Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Riley Bailey, and Kateryna Stepanenko
September 7, 2024, 5:20pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on September 7. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the September 8 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Ukraine's Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov
noted that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is having theater-wide
impacts on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and addressed the
prospects for continued Russian offensive operations in Winter
2024–2025. Budanov stated during an interview published on
September 7 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast complicated
Russia's plans for offensive operations in August 2024 and later this
fall.[1]
Budanov noted that the Russian military command is committing any
available manpower and equipment to achieve their objective in Russia's
"main direction," likely referring to the seizure of Pokrovsk, and that
Russian forces are focusing their attention on this direction. Russian
forces recently intensified offensive operations and made further
advances near Pokrovsk and west and southwest of Donetsk City, but ISW
has not observed intensified Russian offensive operations in other
frontline areas in Ukraine.[2]
The Russian military command has almost certainly decided to prioritize
Russian advances near Pokrovsk and is committing available manpower and
materiel to the area at the expense of Russian offensive operations in
other directions.[3]
A Russian milblogger claimed that manpower constraints are forcing the
Russian military command to adjust their plans in Donetsk and Kursk
oblasts and that Russian officials do not have a "systemic solution" to
generate the forces necessary to reinforce offensive operations in
Ukraine and repel Ukraine‘s incursion into Kursk Oblast.[4]
The milblogger noted that Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction
have begun to slow as Russian units are suffering personnel losses and
are increasingly understaffed and that Russian forces are continuing
offensive operations in the area despite being "exhausted."[5]
The Russian military command will likely be able to funnel enough
forces into the area to continue Russia's ongoing offensive operations
and possibly eventually seize Pokrovsk, although Russian forces may
culminate before seizing the city.[6]
Budanov
noted during the interview that winter weather conditions will likely
complicate Russian offensive operations in the coming months, but that
this does not mean that Russian forces will completely stop assaults on
Ukrainian positions.[7]
The fall mud season has historically hampered Russian and Ukrainian
ground maneuver, but periods of prolonged freezing temperatures that
typically begin in late December freeze the ground and allow armored
vehicles to move more easily than in autumn and spring months.[8]
Russian forces notably fought to seize the initiative and pursued
offensive operations in Fall 2023 during the most challenging weather
conditions of the year instead of waiting for improved weather
conditions later in Winter 2023–2024, however.[9]
Fall and winter weather conditions will likely complicate Russian and
Ukrainian battlefield activity but are very unlikely to completely stall
activity along the frontline.
Iran reportedly recently delivered more than 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[10] UK outlet The Times,
citing a Ukrainian military intelligence source, reported on September 6
that a Russian ship delivered the Fateh-360 missiles to an undisclosed
port in the Caspian Sea on September 4. US and European officials
recently confirmed that Iran began supplying Russia with short-range
ballistic missiles, and ISW assessed that Russian forces will likely use
the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and
civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter.[11]
Ukraine
continues to successfully adapt and develop its anti-drone
capabilities, allowing Ukrainian forces to leverage lower-end systems to
offset Russian pressures on Ukraine's limited air defense umbrella. Ukrainian
military analyst Petro Chernyk stated on September 7 that Ukrainian
electronic warfare (EW) systems are disrupting radar-guided
Shahed-136/131 drones, causing the drones to change course and crash
after running out of fuel.[12]
Ukrainian officials have recently reported that some Russian Shahed
drones have not reached their targets for unspecified reasons, but the
Ukrainian Air Force acknowledged on August 31 and September 6 that
Ukrainian EW affected the drones.[13]
Ukrainian drone production company Besomar stated on September 7 that
it developed an interceptor drone that can shoot down unspecified
Russian drones and that Ukrainian forces are already using these
interceptor drones in the combat zone.[14]
