-led
security forces used long-range rockets and drones to target former
regime remnants in Balqassa and nearby town Khirbet al Hamam.[20]
CTP-ISW cannot confirm HTS-affiliated forces’ use of these weapons.
This would be the first reported use of indirect and deep strike fires
by HTS-affiliated forces since HTS assumed control of Damascus.[21]
The
HTS-led interim government is not publicly responding to SDF overtures
to negotiate the SDF’s incorporation into the new Syrian army and
incorporation into a Syrian state. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi
reiterated his desire for the incorporation of the SDF into a future
Syria to Asharq al Awsat on December 27.[22]
Abdi said that the SDF has not yet engaged in direct negotiations with
HTS despite Abdi’s repeated expressed interest in negotiations since the
fall of the Assad regime.[23]
Abdi outlined his priorities for negotiations with HTS—should such
negotiations occur—and noted that the SDF would require an end to
Turkish and Turkish-backed attacks on the SDF so that Syrians may
discuss the future without “external interference.”[24]
It
appears increasingly unlikely, however, that the HTS-led government’s
leadership views negotiating with the SDF as a priority as it formalizes
relations with Turkey. HTS, while not a Turkish proxy or beholden to
Turkey, has been quick to deepen its cooperation with Turkey since the
fall of the Assad regime. HTS’s intensifying alignment with Turkish
interests continues to pose an existential threat to the SDF as Turkey
continues to signal a possible Turkish incursion into Syria or a
Turkish-backed operation in northern Syria to “eliminate” the SDF.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on December 27 that
Turkey shall ensure security “beyond its southern borders” and
“eliminate terrorist threats” starting in 2025.[25] Abdi warned of a potential “catastrophe” facing Kobani from the Turkish military buildup on the border.[26]
Syrian media reported on December 27 that Turkish military
reinforcements arrived in the town of Suluk, which is located north of
Raqqa in SNA-controlled territory.[27]
The SNA continued to engage the SDF west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[28] Local sources reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the frontlines near the Tishreen Dam.[29] The SDF claimed on December 27 that it engaged SNA forces near Abu Qalqal in the Manbij countryside.[30]
Local
sources reported that the SDF continued to advance southwest of Lake
Assad into SNA-controlled territory south of Tishreen Dam on December
27.[31]
A pro-SDF social media user posted a photo of SDF members on the “Deir
Hafer and Khafsah front” and said that SDF forces are operating in the
area.[32]
An Aleppo-based outlet reported on December 27 that the Khafsah water
treatment plant, which the SDF had reportedly taken control of on
December 23, is not operating at ”maximum capacity” due to nearby
fighting.[33]
The Khafsah water treatment plant is a critical plant services in
Aleppo City. The Aleppo Water Establishment asked Aleppo citizens to
ration water consumption.[34]
The SDF advance in the south may intend to relieve pressure on the
Tishreen Dam area by forcing the SNA to redeploy its forces to respond
to a new threat.
Iranian-backed
Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri inspected combat
units along the Iraq-Syria border on December 26 and 27. Ameri met with combat units at the Rabia border crossing in northern Ninewa Province on December 26.[35]
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Ninewa Operations Commander Khadir al
Matrohi, who is affiliated with the Badr Organization, accompanied
Ameri.[36]
Ameri met with a military official named Majid Saleh Jassem, although
it is unclear whether this official serves in the Iraqi Army, PMF, or
Iraqi Border Guard.[37] The 15th and 20th Infantry divisions redeployed to areas between Rabia and Sinjar on December 7.[38]
Ameri
separately reviewed security and intelligence plans and emphasized the
need to conduct unspecified “preemptive operations” during a visit to
the Iraqi Army 7th Infantry Division in al Qaim, western Anbar Province,
on December 27.[39]
7th Infantry Division Commander Major General Hassan al Silawi and
unspecified PMF commanders attended the meeting. Iranian-backed Iraqi
militia Kataib Hezbollah controls several PMF brigades that control the
al Qaim border crossing.[40]
The Iraqi Army 27th Infantry Brigade, which operates under the 7th
Infantry Division, oversees border security north of al Qaim across from
the Syrian town of Baghouz.[41]
Ameri’s
inspections come as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani
implicitly threatened on December 27 to militarily intervene in Syria if
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurges and threatens Iraq.
