Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros
Date cut-off: 10:15pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on April 6 ISW will cover
subsequent reports in the April 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated that Ukraine does not have
enough materiel to contest the battlefield initiative. Zelensky
stated during an interview aired on April 6 that Ukrainian forces
currently do not have enough ammunition to initiate and sustain future
counteroffensive operations and reiterated that Ukrainian forces are
currently using drones to partially compensate for artillery ammunition
shortages across the theater.[1]
Zelensky stressed that Ukraine must conduct countermeasures to deprive
Russian forces of the ability to prepare and conduct significant
offensive efforts and not only rely on defensive operations. Zelensky
stated that striking Russian force concentrations is one such
countermeasure but that Ukrainian forces lack long-range weapons to
strike Russian force concentrations and other targets necessary to
undermine Russian operations. Senior Ukrainian officials have long
called for timely and sustained Western military assistance that would
enable Ukraine to conduct both defensive and counteroffensive operations
when the timing is optimal for Ukraine to undertake such efforts, as
opposed to having materiel shortages constrain Ukraine’s ability to plan
and execute operations and losing opportunities to exploit Russian
weaknesses.[2]
Zelensky recently stated that delays in security assistance forced
Ukraine to cede the battlefield initiative to Russia, and Ukrainian
officials have warned that Ukraine cannot plan either a successful
counteroffensive or defensive effort without knowing when and what kind
of aid Ukraine will receive. ISW continues to assess that shortages in
Western military assistance have forced Ukrainian forces to husband
materiel, and Zelensky’s statement suggests that Ukrainian forces are
now having to make difficult decisions about prioritizing certain
aspects of its defense over constraining Russian military capabilities
or preparing for counteroffensive operations.[3] The New York Times
similarly reported on April 5 that Ukrainian forces are close to
running out of some types of munitions and that Ukrainian officials have
observed a five-to-one Russian artillery advantage throughout the
frontline.[4] Ukrainian soldiers reportedly told the New York Times
that Ukrainian forces currently have enough cluster munitions that are
effective at repelling Russian infantry assaults but are low on
high-explosive artillery shells needed to repel mechanized assaults.[5]
Zelensky
stressed that additional Western security assistance is necessary for
Ukrainian forces to effectively defend Ukraine’s airspace against the
intensified Russian strike campaign and increased Russian aviation
operations along the frontline. Zelensky stated that Ukraine
will need an additional 25 Patriot air defense systems, likely meaning
launchers, to extend full air defense coverage to all of Ukraine’s
territory.[6]
Zelensky warned that if Russian forces sustain the tempo of their
current missile and drone strikes then Ukraine will likely lack the air
defense missile stocks needed to protect Ukrainian cities and critical
infrastructure.[7]
Russian forces appear to be exploiting Ukraine’s already degraded air
defense umbrella in an attempt to collapse Ukraine’s energy grid, likely
in an effort to constrain Ukraine’s long-term defense industrial
capacity.[8]
Russian missile and drone strikes have consistently pressured Ukraine’s
limited air defense and have forced Ukraine to make difficult decisions
about providing air defense coverage between large population centers
in the rear and active areas of the frontline.[9]
Sparse and inconsistent air defense coverage along the front has likely
facilitated Russia’s intensification of guided and unguided glide bomb
strikes, which Russian forces used to tactical effect in their seizure
of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024.[10]
Zelensky stated that the previous downing of Russian aircraft has
temporarily constrained glide bomb strikes and that Russian forces are
now conducting glide bomb strikes from further away, increasing the need
for long-range air defense systems.[11]
Zelensky
cautioned that the arrival of all promised F-16 fighter jets from
Ukraine’s Western partners in 2024 will provide Ukraine with only 10
percent of the fighter aircraft Ukraine would need to completely defeat
Russian aviation and restore Ukraine’s ability to operate effectively in
the air domain.[12]
Zelensky stated that Ukraine will need a combination of air defense
systems and fighter aircraft to combat the Russian aviation threat,
namely to prevent the Russian use of KAB guided glide bombs.[13]
Zelensky also added that Ukraine is currently developing new weapons to
defend against Russian KAB guided glide bombs as part of this combined
air defense. The further degradation of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella
would not only limit Ukraine’s ability to protect critical elements of
its war effort in the rear but would also likely afford Russian aviation
prolonged secure operation along the frontline. Such security would
allow Russian forces to significantly increase glide bomb strikes at
scale and possibly even allow Russian forces to conduct routine
large-scale aviation operations against near rear Ukrainian logistics
and cities to devastating effect.[14]
Western security assistance that allows Ukraine to establish a robust
combined air defense system will enable Ukraine to protect its cities
while providing air defense to potentially operationally significant
defensive and counteroffensive operations.