ISW has also recently observed reports of Ukrainian forces using
first-person view (FPV) drones to down Russian helicopters and
reconnaissance and strike drones.[15]
These Ukrainian countermeasures are part of wider efforts aimed at
offsetting the pressure that repeated, large-scale Russian strike series
exert on Ukraine's limited air defense umbrella in the face of delayed
and inconsistent deliveries of Western security assistance.[16]
Ukraine's use of EW to counter Shahed drones will notably allow
Ukrainian forces to conserve the limited air defense systems and
missiles that Ukraine needs to protect against Russian missile strikes
targeting Ukrainian frontline areas, critical infrastructure, and major
population centers. ISW continues to assess that Russian and Ukrainian
forces are engaged in a technological offense-defense race and that
Ukraine's ability to field technological innovations at scale ahead of
Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine's ability to offset Russia's
current materiel advantages.[17]
Key Takeaways:
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian
forces recently regained territory and Ukrainian forces recently
advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations
in the area on September 7. Geolocated footage published September 6
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to positions south of
Khitrovka (north of Sudzha).[18]
Geolocated footage published on September 6 indicates that Russian
forces recently regained positions southeast of Korenevo and in northern
Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha).[19]
Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to attack southwest of Korenevo
near Snagost, Vishnevka, and Komarovka; near Korenevo; east of Korenevo
near Olgovka and Matveyevka; north of Sudzha near Maryevka and Pogrebki;
northeast of Sudzha near Martynovka; and southeast of Sudzha near Borki
on September 6 and 7.[20]
Elements of the of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific
Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]), and 83rd Airborne
(VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[21]
Ukrainian
forces continue to target Russian ground lines of communications
(GLOCs) and Russian military equipment in near rear areas in Kursk
Oblast. Geolocated footage published on September 7 shows Ukrainian
forces striking a Russian pontoon bridge across the Seim River north of
Glushkovo and Zvannoye (both southwest of Korenevo) with likely GMLRS
cluster munitions.[22]
Additional footage published on September 7 shows Ukrainian forces
striking a Russian 9K33 Osa air defense system in an unspecified area of
Kursk Oblast.[23]
Ukrainian
forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian ammunition depot near
Soldatskoye, Voronezh Oblast on the night of September 6 to 7.
Ukrainian media reported on September 7 that sources stated
that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) conducted the drone strike
against the ammunition depot, and geolocated footage shows a fire and
secondary detonations near Soldatskoye following the drone strike.[24]
Satellite imagery collected on September 7 shows extensive fires and
smoke plumes near Soldatskoye, and NASA FIRMS data shows extensive heat
anomalies in the area.[25]
Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces
suppressed a Ukrainian drone over Ostrogozhsky Raion, Voronezh Oblast
and that the falling drone debris caused a fire and subsequent secondary
detonations at a facility with explosive objects.[26]
The Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation,
Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, stated that the Ukrainian drone strike
destroyed North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles at the
ammunition depot in Soldatskoye.[27]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Fighting continued north and
northeast of Kharkiv City on September 7, but there were no confirmed
changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian
forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified size from the
direction of Lyptsi and counterattacked near Hlyboke (both north of
Kharkiv City).[28]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued
ground assaults near Lypsti and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on
September 6 and 7.[29]
Ukrainian
Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev stated on
September 7 that Russian forces continue to pursue operational
objectives in northern Kharkiv Oblast but that Ukrainian operations in
the area and the operational pressures of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk
Oblast are disrupting Russia's offensive effort.[30]
Sarantsev stated that Russian forces retain their goals to create a
"buffer zone" in northern Kharkiv Oblast along the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and to fix and draw Ukrainian forces to the area.