Sudani stated that “any dysfunction” in Syrian prisons would “push [Iraq] to counter terrorism.”[42]
Sudani was likely referring to the SDF-controlled al Hol camp and
network of Syrian prisons that contain thousands of ISIS supporters and
fighters.[43]
Iraqi National Intelligence Service Director Hamid al Shatri similarly
suggested on December 26 that Iraq would consider intervening or
allowing Iraqi militias to intervene in Syria if unspecified Syrian
armed groups threatened Iraq.[44]
CTP-ISW previously assessed that the SDF cannot conduct offensive
operations against ISIS while contending with threats from Turkey and
its allies in Syria, namely the SNA.[45]
Ongoing Turkish-backed operations against the SDF have forced the SDF
to prioritize the existential threat posed by Turkey over the
counter-ISIS mission.
An Iraqi Shia Coordination
Framework member said on December 26 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias
will resume attacking US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces extend
their presence in Iraq beyond the agreed–upon withdrawal date of
December 2026.[46]
The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of
US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by
September 2025 and that the remaining troops will withdraw by the end of
2026.[47]
Mukhtar al Musawi, a Shia Coordination Framework member of parliament,
denied reports that the Iraqi government is considering its request for
US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026 due to concerns that
the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria threatens Iraqi security.[48]
Musawi also told Iraqi media that the Iraqi militias had stopped
targeting US forces due to the withdrawal timeline but added that
operations could resume if the United States extends its presence in
Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias last claimed an attack targeting US
forces in Iraq on August 5, 2024.[49]
Likely Iranian militias also launched three rockets at Baghdad
International Airport on October 1, but no militia claimed this attack.[50]
Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ)'s Jenin Battalion said that it engaged with
“occupation forces” in multiple areas of Jenin on December 26.[51] Palestinian militias, including PIJ, historically used the term ”occupation forces” to refer to Israeli forces.[52]
CTP-ISW has not observed any reports or indications of Israeli forces
operating in Jenin at the time of this writing. The Palestinian
Authority (PA), however, continued to operate against Palestinian
militias in Jenin on December 26.[53]
Palestinian militia fighters killed a PA security forces officer in
Jenin on December 26, marking the third PA officer killed in Jenin since
the operation began on December 5.[54]
It would be a notable inflection if PIJ began referring to the PA as
”occupation forces.” It would, conversely, also be notable if the IDF
began operating in Jenin at the same time as the PA operation against
Palestinian militias.
Key Takeaways:
- Explosion in Homs: An
explosion in Homs suggests that HTS does not yet have full control on
the ground and that local groups and individuals can access and
repurpose unexploded ordinance.
- Sectarian Tension in Syria: The
HTS-led interim government has thus far failed to prevent individual
opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community.
- HTS and Christian Communities:
The HTS-led interim government deployed forces to the Christian town of
al Masmiyah in Daraa Province on December 27 to maintain security in
the town during Christmas celebrations.
- HTS Operations Against Former Regime Elements:
HTS-led security forces engaged alleged former regime fighters in
several villages west of Homs on December 26. HTS-led security forces
entered Balqassa village, west of Homs City, on December 26, reportedly
to pursue regime-affiliated official Shuja al Ali.
- HTS-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Negotiations: The
HTS-led interim government is not publicly responding to SDF overtures
to negotiate the SDF’s incorporation into the new Syrian army and
incorporation into a Syrian state. It appears increasingly unlikelythat
the HTS-led government’s leadership views negotiating with the SDF as a
priority as it formalizes relations with Turkey.
- SDF-Syrian National Army (SNA) Fighting: Local
sources reported that the SDF continued to advance southwest of Lake
Assad into SNA-controlled territory south of Tishreen Dam on December
27. The SNA also continued to engage the SDF west of Tishreen Dam in the
Manbij countryside.
- Iraq: Iranian-backed Badr
Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri inspected combat units
along the Iraq-Syria border on December 26 and 27. Ameri also reviewed
security and intelligence plans and emphasized the need to conduct
unspecified “preemptive operations.” Ameri’s inspections come as Iraqi
Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani implicitly threatened on December
27 to militarily intervene in Syria if the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) resurges and threatens Iraq.
