by Kimberly Kagan
The power brokers leading
the most lethal Iranian-backed Shi’a militias are taking actions to undermine
PM Abadi’s reforms. Leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah, Abu Mahdi Muhandis and leader
of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Ameri, visited the head of Iraq’s Judiciary, Medhat al-Mahmud. They likely aimed
to ensure that Medhat cooperates with their political agenda, and their
personal visit in itself – a first for Muhandis – is in itself a threat. While
in office, Mahmud can be one of the strongest obstacles to PM Abadi’s reforms.
The Iranian-backed militias, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Badr
Organization, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, all have a vested interest in thwarting PM
Abadi’s reforms, especially the attempt to eliminate the vice presidential
positions and thereby expel VP Nouri al-Maliki, who has been aligning himself
with the militias for months.
The procedure to
eliminate the VP positions requires either that President Fuad Masum formally
request the elimination to the CoR, which has already
voted in favor, or that PM Abadi pursues constitutional reforms. The leader of
another Iranian proxy group, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Qais al-Khazali, met with President Masum on August 25 in a likely attempt by the
former to exert pressure on the president not to finalize the elimination of
the VP posts. Masum has not yet referred the matter to the CoR.
The judiciary can
undermine PM Abadi’s reforms by supporting legal and constitutional challenges
to them. Maliki has proven a master in the past of presenting such challenges,
and Mahmud had supported him during the premiership. Mahmud can facilitate or
impede a constitutional or legal challenge. The power balance has superficially
changed, however, since Maliki is no longer premier. Maliki and the militias
therefore have reasons to ensure that he understands his equities sufficiently
to check PM Abadi’s efforts.