by: Sinan Adnan
Key Take-away: Iranian proxy groups in Iraq have begun to challenge PM
Abadi and ISF control in Baghdad through more aggressive means. Kata’ib
Hezbollah among other proxy groups recently denounced new initiative to pass
the National Guard law, which resulted in the law’s obstruction. Kata’ib
Hezbollah also likely kidnapped 18 Turkish workers in Baghdad on September 2 and
clashed with the ISF in Baghdad on September 3. The proxy groups are likely to
increase kinetic activities in Baghdad to pressure or coerce PM Abadi to limit
further reforms. This push is eroding state authority at a time when the state
is preoccupied with ISIS threat and is unlikely to be able to confront threats
from the proxies.
Iranian proxy militias recently took steps to obstruct the proposed
National Guard law, which was scheduled to appear before the Council of
Representatives (CoR) on September 8. The Nation Guard law was originally crafted
as an accommodation for Iraqi Sunnis to participate in PM Abadi’s government.
It was designed to give Iraqi Sunnis semi autonomy in managing security in
mostly Sunni provinces. However, discussion over the law expanded after the
fall of Mosul to include the Popular Mobilization and other militias fighting
with the Iraqi government against ISIS. The National Guard law thereby became a
vehicle for the Iraqi government to limit the ability of Iraqi Shi’a militias
to operate outside of the command and control of the Iraqi state, which raised
major concerns for militia leaders among Iran’s proxies in Iraq. These proxies
in particular include Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Asa’ib Ahl-Haq (AAH), and the
Badr Organization. The National Guard law appeared on the national agenda again
on September 6, suggesting that PM Abadi’s reform agenda and the newfound
consensus within Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) generated new momentum
to pass this controversial legislation, which would serve PM Abadi’s cause in
limiting the power of political rivals, among them Iranian proxy militias.
On September 6, 2015, the speaker of the CoR, who is also a major
leader in the Iraqi Sunni bloc, Etihad, Salim al-Juburi stated the draft
National Guard Law was going to be passed in the CoR during the CoR session on September
8, indicating that major CoR blocs were reaching consensus on the law. However,
on September 7, discussion of the law was abruptly taken off CoR agenda.
According to member of the CoR Presidency Humam Hamudi, the decision was the
result of an agreement between the speaker of the CoR and presumably Hamudi in
order to ensure the law does not squander achievements of the Popular
Mobilization. This shift in the CoR’s plan for the National Guard law was
almost certainly the result of pressure exerted by Iranian proxy groups. Pressure
by the militias became overt on September 6 when KH, a powerful proxy group expressed its disapproval of CoR efforts to pass the law through a critical
statement on its website. KH’s statement portrayed the law as the making of a
conspiracy of the U.S, ISIS, the Baath Party, and Arab countries against the
“protectors of the people,” in reference to proxies.
KH was not the only proxy group to express such a stance. On September
8, other proxies such as AAH, the Badr Organization, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Jund
al-Imam, and others announced their collective
disapproval of the National Guard law in a strongly worded statement read by a
KH leader in a press conference. The statement explained that the law would
have a negative impact on the future of the Popular Mobilization and the
Islamic Resistance, the latter a direct reference to the proxies and their
Iranian agenda. Proxies view the law as a threat for two reasons. The law would
give Iraqi Sunnis control over security assets in their areas, which would be problematic
for proxies operating in such majority Sunni locations as Samarra, Tikrit, and
Baiji. It would also place the proxies under the command and control of the
Iraqi Government, which runs entirely counter to the objectives of the Iranian
backed militias to exert influence over the Iraqi government through dominance within
the security sector. The proxies can leverage the general distrust of Iraqi
Sunnis by many Shi’a politicians of in order to obstruct the National Guard
law. Many Iraqi Shi’a politicians blame Iraqi Sunni communities for the rise of
ISIS, which has fed an inherent phobia that military empowerment of the Sunnis
would bring back the disbanded Baathist regime. The general bias against
empowering Iraqi Sunnis was likely a major factor in dropping the bill from the
CoR session; whereas the statements of the proxies were more focused on the
ramifications the law would have on their status as independent forces. Both reasons
nevertheless suit the agenda of the Iranian proxy groups in Iraq, upon which
they have begun to act more aggressively over the last week.
This rhetorical escalation by Iranian proxy groups over the
National Guard law is the latest manifestation of increasing tension between
the proxies and the Iraqi government as a result of PM Abadi’s numerous reforms.
On September 3, gunmen from KH clashed with a force from the Baghdad Operations
Command (BOC) when the BOC element ventured into an area
of Palestine Street in eastern Baghdad where KH operates one of its
headquarters. The BOC force was pursuing the kidnappers of 18 Turkish workers who
were kidnapped on September 2
by unknown gunmen likely affiliated with one of the proxy groups in eastern
Baghdad. It is possible that KH kidnapped the Turks on Iran’s behalf, given
that Iran and Turkey are currently facing off in Syria as Turkey supports U.S.
efforts to fight ISIS, which can also impede Iranian interests in Syria. Iranian
proxy groups including KH were known to commit similar kidnappings in the
2006-2007 timeframe. The clash between the BOC and KH gunmen on September 3 killed
one BOC member and injured three others. However, aside from a formal statement
from the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which minimized the incident by
claiming it was the result of lack of coordination, public discussions of the
clash ceased shortly thereafter.
A threshold has nevertheless been crossed as KH used force in the
capital to pressure or coerce PM Abadi on behalf of Iran. Another manifestation
of this trend was the kidnapping on September 8
of the deputy minister of justice and director of investigations in Bunug of
Eastern Baghdad, an area where proxies enjoy much freedom of movement. Tensions
between PM Abadi’s government and the Iranian proxy militias is therefore
likely to escalate further in Baghdad and potentially result in more clashes
between proxy fighters and the ISF. Despite PM Abadi’s desire to contain the
proxies, the Iraqi government currently has limited means to escalate against
the militias in Baghdad while other security threats mount across northern and
southern Iraq. As a result, the Iraqi government will not likely take immediate
and forceful measures to confront the proxies in Baghdad. However, tension is
likely running high between proxies and the ISF in Baghdad. It is therefore
important to watch for more violence between the two sides as the proxies aim
to challenge the ISF’s control and shape political conditions to their benefit.
