By: Christopher Kozak
Key Takeaway
ISIS currently faces an unprecedented threat to its core terrain
in Northern Syria from an array of competing actors. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces
surrounded the key transit hub of Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province on June 9,
threatening to sever the last remaining supply lines available to ISIS over the
Syrian-Turkish Border. Meanwhile, ISIS’s stronghold of Ar-Raqqa City faces
mounting pressure as both the U.S.-led coalition and pro-regime forces advance
into its countryside. These combined pressures forced ISIS to withdraw from its
frontlines with opposition forces in Northern Aleppo Province in order to
prioritize the defense of its core terrain. Nonetheless, the
degrading position of ISIS in Northern Syria is poised to ignite further
conflict between local and regional actors that may jeopardize future
successes. The terrain vacated
by ISIS will likely host renewed competition between Syrian Kurds, opposition
groups, and pro-regime forces as well as a geopolitical struggle involving
Turkey, Syria, Russia, and the U.S. These conflicts could strain the
international anti-ISIS coalition and stall further progress against ISIS in
Syria unless the U.S. can successful navigate the conflicting interests of its
allies and adversaries in the region.
Introduction
ISIS currently
faces unprecedented pressure in Northern Syria. The U.S.-led anti-ISIS
coalition has long pursued a campaign to isolate and ultimately seize Ar-Raqqa
City – the de-facto capital of ISIS in Syria. This strategy has included
several separate lines of effort over the past twelve months to sever the
ground lines of communication linking Ar-Raqqa City to Mosul in Iraq as well as
the Syrian-Turkish Border. These cumulative efforts planted the seeds for actors
on the ground to achieve nonlinear effects against the organization. Over the past
ten weeks, an array of groups, including Syrian Kurds backed by the U.S., Sunni
Arabs backed by Turkey, and the Syrian Arab Army backed by Russia and Iran,
have exploited these vulnerabilities to varying degrees. ISIS will likely lose
access to its cross-border flows of foreign fighters and supplies over the
near-term, leaving the organization vulnerable throughout its core terrain in
Iraq and Syria. Nonetheless, the ongoing successes against ISIS in Northern
Syria remain uncoordinated and localized. The major factions active on the
ground view each other with hostility and often operate at cross-purposes to
one another. The competing actors also aim to leverage their independent
campaigns in Northern Syria to their own ends despite their ostensible shared
goal to defeat ISIS in Syria. The Syrian Kurds harbor ambitions to unite their
disparate cantons and construct a contiguous autonomous zone upon terrain
formerly held by ISIS along the Syrian-Turkish Border; Turkey aims to use its
network of allied opposition groups to check the Syrian Kurds and block their
future expansion; and the regime and its allies hope to exploit anti-ISIS
operations in order to reassert their claims to domestic rule and international
legitimacy. These competing motives and actions set the stage for future
conflict that could strain the international anti-ISIS coalition and allow ISIS
to preserve its control of terrain along the Euphrates River Valley in Eastern
Syria over the long-term.
The Competing Actors
The Syrian Democratic Forces
The Syrian
Democratic Forces – a U.S.-backed coalition consisting of the Syrian Kurdish
YPG and allied opposition groups – represents the primary ground partner in the
fight against ISIS in Syria. The U.S. began providing
direct air support to the Syrian Kurdish YPG in September 2014 in order to
blunt an ISIS offensive on the border town of Kobani
(Ayn al-Arab) in Eastern Aleppo Province. The military partnership continued to
expand over time as the Syrian Kurdish YPG demonstrated its effectiveness
against ISIS on the battlefield. U.S. President Barack Obama authorized
the deployment of up to fifty U.S. Special Operations Forces soldiers to
Northern Syria in October 2015 in order to “train, advise, and assist” the
Syrian Kurdish YPG as well as allied tribal and opposition groups in the
so-called Syrian Arab Coalition as part of the newly-formed
Syrian Democratic Forces. This deployment occurred despite long-standing
reservations from Turkey, which considers the Syrian
Kurdish YPG to be a terrorist organization due to its links
to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). By the end of 2015, the Syrian
Democratic Forces controlled the majority of the Syrian-Turkish Border and occupied
a bridgehead across the Euphrates River at the Tishreen
Dam.
The U.S. intensified
its cooperation with Syrian Democratic Forces in early 2016 in order to accelerate
operations aimed at isolating and seizing the ISIS stronghold of Ar-Raqqa City.
The U.S. expanded its deployment of Special Operations Forces by an additional
250 personnel in April 2016. U.S. Special Envoy to the Anti-ISIS Coalition
Brett McGurk later stated on May 15 that a “pressure
campaign” on Ar-Raqqa City would begin over the “coming weeks and months.”