Continued
delays in US security assistance are specifically impacting the
capabilities that Ukrainian forces need to respond to the increased
tempo of Russian mechanized assaults in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi warned on April 6
that a particularly difficult situation has emerged east of Chasiv Yar
and west of Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast, both areas where ISW has
observed a recent intensification of Russian mechanized assaults ranging
from platoon-sized to battalion-sized attacks.[15]
Syrskyi also observed that Russian forces are conducting platoon-,
company-, and sometimes battalion-sized infantry assaults in separate
directions. The Press Service of the Ukrainian Airborne Forces stated
that Russian forces with massed armored vehicle support are still
attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses west of Avdiivka despite
not yet repeating mechanized assaults as large as the ones that they
conducted in the area between March 29 and March 31.[16]
Geolocated footage published on April 6 indicates that elements of the
Russian 90th Guards Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA],
Central Military District [CMD]) recently conducted a likely
company-sized mechanized assault southeast of Umanske (west of
Avdiivka), and a Ukrainian airborne assault brigade reported that its
personnel destroyed 10 Russian tanks, five BMP infantry fighting
vehicles (IFVs), and a MT-LB IFV during 11 mechanized assaults in the
area.[17] Ukrainian
forces have so far successfully repelled intensified Russian mechanized
assaults throughout eastern Ukraine in the past week but have done so
despite persisting materiel shortages.
The
Kremlin explicitly threatened its long-term ally Armenia on April 5
over Armenian outreach to the West following Russia’s failure to prevent
Armenia’s loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. Armenian
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, European Commission President Ursula
von der Leyen, European Union (EU) High Representative Josep Borell, US
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and US Agency for International
Development (USAID) Administrator Samantha Powers met on April 5 in
Brussels to discuss continued Western support of Armenian democratic and
economic development.[18]
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) released a statement
later on April 5 responding to the meeting, in which the Russian MFA
claimed that the West is attempting to “drag the South Caucasus [region]
into a geopolitical confrontation" between Russia and the West.[19]
The Russian MFA stated that "extra-regional interference” in the South
Caucasus region is “irresponsible” and “destructive” and aims to drive a
wedge between the South Caucasus countries and Russia. The Russian MFA
threatened that Western interference could result in the “most negative
consequences for [regional] stability, security, and economic
development” and an “uncontrollable increase in tension” in the region.
The Russian MFA explicitly threatened the Armenian government and warned
that Armenia could “go down the wrong path,” which the MFA claimed is
fraught with security and economic issues, could result in an “outflow
of the population,” and is reminiscent of the issues that Russia’s
invasion has caused Ukraine. The Russian MFA accused the West of
attempting to “deceive” Armenia into withdrawing from the Russian-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic
Union (EAEU) and requesting that Russia withdraw from Russia’s military
base in Armenia and from the Yerevan International Airport.
The
Russian MFA's April 5 statement follows several months of Kremlin
threats against Armenia in response to ongoing Armenian efforts to
secure new, Western security guarantees and efforts to blame Armenia for
deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.[20]
Armenian officials recently stated that Armenia is considering
withdrawing from the CSTO and applying to join the EU and recently asked
Russia to withdraw Russian border guards from the Yerevan International
Airport.[21]
The Russian MFA’s statement insinuates that the Armenian government is
not independently making decisions about its security, and that Western
countries are somehow guiding the Armenian government’s decisions. The
Kremlin has made similar ridiculous claims that the West controls the
Ukrainian government as part of Kremlin efforts to question and
undermine Ukrainian sovereignty.[22] The Kremlin has previously conducted hybrid wars against former Soviet states that have sought EU accession.
The
Russian MFA also continues to threaten Finland and claimed that Finland
has “lost its independence in making foreign policy decisions” since
its accession to NATO — a narrative that the Kremlin routinely used to
falsely claim that NATO was controlling Ukraine and using Ukraine to
threaten Russia. Russian Ambassador to Finland Pavel Kuznetsov stated during an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS on
April 6 that Finland is on a “destructive course” in its relationship
with Russia and that Finland’s accession to NATO is making the Baltic
region a “zone of potential escalation.”[23]
Kuznetsov threatened Finland and the NATO alliance broadly, claiming
that Russia would have to respond to a buildup of NATO material and
manpower or the deployment of a nuclear weapon in Finland and that
Russia’s response would be “adequate but not necessarily symmetrical.”
