Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Kaylin Nolan of the Institute for the Study of War
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: April 16 at 5 pm ET
The
China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for
the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update
supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses
Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for
the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to
controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
- ROC
opposition parties advanced a bill in the Legislative Yuan (LY) that
aims to strengthen the LY’s oversight of the government. Passing the
bill could hamper the DPP-led government’s ability to implement its
policies. Political feuding that impedes the DPP’s ability to govern is
favorable to CCP interests.
- PRC Minister of National Defense
Dong Jun and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin held the first US-PRC
defense minister’s talk since November 2022. Dong dismissed US concerns
about South China Sea tensions and claimed the situation was “generally
stable.”
- CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping promoted economic integration during a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Beijing.
- The PRC claims that the Philippines is not upholding a 2016 “gentleman’s agreement” and driving tensions at Second Thomas Shoal.
- Unnamed
senior US officials said that the PRC is supplying Russia with
equipment that Russia is using to rapidly increase military production
for use in its war against Ukraine.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
ROC
opposition parties advanced a bill in the Legislative Yuan (LY) that
aims to strengthen the LY’s oversight of the government. Passing the
bill could hamper the DPP-led government’s ability to implement its
policies. Political feuding that impedes the DPP’s ability to govern is
favorable to CCP interests. The reforms would grant the LY the
ability to conduct inquiries and call on officials to testify before the
LY, establish penalties for perceived non-compliance or dishonesty in
responses, and confirm political appointments.[1]
The bill would also impose penalties on members of the Executive Yuan,
including up to a year of imprisonment for concealing information or
providing false or misleading information.[2]
The maximum sentence is three years for all other individuals. DPP
Caucus Whip Ker Chien-ming articulated the threat that the bill poses to
the executive branch, calling it a “limitless expansion of powers” and
the “constitutional monster” whose purpose was to weaponize the
legislature. Ker claimed that if the law is passed, the president will
be immediately summoned on May 20 to answer inquiries from the
Legislative Yuan and can even be imprisoned if found to be in contempt
of the legislature.[3]
The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) were able to
advance the proposed bill through the LY Judiciary and Organic Laws
Statutes Committee despite objections from the Democratic People’s Party
(DPP) because they have a majority on the committee.
The bill
entered a month-long “consultation period” after passing the Judiciary
and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee. The KMT and TPP plan to bring
the reform bill to the LY for a vote as early as May 17, before the
change of government on May 20. KMT Caucus Whip stated the KMT’s intent
to formally vote on the bill before President-elect Lai Ching-te’s
inauguration on May 20.[4] TPP Caucus Whip Huang Kuo-chang declared the opposition’s goal to clear the bill from the committee on the day of the meeting.[5]
Collaboration
between the KMT and the TPP on the proposals suggests that the reforms
will pass with a majority in the LY, as the two opposition parties
outnumber the DPP in the LY. The TPP and KMT have consistently stated
that establishing a legislative investigative task force to strengthen
oversight of the executive branch is at the top of their agenda.[6]
KMT Caucus Deputy Secretary-General Lin Szu-ming, one of the main
authors of the reform bills, earlier referred to the proposed reforms as
a “great weapon” that the LY must use to supervise the government.[7]
The
DPP will continue to oppose the legislative oversight bill. DPP Caucus
Secretary-General Rosalia Wu stated on April 1 that the DPP will fight
against the law with all its strength, and would request action from the
justices of the Constitutional Court if the bill passed the LY.[8]
Stopping the bill would require more than a quarter of legislators
petitioning the Constitutional Court to issue a judgment declaring the
bill unconstitutional.[9] The DPP holds 51 seats in the Legislative Yuan, exceeding the threshold to initiate a lawsuit.
The KMT approved of former President Ma Ying-jeou’s meeting with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. The party issued a press release that praised Ma’s articulation of the 1992 Consensus.[10]
Ma described the 1992 Consensus as both sides agreeing to a "one China
principle," with each side free to determine what "China" means.[11]
The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official
representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following
negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one
China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one
China” to be the People’s Republic of China, while the KMT interprets it
to be the Republic of China. The PRC has never publicly recognized the
part of the “consensus” that acknowledges differing interpretations of
“China” and did not include this part of Ma’s comments in its official
readout of the meeting. KMT Chairman Eric Chu separately announced after
Ma’s return that he had given Ma his “blessing” for his trip to the
mainland.[12]
The
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), chaired by DPP members, issued a press
release expressing disappointment that Ma failed to convey to Xi the
Taiwanese people’s insistence on safeguarding the sovereignty of the
Republic of China (ROC) and its democratic system.[13] The MAC called the 1992 Consensus an attempt to undermine Taiwan’s sovereign status that left no room for the ROC’s survival.