U.S. CENTCOM Commander Gen. Joseph Votel later conducted an unannounced
visit to Northern Syria on May 21 in order to review campaign plans with
the leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the affiliated Syrian Arab
Coalition. These efforts laid the groundwork for the start of a new phase of
the anti-ISIS campaign on the ground. On May 24, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced
an operation to “liberate” the northern countryside of the ISIS stronghold
of Ar-Raqqa City. The Syrian Democratic Forces achieved initial
gains despite the presence of a large number of IEDs and later expanded
the operation to target the town of Tabaqa west
of Ar-Raqqa City on May 30, although a spokesperson clarified
that the ongoing offensive did not aim to contest the city itself.
The looming
territorial expansion of the Syrian Kurds in Northern Syria prompted fierce
resistance in Turkey. Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff Gen. Yasar Guler
reportedly warned U.S. CENTCOM Commander Gen. Joseph Votel after his visit to
Northern Syria that the Syrian Kurdish YPG would “let
him down when the fight gets tough” and urged the U.S. to expand its
support to Turkish-backed opposition groups in Northern Aleppo Province. On May
25, tensions flared further after the release
of photographs showing U.S. Special Operations Forces in Northern Syria
wearing the shoulder patches of the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Turkish Foreign
Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu denounced the incident as an “unacceptable…double
standard” while Turkish President Recep Erdogan stressed that the images
illustrated the “wrong
steps” being taken in cooperation with “terrorist groups.” The U.S. ordered
its soldiers to remove the patches within days, but the vast gap between the
positions of the two countries remained clear. On May 30, Turkey proposed
a joint deployment of Special Operations Forces with the U.S. and other
allies to clear ISIS from the Syrian-Turkish Border and open a “second front”
against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City on the condition that the coalition embed with
local opposition groups rather than the Syrian Kurdish YPG. These plans failed
to gain traction.
The operation
in Northern Ar-Raqqa Province that provoked the ire of Turkey nonetheless
obscured the true objective of the Syrian Democratic Forces – the key town of Manbij
in Eastern Aleppo Province. Manbij serves as ISIS’s main “transit
hub for foreign fighter flows” as well as a base for its international
terrorist attacks. The seizure of the town also serves the overall strategic
objective to isolate Ar-Raqqa City from its last remaining supply routes to the
Syrian-Turkish Border. On May 31, the
Syrian Democratic Forces advanced
on Manbij from the direction of their beachhead at the Tishreen
Dam. At the same time, a separate detachment conducted a forced
crossing of the Euphrates River and repaired the Qarah
Qawzaq Bridge, opening a new front east of Manbij. These forces converged
on Manbij with the support of coalition airstrikes and successfully isolated
the town from three sides on June 9, placing ISIS under severe pressure
even as the Syrian Democratic Forces vowed
that the campaign would continue “until the liberation of the last inch of land
in Manbij and its rural areas.” U.S.
officials stressed that the design of the operation minimized the participation
of the Syrian Kurdish YPG in accordance with the concerns held by Turkey.
Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesperson Col. Chris Garver stated that “local
Arabs” comprised approximately
85% of the 3,000 fighters participating in the operation.
Turkey responded cautiously to
the ongoing offensive on Manbij. Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus
stated on May 31 that the potential expansion of the Syrian Kurdish YPG west of
the Euphrates River “constitutes a national security
line for Turkey” and that Turkey
rejected any military
participation in the
operation as “out of question.” Nonetheless, President Erdogan acknowledged on
June 2 that roughly 2,500 of the 3,000 fighters participating in the operation
are Sunni Arabs with Syrian Kurds operating as a “logistical force.” Foreign
Minister Cavusoglu later stated on June 7 that the U.S. had “given a guarantee”
that the Syrian Kurdish YPG would withdraw east of the Euphrates
River after the
completion of the operation to seize Manbij. If implemented, these concessions
will likely prove sufficient to prevent Turkey from acting to undermine the
operation. Nonetheless, it remains an open question whether the Syrian Kurdish
YPG intends to honor the deal given its long-term strategic objective to unite
all of its cantons along the Syrian-Turkish Border.
Northern Aleppo Opposition Groups
The loose
coalition of Sunni Arab opposition groups supported by Turkey in Northern
Aleppo Province constitutes another key group of actors engaging in anti-ISIS
operations in Northern Syria. These groups span a wide ideological range – from
Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated moderate secularists to Islamists linked with
the Muslim Brotherhood to Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham – but remain
united in their opposition to ISIS. The groups contain a large number of local
fighters with a strong motivation to defend their hometowns, particularly the
key urban centers of Mare’a
and Azaz.