Sarantsev added that Russian forces aim to advance closer to Kharkiv
City from the Hlyboke-Lyptsi direction in order to pressure Ukrainian
leadership and aim to advance into the rear of the Ukrainian grouping in
the Kupyansk direction from Vovchansk. Sarantsev stated that the
Russian Northern Grouping of Forces concentrated 30,000 out of 50,000
total personnel for the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast
in early May 2024, but that Ukrainian forces quickly strengthened their
grouping in the area and stopped Russian advances. Sarantsev stated
that the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk in early August 2024
forced the Russian military to transfer some units from the Kharkiv
direction to Kursk Oblast but cautioned that Russian forces retain
significant forces and means in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Sarantsev
stated that Russian forces are continuing offensive activities northeast
of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Buhruvatka, Ohirtseve, and
Tykhe but are increasingly switching to the defensive in unspecified
areas. Sarantsev stated that Russian forces continue attacks in the
Hlyboke-Lypsti direction with small assault groups of two to three
personnel that storm Ukrainian positions from multiple directions at
once. Sarantsev stated that Russian forces dig trenches and dugouts
immediately when they consolidate at a new position in northern Kharkiv
Oblast. Sarantsev stated that the decreased tempo of Russian aviation
operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast continues, and that Russian
aircraft now conduct a few or no glide bomb strikes every day as
compared to 30 to 50 daily glide bomb strikes at the start of the
Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces recently advanced amid continued Russian offensive operations
along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 7. Geolocated
footage published on September 6 indicates that Russian forces recently
advanced within southern Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and seized the
settlement.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Synkivka on August 30.[32]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers
from Pishchane (northwest of Svatove) towards Kolisnykivka (immediately
west of Pishchane) and advanced southwest of Ploshchanka (northwest of
Kreminna), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk
near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka, Hlushkivka, and
Berestove and in the direction of Lozova; west of Svatove near
Andriivka; southwest of Svatove near Cherneshchyna, Novoyehorivka, and
Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske and Makiivka; west of
Kreminna near Torske and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova
on September 6 and 7.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces continued assaults east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and
southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka on September 6 and 7, but
there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[35]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on September 7,
but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 700 meters deep in
western Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and advanced west of
Klishchiivka (south of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed visual
confirmation of these claims.[36]
Russian forces also continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar
itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, and south of Chasiv Yar
near Andriivka on September 6 and 7.[37]
Elements of the Russian 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th
Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue
to operate near Chasiv Yar.[38]
Ukrainian
forces recently conducted a counterattack in northwestern Niu York
(south of Toretsk) amid continued Russian offensive operations near
Toretsk on September 7. Geolocated footage published on September 7
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked in northwestern
Niu York and maintain positions in the settlement.[39]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in
northwestern Niu York (south of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed
confirmation of this claim.[40]
Russian forces continued assaults near Toretsk and south of Toretsk
near Nelipivka and Niu York and towards Sukha Balka on September 6 and
7.[41]
Russian
forces recently advanced east and southeast of Pokrovsk and continued
offensive operations in the area on September 7. Geolocated footage
published on September 7 shows Russian servicemembers assaulting a group
of Ukrainian servicemembers in an armored vehicle in central Hrodivka
(east of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces have advanced into
the central part of the town.[42]
Additional geolocated footage published on September 6 and 7 indicates
that Russian forces operating southeast of Pokrovsk recently marginally
advanced in northwestern and western Mykhailivka (just east of
Selydove), south of Mykhailivka, and just south of Novohrodivka.[43]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Lysivka
(southeast of Pokrovsk), advanced in eastern and southern Ukrainsk
(southeast of Pokrovsk and southeast of Selydove), and are advancing
towards Hirnyk (further south of Ukrainsk).[44]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Central
Grouping of Forces recently seized one of the two settlements named
Kalynove in the area but did not specify which settlement.[45]
The Russian MoD is likely claiming the seizure of the settlement that
is southeast of Pokrovsk (east of Mykhailivka), which ISW assessed
Russian forces seized as of August 27.[46]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating southeast