Kuznetsov claimed that Finland has joined the “party of war until
victory over Russia” by joining NATO and accused perceived Finnish
“Russophobia” of causing a complete breakdown of the Russian-Finnish
relationship. Kuznetsov insinuated that Finland has no option but to
improve its relationship with Russia, given that “we can’t escape
geography," but blamed Finland unilaterally for the poor state of
Russian–Finnish relations, despite the artificial migrant crisis that
Russia created on the Russian–Finnish border in fall 2023 and repeated
Russian threats against Finland and the wider NATO alliance.[24]
ISW continues to assess that Russian threats against NATO member states
are aimed at leading the West to deter itself and that Russian claims
of imagined threats originating from NATO are aimed at setting
informational conditions to justify and support an envisioned long-term
geopolitical confrontation with the West.[25]
Chechen
Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov announced on April 5 that 3,000 former
Wagner Group personnel will join the Akhmat Spetsnaz unit following
successful negotiations between Akhmat and Wagner commanders.[26] Kadyrov
claimed that Commander of the Akhmat Spetsnaz (and deputy commander of
the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic’s [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) Apty
Alaudinov reached an agreement with Wagner leadership that Wagner
commander Alexander Kuznetsov (call sign “Ratibor”) will join Akhmat
Spetsnaz along with 3,000 Wagner personnel. Kadyrov added that the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) already allocated a required number of
vacancies within the Akhmat Spetsnaz unit to accommodate the Wagner
personnel, and that Wagner personnel can start combat missions after
resolving all organizational issues. Kadyrov’s mention of the Russian
MoD indicates that these Wagner elements will be subordinated under the
Russian MoD’s authority rather than Rosgvardia. Alaudinov also amplified
a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger’s claim that the main group of Wagner
commanders and 5,000 Wagner personnel are transferring to the 2nd AC
under the Russian MoD.[27]
The milblogger added that the Russian military is still discussing
whether these 5,000 Wagner personnel will form a regiment like the unit
under Kuznetsov, form a new separate brigade, or be distributed among
existing brigades.
The claimed transfer of 3,000
Wagner personnel into MoD’s Akhmat Spetsnaz indicates that the Russian
MoD is successfully formalizing control over some elements of the
remaining Wagner Group force — an objective it has been pursuing since
2023. ISW previously assessed that the Russian MoD launched a
campaign in early-to-mid-2023 which aimed to directly subordinate Wagner
forces under the Russian MoD. ISW also assessed that deceased Wagner
Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner personnel started the
mutiny in June 2023 in protest of the Russian MoD’s efforts to
consolidate control over Wagner forces.[28]
The transfer of Wagner personnel to Akhmat Spetsnaz units sparked some
criticism from Wagner-affiliated irregular formations, such as the
Rusich Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group which accused these Wagner
personnel of selling out to the Russian MoD.[29]
One Russian milblogger also accused Kadyrov of exaggerating the number
of transferred Wagner personnel, claiming that most Wagner personnel
hate Kuznetsov and are located in Africa.[30]
Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers largely celebrated the claimed transfer,
claiming that Wagner personnel had two options: to either hold on to
their past grudges or let them go to serve the Russian state.[31]
One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that former Wagner forces
previously formed the Kamerton detachment under Akhmat Spetsnaz and that
the Russian MoD did not ban this detachment from using Wagner
symbology, networks, and management systems.[32]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated that Ukraine does not have
enough materiel to contest the battlefield initiative.
- Zelensky
stressed that additional Western security assistance is necessary for
Ukrainian forces to effectively defend Ukraine’s airspace against the
intensified Russian strike campaign and increased Russian aviation
operations along the frontline.
- Zelensky
cautioned that the arrival of all promised F-16 fighter jets from
Ukraine’s Western partners in 2024 will provide Ukraine with only 10
percent of the fighter aircraft Ukraine would need to completely defeat
Russian aviation and restore Ukraine’s ability to operate effectively in
the air domain.
- Continued delays in US
security assistance are specifically impacting the capabilities that
Ukrainian forces need to respond to the increased tempo of Russian
mechanized assaults in eastern Ukraine.
- The
Kremlin explicitly threatened its long-term ally Armenia on April 5 over
Armenian outreach to the West following Russia’s failure to prevent
Armenia’s loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023.
- The
Russian MFA also continues to threaten Finland and claimed that Finland
has “lost its independence in making foreign policy decisions” since
its accession to NATO — a narrative that the Kremlin routinely used to
falsely claim that NATO was controlling Ukraine and using Ukraine to
threaten Russia.