China
PRC
Minister of National Defense Dong Jun and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin held the first US-PRC defense minister’s talk since November
2022. Dong dismissed US concerns about South China Sea tensions and
claimed the situation was “generally stable.” The US readout of
the virtual meeting on April 16 said Austin and Dong discussed US-PRC
defense relations as well as regional and global security issues,
including the South China Sea, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and North Korea.
Austin underscored freedom of navigation, especially in the South China
Sea, and re-iterated the US commitment to the One China Policy. He also
stressed the importance of maintaining open lines of communication.[14]
The PRC readout said Dong emphasized that Taiwan is at the core of the
PRC’s core interests and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will
never let “‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities” and “external
connivance and support” go unchecked. Dong also claimed the situation in
the South China Sea is “generally stable” and that regional countries
have the “willingness, wisdom, and capacity” to resolve issues. He urged
the United States to respect the PRC’s territorial sovereignty and
maritime rights and interests in the sea.[15]
This
call was Austin’s first conversation with Dong since Dong became the
PRC defense minister in December 2023. It was the first formal top-level
military communication between the United States and PRC since November
2022.[16]
The PRC cut off military talks with the United States after US House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. It agreed to resume
them at the presidential summit between US President Joe Biden and CCP
General Secretary Xi Jinping in San Francisco in November 2023. The CCP
views military exchanges, at least in part, as a bargaining chip that it
can use to influence US behavior to the party’s benefit.
Senior
US and PRC diplomats met for three days to discuss various bilateral
and regional issues. The PRC readout stressed PRC criticism of
US-Japan-Philippines collaboration “against China” on South China Sea
issues, US interference in PRC “internal affairs,” and US “suppression”
of PRC companies. US Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink and National Security
Council Senior Director Sarah Beran led a delegation to the PRC from
April 14-16 to meet PRC officials including Vice Foreign Minister Ma
Zhaoxu. US Ambassador to the PRC Nicholas Burns also joined a meeting on
April 15. A US State Department readout said the two sides had “candid”
and “constructive” discussions on a range of bilateral, regional, and
global issues, including the Middle East, PRC support for Russia’s
defense industrial base, cross-Strait issues, the South China Sea, and
North Korea.[17]
A PRC readout said the PRC expressed its “solemn position” on the US
promotion of its Indo-Pacific Strategy “against China” and about the
United States trying to “cobble together a small circle” with Japan and
the Philippines to “disrupt the situation in the South China Sea.” It
urged the United States to not engage in “camp confrontation, “stop
interfering in China’s internal affairs, stop obstructing China’s
development, stop unreasonable sanctions on Chinese companies, and stop
suppressing China’s economy, trade, science and technology.”[18] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to visit the PRC in the coming weeks.[19]
The PRC imposed sanctions on US defense firms General Atomics and General Dynamics for arms sales to Taiwan.
The sanctions froze all assets of the two companies within the PRC and
barred senior management employees from obtaining a visa to enter the
country.[20]
General Dynamics operates half a dozen Gulfstream and jet aviation
services in the PRC and manufactures the Abrams tanks that Taiwan agreed
to purchase in 2019. General Atomics is a drone manufacturer that
signed a contract with Taiwan in 2020 to deliver MQ-9B drones.[21]
The PRC previously sanctioned five other US defense companies in
January 2024 in response to US arms sales to Taiwan and US sanctions on
PRC companies and individuals.[22]
A 2023 report by the German think tank Mercator Institute for China
Studies (MERICS) found that the PRC has significantly increased its use
of unilateral sanctions since 2018 against US individuals, groups, or
companies it perceives to be interfering in its internal affairs.[23]
The PRC has repeatedly expressed opposition to unilateral sanctions in
general, however, including US sanctions against it and other countries
such as Russia and Iran.[24]
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The
PRC claims that the Philippines is not upholding a 2016 “gentleman’s
agreement” and driving tensions at Second Thomas Shoal. Xi Jinping and then-Phillipines President Rodrigo Duterte met in 2016 to discuss the South China Sea territorial disputes.[25]
The PRC alleges that Duterte and Xi made a gentleman’s agreement to not
transport construction materials to repair the Sierra Madre, which is a
dilapidated World War II-era naval ship on Second Thomas Shoal that the
Philippines deliberately ran aground in 1999 to serve as a military
detachment.[26]
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning clarified
that if the Philippines needed to replenish the Sierra Madre with
necessities for the personnel there, it must notify the PRC in advance,
which will approve and supervise the process.[27]
Duterte denied ever making a “gentleman’s agreement” with Xi, however,
and claimed that the meeting helped keep the status quo of peace in the
South China Sea. Duterte also claimed that Xi threatened to go to war if
the Philippines exercised its economic rights in the South China Sea.[28]
Current Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. views the alleged
agreement as illegitimate since it was a “secret agreement” hidden from
the public.[29]
The spokesperson for the PRC Embassy in the Philippines responded that
