Friday, July 12, 2019

Russia in Review: Exploiting Transition in Ukraine

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Author: Nataliya Bugayova

Key Takeaways
  • The Kremlin is exploiting new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s political inexperience and desire to end the war in Eastern Ukraine to achieve its preferred outcome in Ukraine – a risk previously outlined by ISW. The Kremlin will likely attempt to link Ukraine and Europe’s urge to pursue peace in Ukraine with its recent diplomatic gains in parts of Europe to push for a settlement that starts lifting the economic sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014.
  • Zelensky has reaffirmed Ukraine’s commitment to closer relations with the West. He likely does not voluntarily intend to empower Russia’s interests in Ukraine. His administration’s actions and inactions nevertheless create a favorable environment for the Kremlin, including a tolerant atmosphere for the return of Kremlin-linked actors displaced by the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution.
  • The Kremlin’s success in Ukraine is not inevitable. The upcoming 2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections will provide an opportunity for reform-oriented professionals to unite and serve as a counterbalance to Russia in Ukraine. The U.S. should expand its support for reformists in both the Zelensky Administration and the Ukrainian Parliament. The U.S. should also work with its partners in Europe to prevent Zelensky from blindly walking into a deal with Russia that compromises Ukraine’s sovereignty. The U.S. must not allow the Kremlin to legitimize its aggression by playing mediator to a conflict in which it is an active belligerent.
The new Government of Ukraine might be setting conditions for future reconciliation to end the war in Eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ran for office on a core promise to end the conflict with Russia in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine. He and his associates are now taking rhetorical steps towards that goal. Ukrainian National Security Council Secretary Oleksandr Danilyuk stated on July 1 that the Government of Ukraine is “ready to integrate Donbas” under certain conditions including the disarmament of separatist militias led by Russia.[1] Danilyuk dismissed concerns that the reintegration could result in an enclave controlled by Russia inside Ukraine - a risk previously highlighted by ISW.[2] Meanwhile, Ihor Kolomoyskyi - a key oligarch who backs Zelensky - minimized the war in Eastern Ukraine as an “internal civil conflict” on July 4, mirroring the propaganda of the Kremlin.[3] Kolomoyskyi funded militias to counter the Kremlin in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 but he is likely now hedging his bets in anticipation of restored influence for Russia in Ukraine.[4] Zelensky and his associates have also stated that they would consider lifting the economic blockade on the Donbas.[5] Zelensky called for businesses to reinvest in the Donbas on June 20.[6] Ukraine’s Ukrzaliznytsia - the state-owned railway - included the potential restoration of service to the Donbas in its outlook for 2023.[7]

Zelensky is also setting conditions on the ground for a potential reconciliation with the Donbas. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) withdrew from the contested town of Stanytsia Luhanska in Eastern Ukraine on July 1 under a deal first signed by Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2016.[8] The U.S., Europe, and Russia all welcomed the move, which Zelensky framed as a “fragile hope” for peace in the Donbas.[9] The deal nonetheless raised concerns among military officials and civil activists in Ukraine. One senior commander warned that the withdrawal created a tactical disadvantage for the UAF that the Kremlin and its proxies could exploit to escalate the conflict yet again in Eastern Ukraine.[10]

Zelensky has also attempted to build new momentum for a diplomatic deal over Eastern Ukraine. Zelensky and Putin held their first telephone call to discuss the War in Donbas on July 11.[11] He offered on July 8 to meet with Putin in the presence of the U.S., Britain, Germany and France.[12] Putin and Zelensky also both separately discussed resuming the Normandy Four Talks between Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany in June 2019.[13] Putin has expressed a cautious willingness to work with Zelensky.[14] Ukraine and Russia have been discussing a meeting between the two leaders.[15]

