Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Karolina Hird, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events. Click here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.
Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
leadership is signaling to its forces that it will conduct a major
ground operation into Lebanon imminently. IDF Chief of Staff
Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces on September 25 that
the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon is “prepar[ing] the area for the
possibility of [Israeli forces’] entry.”[1]
Halevi said that the IDF is preparing in particular for maneuver
operations that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah
militants and advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are
Hezbollah “military outposts.” Halevi made these remarks to the IDF 7th
Armored Brigade during a training exercise on the Israel-Lebanon border.[2] The 7th Armored Brigade is one of several IDF units that have deployed to the northern border in recent weeks.[3]
Major General Ori Gordin—the commander of the IDF Northern
Command—similarly remarked that the Israeli forces must be “strongly
prepared” for a ground offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while
observing the 7th Armored Brigade simulate a ground operation in Lebanon
on September 24.[4]
Gordin said that the IDF campaign into Lebanon began with degrading
Hezbollah rocket capabilities and command-and-control. The IDF has now
entered a new phase of this campaign, according to Gordin.[5]
Halevi
and Gordin made these remarks directly to Israeli service members, as
the IDF called up reservist units to deploy to the northern border.[6]
The IDF announced on September 25 that it activated two reservist
brigades—the 6th Infantry Brigade (36th Division) and 228th Infantry
Brigade (146th Division)—so that the units would “allow the continuation
of the fighting effort” against Hezbollah.[7]
These two reservist brigades join several other IDF units, including
the 98th Division, that have been called up or deployed from other areas
of responsibility to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent days.[8]
The commander of the 7th Brigade recently published a letter in which
he said his unit is prepared to “lead the IDF in the northern arena.”[9]
Iran, Hezbollah, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance appear to be preparing for an Israeli ground operation into Lebanon. The
IDF has observed around 40,000 Iranian-backed Iraqi, Syrian, and Houthi
militants concentrate around the Syrian border with the Golan Heights,
according to Israeli media.[10]
It is unclear why and when the Axis of Resistance deployed these
militants or whether they were already in the area. It is also unclear
whether Hezbollah is able or willing to integrate these foreign fighters
into its already well-organized and trained force structure. Syrian
opposition media separately reported on September 24 that IRGC officers
and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders recently met in Deir ez Zor
Province and discussed how to “ease pressure” on Hezbollah.[11] The meeting participants reportedly considered attacking international coalition targets in eastern Syria.[12]
CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran is trying to balance its support for
the Axis of Resistance while trying to avoid an all-out war against
Israel.[13]
The IDF Air Force continued to strike Hezbollah targets across Lebanon on September 25. The
IDF announced that it struck over 280 targets across Lebanon, including
rocket launchers and military infrastructure, such as weapons depots.[14] Numerous sites struck by the IDF produced secondary explosions, indicating the presence of explosive munitions.[15]
The IDF also stated that it struck 60 targets connected to the
Hezbollah intelligence apparatus, including collection sites and
headquarters.[16]
Some
of the IDF airstrikes targeted weapons depot and other military
infrastructure in Nabatieh, which is one of the largest population
centers in southern Lebanon.[17]
Geolocated footage and local reports indicate that IDF struck targets
within relatively densely populated areas near Nabatieh city center.[18] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF airstrikes in the city are ”relatively unusual.”[19]
This
map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on
local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm
ET on September 24 to 2:00pm ET on September 25. This map is not
exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli
strikes.
Hezbollah fired a ballistic missile targeting the Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv on September 25.[20] Hezbollah has never before fired a ballistic missile at Tel Aviv.[21] Hezbollah used a Qadr-1 missile, which is a variant of the Iranian Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile.[22] An Israeli David’s Sling air defense system intercepted the missile over central Israel.[23]
The Hezbollah attack was at least partly a reconnaissance-in-force
operation, which the US Army defines as “a deliberate combat operation
designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and
reactions or to obtain other information.”[24]
Hezbollah could use this attack to better understand Israeli air
defense capabilities and how to more effectively defeat them in the
future. Hezbollah also likely sought to demonstrate its willingness to
fire ballistic missiles into Israel.