the agreement was not a secret, and the two sides operated in accordance
with the agreement for a short time before the Philippines reneged.[30]
A Chinese Coast Guard vessel tailed two Philippine vessels conducting a hydrographic survey near Scarborough Shoal on April 15. The
Philippine National Security Council refuted initial reports that the
CCG vessel had blocked the Philippine ships for over eight hours as they
crossed the “nine dash line” 35 nautical miles from the Philippine
coast.[31]
The CCG vessel in question, CCG 5303, was also present in a “swarm” of
PRC ships around Scarborough Shoal on April 13, including two
preexisting CCG ships and 25 militia vessels.[32]
Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Jay Tarriela rejected the PRC
narrative that the Philippines is deliberately provoking the PRC in the
South China Sea.[33]
The
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning portrayed the
United States, Japan, and the Philippines as stoking “bloc
confrontation” tensions in the region in response to the trilateral
meeting on April 11. The United States, Japan, and the
Philippines issued a trilateral statement on April 12 that condemned the
PRC’s coercive use of their coast guard and maritime militia in the
South China Sea.[34]
She accused the trilateral meeting of targeting the PRC and introducing
“camp confrontation” into the region. Mao inaccurately claimed that PRC
coercion in the South China Sea was “lawful [and] justified” while
blaming “certain countries [an implicit reference to the United States]
outside the region” for “fanning the flames and provoking
confrontation.”[35]
Northeast Asia
North Korea
CCP Politburo Standing Committee member Zhao Leji led a delegation to visit North Korea from April 11-13.
Zhao emphasized the PRC’s willingness to “intensify high-level
exchanges [and] deepen mutually beneficial cooperation” with the DPRK
throughout this year, which the CCP calls the “China-DPRK Friendship
Year” in celebration of the 75th anniversary of ties between the two countries. [36]
Europe
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping promoted economic integration during a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Beijing. Xi
said that PRC and German industrial and supply chains are “deeply
embedded” in one another and claimed this is not a “risk” but a
guarantee of future relations – a possible reference to the European
Union’s “de-risking” policies toward the PRC. He stressed that the two
countries have “huge potential” for “win-win cooperation,” including in
green development, and said both sides should be wary of protectionism.
He said that the PRC hopes for a “fair, open, and non-discriminatory
German market.”[37]
The two countries launched cooperation mechanisms on climate change and
green transition, science and technology, and agriculture.[38] The PRC also lifted some restrictions on German agricultural imports after the meeting.[39]
The PRC’s positive messaging on PRC-German free trade and economic
cooperation comes as the European Union has taken a harsher stance on
PRC trade practices, particularly focused on countering their damaging
impact on European electric vehicles and green energy technology.[40]
The PRC has repeatedly criticized “baseless” investigations into PRC
firms and warned against “de-coupling” and “de-risking” policies.[41]
The
PRC’s bilateral engagement with Germany is consistent with CCP efforts
to undermine moves in the EU toward more hawkish policies against the
PRC. The European Commission and its president Ursula von der Leyen have
called EU-PRC trade “critically unbalanced,” criticized the PRC’s
preferential treatment of its domestic companies and overcapacity in its
production, and called for “de-risking” policies to reduce Europe’s
economic dependence on the PRC.[42]
The European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy released in 2023
said “de-risking” policies are meant to mitigate risks to supply chain
resilience, risks to critical infrastructure, risks related to leakage
of sensitive technology, and risks of economic coercion by diversifying
supply chains and restricting European companies’ ability to produce
sensitive technologies overseas.[43]
The PRC has promoted the strength of the PRC-Germany trade relationship to counter the broader European “de-risking” strategy.[44]
PRC Ambassador to Germany Wu Ken claimed on March 26 that the
resilience of PRC-Germany trade relations shows the “unpopularity” of
the EU’s de-risking policy.[45] The overseas edition of the CCP’s official newspaper People’s Daily
claimed after Scholz’s visit that Scholz signaled to other countries
Germany’s opposition to “decoupling and breaking links” with the PRC
despite the pressure of the EU’s de-risking strategy.[46]
CCP
General Secretary Xi Jinping presented four “principles” to peacefully
end the Russia-Ukraine war during his meeting with German Chancellor
Olaf Scholz. Xi proposed “four dos and four don’ts” to “restore
peace” in Ukraine — prioritize peace and stability and not “seek
selfish gain,” cool down the situation and not “add fuel to the fire,”
create the conditions for restoring peace and not aggravate the
situation, and reduce the negative impact on the global economy and not
undermine the stability of global industrial supply chains.[47]
Xi’s vague and seemingly neutral language is consistent with the PRC’s
portrayal of itself as an unbiased and fair “stabilizing force” in the
war and its reticence to make the Sino-Russian partnership as deep as
Russia desires, partially to maintain access to Western markets.[48]
The PRC rhetorically aligns with the Russian framing of the war,
however. It is critical of NATO, portrays the Western security order and
arms sales to Ukraine as fueling the war, opposes sanctions on Russia,
does not call the war a war, and calls for respect for Russia’s
“legitimate security concerns. Xi’s four principles may therefore be
read in this context as veiled criticisms of US and Western actions.
