Iran Update, July 28, 2024

Brian Carter, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

NOTE: CTP-ISW incorrectly marked the location of Majdal Shams on its July 27, 2024, Iran Update Northern Israel map. We have updated the map showing Majdal Shams in the correct location. We apologize for the error.

Hezbollah likely conducted the July 27 rocket attack that killed 12 Israeli children in Majdal Shams, northern Israel. The IDF published a graphic on July 28 showing the Falaq-1 rocket’s flight path, which passed several hundred feet west of the IDF position at Maale Golani, 2km north of Majdal Shams.[1] Hezbollah fired the rocket from north of Shebaa village, southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed two attacks targeting Maale Golani on July 27, including one attack in which Hezbollah said that it fired a Falaq-1.[2] Hezbollah claimed the Falaq-1 attack targeting Maale Golani at 1229 ET, roughly one hour after the first reports of a rocket impact at Majdal Shams.[3] Hezbollah attack claims frequently lag behind reports of the actual attack. Hezbollah denied that it conducted the attack on Majdal Shams and falsely claimed that the attack was the result of an Israeli Tamir Iron Dome interceptor that hit Majdal Shams.[4] The IDF found debris of an Iranian-made Falaq-1 rocket in Majdal Shams, and the IDF reported that only Hezbollah uses the Falaq-1.[5] The IDF did not fire an Iron Dome interceptor at the rocket.[6] Other militias operating in southern Lebanon—such as Hamas elements or Jama’a al Islamiyah—could have acquired and used a Falaq-1, but CTP-ISW has not previously observed these militias using the Falaq-1.

This attack is the consequence of a long, Hezbollah-initiated campaign targeting both civilian areas and military sites in northern Israel. Hezbollah initiated the war in the north on October 8, when it began its attack campaign targeting northern Israel. This campaign caused Israel to evacuate tens of thousands of civilians from their homes in northern Israel.[7] Hezbollah has targeted both civilian and military sites throughout the war. Hezbollah’s decision in early 2024 to transition from less-sophisticated rocket and anti-tank guided missile systems to more advanced and deadly rocket (including the Falaq-1), one-way attack drone, and anti-tank guided missile systems also increased the risk that a Hezbollah attack would cause significant Israeli casualties, either intentionally or due to a miscalculation.[8]

Israeli political officials are currently weighing their response to this attack amid mounting domestic pressure to address Hezbollah’s attacks on northern Israel. Israeli military and political officials vowed to respond “harshly” to Hezbollah’s attack on Majdal Shams.[9] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu returned to Tel Aviv from the United States to convene the Security Cabinet on July 28.[10] Israeli law requires the approval of the Security Cabinet to discuss major military offensive operations. Two unspecified security sources told Reuters that Hezbollah is on “high alert” and had cleared out some key sites in both Lebanon's south and the eastern Bekaa Valley anticipating a retaliatory Israeli attack.[11] Domestic pressure on the Israeli government has been increasing for months, with some senior government officials beginning to call for action against Hezbollah even before the July 27 attack.[12] The Israeli education minister announced on July 23 that northern Israeli schools would not open for the new school year. The minister called on Netanyahu to ”act now, strongly, against the state of Lebanon.”[13]

Israeli artillery shelled the alleged launch site for the Majdal Shams attack in Shebaa village with artillery fire on July 27.[14] The IDF Air Force separately conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah sites in at least seven locations near Tyre, in the Bekaa Valley, and in southern Lebanon on July 27.[15] These airstrikes are consistent with Israel’s daily targeting of Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon and are not the full Israeli response to the Majdal Shams attack.

An unspecified senior Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada official claimed on July 28 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee do not know which militia conducted the recent attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria.[16] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted four attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since July 16.[17] The senior militia official claimed that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada is “committed to calm” and that the militia that conducted the recent attacks targeting US forces probably operated “individually.”[18] A new Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, al Thawriyyun, claimed two rocket attacks targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Iraq and the Conoco Mission Support Site in Syria on July 25.[19] Al Thawriyyun asserted that it is connected to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that claimed over 160 attacks target US forces between October 2023 and February 2024.[20] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq suspended attacks targeting US forces following a one-way drone attack that killed three US personnel in northeastern Jordan in late January 2024.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Rocket Attack in Northern Israel: Hezbollah likely conducted the July 27 rocket attack that killed 12 Israeli children and “youths” in Majdal Shams, northern Israel. This attack is the consequence of a long, Hezbollah-initiated campaign targeting both civilian areas and military sites in northern Israel. Hezbollah began using more advanced systems to attack northern Israel in January, which increased the risk that a Hezbollah attack would cause significant casualties, either intentionally or due to a miscalculation.
• Israeli Response to the Rocket Attack: Israeli political officials are currently weighing their response to this attack amid mounting domestic pressure to address Hezbollah’s attacks on northern Israel. Israeli military and political officials vowed to respond “harshly” to Hezbollah’s attack on Majdal Shams.
• Lebanon: Israeli artillery shelled the alleged launch site for the Majdal Shams attack in Shebaa village on July 27.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF issued evacuation orders for areas of Bureij and Shuhada in the central Gaza Strip on July 28.
• Iraq and Syria: An unspecified senior Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada official claimed on July 28 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee do not know which militia conducted the recent attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria.
  