West Bank: Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ)'s Jenin Battalion said that it engaged with
“occupation forces” in multiple areas of Jenin on December 26.
Palestinian militias, including PIJ, historically used the term
”occupation forces” to refer to Israeli forces, but CTP-ISW has not
observed IDF operations in Jenin in recent days. It would be a notable
inflection if PIJ began referring to the PA as ”occupation forces.”
Gaza Strip:
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The
IDF 401st Armored Brigade (162nd Division) began operations targeting a
Hamas command-and-control site inside Kamal Adwan Hospital in Jabalia,
northern Gaza Strip, on December 27.[55] The
IDF evacuated hospital patients and staff to other hospitals in
coordination with international organizations and local health
officials. An Israeli media correspondent reported that the IDF last
operated at the hospital in October 2024.[56] [57]
Palestinian militias conducted four attacks in the northern Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 26.[58]
Hamas conducted two attacks in and around Jabalia on December 26 and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducted one attack west of Beit Hanoun
on December 27.[59]
Hamas
also claimed that a Hamas fighter detonated a suicide vest (SVEST)
targeting Israeli forces while firing a gun and throwing grenades east
of Jabalia camp on December 26.[60] Hamas last claimed that it conducted an SVEST attack on December 20.[61]
An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported after the December 20
attack that the IDF struck and killed the Hamas fighter before he
approached Israeli forces, however.[62]
The IDF has not corroborated this SVEST attack and given Hamas’ recent
willingness to lie about its use of SVESTs, Hamas may not have conducted
an SVEST attack on December 26.
Hamas detonated an EFP targeting Israeli armor south of the Zaytoun neighborhood, Gaza City, on December 26.[63]
The National Resistance Brigades mortared an Israeli command-and-control site along the Netzarim Corridor on December 27.[64]
An
unidentified Palestinian militia conducted an indirect fire attack on
December 27 that struck an open area in southern Israel.[65] No militia has claimed the attack as of the time of this writing.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
A
Palestinian man originally from Tulkarm conducted a stabbing attack
targeting an elderly woman in Herzliya, central Israel, on December 27.[66] The
Shin Bet stated that the man previously worked as a Shin Bet informant
in the West Bank but was relocated to Israel after his cover was blown.
Security guards in Herzliya shot the attacker before the police later
arrested him.
Northern Israel and Lebanon
Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:
- End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
- Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon
Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces fired artillery at Aita al Shaab, on the Israel-Lebanon border, on December 27.[67]
The
IDF 226th Paratroopers Brigade (146th Division) destroyed Hezbollah
infrastructure and weapons in Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon, on December
27.[68] The
IDF identified and destroyed dozens of weapons depots containing
rockets, IEDs, mortars, and missiles located in civilian buildings in
Naqoura.[69] Hezbollah used these sites to carry out attacks targeting Israel.[70]
Israeli forces also located and destroyed an unspecified number of
rocket launchers aimed at Israeli territory during a separate raid in
the area.[71]
The
IDF conducted several airstrikes on December 27 targeting Hezbollah
infrastructure at several border crossings that enable Hezbollah to
transfer weapons from Syria to Lebanon.[72] IDF
Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar stated that the IDF struck
seven border crossings on the Lebanon-Syria border that Hezbollah
previously used to transport weapons.[73]
Bar stated that Hezbollah is ”once again” trying to establish weapons
smuggling routes through these border crossings. The IDF reported that
the IDF struck infrastructure at the Janta Border crossing, which
Hezbollah has used to move weapons and fighters.[74]
Geolocated images posted to X (Twitter) showed the result of two
Israeli airstrikes near Qusayya village, eastern Lebanon, on December
27.[75]
Hezbollah
is contending with multiple competing priorities, including
reconstruction in Lebanon and reconstituting Hezbollah’s organization,
which may decrease support for the group in some quarters. UK-based
media reported on December 24 that delayed war compensation to
non-Hezbollah members and those injured in Israel’s operations in
Lebanon has caused growing unrest among Hezbollah’s support base.[76]
Hezbollah, which quickly rebuilt Lebanon and provided a social safety
net for the Lebanese after the 2006 war, is facing much more difficult
reconstruction and reconstitution tasks compared to 2006. The 2006 War
lasted 34 days and destroyed only relatively limited areas of Lebanon.