- Chechen Republic Head Ramzan
Kadyrov announced on April 5 that 3,000 former Wagner Group personnel
will join the Akhmat Spetsnaz unit following successful negotiations
between Akhmat and Wagner commanders.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin passed two laws on April 6, offering Russian
society some concession for its sacrifices to support Russia’s war in
Ukraine.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in a televised interview on April 6
that there is currently no threat of a Russian ground invasion towards
Kharkiv City and that all discussions about Russia’s plans to capture
the city are information operations aimed at inciting panic in Ukraine.[33]
Ukrainian
forces reportedly achieved unspecified tactical successes in the
Kupyansk and Lyman directions amid continued positional engagements
along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 6. Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that
Ukrainian forces have achieved unspecified tactical successes in the
Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[34]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled
Russian attacks near Terny (west of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (south of
Kreminna), although Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are
advancing on the outskirts of Terny and near the chalk quarry in
Bilohorivika.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces continued efforts to advance west of Bakhmut towards Chasiv Yar
on April 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the
area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, chiefly elements
of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, continued attacks northeast and
southeast of Chasiv Yar and captured positions in forest areas along the
railway to the east and in the Stupky-Holubovski 2 nature preserve to
the southeast.[36]
The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted heavy tube
artillery, rocket, and airstrikes against Ukrainian positions in and
around Chasiv Yar. A milblogger also claimed that elements of the
Russian “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) pushed
back some Ukrainian forces from Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut)
towards Chasiv Yar and Kalynivka (between Bohdanivka and Chasiv Yar).[37]
Another Russian milblogger claimed that vulnerable logistics will
likely complicate Russian efforts to advance towards Chasiv Yar and that
Russian forces need to prioritize additional measures to defend against
Ukrainian drone strikes and stabilize their supply lines over rushing
to pressure Bohdanivka and Ivanivske (between Bakhmut and Chasiv Yar).[38]
Positional
fighting also continued northeast, southwest, and south of Bakhmut.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near
Vesele (northeast of Bakhmut near Siversk) on April 6, but ISW has not
observed visual confirmation of these claims.[39]
Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne,
Rozdolivka, and Vyimka; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka,
Andriivka, and Zelenopillya; and south of Bakhmut near Niu York.[40]
Russian
forces continued to advance west of Avdiivka amid continued attacks on
April 6. Geolocated footage published on April 6 shows that Russian
forces advanced southwest of Umanske (west of Avdiivka) during a likely
company-sized mechanized assault and into central Pervomaiske (southwest
of Avdiivka).[41]
Additional geolocated footage published on April 6 shows that Russian
forces advanced further into northern Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka)
but likely did not make this advance within the past day.[42]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in and north
of Berdychi and into southern and central Semenivka (west of Avdiivka).[43]
Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are clearing forest areas
between Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) and Vodyane (southwest of Avdiivka).
ISW is unable to confirm these Russian claims of advance, however.
Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to
push Ukrainian forces from Pervomaiske and advance towards Umanske (both
southwest of Avdiivka).[44]
Russian milbloggers posted footage on April 6 of Russian forces
conducting an airstrike against a dam bridge allegedly across the Durna
River near Umanske.[45]
Fighting also continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove; west
of Avdiivka near Orlivka, Nevelske, and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of
Avdiivka near Netaylove.[46]
Elements of the Russian 90th Guards Tank Division (41st Combined Arms
Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly fighting
southeast of Umanske, elements of the “Yastreb” private military company
(reportedly created by Russian state energy operator Gazprom) are
reportedly fighting near Semenivka, and elements of the ”Vega” Special
Purpose Detachment (reportedly of the 24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade) are
reportedly fighting in the Avdiivka direction.[47]
The Ukrainian Airborne Forces Press Service reported on April 6 that
Russian forces are still conducting large numbers of infantry-led
assaults and are using combat vehicles to drive infantry to the front.[48]
A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Avdiivka direction noted
that Russian forces are trying to cut off and capture settlements on the
flanks of Avdiivka but that Russian forces are now attacking strong
Ukrainian defensive lines.[49]
Russian
forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued
fighting in the area on April 6. Geolocated footage published on April 6
shows that Russian forces advanced on the northern outskirts of
Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and further west into
central Novomykhailivka.[50]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced into a