  

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
  
  

Palestinian militias claimed seven attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tal al Hawa, south of Gaza City, on July 28.[22] Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces with rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and an anti-personnel mine near Tal al Hawa, south of Gaza City, on July 28.[23] Palestinian sources reported on July 28 that Israeli forces were present in Tel al Hawa after re-entering the neighborhood on July 26.[24] The IDF previously withdrew from Tal al Hawa on July 12.[25]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for areas of Bureij and Shuhada in the central Gaza Strip on July 28.[26] The IDF said that Palestinian fighters had fired rockets from Bureij and Shuhada.[27] The IDF instructed Palestinians to evacuate immediately to al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[28] The IDF said it will “forcefully operate” against militias in Bureij and Shuhada areas.[29]

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducted rocket and mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces stationed along the Netzarim Corridor on July 28.[30] Hamas also mortared Israeli forces near the corridor in Juhor ad Dik.[31]

Palestinian militias continued to target Israeli forces operating east of Khan Younis on July 28. PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces operating in several sectors east of Khan Younis, including al Zanna and Bani Suheila.[32] Hamas fighters targeted two Israeli soldiers with sniper fire in Bani Suheila.[33] Israeli armor reportedly advanced further into Qarara, al Zanna, and Bani Suheila on July 28.[34] The IDF has concentrated its forces primarily in Qarara and Bani Suheila since beginning its operation in Khan Younis on July 22.[35]

Palestinian militias conducted attacks targeting Israeli forces in several sectors of Rafah on July 28. Hamas fighters targeted an IDF engineering unit with an anti-personnel mine in al Salam, east of Rafah.[36] Hamas fighters fired an anti-tank guided missile targeting an IDF armored personnel carrier in Tal al Sultan.[37] The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces in Yabna refugee camp in Rafah city.[38]

PIJ conducted two attacks targeting sites in southern Israel from the Gaza Strip on July 28.[39] PIJ mortared Nahal Oz and a nearby IDF military site.[40] PIJ also fired rockets targeting Sderot.[41] The IDF detected two rockets launched from Jabalia targeting Netiv HaAsara.[42] One of the rockets did not cross into Israeli territory and the other exploded in an open area.[43]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 27.[44] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces using small arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[45] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades called for a “general mobilization” of all units in all governorates in the West Bank and for these units to attack Israeli forces on July 28 in response to the Israeli forces’ raid in Balata refugee camp, Nablus, on July 27.[46] The al Quds Brigades also targeted Israeli forces with small arms and IEDs in Silat al Harithiya, near Jenin, on July 27.[47]

Israeli security forces found eight improvised explosive devices (IED), a Carlo rifle, and a large quantity of ammunition near Burqa and Silat ad Dhahr in the West Bank on July 28.[48]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria
  
  

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least two attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 27.[49]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

See topline.

 

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[1] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1817606374924210217

[2] https://t.me/mmirleb/5722; https://t.me/mmirleb/5720

[3] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1817220392102060184; https://t.me/mmirleb/5722; https://t.me/mmirleb/5720

[4] https://t.me/mmirleb/5730; https://www.axios.com/2024/07/27/golan-heights-attack-israel-hezbollah-war

[5] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1817605374310072385

[6] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1817450048541589850

[7] https://apnews.com/article/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-evacuees-gaza-war-1841834d89af938a8445821567640aea#:~:text=Among%20approximately%2060%2C000%20Israelis%20evacuated,Lebanon%20have%20also%20been%20displaced.

[8] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/five-months-of-hostilities-on-the-israel-lebanon-border/

[9] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1817517978390241296; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1817517716988731599; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1817395626868412462 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12275

[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/rocket-strike-on-israeli-soccer-field-raises-risk-of-escalation-with-hezbollah-69943fd8?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2)

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-vows-hit-hezbollah-hard-after-rocket-kills-12-football-field-2024-07-28/

[12] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/11/israel-lebanon-border-hezbollah-rockets-war/

[13] https://www.timesofisrael.com/education-minister-students-wont-start-school-year-in-displaced-northern-towns/

[14] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1817294637176176894

[15] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1817407939528802573; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1817409160847200689

[16] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[17] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3843602/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing/ ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-25-2024 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-26-2024

[18] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-26-2024

[20] SITE Intelligence Group, “Alleged Unit within IRI Claims Missile Strikes on U.S. Positions in Iraq and Syria,” July 26, 2024, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/

[22] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31475; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31477; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6920; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31478; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6921; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2805; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2806

[23] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31475; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31477; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6920; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31478; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6921; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2805; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2806

 

[24]https://t.me/hamza20300/275588; https://t.me/hamza20300/275527; https://t.me/hamza20300/275590; https://t.me/hamza20300/274634 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/274572; https://t.me/hamza20300/274555

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-12-2024

[26] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1817566489676791840

[27]https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1817566489676791840; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1817567455805321375

[28] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1817566489676791840

[29]https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1817566489676791840; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1817567455805321375

[30] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31471; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31476; https://t.me/sarayaps/18391

[31] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31479

[32] https://t.me/nedalps/4309; https://t.me/sarayaps/18392; https://t.me/sarayaps/18393

[33] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2808

[34] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-forces-advance-south-gaza-more-people-displaced-residents-say-2024-07-28/

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-27-2024

[36] https://t.me/qassambrigades/31481

[37] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2807

[38] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4368

[39] https://t.me/sarayaps/18389; https://t.me/sarayaps/18390

[40] https://t.me/sarayaps/18389

[41] https://t.me/sarayaps/18390

[42] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12281; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1817503888905314480

[43] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12281

[44] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6917 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6918 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1389 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1390

[45] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6917 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6918

[46] https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3217

[47] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1389; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1390

[48] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/181746405482423101524231015

[49] https://t.me/mmirleb/5736 ;

https://t.me/mmirleb/5734