The Kremlin will likely exploit these efforts to advance its preferred outcome in Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin retains its long-standing strategic goals to prevent Ukraine’s integration with the West and pull it back into the sphere of influence of Russia. Russia intends to maintain its dominance over the Donbas - overtly or covertly - and thereby the Government of Ukraine. ISW has warned that the Kremlin intends to legitimize its proxies in Donbas within the official state structures of Ukraine. The Kremlin likely ultimately seeks a favorable political settlement that reintegrates a large and supportive bloc of voters back into the politics of Ukraine as a permanent lever of influence over Kyiv. It will likely offer superficial concessions and portray itself as a responsible international actor to achieve this preferred outcome. It will also likely amplify a narrative of “peace at all costs” through media in Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s vision of peace will undermine the sovereignty of Ukraine. Any degree of legitimization of its separatist proxies will also likely fuel polarization and civil unrest within Ukraine. It would set a number of dangerous international precedents, including the de facto legitimization of the invasion of a sovereign nation and the notion of truncated sovereignty for states in the former Soviet Union. It would set the standard that an aggressor can legitimize an invasion if it later manipulates the internal political dynamics of the victim to ‘accept’ its aggression.

The Kremlin will also likely capitalize on these efforts to lift or otherwise roll back international sanctions on Russia. Putin has a critical need to lift sanctions given the deteriorating economic situation in Russia, which is starting to affect his popular support and to some degree his inner circle of powerbrokers.[16] The Kremlin could advance this goal by exploiting the willingness of Ukraine and Europe to reach a settlement on Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin could similarly leverage other recent diplomatic gains in Europe. Russia and the West aligned over a new Government of Moldova in June 2019. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) later reinstated voting rights for Russia on June 25, marking the first reversal of an international constraint imposed on Russia after its illegal occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014.[17] Slovakia’s Parliament is reportedly drafting a resolution declaring the need to end sanctions on Russia.[18] ISW has previously forecast that the Kremlin could reduce overt military tensions in the Donbas and broadcast this decision as a step toward peace in Ukraine. Putin could thereby undermine sanctions against his regime by shifting only his approach rather than his underlying goals in Eastern Europe.

Zelensky likely does not voluntarily seek to advance the interests of Russia in Ukraine. His administration nonetheless is proving a favorable environment for the Kremlin. Zelensky has reaffirmed Ukraine’s preferred course towards deeper integration with the West and prioritized meetings with leaders from the U.S., Canada and Europe.[19] He has criticized the Kremlin for its aggressive policies towards Ukraine.[20] However, his lack of defined policy stances, his limited understanding of geopolitics, his acquiescence to the resurgence of powerbrokers linked to Russia, and the conflicting messages coming from his team (which often reinforce propaganda narratives pushed by the Kremlin) have created a permissive environment for Putin in Ukraine.
  • Former Kremlin-linked powerbrokers displaced by the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 are reestablishing themselves in Ukraine. Andrei Portnov - a key ally of former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych - returned to Ukraine after five years in exile in May 2019 and stated his intent to move his business back to Ukraine.[21] Portnov and his associates are attempting to initiate a criminal investigation into alleged abuse of authority by former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.[22] Zelensky’s Chief of Staff Andriy Bohdan has openly noted his longtime friendship with Portnov.[23] Meanwhile, the Odesa Prosecutor’s Office closed an embezzlement case against Yuriy Ivanyushchenko - another key ally of Yanukovych - on June 4.[24] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office later reversed the decision.[25] Yanukovych’s former Chief of Staff Andriy Klyuyev attempted to register in the 2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections, sparking protests in Kyiv on July 2.[26] Bohdan blamed Poroshenko for the protests but did not take a stance against the return of Klyuyev.[27] Finally, the General Court of the European Union annulled asset freezes imposed by the EU on Yanukovych, his son, and five of his associates who fled Ukraine in 2014.[28]
These actors are likely taking deliberately provocative actions to test the threshold of public sentiment towards their agenda in Ukraine. The Kremlin might thus be setting conditions to either gradually return its influence or ignite popular discontent if it fails to advance its goals under Zelensky. Ukrainian activists are countering this resurgent influence but their long-term ability to sustain such resistance is not a given. Zelensky’s lack of pushback against these powerbrokers is helping to normalize the creeping gains of the Kremlin in Ukraine.