Hezbollah also suffered only 500 casualties in 2006.[77]
The October 7 War in Lebanon lasted nearly 14 months, destroyed many
villages in southern Lebanon, and killed thousands of Hezbollah fighters
while severely damaging Hezbollah‘s military command-and-control
structure.[78]
An engineer affiliated with Hezbollah construction company Jihad al
Bina told Hezbollah media on December 24 that Hezbollah is continuing
the ”restoration and reconstruction” of buildings destroyed by Israel’s
operations in Lebanon.[79]
This construction process will take a very long time, and Jihad al Bina
will need to compete with Hezbollah‘s other priorities--including
acquiring new weapons, training new leaders, and reorganizing
Hezbollah’s military wing--for funding and personnel.
A
Hezbollah-backed Lebanese political claimed on December 25 that
Hezbollah has rebuilt its leadership, military, and security structures,
but even if this is accurate, the new commanders will presumably need
training before they can operate at the same level their predecessors
had.[80]
These commanders will also need to acquire new weapons to replace those
captured and destroyed by the Israelis, further straining Hezbollah’s
resources.
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
The
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) called on Iraqi citizens to
participate in a procession on December 28 commemorating the five-year
anniversary of the December 2019 US airstrikes that targeted
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[81] The December 2019 US airstrikes targeted the PMF 45th and 46th Brigades, which are Kataib Hezbollah formations.[82]
The
Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport and
claimed a drone attack targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area.[83] The US THAAD air defense system intercepted the Houthi ballistic missile outside Israeli borders.[84] There are no reports of a drone reaching Israel, however.[85]
The Houthis conducted a drone attack targeting the Danish-flagged vessel Santa Ursula east of Socotra Island on December 27.[86] The Houthis said that they targeted the shipping because it had entered an Israeli-"linked” port.[87]
Houthi media claimed a US-UK airstrike targeted the “September 21 Park” in the Maeen neighborhood, Sanaa City, on December 27.[88] Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom have not commented on the strikes at this time.[89]
CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1872675491406094752
[2] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1872650060506542097
[3] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1872627963394654432
[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/27/world/middleeast/syria-alawites-assad.html ;
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce8nzjkye42o
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-new-rulers-declare-crackdown-tensions-flare-coastal-area-2024-12-26/
[6] https://apnews.com/article/syria-homs-alawites-hts-assad-sectarian-6c8d534d9f93da13dc8629f2f2c49aae ;
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/27/world/middleeast/syria-alawites-assad.html
[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-new-rulers-declare-crackdown-tensions-flare-coastal-area-2024-12-26/
[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/27/world/middleeast/syria-alawites-assad.html
[9] https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/342
[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-24-2024
[11] https://x.com/aleamaliaat_ale/status/1872367696983310814 ;
https://t.me/mzmgr_syria/26647 ;
https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/119901 ;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1872606549707014537
[12] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1037
[13] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1037
[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syria%20SITREP%2015%20-%2023%20AUG%20%281%29.pdf ;
https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1872399886630662290
[15] https://en.royanews dot tv/news/56377
[16] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1872309766317568016
[17] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1817975878229356695;
https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1818702163226378418 ;
https://www.alarabiya dot
net/arab-and-world/syria/2024/12/27/-Ø£Øد-قادة-نظام-الأسد-ورجل-Øزب-الله-من-هو-شجاع-العلي-الذي-أعلن-عن-مقتله#
[18] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1872308578851442771;
https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1872332239805321360;
https://t.me/The_Free_City_of_Homs/355; https://x.com/ivarmm/status/1872354742120378809
[19] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1872308578851442771;
https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1872332239805321360;
https://t.me/The_Free_City_of_Homs/355; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1872356132377047204
[20] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1872364651159429189
[21] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1872364651159429189
[22] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5095590-قائد-قسد-لـالشرق-الأوسط-تركيا-لا-تستجيب-للوساطة-وكوباني-مهدَّدة
[23] www dot npasyria.com/en/119592; https://x.com/MazloumAbdi/status/1866615394238116008
[24] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5095590-قائد-قسد-لـالشرق-الأوسط-تركيا-لا-تستجيب-للوساطة-وكوباني-مهدَّدة
[25]
https://www.aa.com dot
tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-to-ensure-security-beyond-its-southern-borders-starting-from-2025-president-erdogan/3436076#
[26] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5095590-قائد-قسد-لـالشرق-الأوسط-تركيا-لا-تستجيب-للوساطة-وكوباني-مهدَّدة
[27] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1872701374405988719
[28] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131106
[29] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/131103
[30] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1872687052275507502