of Pokrovsk are concentrating their assaults on the tactical heights
between Tsukuryne and Hirnyk and are trying to advance in this area to
avoid conducting frontal assaults against Ukrainian forces in Ukrainsk.[47]
Russian forces also continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near
Vozdvyzhenka, Zelene Pole, and Myrolyubivka; and southeast of Pokrovsk
towards Novotroitske and near Selydove, Mykhailivka, Zhelanne Pershe,
and Halytsynivka.[48]
Russian milbloggers amplified footage claiming to show a Russian
missile striking a bridge on the eastern outskirts of Selydove and noted
that Russian forces are attempting to complicate Ukrainian logistics in
the area.[49]
Russian
forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian
offensive operations in the area on September 7. Geolocated footage
published on September 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
within northern Krasnohorivka and further north of the settlement.[50]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced west of
Krasnohorivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[51] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Krasnohorivka, Maskymilyanivka, and Heorhiivka on September 6 and 7.[52]
Elements of the Russian "Kaira" Detachment (39th Motorized Rifle
Brigade, 68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]), the "Solnyshko"
detachment (68th AC), and other unspecified elements of the 68th AC are
reportedly operating in the south Donetsk direction (west and southwest
of Donetsk City).[53]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on
September 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kostyantynivka,
Vodyane, and Vuhledar on September 6 and 7.[54]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces' main task in the
Vuhledar direction is to clear the Pivdennodonbaska mine area (east of
Vuhledar) but that Ukrainian positions on the outskirts of Vuhledar are
complicating this effort.[55]
Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army
[CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]); the 20th Motorized Rifle
Division (8th CAA), including its 944th Self-Propelled Artillery
Regiment; and the "Grachi" Spetsnaz detachment are reportedly operating
near Antonivka.[56]
The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked in the
Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (south of
Velyka Novosilka) on September 6 and 7.[57]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian
forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 7,
but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian
General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Mala Tokmachka
(north of Robotyne) on September 7.[58]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Robotyne
and Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed
confirmation of these claims.[59]
Artillerymen and drone operators of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle
Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District
[SMD]), including its 50th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, are
reportedly striking Ukrainian forces north of Robotyne.[60]
Russian
forces recently advanced on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta amid
continued positional engagements in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on
September 6 and 7.[61]
Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Russian
forces recently advanced on an island south of Berehove (southwest of
Kherson City).[62] Elements of the Russian 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[63]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of September 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian
forces launched 67 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast; Yeysk,
Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and that Ukrainian
forces shot down 58 drones over Vinnytsia, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv,
Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Sumy, Kherson, and Poltava
oblasts.[64] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported that drone debris fell in Pecherskyi and Dniprovskyi raions.[65]
The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada reported that drone debris fell near the
Verkhovna Rada building in Kyiv City but did not cause damage.[66]
Russian sources claimed on September 6 that Russian forces conducted an
Iskander missile strike against a hotel in Zaporizhzhia City.[67]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
officers continue to mistreat and abuse their subordinates likely due
to poor command training and discipline. A Russian source claimed on
September 6 that a Russian battalion commander and the chief of staff of
the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are physically
abusing their subordinates and extorting money from them.[68]
The source also claimed that the officers demand monthly bribes and
allow their subordinates to purchase combat orders and leave the unit
for additional fees. The source posted footage and imagery purporting to
show the abuse.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Kremlin newswire TASS claimed
on September 7 that Russian specialists from the Stupor anti-drone
software development company developed a “sliding interference”
technology that causes Ukrainian drones to lose contact with their
operators.[69]
A Stupor representative claimed on the fields of the All-Russian
gathering of combat drone operators ”Dronnitsa -2024” that the "sliding
interference" creates "echelon protection" that allows Russian forces to
more easily target Ukrainian drone frequencies, which are constantly
changing. Russian forces are reportedly testing the technology in the
Zaporizhia direction in Ukraine.