PRC
state media has claimed Western military aid to Ukraine “adds fuel to
the fire” in pursuit of profit for defense firms, for instance.[49]
NATO and US officials have warned that China is helping to “prop up”
the Russian defense industrial base and support Russia via
microelectronics, optics, machine tools, and missile propellant
deliveries.[50]
Xi’s generally vague signaling to Scholz vis-a-vis Ukraine over the
backdrop of reportedly intensifying Chinese support for Russia is
therefore likely an attempt to secure PRC economic interests in Europe
by garnering goodwill with Germany rather than a show of genuine
interest in facilitating an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Russia
Unnamed
senior US officials said that the PRC is supplying Russia with
equipment that Russia is using to rapidly increase military production
for use in its war against Ukraine. The officials said on April
12 that the PRC is selling Russia large quantities of machine tools,
drone and turbojet engines, technology for cruise missiles,
microelectronics, and nitrocellulose used in ammunition. They also said
that PRC and Russian entities have been jointly developing drones in
Russia and that the PRC has provided Russia with satellite imagery that
aided its war effort. The officials said the PRC provided Russia with
more than 70% of its nearly $900 million in machine tools imports in the
last quarter of 2023, which Russia has likely used to build ballistic
missiles. In 2023 the PRC also provided 90% of Russia’s microelectronics
imports, which are essential for producing missiles, tanks, and
aircraft. One official said PRC materials are filling critical gaps in
Russia’s defense production cycle and claimed that Russia would
“struggle to sustain its war effort without PRC input.” [51] The PRC embassy in the United States denied that the PRC provided weaponry to any party in the Ukraine war.[52]
The PRC’s role as a lifeline for the Russian economy and
military-industrial complex undermines its repeated claims to be a
neutral and impartial promoter of peace between Russia and Ukraine. The
PRC has rhetorically aligned with Russia’s narrative about the war,
which it does not call a “war,” and refused to pressure Russia to end
the war.
Iran
The
PRC condemned Israel’s April 1 strike on the Iranian embassy complex in
Syria but did not condemn Iran’s missile attack on Israel on April 13. Israel
killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander Brigadier
General Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1 while he was at the Iranian
embassy complex in Damascus.[53]
On April 14, Chargé d'Affaires of the PRC Permanent Mission to the UN
Dai Bing condemned “Israel’s aggression against its [Iran’s] diplomatic
premises” in Syria.[54] The PRC MFA expressed “deep concern” on April 14 but did not condemn the Iranian missile attack on Israel.[55]
On April 15, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned the attack on the
Iranian embassy in Syria and stated that “China appreciates Iran’s
emphasis on not targeting [other] regional countries.”[56]
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[2] https://lis.ly dot gov.tw/lygazettec/mtcdoc?PD110104:LCEWA01_110104_00028
[3] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202404150271.aspx
[4] https://new.pts dot org.tw/article/690358
[5] https://new.pts dot org.tw/article/690358
[6] https://udn dot com/news/story/123475/7718848
[7] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20240206002157-260407?chdtv
[8] https://www.ly dot gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=54301&pid=238923
[9] https://law.moj dot gov.tw/LawClass/LawSingle.aspx?pcode=A0030159&flno=49
[10] www.kmt dot org.tw/2024/04/blog-post_12.html
[11] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202404100018
[12] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202404160138.aspx
[13] https://www.mac dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=B383123AEADAEE52&s=83286BC7A1E32CAB
[14] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3742639/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-call-with-peoples-republic/
[15] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/jswj/16301372.html
[16] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/article/3259247/us-chinese-defence-chiefs-talk-first-time-more-two-years
[17] https://www.state.gov/assistant-secretary-kritenbrinks-meetings-in-beijing-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc/
[18] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjbxw_new/202404/t20240415_11281963.shtml
[19] https://www.scmp
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[20] http://www.news dot cn/world/20240411/ab495b4411474d3f96fe2c76eee4e3d4/c.html
[21] https://apnews.com/article/china-us-taiwan-arms-sales-companies-sanctioned-1bcd87bf29d90cb276c0281b9e45e306
https://www.newsweek.com/china-sanctions-us-defense-companies-general-atomics-general-dynamics-taiwan-arms-sales-1889635