The return of former powerbrokers also poses a particular risk to good governance in Ukraine. These actors mostly hold revanchist agenda and populist policy goals antithetical to reform, as their fortunes depend on longstanding networks of corruption in Ukraine. They will most likely fall back on old habits that prioritize short-term benefits over the long-term health of the Government of Ukraine – a pattern that led to the Euromaidan Revolution. They will also likely try to sabotage integration with the EU and NATO in order to curry favor with the Kremlin.
  • The Kremlin is further contesting the information space in Ukraine. Russia-24 - a state-owned television channel - stated on July 7 that it would collaborate with Ukraine’s NewsOne to host a teleconference between Ukrainians and Russians entitled ‘We Need to Talk’.[29] The proposal sparked outrage across Ukraine and NewsOne cancelled the collaboration on July 8.[30] Meanwhile, Taras Kozak - an ally of Putin-linked Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk - bought a television channel in Ukraine in June 2019.[31] Kozak had previously acquired stakes in several other television channels linked to Russia in Ukraine in late 2018.[32]
The Kremlin is receiving indirect support in its information campaign from problematic statements by associates of Zelensky. Bohdan made a controversial statement about possibly establishing Russian as the official regional language in Eastern Ukraine on July 1.[33] Meanwhile, a parliamentary candidate from Zelensky’s Servant of the People Party criticized Ukraine’s decision to cut the water supply to the occupied Crimean Peninsula on July 7.[34] The Kremlin views the blockade as a major challenge to its governance of Crimea. It likely contemplated a military option to address the issue if Poroshenko won reelection in April 2019. The Kremlin will almost certainly exploit these and other similar messages in its propaganda to shape the political discussion in Kyiv regarding Crimea and the War in Donbas.[35]

  • The Kremlin is setting conditions to exert major energy pressure over Ukraine. Russia’s deal to transit gas through Ukraine expires in December 2019. Both Ukraine and Russia likely both prefer to reach a new deal. Ukraine will lose an estimated $3 billion per year if transit stops, while Russia risks falling short on its gas deliveries to Europe. The Kremlin is nonetheless setting conditions to ship natural gas without Ukraine.[36] Russia continues to push for the completion of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline to Germany, which would enable Russia to bypass Eastern Europe.[37] The Kremlin might not be able to abandon the transit deal with Ukraine at the end of 2019 but it will use the issue over the short-term to pressure Zelensky even as it builds the future capability to deny a major revenue source to Ukraine.
The 2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections provide an opportunity for Ukraine to counter the influence of the Kremlin. Five political parties will likely win seats in the Ukrainian Parliament, namely Zelensky’s Servant of the People Party led by Zelensky (43%); the pro-Russian Opposition Platform - For Life (12%); the All-Ukrainian Union – Fatherland Party led by populist former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (9.4%); Poroshenko’s European Solidarity Party (8.2%); and the new reformist Holos Party (8.3%).[38]

Zelensky might attempt to form a governing coalition with the reformist Holos Party or the populist Fatherland to distance himself from parties openly affiliated with Russia. Any gains for the populists would still indirectly advance the goals of the Kremlin in Ukraine. Ukraine nevertheless faces a moment of opportunity. Ukraine’s political parties face public pressure to include reform-oriented professionals in their ranks amidst the maturation of civil society in the wake of the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution.[39] This reformist cadre - even if dispersed among various political blocs - has the potential to safeguard Ukraine’s prospects and integration with the West even in the face of growing pressure from Russia.

The West should support reform-oriented professionals in the Government of Ukraine. The U.S. should work with its partners in Europe to prevent the Kremlin from normalizing its actions and removing sanction without reversing for its illegal aggression against Ukraine.