[31] https://x.com/rewsakurda/status/1872402660172984608; https://x.com/hawarhebo99/status/1872691907874406843 ; https://x.com/hawarhebo99/status/1872708257137213512
[32] https://x.com/hawarhebo99/status/1872691907874406843
[33] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1872709673100697950; https://x.com/hebunor/status/1871364483098288319
[34] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1872709673100697950;
https://www.facebook.com/HalabTodayTV/posts/999087988909760/;
https://www.facebook.com/ICRCarabic/videos/%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%81%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9/257167170250728/
[35] https://al-hashed.gov dot iq/?p=531529
[36]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces#:~:text=The%20PMF%20originated%20as%20part,for%20militias%20responsive%20to%20Iran.
[37] https://al-hashed.gov dot iq/?p=531529
[38] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-15-2024
[39] https://www.facebook.com/HadiALamriMediaOffice/videos/2090605064731243/
[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-24-2024 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iran%20Update%2C%20February%203%2C%202024%20PDF.pdf
[41] https://www.facebook.com/rag.iraq/posts/pfbid02dPK8U41inPmZZjpcFXmjcj5aHMpVfq4Ma64yhKsr9nwvRrufs11gzdhHiwH59qCyl?__tn__=%2CO*F
[42]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8
[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024
[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2024
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024
[46]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD-%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84
[47] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/
[48]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD-%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84
[49] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1820583743104622843
[50] https://x.com/USAmbIraq/status/1841107559576449043
[51] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1948 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1949
[52] https://t.me/QudsN/317891 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/415
[53] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-835104
[54] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-835104
[55] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1872598034594349139
[56] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1872598034594349139
[57] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1872602295495749958
[58]
alqassam dot
ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20133/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-447-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86
; https://t.me/sarayaps/18990
[59] https://t.me/sarayaps/18990
; alqassam dot
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[60] https://alqassam
dot
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[61]
https://alqassam dot
ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20127/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84441%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9
[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17696
[63]
alqassam dot
ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20133/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-447-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86
[64] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4500
[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1872654945503388149
[66] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/83-year-old-woman-killed-in-herzliya-terror-stabbing-attacker-is-ex-shin-bet-informant/
[67] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110099
[68] https://www.idf.il/260500
[69] https://www.idf dot il/260500
[70] https://www.idf dot il/260500
[71] https://www.idf dot il/260500
[72] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1872571126129238293; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1872568960694296801
[73] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1872630022944518436; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1872623698630619489
[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1872571126129238293; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1872568960694296801 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-27-2024
[75] https://x.com/MiddleEastOSINT/status/1872632123733291142
[76] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5094983-rising-discontent-within-hezbollah%E2%80%99s-support-base-over-delayed-war-compensation
[77] https://content.ecf.org.il/files/M00626_2006WarLebanonMapEnglish.pdf
[78] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate120224 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-17-2024
[79] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/12944296 ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp271
[80] https://t.me/almanarnews/188043 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/188044
[81] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/107711
[82] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50941693
[83] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1872558787959345391
[84] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1872459413828837605; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/houthis-fire-another-overnight-ballistic-missile-at-central-israel-triggering-sirens/
[85]
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/houthis-take-responsibility-for-overnight-missile-attack-claim-to-have-targeted-ben-gurion-airport/
[86] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1872558787959345391
[87] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1872558787959345391
[88] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1872713862027624561
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/fresh-airstrike-hits-yemens-capital-with-houthis-blaming-us-and-uk/
[89] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/fresh-airstrike-hits-yemens-capital-with-houthis-blaming-us-and-uk/