Lebanese
Hezbollah has continued to fire medium-range rockets targeting Israeli
civilian and military targets in northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last
data cutoff on September 24.[25] Hezbollah fired multiple barrages of Fadi rockets targeting civilian and military sites near Haifa on September 25.[26] Hezbollah began launching Fadi rockets on September 21 and has fired multiple barrages into Israel since then.[27] The IDF detected five rockets that crossed from Lebanon and fell in open areas near Mount Carmel and Wadi Ara, south of Haifa.[28]
Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged on September 25 that the
Israeli operations targeting Hezbollah leadership has caused “losses”
for Hezbollah.[29]
Khamenei made this statement during a meeting with Iran-Iraq War
veterans and senior military officials in Tehran. Khamenei claimed that
Hezbollah can recover from the losses to its leadership because of its
“organizational and military strength.” Khamenei claimed that Hezbollah
and the Axis of Resistance will be the “final winner” in the current
conflict.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a
coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed five attacks
targeting Israeli targets since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September
24.[30] The claims include the following:
The
IDF reported on September 24 that a drone heading toward Israel from
the east crashed near the Arava Desert in southern Israel.[36]
The IDF separately reported on September 25 that it intercepted a drone
that was launched from Syria south of the Sea of Galilee.[37]
The
United States is reportedly pursuing a diplomatic initiative to both
pause fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah and to resume
negotiations on a ceasefire-hostage deal for the Gaza Strip.[38] US
officials, according to Axios, aim for a pause in fighting between
Israel and Hezbollah to allow Israeli and Lebanese civilians to their
homes on both sides of the border while creating momentum toward a
ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[39]
The United States has discussed this initiative with French, Lebanese,
and other unspecified Middle East officials and gotten an endorsement
from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. One of the anonymous
sources speaking to Axios suggested that a deal between Israel and
Hezbollah could encourage Hamas to pursue one more seriously.
Iran
and its Axis of Resistance continue to pursue expanding cooperation
with Russia. Reuters reported that Iran has brokered “secret talks” to
transfer Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis.[40]
Russia has not yet decided whether to send the missiles to the Houthis,
according to anonymous Western and regional sources speaking to
Reuters. CNN reported in August 2024 that the Kremlin had planned to
send missiles to the Houthis but reneged due to international pressure.[41]
Yakhont missiles could improve the Houthis’ ability to conduct
precision strikes targeting maritime traffic around Yemen. The Houthis
could also conceivably learn from Russia’s extensive experience using
Yakhont missiles against Ukrainian targets.[42]
CTP-ISW has reported extensively on the deepening strategic partnership
between Iran and Russia since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022.[43]
Key Takeaways:
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The
IDF 143rd Gaza Division launched a precision operation near Beit Lahiya
in the northern Gaza Strip on September 25 in order to destroy Hamas
infrastructure.[44] Israeli forces located three rocket launchers in Beit Lahiya.[45] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) detonated an IED targeting an Israeli military vehicle northwest of Beit Lahiya.[46]
An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said in June 2024 that the IDF
would shift to a “targeted raid” approach in the whole Gaza Strip after
the end of the Rafah operation.[47]
Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said during a visit to Rafah on
August 21 that the IDF 162nd Division had defeated Hamas’ Rafah Brigade.[48]
The IDF 252nd Division continued clearing operations near the Netzarim Corridor on September 25.[49] The
IDF told the Times of Israel that Israeli forces conducted raids in
Sabra and Zaytoun near Gaza City and the outskirts of Nuseirat, locating
and destroying several tunnels.[50]
Commercially available satellite imagery captured on September 25 shows
flattened terrain and destroyed buildings in Tel al Hawa, further
indicating continued Israeli operations near Gaza City.[51]
Palestinian militias conducted two IED attacks targeting Israeli military vehicles east of Rafah City on September 25.[52]
The IDF said that the IDF 162th and 252th divisions collectively killed 20 Palestinian fighters on September 24.[53] The 162nd and 252nd divisions are currently deployed to Rafah and along the Netzarim Corridor, respectively.[54]
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Israeli
forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in
the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 24.[55]
Israeli
forces returned to Jenin on September 25 to continue the large-scale
counterterrorism operation the IDF launched in late August 2024 in order
to degrade Palestinian militias in the West Bank.[56] An
Israeli military correspondent reported that the current objectives of
the IDF in Jenin are to “attack wanted persons” and militia
infrastructure.[57] Israeli
forces withdrew from Jenin on September 6, but anonymous Israeli
security officials told Israeli Army Radio that Israeli forces would
return to Jenin “soon” and that the IDF’s Operation Summer Camps was not
over.[58]
The IDF, Shin Bet, and Border Police have killed 14 fighters, detained
30 wanted individuals, destroyed 30 IEDs planted under roads, and
conducted four airstrikes during the ten days that they conducted
Operation Summer Camps from August 27 to September 6.[59] The IDF also announced on September 6 that it had killed Hamas’ Jenin commander, Wassem Hazem.[60]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 14 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 24.[61] See the topline for further information.