[22] https://apnews.com/article/china-us-taiwan-sanctions-arms-sales-a2cc4dd00ad8982aa1c67594e1a1c19c
[23] https://merics.org/en/report/how-china-imposes-sanctions
[24] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202404/t20240411_11280275.shtml
https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/web/zyxw/202302/t20230224_11030707.shtml
https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202201/t20220115_10495894.shtml
https://english.news dot cn/20230510/59b65259fcdf477993992b392f819eb7/c.html
[25] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china-xi-jinping.html
[26] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/philippines-china-agreement-04102024065148.html
[27] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202404/t20240411_11280275.shtml
[28] https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1222494
https://news dot abs-cbn.com/news/2024/4/12/duterte-denies-gentleman-s-agreement-with-china-s-xi-1029
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3258816/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-claims-china-threatened-war-over-south-china-sea-if-status-quo-not-kept
[29] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-13/marcos-questions-secret-duterte-deal-with-china-on-sea-dispute
[30] Ph.china-embassy dot gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202404/t20240418_11283890.htm
[31] https://www.gmanetwork dot com/news/topstories/nation/903709/pcg-china-coast-guard-did-not-block-ph-survey-vessels/story/
https://www.ft.com/content/ad828ec4-d699-49a4-8751-b4cf0d44cf78
[32] https://www.gmanetwork dot com/news/topstories/nation/903530/third-china-coast-guard-ship-to-join-vessel-swarm-at-bajo-de-masinloc-analyst/story/
http://gmanetwork
dot
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[33] https://twitter.com/jaytaryela/status/1779809055382573372
[34]
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/11/joint-vision-statement-from-the-leaders-of-japan-the-philippines-and-the-united-states/
[35] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202404/t20240412_11280916.shtml
[36] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/wsrc_674883/202404/t20240409_11278404.shtml
https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202404/t20240413_11281386.shtml
https://english dot news dot cn/20240413/3263aba7bec64197bf63d46eee1c6f9f/c.html
http://www.news dot cn/world/20240411/dc033e570e7e41a1bcef19d02c23b171/c.html
[37] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202404/t20240416_11282426.shtml
[38] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202404/t20240417_11283184.shtml
[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-lifts-ban-some-german-beef-imports-germanys-scholz-visits-beijing-2024-04-16/
[40] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-15/eu-goes-on-china-trade-offensive-after-getting-played-for-years
[41] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202402/t20240221_11248118.shtml
https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/zwbd_673032/wjzs/202401/t20240130_11236020.shtml
[42] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_23_6409
[43] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3358
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ban-companies-make-sensitive-tech-china/
[44] https://www.scmp
dot
com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3259275/visit-china-german-chancellor-scholz-shows-divisions-eu-over-how-engage-beijing-trade-and-russia
[45] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3256748/china-germany-ties-are-resilient-despite-eu-push-de-risk-says-beijing-envoy-berlin
[46] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202404/content_6946007.htm
[47] http://www.news dot cn/20240416/2a000c0a08754ffaa2b9cd5f0ec1dc05/c.html
[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2023
[49] http://www.xinhuanet dot com/mil/2023-02/22/c_1211731674.htm
http://paper.people dot com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-04/21/nw.D110000renmrb_20220421_1-17.htm
[50] https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-russia-arms-production-help-c098c08b
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024
[51] https://apnews.com/article/united-states-china-russia-ukraine-war-265df843be030b7183c95b6f3afca8ec
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-russia-arms-production-help-c098c08b
[52] https://www.scmp
dot
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[53] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/01/world/middleeast/iran-commanders-killed-syria-israel.html
[54] https://un.china-mission dot gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202404/t20240415_11281511.htm
[55] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202404/t20240414_11281441.shtml
[56] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/wjbxw_674885/202404/t20240415_11282042.shtml