Northern Aleppo Province thus represents potential fertile ground for the
development of a Sunni Arab partner against ISIS. The U.S. Department of
Defense attempted to mobilize this community in an ill-fated
‘train-and-equip’ program that ended in October 2015. The U.S. has since
provided training to “dozens” of fighters in Northern Aleppo Province as part
of a restructured
‘train-and-equip’ program that embedded these fighters with several
smaller factions along the so-called Mare’a Line, including Liwa al-Hamza,
Liwa 99, and Liwa al-Mutasem.
Turkey has promoted
support for Turkmens, Islamists, and other opposition groups in Northern Aleppo
Province as a counterweight to further expansion by the Syrian Kurdish YPG.
Turkey allowed several
hundred opposition fighters to transit through its territory from Idlib
Province in order to reinforce Mare’a and Azaz amidst a pro-regime offensive on
the region in February 2016. Turkey also provided the opposition in Northern
Aleppo Province with fresh
supplies of mortars, rockets, and other munitions over the same time
period. Former Turkish Prime Minster Ahmet Davutoglu stressed on
February 18 that “the whole world should know…we will not allow Azaz to fall.” Meanwhile,
Turkey pressed the U.S. and other coalition allies to expand their own support
for the opposition in Northern Aleppo Province. For example, President Erdogan previously
conditioned his support for the operation to seize Manbij in Eastern Aleppo
Province upon the expansion
of the coalition air campaign along the Mare’a Line.
These lobbying efforts led the U.S. to provide its support to an opposition-led
offensive to clear ISIS from the Syrian-Turkish Border. On April 7, the Hawar
Kilis Operations Room – a coalition of opposition groups that included
fighters vetted by the ‘train-and-equip’ program – seized the
ISIS-held border town of Al-Rai
in Northern Aleppo Province with the aid of cross-border artillery fire and
coalition airstrikes. The advance severed a key route for smuggling foreign
fighters and supplies, and left ISIS with little more than thirty miles of
remaining border access. The rapid offensive along the border nonetheless left
opposition forces vulnerable to an attack on their exposed southern flank. ISIS
launched a two-pronged counteroffensive on April 10 - 14, recapturing the
town of Al-Rai and temporarily entrapping
opposition groups in a pocket along the Syrian-Turkish Border. The
opposition continued to suffer a steady erosion in terrain over subsequent
weeks, culminating in a major attack by ISIS on May 27 that punctured
the Mare’a Line and threatened to overwhelm remaining opposition forces in
Mare’a and Azaz.
The reversal of opposition gains in
Northern Aleppo Province stemmed from multiple sources. Opposition groups in Northern
Aleppo Province remain divided and fractious despite the threat posed by ISIS,
failing to unite around a single leader or strategic vision for the operation.
The opposition also split its attention between multiple adversaries and
engaged in several major clashes with the Syrian Kurdish YPG, including a failed attack on the town of Ayn Daqnah in April 2016 that killed at least
sixty opposition fighters. Opposition sources also blamed their external backers for the setbacks, criticizing the U.S. for
failing to provide key equipment - such as night-vision goggles, mine-clearing
vehicles, and anti-tank weapons - that could counter the use of SVBIEDs and
IEDs by ISIS. In a press briefing on May 13, former Operation Inherent Resolve
Spokesperson Col. Steve Warren stated that the operation had ultimately been hindered by the limited
capability of local “hold forces.”
The near-destruction of opposition groups in
Northern Aleppo Province nonetheless generated significant impetus for the U.S.
and Turkey to boost their capabilities on the ground. The U.S. expanded its
military support to select opposition groups, conducting two much-needed airdrops
of weapons and ammunition to Liwa al-Mutasem in Mare’a on June 2 and June 6.
On June 7, Liwa al-Mutasem announced
the integration of all opposition factions in Mare’a under its leadership, likely
due in part from its status as an outlet for external support. Meanwhile, mounting
pressure from the Syrian Democratic Forces at Manbij and Ar-Raqqa City forced ISIS
to deprioritize its operations against the opposition. ISIS withdrew
from large parts of Northern Aleppo Province on June 8, lifting the sieges
of Mare’a and Azaz. The opposition – forged under the pressure of a relentless
assault by ISIS - now sits in an optimal position to resume operations along
the Syrian-Turkish Border under a unified leadership with strong external
backing.