PIJ
and the Popular Resistance Committees—a coalition of armed Palestinian
militias—announced the death of their fighters in southern Lebanon on
September 24.[62] PIJ announced the death of two fighters who were a part of its Syria-based Martyr Ali al Aswad Brigade.[63]
CTP-ISW previously reported that Hezbollah has used Palestinian
fighters, including some from PIJ, to attack Israel from Lebanon.[64] IDF strikes have killed multiple PIJ fighters in southern Lebanon throughout the war.[65] The Popular Resistance Committees similarly announced the death of a fighter who died in an Israeli airstrike.[66]
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
US Central Command (CENTCOM) intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea on September 24.[67]CENTCOM
determined that this drone presented an imminent threat to US and
coalition forces as well as merchant vessels in the area.
Iranian
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with
Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller in Tehran on September 24.[68]
Miller traveled to Tehran to discuss energy cooperation. Iranian Energy
Minister Abbas Ali Abadi meanwhile went to Russia to meet with
representatives of BRICS member states on September 25.[69] Ali Abadi emphasized Iranian readiness to cooperate with the BRICS members in the energy sector.
Iranian
President Masoud Pezeshkian continued to meet with foreign officials on
the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on September 24 and 25.[70] Pezeshkian
described the role that China could play as an international mediator
in the Middle East during a meeting with Chinese Foreign Affairs
Minister Wang Yi.[71]
Pezeshkian also expressed his intent to expanding Chinese-Iranian
relations. Pezeshkian also discussed deescalating regional tensions with
French President Emmanuel Macron. Macron warned Pezeshkian against
supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine and pressed for the release
of three French nationals imprisoned in Iran.[72]
Iranian
foreign affairs ministry officials met with European officials on the
sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 25 to
discuss nuclear issues.[73] Iranian
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Policy Majid Takht Ravanchi
emphasized the importance of "dialogue and cooperation" to address
"sanctions lifting and nuclear issues" during a meeting with French,
German, and UK officials. International Atomic Energy Agency Director
General Rafael Grossi told Western media that Iran "expressed
willingness to re-engage" on nuclear issues in a "meaningful way.”[74]
Iranian Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif
accompanied the Iranian delegation to New York but was notably absent
from these meetings.[75]
Zarif was a leading member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team
under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action.[76]
Iranian
Law Enforcement Command Border Guard Commander Brigadier General Ahmad
Ali Goudarzi attended the 18th Border Conference in Qatar on September
23, meeting with Major General Nasser Jabor Al Naimi, head of Qatari
Coasts and Borders Security.[77] Both
commanders emphasized the importance of strengthening cooperation
between Iranian and Qatari border guards in order to ensure maritime
security. Both sides highlighted joint patrols, intelligence sharing,
and the use of advanced technology, such as artificial intelligence, to
combat smuggling and unauthorized crossings. Goudarzi discussed further
cooperation through joint meetings, training, and combating drug
trafficking.[78]
[1] https://t.me/moriahdoron/14401; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838950838590386582
[2] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838950838590386582
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-22-2024; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1837783800136302791
[4]
www dot idf.il/233630; https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/2-wounded-in-northern-kibbutz-rocket-impact-as-idf-warns-of-possible-ground-invasion
[5] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/2-wounded-in-northern-kibbutz-rocket-impact-as-idf-warns-of-possible-ground-invasion
[6] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838920538476912719
[7] https://t.me/moriahdoron/14400; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838920538476912719; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1838921154162983405
[8] https://x.com/doron_kadosh/status/1836325605857443913?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1836331751888576718
[9] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1837783800136302791
[10]
https://www.haaretz dot
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[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-24-2024
[14] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838931646336143797
[15] https://t.me/moriahdoron/14378; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838806201607311375
[16] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838923414112710677
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[18] https://x.com/KJ_X23/status/1838876691327746386; https://t.me/nabatiehlb/54024; https://t.me/nabatiehlb/54022
[19] https://t.me/moriahdoron/14385
[20] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/25/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-hamas-war-news-gaza/#link-DET25WUESRG5JEXMREFPAUXRDY; https://t.me/mmirleb/7285
[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/25/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-hamas-war-news-gaza/#link-DET25WUESRG5JEXMREFPAUXRDY
[22] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/25/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-hamas-war-news-gaza/#link-DET25WUESRG5JEXMREFPAUXRDY ;