Russian First Deputy
Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited the Aero-HIT drone production
facility in Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk Krai on September 6 and inspected the
“Veles” modular first-person view (FPV) drone.[70]
Russian forces can reportedly use the “Veles” FPV drone as a strike and
reconnaissance drone, and the drone includes an interference-proof
communication channel. Aero-HIT reportedly plans to expand the
production of “Veles” drones from the current rate of 1,500 per month to
15,000 per month starting from January 2025. A DW investigation
recently found that Russian drone operators have been using ”Veles”
drones in test strikes against civilians in Beryslav, west (right) bank
Kherson Oblast.[71]
Russian
tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod claimed on September 7 that it
delivered a new batch of T-90M tanks equipped with anti-drone electronic
warfare (EW) capabilities and “cape” radio-absorbing stealth technology
to the Russian army.[72]
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian
officials attempted to demonstrate Russian unity and support for
Russian federal subjects (regions) bordering Ukraine to downplay the
ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian Central Election
Commission (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova claimed on September 7 that
the highest turnout in the State Duma by-elections for single-member
constituencies was in Bryansk Oblast and that the highest turnout in the
elections of regional heads was in Kursk and Kemerovo oblasts.[73]
Pamfilova claimed that the high voter turnout in Kursk Oblast reflected
the residents’ response to the Ukrainian incursion in the region.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on September 7 during his
speech honoring Moscow City Day that Moscow continues to support
occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Russian regions on the
Russian-Ukrainian border, likely in a deliberate attempt to portray the
Kremlin and Moscow as aware of the situation in Kursk Oblast.[74]
Putin's statement contrasts with the subpar response of Russian
authorities to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, which Putin
has often ignored or downplayed, leading to large-scale, chaotic
evacuations from the very border regions he ostensibly cares for.[75]
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FskyzaW5iRs ; https://suspilne dot media/831325-ocilnik-gur-armia-rosii-pripinila-nastup-majze-na-vsih-dilankah-frontu/
[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar090524
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar090524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082724
[4] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58861
[5] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58859
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024
[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FskyzaW5iRs ; https://suspilne dot media/831325-ocilnik-gur-armia-rosii-pripinila-nastup-majze-na-vsih-dilankah-frontu/
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120422 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923
[10] https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/ballistic-clmpm3d7m
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2024
[12] https://armyinform
dot
com.ua/2024/09/07/padayut-abo-letyat-na-rosiyu-ekspert-prokomentuvav-zminu-povedinky-shahediv/
; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2024; https://t.me/kpszsu/18539
[14] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/v-ukrayini-rozrobyly-perehoplyuvach-bpla-litakovogo-typu/ ; https://youtu.be/0GqCgb60qIw?si=vWeCEhP17HuzrKqQ
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar08072024
[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar08072024
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024
[18] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6676?single; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76490
[19] https://t.me/BRAVO_Team_chanel/71; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6692; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1832354078447341618; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1832354566886605301 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6682; https://t.me/khornegroup/2642
[20] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/183355 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17001 ; https://t.me/rybar/63316 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/43071 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51827; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/40698
[21] https://t.me/rusich_army/17004 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136468 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136511 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76545 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136469
[22] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/19723; https://t.me/ua_regteam/135; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/13401
[23]
https://t.me/ua_regteam/135 ; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/09/07/hody-po-vodi-i-na-zhalys-syly-oborony-znyshhyly-dvi-pontonni-perepravy-voroga-i-zrk-osa/
; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/13401 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/syly
[24] https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/110221
; https://mil.in dot
ua/uk/news/udarni-bezpilotnyky-urazyly-sklad-z-boyeprypasamy-u-voronezkij-oblasti/
; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1832276164838056413; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1832276336242569697 ; https://kyivindependent dot com/ukrainian-drones-hit-ammunition-warehouse-in-russias-voronezh-oblast-source-confirms/
[25] https://x.com/georgewbarros/status/1832432595369423276 ; https://x.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1832420621629694063
[26] https://t.me/gusev_36/2730; https://t.me/gusev_36/2732
[27] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/7823
[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15088
[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bknSp5vCxzExdCbGcG6v159ELaoCSFAvhVa7e1duwu9mq9WrD2dRRwyfxNdDyxdxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel
[30]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/09/07/harkivshhyna-yak-druga-syriya-rechnyk-otu-harkiv-nazvav-najmerzennishu-metu-zastosuvannya-kabiv-intervyu/
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/09/07/u-vovchansku-boyi-tochatsya-vseredyni-bagatopoverhivok/ ;
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/09/07/v-zsu-rozpovily-pro-zastosuvannya-rosiyanamy-kabiv-yak-zaminnyka-dalekobijnoyi-artyleriyi/
[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6675; https://t.me/UkrArmy3/1016
[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2024
[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15092; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136500; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28019
[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bknSp5vCxzExdCbGcG6v159ELaoCSFAvhVa7e1duwu9mq9WrD2dRRwyfxNdDyxdxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel
[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bknSp5vCxzExdCbGcG6v159ELaoCSFAvhVa7e1duwu9mq9WrD2dRRwyfxNdDyxdxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel
[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76522 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51799
[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bknSp5vCxzExdCbGcG6v159ELaoCSFAvhVa7e1duwu9mq9WrD2dRRwyfxNdDyxdxl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21954
[38] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76542
[39] https://x.com/Deepstate_UA/status/1832416237579653554 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1210138846703900 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1832422334302654673
[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58870
[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bknSp5vCxzExdCbGcG6v159ELaoCSFAvhVa7e1duwu9mq9WrD2dRRwyfxNdDyxdxl
[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6693?single; https://t.me/btr80/20189 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136491
[43] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/19718; https://t.me/jagers68/151; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6681 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6697; https://t.me/ghost_of_khortytsia/139 ; https://x.com/small10space/status/1832024448519594072; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1832483412298375190 ; https://x.com/small10space/status/1832472310776815872; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1832480481868443945
[44] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28014 ; https://t.me/rybar/63315 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76515 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58859 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/39465 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/130105
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/43069
[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2024
[47] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58850
[48] https://t.me/rybar/63315 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76483 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21954 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bknSp5vCxzExdCbGcG6v159ELaoCSFAvhVa7e1duwu9mq9WrD2dRRwyfxNdDyxdxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel
[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76548 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/130107
[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6672?single ; https://t.me/privet_iz_doma152/10147 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28013?single ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6678?single ; https://t.me/filatovcorr/3890 ; https://t.me/filatovcorr/3893
[51] https://t.me/rybar/63315
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bknSp5vCxzExdCbGcG6v159ELaoCSFAvhVa7e1duwu9mq9WrD2dRRwyfxNdDyxdxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel; https://t.me/rybar/63315; https://t.me/notes_veterans/19345; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/183355
[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/10673
[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bknSp5vCxzExdCbGcG6v159ELaoCSFAvhVa7e1duwu9mq9WrD2dRRwyfxNdDyxdxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel
[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/21952
[56] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12678
[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15090
[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76493
[61] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11264; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G6Jber7wSBaNcGiCCHgGBGt6yQhHfLM7LnmkyW8eDmdRvfk6S6Ch3ThktwEz5gtel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0W4RcjUPDvJ5cp6gMudRfn2JgrtMBXs6oaijxPEC6614vjn7vRXZTVW2yuRAsaaygl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bknSp5vCxzExdCbGcG6v159ELaoCSFAvhVa7e1duwu9mq9WrD2dRRwyfxNdDyxdxl
[62] https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/1832159165935968587; https://t.me/jahznebes/99
[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136472
[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/18984
[65] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/7880; https://suspilne dot media/830983-rosijski-vijska-bezpilotnikami-atakuvali-kiiv/
[66] https://t.me/verkhovnaradaofukraine/28633
[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/271124; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15091
[68] https://vk dot com/wall-222744818_6252 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1832356165281370438 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1832356439324598369 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1832356671059853694
[69] https://t.me/tass_agency/271218;
https://nauka dot
tass.ru/nauka/21801181?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com
[70] https://t.me/bpla_veles/53; http://government dot ru/news/52615/
[71] https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&si=xqVFWRPQ9WIzYZye&v=kuTo94TnMPo&feature=youtu.be
[72]
https://t.me/uvznews/2737?single; https://mil dot
in.ua/uk/news/uralvagonzavod-peredav-armiyi-rf-novu-partiyu-t-90m/ ;
https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21798725
[73] https://t.me/tass_agency/271175 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/271170
[74] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75054
[75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080824