[1] [“We Want Full Realization of the Minsk Process. You Cannot Stand and Rest Your Forehead at the Same Time - Danilyuk,”], July 1, 2019,
[2] Valery Saakov, [“Danilyuk: Reintegration of Donbas Is Possible on the Conditions of the Minsk Process with UN Peacekeepers,”] Deutsche Welle, July 1, 2019, https://www.dw(.)com/uk/данилюк-реінтеграція-донбасу-можлива-на-умовах-мінська-і-з-миротворцями-оон/a-49430624.
[3] [“Kolomoyskyi on Who to Blame for Donbas: This Is an Internal, Civil Conflict,”] NV.UA, July 4, 2019, https://nv(.)ua/ukr/ukraine/politics/kolomoyskiy-nazvav-viynu-v-ukrajini-gromadyanskim-konfliktom-50030267.html.
[4] Alan Cullison, “Ukraine’s Secret Weapon: Feisty Oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky,” Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2014,
[5] [“Zelensky Named the Conditions for Lifting the Blockade of the Donbas Region,”] Obozrevatel, July 8, 2019, https://www.obozrevatel(.)com/ukr/economics/zelenskij-nazvav-umovu-znyattya-blokadi-donbasu.htm; [“The Contact Group Agreed to Prepare for a New Truce in Donbas,”] TASS, July 5, 2019, https://tass(.)ru/politika/6511840; “Ukraine’s Envoy at Minsk Talks Proposes Lifting Economic Blockade from Donbas,” UNIAN, June 5, 2019, https://www.unian(.)info/war/10576173-ukraine-s-envoy-at-minsk-talks-proposes-lifting-economic-blockade-from-donbas.html.
[6] “Volodymyr Zelensky Urged Business to Invest in the Restoration of Donbas,” Ukrainian Presidency, June 20, 2019,
[7] Denis Katsilo, [“ Has Acquired the New Strategy of Ukrzaliznytsia: What Awaits the State’s Monopoly?”] Liga.Business, June 18, 2019, https://biz.liga(.)net/all/transport/article/svobodnyy-rynok-i-poezda-na-donbass-samoe-vajnoe-iz-strategii-uz.
[8] “Spot Report by OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Receipt of Notifications on Completion of Disengagement in Stanytsia Luhanska Disengagement Area,” OSCE, June 30, 2019,; “OSCE Confirms Completion of Forces’ Disengagement Near Stanytsia Luhanska,” Interfax, July 1, 2019, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/osce-confirms-completion-of-forces-disengagement-near-stanytsia-luhanska.html; “Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30, 27 June 2019,” OSCE, June 28, 2019,; [“Daynevo: Units of the People's Militia of the LNR Are Relegated from Positions in the Area of the Stanytsia Luhanska,”] TASS, June 27, 2019, http://tass(.)ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6601930; Joint Forces Operation, [“In Stanytsia Luhanska, Withdrawal of Forces and Means Took Place,”] Facebook, June 26, 2019,; [“The Headquarters of the Joint Forces Operation Explains: The Withdrawal of Forces in the Village of Luhanska – Not Weakening,”] Ukrainskaya Pravda, June 26, 2019,
[9] [“Russia Urged to Implement the Agreement on the Dilution of Forces at Stanytsia Luhansk,”] RIA Novosti, June 28, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20190628/1556006683.html; “Foreign Minister Maas on the Disengagement of Troops at Stanytsia Luhanska in Eastern Ukraine,” German Foreign Ministry, July 1, 2019, https://www.auswaertiges-amt(.)de/en/newsroom/news/maas-ukraine/2230596; “Zelensky: Disengagement in Stanytsia Luhanska First Step Toward Ceasefire,” UNIAN, July 1, 2019, https:/www.unian(.)info/war/10602003-zelensky-disengagement-in-stanytsia-luhanska-first-step-toward-ceasefire.html.
[10] [“The Disengagement of Troops Near the Village of Stanytsia Luhanska Created a Danger in Tactical Terms - Zabrodsky,”] ZN, July 5, 2019, https://zn(.)ua/UKRAINE/razvedenie-voysk-okolo-stanicy-luganskoy-sozdalo-opasnost-v-takticheskom-plane-zabrodskiy-322789_.html.
