Jennifer Cafarella
Key Takeaway: The return of a signature Iranian explosive device in Iraq
could indicate that Iran may already have escalated against U.S.
forces in Iraq either to deter the roll out of a new US strategy against
Iran, or to retaliate against it.
President Trump has signaled his intent to decertify the Iranian nuclear agreement and is scheduled to announce a new
counter-Iran strategy on
October 13th. Iranian officials have
signaled that Iran may take military action against US forces in the region if the U.S. takes harsh
steps against Iran such as designating Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. Iranian proxies in Iraq that once
fought against the US have also repeatedly signaled their intent to oust
US forces from Iraq after defeating ISIS. The spokesman for Katai'b Hezbollah
stated that "we look at America as our first enemy" in early 2017, for example. Iran is most likely to use its
proxies to escalate in Iraq, where US forces are vulnerable.
A high-end Iranian signature weapon, an Explosively Formed
Penetrator (EFP), killed U.S. soldier Specialist Alexander W. Missildine and wounded another soldier on a major road in Iraq’s
Salahuddin Province on October 1st. The U.S. military
is still investigating the origin of the explosive. Yet Iran is the likely perpetrator. The
EFP is a high-end explosive device that Iran previously provided to its proxies in Iraq to kill U.S. soldiers during the Iraq War. Iranian-provided EFPs killed nearly 200 US soldiers and wounded over 800 from 2005-2011 according to
figures declassified by US Central Command.
ISW and CTP forecasted in September 2017 that Iran may opt for a “most dangerous”
course of action in the next six months and order its proxy forces in Iraq
to attack US personnel or contractors in Iraq. The use of an EFP against US
soldiers in Iraq could indicate the start of this Iranian path of escalation.
ISW and CTP forecasted that Iran’s plans in the 6 months from
September 2017 will be:
Main Effort: Iran will continue to prioritize efforts to constrain, disrupt,
and ultimately expel the U.S. from Syria. Iran will conduct operations to block
further expansion by coalition partners on the ground, including the Syrian
Kurdish YPG near Raqqa City. Iran will continue supporting operations to
bolster the presence of pro-regime forces in Deir ez Zour Province in Eastern
Syria. The pro-Assad coalition remains unlikely to launch major urban clearing
operations in Deir ez Zour City. They will likely choose to conduct further
operations to secure key oil fields and minor population centers along the
Euphrates River Valley. Iran will help Assad consolidate his control over
Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Dera’a Provinces in western Syria. Iran
remains unlikely to contribute additional, large combat forces to these efforts
unless required to preserve its proxies’ combat power or to counter an emergent
threat to Assad. Iran will likely remain cautious in supporting operations in
southern Syria to reduce the risk of a major direct conflict with Israel, which
Iran is not pursuing at this time. Iran will prioritize efforts to maintain and
develop the Russo-Iranian coalition as well as the Quartet with Russia, the
Assad regime, and Iraq.
Main Effort: Iran will focus on political efforts in Iraq to secure its
influence and the full withdrawal of U.S. forces. Iran will attempt to shape
the outcome of the 2018 Iraqi Parliamentary Election in order to cultivate a
favorable government in Baghdad. Iran will likely attempt to craft a coalition
that sets political constraints on current Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi. Iran
could alternatively seek to ensure the election of a more responsive premier.
Iran will continue its efforts to establish durable influence within the ISF.
Iran has a number of possible courses of action it may pursue in support of its
main effort in Iraq in the next six months. They include:
- Most
Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) - Iraq: The
Russo-Iranian coalition takes new steps to offset the U.S. role in Iraq
and set political conditions that accelerate an ultimate U.S. drawdown.
Iran uses its proxies to coerce the Iraqi government into launching
clearing operations in ISIS-held Tel Afar, now completed, and Hawija with
heavy PMU involvement and minimal U.S. involvement (this operation is well
underway). Iran uses these operations to further develop its influence
within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense while sidelining the U.S. Russia
offers military advisors to the ISF, PMU, or both in order to offset the
U.S. role. Russia and Iran may undertake a combined effort to build up
Iraq’s rotary wing capability independent from the U.S. and possibly in
direct support of the PMU. Russia and Iran both pressure key Iraqi
leaders, possibly including Abadi, to call for a full U.S. withdrawal from
Iraq rather than a residual U.S. troop presence.