field southeast of Novomykhailivka, but ISW has not observed visual
confirmation of this claim.[51]
Positional fighting also continued west of Donetsk City near
Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near
Kostyantynivka.[52]
Elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 105th Infantry Regiment
(1st DNR Army Corps) are reportedly fighting in Novomykhailivka.[53]
Positional
fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near
Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) on April 6.[54]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional fighting continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 6.[55]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi
described Russian assaults near Robotyne and Verbove as localized
offensive operations that aim to recover previously lost territory.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are heavily using drones in the Robotyne area.[57]
Elements of the 108th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment and likely
elements of the 56th Guards VDV Regiment (both of the 7th Guards VDV
Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[58]
Positional fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, likely near Krynky, on April 6.[59]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces destroyed several
Ukrainian groups that attempted to cross the Dnipro River near Krynky on
April 5 and 6.[60] Likely elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are operating in the Kherson direction.[61]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes overnight on
April 5 to 6 and during the day on April 6 targeting civilian,
industrial, and agricultural infrastructure in Ukraine. Ukrainian Air
Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that
Russian forces launched overnight three S-300 missiles from Belgorod
Oblast, two Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from strategic aircraft that
took off from Saratov Oblast, one Kalibr cruise missile from the Black
Sea, and 32 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and
Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[62]
Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed both Kh-101/Kh-555
cruise missiles, the Kalibr cruise missile, and 28 Shahed drones.[63]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces targeted agricultural
enterprises in Kherson Oblast and industrial facilities, civilian
infrastructure, and residential areas in Kyiv, Zaporizhia, Odesa, and
Kharkiv oblasts.[64]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck agricultural
enterprises in Kherson Oblast and industrial facilities in Zaporizhzhia
City and that Russian S-300 missiles struck residential areas in Kharkiv
City.[65]
Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported
that Russian forces also struck a humanitarian center for internally
displaced people in Zaporizhzhia City.[66]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck an unspecified
utility facility near Odesa City with a likely Iskander-M ballistic
missile later in the day on April 6.[67]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces
targeted Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) facilities and
temporary deployment points.[68]
Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated in an interview with Bloomberg
published on April 6 that Ukraine needs improved air defenses to
protect energy assets from Russian strikes and avoid blackouts during
peak energy consumption in the summer.[69]
Halushchenko stated that recent Russian strikes have significantly
damaged both Ukrainian power generation and transmission capabilities
and that Ukrainian officials have not yet assessed the full extent of
the damage at energy infrastructure facilities.[70]
Russian missile and drone strikes have reportedly damaged or disrupted
roughly 80 percent of electricity generation at Ukrainian thermal power
plants (TPPs) in recent weeks, as Russian forces continue to exploit the
degraded Ukrainian air defense umbrella in an effort to collapse
Ukraine’s energy grid.[71]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
President Vladimir Putin passed two laws on April 6 offering Russian
society some concession for its sacrifices to support Russia’s war in
Ukraine. Putin signed a law exempting Russian servicemen fighting in
Ukraine from paying interest on consumer loans and credit holidays.[72]
Putin previously signed a law on October 7, 2022, exempting mobilized
personnel and other participants of the Russian full-scale invasion of
Ukraine from accruing penalties for late payments for housing, communal
services, loans, and credit card debts.[73]
ISW previously assessed that such payment holidays may cost the Russian
federal government little in the short term but may have long term
implications as Russia continues to financially incentivize more
recruits to fight in Ukraine in exchange for state benefits. Putin also
signed a law amending the Russian Labor Code and prohibits employers
from dismissing widows of Russian servicemen for one year from the date
of the husband’s death.[74] The Kremlin has likely instituted this law in hopes of appeasing and limiting criticism from wives of deceased servicemen.
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed reports that Russia is planning
to “mobilize” 300,000 servicemembers by June 1 during a televised
interview on April 6, noting that Russia may not be able to meet this
goal.[75]
Zelensky stated that Russia may attempt to mobilize more than 300,000
personnel but might not meet its June 1 deadline because of discipline
problems and the need to train these forces. It is unclear if Zelensky
was referring to Russia’s ongoing “crypto-mobilization” campaign, which
aims to generate combat forces via volunteer and irregular recruitment
campaigns, or a possible future Russian decision to conduct a formal
call up of the Russian mobilization reserve.