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/emad/
[23] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-821615
[24] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/adrp/3-90/adrp3_90.pdf
[25] https://t.me/mmirleb/7298; https://t.me/mmirleb/7278; https://t.me/mmirleb/7299
[26] https://t.me/mmirleb/7298
https://t.me/mmirleb/7299
[27] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240925-hezbollah-s-fadi-rockets-more-power-little-precision; https://t.me/mmirleb/7182; https://t.me/mmirleb/7236; https://t.me/mmirleb/7243
[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838827563512148032;
[29] leader dot ir/fa/content/27629
[30] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1264 ;
https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1265 ;
https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1268 ;
https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1270 ;
https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1272
[31] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1268
[32]
https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1270
[33] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1264
[34] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1272
[35] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1265
[36]
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[37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838826275693084716
[38] https://www.axios.com/2024/09/25/biden-israel-lebanon-fighting-pause-plan
[39] https://www.axios.com/2024/09/25/biden-israel-lebanon-fighting-pause-plan
[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-brokering-talks-send-advanced-russian-missiles-yemens-houthis-sources-say-2024-09-24/
[41] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/02/politics/russia-weapons-houthis-saudi-arabia?cid=ios_app&fbclid=IwY2xjawEaOVpleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHeG0-Ne0AhvaKtrd9roLe2bYqH7fVHi2-3n7Nq3Owj2foXHmSR1vJbZKCA_aem_VFNJdy_BoanqWDuV4o-z6g
[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15
[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2024
[44] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/over-40-hamas-operatives-killed-over-past-day-as-idf-launches-fresh-raids-in-gaza/
[45] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/over-40-hamas-operatives-killed-over-past-day-as-idf-launches-fresh-raids-in-gaza/
[46] https://t.me/sarayaps/18604
[47] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1799679161004380328
[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-21-2024
[49] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/over-40-hamas-operatives-killed-over-past-day-as-idf-launches-fresh-raids-in-gaza/
[50] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/over-40-hamas-operatives-killed-over-past-day-as-idf-launches-fresh-raids-in-gaza/
[51] https://x.com/NemoAnno/status/1838920269840232677
[52] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4413 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7560
[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838940112475832427
[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1837394499871383790
[55] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1607 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7558 ; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6226 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1610
[56] https://t.me/moriahdoron/14379
[57] https://t.me/moriahdoron/14379
[58] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13526
[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1831957558531375403
[60] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1831957624214131075
[61] https://t.me/mmirleb/7278; https://t.me/mmirleb/7285; https://t.me/moriahdoron/14361; https://t.me/mmirleb/7287; https://t.me/mmirleb/7288; https://t.me/mmirleb/7291; https://t.me/mmirleb/7293; https://t.me/mmirleb/7298; https://t.me/mmirleb/7299; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838698566107165007; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1838827563512148032; https://t.me/mmirleb/7305; https://t.me/mmirleb/7306
[62] https://t.me/sarayaps/18605 ; https://t.me/alwya2000/6864
[63] https://t.me/sarayaps/18605
[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-28-2024
[65] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/islamic-jihad-names-member-killed-in-israeli-strike-in-southern-lebanon/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-28-2024
[66] https://t.me/alwya2000/6864
[67] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1838695956314734899
[68] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/221854/SNSC-chief-Gazprom-CEO-discuss-energy-cooperation
[69] https://www.basirat dor ir/fa/news/365745
[70] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/04/3164750
[71]
https://farsnews dot
ir/Rahgozar_b/1727246793191594163/Iranian-President-Says-China-Can-Play-Crucial-Role-in-Halting-Zionist-Crimes
[72] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240925-macron-presses-iran-president-for-lebanon-de-escalation
[73] https://mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/753704
[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/04/3165020
[75] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/819700 ; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1838747039850508418
[76] https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/25/javad-zarif-negotiator-of-iran-nuclear-deal-backs-reformist-presidential-candidate
[77] https://basirat dot ir/fa/news/365750
[78] https://www.qna.org.qa/en/News-Area/News/2024-09/23/0062-qatar,-iran-hold-18th-joint-meeting-for-coasts-and-borders-security-directors