- Most
Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) - Iraq (A):
Iran orders its proxy forces to attack U.S. personnel or U.S. contractors
in Iraq in order to compel a U.S. withdrawal. This COA directly places
forces at risk and might escalate beyond Iraq. It is not likely unless the
U.S. decides to increase the U.S. troop presence in Iraq or to take
aggressive action against Iran after the U.S. policy review concludes,
such as imposing meaningful secondary sanctions against the entire IRGC.
Iran’s proxies could also target U.S. personnel that deploy to Iraq to
secure the highways from Jordan and Saudi Arabia to Baghdad.
- MDCOA
- Iraq (B): Iran deploys ground forces
into Diyala Province in eastern Iraq in order to secure the province. This
course of action is likely if ISIS shifts reinforcements to Diyala
Province or has unspent capabilities there – not visible through open
sources – that let ISIS achieve a major breakthrough. This COA is
dangerous because it would further undermine Iraqi state sovereignty and
set a precedent for foreign intervention in Iraq that could embolden
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to increase his own involvement in
northern Iraq. Supporting Effort (enduring): Iran will prioritize efforts
to strengthen the capabilities and cohesion of the Axis of Resistance.
Iran will attempt to limit the costs of its ongoing interventions in Iraq
and Syria by discouraging large-scale troop deployments or sudden, massive
military campaigns by Assad. It will work to preserve and expand its
existing proxy forces including Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shi’a
militias. Iran will also continue supporting the al Houthi movement in
Yemen, although it remains unlikely to expand that support dramatically in
either scope or scale.
Supporting Effort
(enduring): Iran will vigorously
oppose the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. It will try to block or delay a
declaration of independence in principle and in practice after the independence
referendum. It will use military means to deny the incorporation of contested
terrain and key positions into Kurdistan. It will begin by positioning military
assets to deter Kurdish forces, but is willing to use force if deterrence
fails. Its primary instrument will be its proxy forces within the Iraqi Popular
Mobilization Units. Iranian-backed PMU are currently positioned on the southern
and western borders of the oil-rich disputed Kirkuk Province, currently largely
under Kurdish control. They are also present around contested areas in both
Diyala and Salah al Din Provinces. Iran will also use coercive means to deter
local councils in disputed areas from joining the referendum. This effort is
already underway. Iran will also pressure Arab politicians to reject the
referendum, and possibly to oppose it through force.
Friction: Iran’s primary source of friction will be the continued
threat posed by ISIS in Iraq. Iran is unlikely to press for the rapid expulsion
of the U.S. from Iraq if it would risk a resurgence by ISIS. Iran will opt to
increase political pressure on Baghdad to gradually reduce and ultimately end
the U.S. presence in Iraq. Iran will likely wait until after anti-ISIS
operations in Kirkuk and Anbar provinces conclude to push this campaign. Iran
could nonetheless orchestrate a more dramatic campaign to expel the U.S. from
Iraq if it perceived a more manageable threat from ISIS and al Qaeda or a more
urgent threat from the U.S. Iran could pursue this option if the U.S. attempts
to increase its force posture in Iraq or challenges Iran elsewhere in the
Middle East. Iran must also balance its hostile policy towards the U.S. and
Israel against its obligations in the Russo-Iranian coalition. Iran will avoid
generating a major confrontation with the U.S. in Syria. Iran will also refrain
from openly spoiling negotiated deals between the U.S. and Russia in Syria.
Iran could reevaluate its priorities if tensions escalate between the U.S. and
Iran elsewhere in the Middle East. Increased pushback by the U.S. against Iran
— including sanctions legislation passed this year and tougher rhetoric —
remains unlikely to generate such a decision in the absence of wider threats to
Iran’s core strategic interests.