Russia is
forming a new “Stalinskiye Sokoly” (Stalin’s Hawks) Volunteer Battalion
to defend a “strategically important facility” in Republic of Tatarstan,
likely in response to the recent successful Ukrainian unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) strikes on military production infrastructure in the
region.[76]
A prominent Russian milblogger amplified a recruitment advertisement
offering 261,000 rubles (around $2,820) monthly salaries to recruits
with past air defense military service experience.[77]
Russian officials also continue to recruit foreigners to fight in
Ukraine. A Russian opposition outlet published pictures of an
English-language brochure from an Oryol City military recruitment office
inviting foreigners to join an unnamed special unit for foreigners. The
brochure offered recruits a one-time signing bonus of $2,000, a monthly
salary of $2,200, and Russian citizenship for recruits and their
families.[78]
Rosgvardia’s
Press Service reported on April 6 that Rosgvardia plans to conscript
over 11,000 servicemen during the spring 2024 conscription cycle between
April 1 and June 15.[79]
Rosgvardia’s Press Service claimed that Rosgvardia will not involve
conscripts in Russia’s war in Ukraine and added that the number of
conscripts wishing to serve in Rosgvardia has increased since 2022.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
A
Ukrainian military observer reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a
T-72 tank jerry-rigged with several EW systems in an unspecified part of
the front on April 5.[80]
The Ukrainian military observer stated that the Russian tank, which was
leading a column of armored vehicles during a mechanized assault, was
able to completely disrupt all Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones
in the area and that Ukrainian forces had to use a specialized
fixed-wing drone with an additional terminal guidance system to strike
the tank.[81]
Russian forces are attempting to equip their armored vehicles with
electronic warfare (EW) systems to protect them against Ukrainian drone
strikes.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian
State Duma Deputy and former Southern Military District (SMD) Commander
Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev reportedly claimed in a leaked voice
memo that Russia plans to invade Kazakhstan. A Russian insider source
leaked a voice memo on April 6, which Gurulev purportedly privately sent
to members of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee, in which
Gurulev claimed that Russia could attack Kazakhstan after completing its
invasion of Ukraine and that Russian authorities have already made an
unspecified, corresponding decision to this effort.[82]
The insider source claimed that Gurulev is advocating for a future
Russian invasion of Kazakhstan because Gurulev believes that
unspecified, presumably pro-Ukrainian actors launched the April 2
Ukrainian drone strike against Tatarstan from Kazakhstan or another
Central Asian country.[83]
Gurulev responded to the leaked audio, calling it fake and rude and
criticizing the Telegram channels that amplified the leaked audio.[84]
Gurulev previously faced backlash from Russian milbloggers and other
Kremlin officials for leaking an audio recording of former Russian 58th
Combined Arms Army (SMD) Commander Major General Ivan Popov complaining
about heavy Russian losses and a lack of effective counterbattery
capabilities in western Zaporizhia Oblast, which resulted in Popov’s
dismissal in July 2023.[85] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger recently criticized Kazakhstan for not appreciating its “shared history” with Russia.[86] ISW is unable to verify the authenticity of Gurulev’s alleged leaked audio message.
Prominent
Russian milbloggers are circulating claims that US military personnel
participated the recent border raids into Russia. A prominent Russian
milblogger published footage on April 6 that he alleged showed US
citizens participating in combat operations in Belgorod Oblast.[87]
The milblogger insinuated that the video is proof that US citizens are
imbedded within the Ukrainian military and are participating in combat
operations against Russia. At least six other prominent Russian
milbloggers amplified the posts and footage and expressed agreement with
the first milblogger’s assertion that US citizens were involved in the
border raids.[88] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on March 18 that military personnel from NATO member countries are already in Ukraine.[89]
The Kremlin is already publicly communicating that it believes that
NATO military contingents are in Ukraine and that the West has already
violated Russia’s stated ”red line” regarding NATO personnel in
Ukraine.
The Kremlin appears to be investing in its next
generation of propagandists, having recognized the success of its
previous and ongoing information operations. Russia’s Far Eastern
Federal University announced on April 5 that its students recently met
with a Donetsk Oblast occupation official as part of the university’s
“Heroes Among Us” program.[90]
The “Heroes Among Us” program is reportedly aimed at helping students
create emotional and persuasive propaganda documentaries to further the
Kremlin’s narratives that justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and
occupation of Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson
oblasts.
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 6 that Ukrainian officials do not
assess that there is an active threat to Ukraine from Belarusian
territory.[91]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkqm0yx5ByY
[2]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2024
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2024
[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/05/world/europe/ukraine-ammunition-shells-russia.html
[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/05/world/europe/ukraine-ammunition-shells-russia.html
[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkqm0yx5ByY
[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkqm0yx5ByY
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031524
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824 ;
[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkqm0yx5ByY
[12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkqm0yx5ByY
[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkqm0yx5ByY