Pro-Regime Forces
The intensifying fight against ISIS in Northern
Syria also motived Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his foreign allies to
escalate their own operations under the guise of the fight against terrorism. On
June 2, the Syrian Arab Army and allied paramilitary forces supported by
Russian aircraft launched an operation in the direction Ar-Raqqa City from the
crossroads of Ithriya
in Eastern Hama Province, taking advantage of the ongoing fight against ISIS in
Manbij. Video footage showed large numbers of armored
vehicles, multiple rocket launcher systems, and field artillery participating in the offensive. Pro-regime
forces advanced rapidly along the open desert highway, entering
the boundary of Ar-Raqqa Province
on June 4 and seizing
a key road junction roughly twenty miles from Tabaqa west of
Ar-Raqqa City on June 7. On the same day, President Assad vowed to “liberate every inch of Syria” as part of the “war against terrorism” in a
speech before the Syrian Parliament. ISIS responded to this pressure by deploying a column of reinforcements to Tabaqa from Ar-Raqqa City while mounting probing attacks to disrupt the regime ground line of
communications further west.
Pro-regime forces likely remain incapable of
seizing Ar-Raqqa City or other ISIS-held urban areas. The advance nonetheless allows
the regime to stake its claim to Ar-Raqqa Province while positioning for
follow-on operations to exploit further losses by ISIS at the hands of the
Syrian Democratic Forces. The offensive also provides Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin with an opportunity to impose
their strategic priorities on the U.S. and its coalition allies. Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov floated a proposal for the U.S. and Russia to coordinate
operations against Ar-Raqqa City in March 2016. The U.S. flatly rejected
this offer, but the presence of pro-regime forces outside of Ar-Raqqa City would
at a minimum force the U.S. to engage in battlefield deconfliction – opening
the door for Syria and Russia to message their role as valuable partners against
ISIS before the international community.
Conclusion
The
multi-sided fight for Northern Syria over the coming months will likely
complicate efforts by the U.S. to maintain the focus and coherence of its local
partners on the fight against ISIS. The Syrian Kurdish YPG maintains a
long-term strategic objective to form a contiguous autonomous
zone along the Syrian-Turkish Border, calling into question the ability of
the U.S. to maintain its guarantees to Turkey. The Syrian Kurdish YPG could
elect to establish a land corridor to the Afrin Canton in Northern Aleppo
Province rather than press the fight against Ar-Raqqa City – a move that could
find support from Russia. This decision would likely provoke significant
military retaliation from both Turkey and local opposition groups, fracturing
the tenuous coalition of anti-ISIS actors in Northern Syria. Even in a
best-case scenario, Northern Aleppo Province will likely constitute a venue for
continued skirmishes between Sunni Arabs and Syrian Kurds stemming from historical
rivalries, ethnic tensions, and foreign interference by Turkey.
Meanwhile,
pro-regime forces remain positioned to exploit gains against ISIS for their own
ends. Pro-regime forces sit outside the key urban centers of Al-Bab in Aleppo
Province and Tabaqa in Ar-Raqqa Province in anticipation of future
opportunities to secure new terrain and broadcast their claims of effectiveness
in the “war against terrorism.” The decision to prioritize these efforts
reflects the overriding strategic aim shared by Syria, Russia, and Iran –
namely, the expulsion of the U.S. and all vestiges of its influence in the
region. This objective provides pro-regime forces with an incentive to subvert
and undermine the international coalition against ISIS in favor of their own
regional security structures. At the same time, the campaign for Northern Syria
will open new opportunities for Russia to threaten Turkey and thereby pressure
the southern flank of NATO. Russia has expressed interest in expanding
its ties with the Syrian Kurdish YPG in Northern Syria and faces accusations
of providing material
support including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency in Turkey. A competition for control over
Northern Syria will provide Russian President Vladimir Putin with additional
avenues to pursue this policy.
At the same
time, the campaign in Northern Syria remains insufficient to defeat ISIS over
the long-term. The seizure of key terrain along the Syrian-Turkish Border in
Aleppo Province will deny ISIS easy access to the flow of foreign fighters and
supplies that replenish its forces and bolster the staying power of its so-called
‘caliphate’. Nonetheless, local forces on the ground remain incapable of
seizing ISIS’s stronghold of Ar-Raqqa City over the near-term. Neither the
Syrian Democratic Forces nor pro-regime forces possess the forces necessary to
contest the urban terrain of the city itself without mustering new recruits and
risking overextension on other battlefronts. This constraint will be
exacerbated by any military competition over terrain formerly held by ISIS in
Aleppo Province. Moreover, the fall of Ar-Raqqa City remains insufficient to
defeat ISIS along the remainder of the Euphrates River Valley. ISIS thus stands
to maintain its presence in Eastern Syria over the long-term despite – or
perhaps, because of – the multiple forces arrayed against it.