[11] “Zelensky, Putin Talk Donbas War and Prisoner Swap in First Phone Call,” Kyiv Post, July 11, 2019,
[12] Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine’s Zelensky Calls for Putin and Trump to Join Peace Talks,” Financial Times, July 8, 2019,
[13] “Putin Agrees on Normandy Format to Settle War is Donbas,” Kyiv Post, June 29, 2019,; “Macron Says New Ukraine Peace Talks Possible Under Zelensky,” France24, June 17, 2019,
[14] “Russia Not Declining Contacts with Zelensky, Says Putin,” TASS, June 7, 2019, https://tass(.)com/politics/1062750.
[15] [”In Russia, They Started Talking About Meeting Putin with Zelensky: A Possible Date is Named,”] Fakty, June 3, 2019, https://fakty(.)ua/307378-v-rossii-zagovorili-o-vstreche-putina-s-zelenskim-nazvana-vozmozhnaya-data; “Danilyuk Said that the Meeting of Zelensky and Putin is Real,” Goruduna, July 1, 2019, https(:)//
[16] [“Railway Shipments Are Down as Before Recession,”] The Bell, July 2, 2019, https://thebell(.)io/perevozki-rzhd-snizilis-kak-pered-retsessiej/; Marina Karpova, “Russian Supermarket Starts Selling Food on Credit,” Russia Beyond The Headlines, February 12, 2016,
[17] Denys Krasnikov, Jack Laurenson, “Ukraine Suspends Membership as PACE Reinstates Russia,” Kyiv Post, June 25, 2019, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-suspends-membership-as-europes-parliamentary-assembly-reinstates-russia.html.
[18] Dmitri Laru, [“Friendship Resolution: Slovakia Prepared a Document on the Lifting of Sanctions,”] Izvestia, July 5, 2019, https://iz(.)ru/895424/dmitrii-laru/rezoliutciia-druzhby-v-slovakii-podgotovili-dokument-ob-otmene-sanktcii.
[19] “Canada Continues to Strengthen Ties with Ukraine, Says Trudeau,” Global News, July 2, 2019,; Volodymyr Zelensky, Facebook, May 2, 2019,
[20] Volodymyr Zelensky, Facebook, May 2 2019,; “Zelensky at Meeting with Freeland Confirms Ukraine’s Course Towards EU and NATO,” Ukrinform, July 2, 2019,
[21] [“Portnov Moves His Business from Austria: “We Need to Pay Taxes in Ukraine,”] UA1, June 6, 2019,; [“’Poroshenko Will Sit’: First Interview with Andrei Portnov in Kiev,”] Strana Ukraine, May 19, 2019, https://strana(.)ua/news/201882-vernuvshijsja-v-ukrainu-andrej-portnov-zajavil-chto-petr-poroshenko-budet-sidet.html.
[22] [“’Poroshenko Will Sit’: First Interview with Andrei Portnov in Kiev,”] Strana Ukraine, May 19, 2019, https://strana(.)ua/news/201882-vernuvshijsja-v-ukrainu-andrej-portnov-zajavil-chto-petr-poroshenko-budet-sidet.html; “SBI Starts Investigation into the Seizure of State Power by Poroshenko,” Interfax, June 2, 2019,; “Criminal Case Registered About False Claims by Portnov About Poroshenko's So-Called Crimes - Poroshenko's Lawyer,” Interfax, June 25, 2019,
[23] [“‘Portnov Is My Long-Term Friend’: Bogdan Spoke About Relations with the Ex-Regionalist,”] 5Ukraine, July 1, 2019, https://www.5(.)ua/polityka/portnov-tse-mii-bahatorichnyi-druh-bohdan-rozpoviv-pro-stosunky-z-eksrehionalom-194950.html.
[24] [“Stolen Government Funds and the Market: The Prosecutor's Office Closed the Case of Ivanyushchenko,”] Ukrainskaya Pravda, June 4, 2019,
[25] [“Prosecutor General's Office Resumed the Investigation Against Ivanyushchenko – Source,”] Ukrainskaya Pravda, July 9, 2019,