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724
[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035ZqgtxFnUopZxDVv36fC2BMHzSh7kvbLpssqRRFbhrJ8ztpUb5ZJyBCX2rVPREkal ; https://t.me/osirskiy/645 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2024
[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KiEDTqd7Fr6uxJjVm2kpDMEwQTaKTDEZ8VaaoZiMcL3Z21f8mnXGBqMhJrHTKgLDl
[17] https://t.me/ua_dshv/2318 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1776607265052610926; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/36; https://t.me/ua_dshv/2318
[18]
https://neighbourhood-enlargement dot
ec.europa.eu/news/joint-eu-us-armenia-high-level-meeting-support-armenias-resilience-2024-04-05_en#:~:text=President%20of%20the%20European%20Commission,April%205%2C%202024%20in%20Brussels
;
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-european-commission-president-ursula-von-der-leyen-armenian-prime-minister-nikol-pashinyan-and-high-representative-of-the-european-union-for-foreign-affairs-and-secu/
[19] https://t.me/MID_Russia/38403
[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111423
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122222
[23] https://tass dot ru/interviews/20456809; https://t.me/tass_agency/242111
[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024
[26] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4648
[27]
https://t.me/s/AptiAlaudinovAKHMAT?q=+%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%86%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B7+%C2%AB%D0%90%D0%A5%D0%9C%D0%90%D0%A2%C2%BB+%D0%9C%D0%9E+%D0%A0%D0%A4+
[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/June%2026%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.docx_.pdf
[29] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/9787
[30] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1776534493324517763
[31] https://t.me/sashakots/45960; https://t.me/akashevarova/7257 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1776605573045219465
[32] https://t.me/sashakots/45960
[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkqm0yx5ByY&ab_channel=%D0%9C%D0%B8-%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B0
[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035ZqgtxFnUopZxDVv36fC2BMHzSh7kvbLpssqRRFbhrJ8ztpUb5ZJyBCX2rVPREkal
[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mxwmudtjWmYqEn7tJrFBAxZE6pFQzGQsLGCYeo3v643zSzqtuMCqnsoJg9ie16Rfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kA6twrSvrCqseVC8dnVPqtr6jeK23QttrnFtzcKSutUs56CrV1LKqpQyXL5irVe5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jCJBoWgFt5edNezibC1cQpaMDk3vMGYtigqS9w1Ej3phhYz9cSbJioCGH5njcGLyl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39251 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26457 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9158
[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/19198; https://t.me/vdd98/3062; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16521; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65439; https://t.me/rybar/58917; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1776543948766351754; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9166; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16546
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9127
[38] https://t.me/philologist_zov/904
[39] https://t.me/rybar/58917; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9164; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16546
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035ZqgtxFnUopZxDVv36fC2BMHzSh7kvbLpssqRRFbhrJ8ztpUb5ZJyBCX2rVPREkal; https://t.me/rybar/58917; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jCJBoWgFt5edNezibC1cQpaMDk3vMGYtigqS9w1Ej3phhYz9cSbJioCGH5njcGLyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mxwmudtjWmYqEn7tJrFBAxZE6pFQzGQsLGCYeo3v643zSzqtuMCqnsoJg9ie16Rfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kA6twrSvrCqseVC8dnVPqtr6jeK23QttrnFtzcKSutUs56CrV1LKqpQyXL5irVe5l; https://t.me/mod_russia/37393
[41]
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5018; https://t.me/ssternenko/27165;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/119267;
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1776607265052610926;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/36; https://t.me/ua_dshv/2318;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/119267;
[42]
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5015;
https://t.me/aerial_reconnaissance25/42 ;
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1776548944719360021;
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1776543862124581062;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/119267
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9165; https://t.me/ironzek/1067; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26459; https://t.me/motopatriot/21468; https://t.me/wargonzo/19198; https://t.me/rybar/58917
[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/19198
[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65494; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55490; https://t.me/milinfolive/119845
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jCJBoWgFt5edNezibC1cQpaMDk3vMGYtigqS9w1Ej3phhYz9cSbJioCGH5njcGLyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mxwmudtjWmYqEn7tJrFBAxZE6pFQzGQsLGCYeo3v643zSzqtuMCqnsoJg9ie16Rfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kA6twrSvrCqseVC8dnVPqtr6jeK23QttrnFtzcKSutUs56CrV1LKqpQyXL5irVe5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035ZqgtxFnUopZxDVv36fC2BMHzSh7kvbLpssqRRFbhrJ8ztpUb5ZJyBCX2rVPREkal ; https://t.me/osirskiy/645; https://t.me/mod_russia/37393;
[47]
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1776607265052610926;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/36; https://t.me/ua_dshv/2318 ;
https://t.me/ButusovPlus/9353 (Umanske);
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/119259 (Semenivka);
https://t.me/sashakots/45956 (Avdiivka); https://novo-sibirsk
dot ru/news/386616/?special_version=Y;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2023
[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0KiEDTqd7Fr6uxJjVm2kpDMEwQTaKTDEZ8VaaoZiMcL3Z21f8mnXGBqMhJrHTKgLDl
[49] https://suspilne dot media/721951-rosiani-na-avdiivskomu-napramku-vperlis-v-potuzni-linii-oboroni-vijskovij-110-brigadi/
[50] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/35; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5016 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1776576065734881556; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5017; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/37
[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/119267
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jCJBoWgFt5edNezibC1cQpaMDk3vMGYtigqS9w1Ej3phhYz9cSbJioCGH5njcGLyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mxwmudtjWmYqEn7tJrFBAxZE6pFQzGQsLGCYeo3v643zSzqtuMCqnsoJg9ie16Rfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kA6twrSvrCqseVC8dnVPqtr6jeK23QttrnFtzcKSutUs56CrV1LKqpQyXL5irVe5l; https://t.me/wargonzo/19198; https://t.me/dva_majors/39251
[53] https://t.me/polk105/20124 (Novomykhailivka)
[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jCJBoWgFt5edNezibC1cQpaMDk3vMGYtigqS9w1Ej3phhYz9cSbJioCGH5njcGLyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mxwmudtjWmYqEn7tJrFBAxZE6pFQzGQsLGCYeo3v643zSzqtuMCqnsoJg9ie16Rfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kA6twrSvrCqseVC8dnVPqtr6jeK23QttrnFtzcKSutUs56CrV1LKqpQyXL5irVe5l; https://t.me/dva_majors/39251
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9101 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39251 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jCJBoWgFt5edNezibC1cQpaMDk3vMGYtigqS9w1Ej3phhYz9cSbJioCGH5njcGLyl
[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035ZqgtxFnUopZxDVv36fC2BMHzSh7kvbLpssqRRFbhrJ8ztpUb5ZJyBCX2rVPREkal
[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9101
[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/37384 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39323
[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jCJBoWgFt5edNezibC1cQpaMDk3vMGYtigqS9w1Ej3phhYz9cSbJioCGH5njcGLyl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mxwmudtjWmYqEn7tJrFBAxZE6pFQzGQsLGCYeo3v643zSzqtuMCqnsoJg9ie16Rfl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kA6twrSvrCqseVC8dnVPqtr6jeK23QttrnFtzcKSutUs56CrV1LKqpQyXL5irVe5l
;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0iGM6hPqbGTe86e3bNrfnYcm3qn9VSGDBdiRrX8oHgbPba2Qhx1XhD5RigjVEmtAsl
[60] https://t.me/rybar/58917 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39251 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/39325 ; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/2806
[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/37395
[62] https://t.me/ComAFUA/252
[63] https://t.me/ComAFUA/252
[64] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7927 ; https://t.me/ComAFUA/252 ; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=346332265087271&id=100091315017222&mibextid=WC7FNe&rdid=ze0LwJdwxYSioizD
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/04/06/okupanty-atakuyut-dronamy-agropidpryyemstva-hersonshhyny-shhob-ne-daty-yim-mozhlyvosti-vidnovytys-nataliya-gumenyuk/
[65]
https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7927 ; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/04/06/drony-zahodyly-z-pivdennogo-napryamku-ye-vluchannya-podrobyczi-rankovoyi-vorozhoyi-ataky/
; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02EcVBMnuFoWKV7WfrLSMpgKp4QrgcvEehsVEDzBiyBVszSFFqZfX8UgvJeCbBtn1Nl ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/06/shist-lyudej-zagynuly-u-harkovi-vid-rosijskyh-raket/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/8936 ; https://t.me/synegubov/8939 ; https://suspilne dot media/721890-naslidki-vlucanna-raket-s-300-po-sevcenkivskomu-rajonu-harkova-6-kvitna-fotoreportaz/
[66] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/6170
[67] https://t.me/odesacityofficial/27611 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7946
[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/37393
[69] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-06/ukraine-hunts-for-power-equipment-ammunition-to-avoid-summer-blackouts
[70] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-06/ukraine-hunts-for-power-equipment-ammunition-to-avoid-summer-blackouts
[71] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524
[72] https://ria dot ru/20240406/protsenty-1938254006.html ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16524
[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7
[74] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/20464951; https://t.me/tass_agency/242166 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16524 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37403
[75] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkqm0yx5ByY&ab_channel=%D0%9C%D0%B8-%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B0
[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/39303
[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/39303
[78] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18216
[79] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20462721
[80] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/9331
[81] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/9331
[82] https://t.me/vchkogpu/47264
[83] https://t.me/vchkogpu/47272 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040224
[84] https://t.me/sotaproject/78848; https://t.me/agurulev/4729 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/10269
[85] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071323
[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024
[87] https://t.me/epoddubny/19563 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/19564 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/19566 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/19571
[88] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/65482 ; https://t.me/sashakots/45957 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13970 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10171 ; https://t.me/sashakots/45959 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/19569 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17240 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/19570
[89] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824
[90]
https://www.dvfu dot
ru/news/fefu-news/sovetnik_glavy_dnr_rasskazal_uchastnikam_proekta_geroi_sredi_nas_kak_snyat_silnyy_dokumentalnyy_film/;
https://t.me/ironzek/1064
[91] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkqm0yx5ByY&ab_channel=%D0%9C%D0%B8-%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B0