[26] Oleksiy Sorokin, “Yanukovych’s Top Official Tries to Run for Parliament 5 Years After Fleeing Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, June 24, 2019, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/yanukovychs-top-official-tries-to-run-for-parliament-5-years-after-fleeing-ukraine.html; [“Lawyer: Supreme Court Confirmed the Right of Andriy Klyuyev to Participate in the Parliamentary Elections,”] Interfax, July 1, 2019,; Daria Shulzhenko and Volodymyr Petrov, “Yanukovych’s Top Official Klyuyev, Blogger Shariy Approved to Run for Parliament,” Kyiv Post, July 2, 2019, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/yanukovychs-top-official-klyuyev-blogger-shariy-approved-to-run-for-parliament.html.
[27] [“Bogdan Recommends Referring the Question of the Registration of Klyuyev and Shariy in the Elections to Poroshenko,”] Interfax, July 3, 2019,
[28] “Press Release No 93/2019,” General Court of the European Union, July 11, 2019,; “EU Court Annuls Yanukovych Asset Freezes,” RFERL, July 11, 2019,
[29] Oksana Grytsenko, “Teleconference Idea Between Ukrainian, Russian TV Channels Sparks Outrage,” Kyiv Post, July 8, 2019, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/proposed-teleconference-between-pro-russian-channels-sparks-outrage-in-ukraine.html.
[30] [“Lutsenko: Everyone, from the Owner of NewsOne to the Host, Was Called in for Questioning,”] Ukrainskaya Pravda, July 8, 2019,
[31] Vyacheslav Hnatyuk, “Russia-Friendly Lawmaker Kozak Buys ZIK TV Channel, Journalists Resign,” Kyiv Post, June 15, 2019, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/russia-friendly-lawmaker-kozak-buys-zik-tv-channel-journalists-resign.html.
[32] Kateryna Churilova, [“Taras Kozak Became the New Owner of the NewsOne Channel,”} Zaxid, October 5, 2018,
[33] Sergey Shcherbyna, [“Andriy Bohdan: I Would Allow Donetsk and Luhansk an Official Russian Language if They Will Be the Territory of Ukraine,” RBK, July 1, 2019, https(:)//
[34] [“‘These Are Our Citizens’: Candidate from Zelensky’s Party Said That Ukraine Is Harming the Residents of Crimea,”] Strana, July 7, 2019, https://twnews(.)at/ua-news/eto-nashi-grazhdane-kandidat-ot-partii-zelenskogo-zaiavil-chto-ukraina-vredit-zhiteliam-kryma.
[35] Ivan Grachev, [“Ukrainian Oligarch Kolomoisky: The War in the Donbas is our Internal Civil Conflict,”] Komsoloskaya Pravda, July 4, 2019,; [“Kolomoisky Called the Conflict in the Donabs Civil War,”] TASS, May 2, 2019, https(:)//
[36] Vladimir Soldatkin, “Record Russian Gas Sales to Europe Help Gazprom Profits Double,” Reuters, April 29, 2019,
[37] “Ukraine Loses $3 Billion per Year If Russia Gas Transit Ceased - Naftogaz CEO,” 112 UA, January 21, 2019, https://112(.)international/russia/ukraine-loses-3-billion-per-year-if-russian-gas-transit-ceased-naftogaz-ceo-36205.html.
[38] [“Monitoring Electoral Mood of Ukrainians: June 20-24, 2019,”] Rating Group UA, June 26, 2019, ratinggroup(.)ua/research/ukraine/monitoring_elektoralnyh_nastroeniy_ukraincev_20-24_iyunya_2019_goda.html; [“Monitoring Electoral Orientations of the Population of Ukraine,”] Center for Social Monitoring, 1 July, 2019,; Vyacheslav Hnatyuk, “Pro-Russia Opposition Union Reveals Candidates for Parliamentary Elections,” Kyiv Post, June 12, 2019, https(:)//
[39] “Parties Finish Selecting Deputies Candidates for Early Rada Elections,” Kyiv Post, June 12, 2019, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/parties-finish-selecting-deputies-candidates-for-early-rada-elections.html; Oleksiy Sorokin, “Zelensky’s Servant of the People Party Unveils Candidates for Parliament,” Kyiv Post, June 9, 2019,; “Names of First Candidates for Snap Elections from Vakarchuk’s Party Holos Announced” 112 UA, June 8, 2019, https://112(.)international/ukraine-top-news/first-five-candidates-for-snap-elections-from-vakarchuks-party-golos-reported-40544.html; “First Hundred Candidates on Servant of the People's Election List: Who Are They?” Interfax, June 12, 2019,