Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and George Barros

June 5, 2024, 9:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on June 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US officials continue to attempt to clarify US policy regarding Ukraine's ability to strike a limited subset of Russian military targets within Russia with US-provided weapons, but public communications about US policy remain unclear. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated during a press conference on June 4 that "there's never been a restriction on the Ukrainians shooting down hostile aircraft, even if those aircraft are not necessarily in Ukrainian airspace."[1] Kirby made this statement in response to a question about whether America's recent partial lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike targets within Russia with US-provided weapons pertains to strikes against Russian aircraft operating in Russian airspace. Kirby suggested that Ukrainian forces can shoot down Russian aircraft within Russian airspace if they "pose an impending threat" to Ukraine and stated that Ukrainian forces already have done so since the beginning of the war. It remains unclear what the official US policy on what Russian aircraft constitute "an impending threat" to Ukraine, and Kirby's statements did not elucidate how the US administration views this issue. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to defend itself against devastating Russian glide bomb strikes is heavily contingent on Ukraine's ability to target Russian aircraft within Russian airspace using US-provided air defense systems before Russian aircraft can launch strikes at Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and frontline positions.[2] The current lack of clarity in US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike Russian military assets within Russia has routinely missed the opportunity to force Russia to self-deter against conducting such strikes on Ukrainian territory from Russian airspace.[3]  Russian forces continued to conduct intense glide bomb attacks against Ukraine on June 5, likely largely from Russian airspace.[4]|

Kirby also stated during the press conference that the US cannot confirm if Ukraine has already used US-provided weapons in strikes on Russia since the US partially loosened its restrictions on May 30, but the Associated Press (AP) reported on June 5, citing an unnamed US senator and Western official, that Ukraine has used US-provided weapons to strike Russia "in recent days."[5] ISW has observed geolocated footage from June 1 or 2 that shows a likely Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian S-300/400 air defense system in Belgorod Oblast.[6]

Western-provided artillery ammunition has reportedly started arriving to Ukrainian forces on the frontline, although not at a scale that would allow Ukrainian forces to fully challenge the Russian military's current artillery shell advantage. Ukrainian soldiers operating near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) told the Telegraph in an article published on June 5 that Western-provided ammunition started to reach their sector of the frontline, but that Russian forces in the area still maintain a munitions advantage.[7] One Ukrainian soldier told the Telegraph that Russian forces still maintain a five-to-one artillery advantage. A Ukrainian soldier operating in an unspecified area of the frontline told Estonian outlet ERR that Western-provided ammunition began to "trickle" to the frontline but has not arrived at scale.[8] The Ukrainian soldier stated that Russian forces continue to have a "significant advantage" in munitions. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are attempting to make tactically and operationally significant gains before US military assistance arrives to Ukrainian forces at the frontline at scale, and that the initial arrival of Western-provided weaponry will take some time to have tactical to operational effect on the frontline.[9]

Russian missile and drone strikes have caused significant long-term damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will reportedly face even greater energy constraints in summer 2024. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked out or captured over half of Ukraine's power generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below 20 gigawatts (likely meaning per year) from 55 gigawatts per year before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.[10] European Union (EU) Ambassador to Ukraine Katarina Matherovna told FT that Russia has destroyed 9.2 gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity since resuming large scale missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in late March 2024.[11] A Ukrainian official told FT that Russian forces damaged 1.2 gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity alone during strikes against energy infrastructure on the night of May 31 to June 1.[12] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated on June 5 that it expects the Ukrainian energy system to face its most difficult period in the middle of summer 2024 as energy consumption increases due to the heat.[13] The Russian military has attempted to exploit degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities in spring 2024 to collapse Ukraine's energy grid and constrain Ukraine's defense industrial capacity.[14] Russia will likely continue periodic large-scale strikes against energy infrastructure to cause significant long-term damage that degrades Ukrainian war fighting capabilities while setting conditions for pronounced humanitarian pressures in winter 2024–2025.

Ukrainian outlet Liga reported on June 4 that a source in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that there are roughly 550,000 Russian military and paramilitary personnel concentrated in occupied Ukraine and near the international border.[15] The GUR source reportedly stated that there are about 32,000 Rosgvardia, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and other law enforcement personnel operating in occupied Ukraine, in addition to about 520,000 Russian military personnel in and around Ukraine. ISW cannot independently confirm these figures, and the numbers likely encompass combat and other non-combat military personnel who perform support functions and do not represent Russia's immediate combat power. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated that as of May 3 there were roughly 510,000 to 515,000 Russian personnel deployed in Ukraine.[16] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in December 2023 that there were 617,000 Russian personnel in the “combat zone,” likely referring to all Russian military personnel in the zone of the “special military operation,” which includes staging areas in border areas within Russia.[17] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov reported in January 2024 that there are 35,000 Rosgvardia personnel in occupied Ukraine and that Russian authorities are considering deploying more Rosgvardia personnel to occupied areas.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 4 that former Russian Defense Minister and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu will coordinate efforts to increase Russian defense industrial capacity alongside former Tula Oblast Governor and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin and Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev.[19] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that Shoigu, Dyumin, and Medvedev will each oversee an unspecified aspect of the effort to increase Russian defense industrial capacity.[20] Shoigu's roughly equivalent position with Dyumin and Medvedev further indicates that the Kremlin has demoted Shoigu following his removal from defense minister and suggests that he is a secondary figure in newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's task to significantly mobilize the Russian economy and DIB for a protracted war in Ukraine.[21] Putin routinely rotates Kremlin officials in and out of his personal favor with the aim of incentivizing them to strive to regain his support, and Putin may have tasked Dyumin and Shoigu with DIB efforts in order to maintain their devotion following Shoigu's demotion from his prior long-term role as defense minister and rebukes against Dyumin's possible effort to become defense minister in the aftermath of the Wagner Group's rebellion in June 2023.[22]  Shoigu is currently working with the Presidential Administration's Military-Industrial Complex Commission and the Federal Service for Cooperation with Foreign Countries, suggesting that Shoigu is likely involved in the Kremlin's efforts to leverage relationships with Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to help Russia procure the components and materiel it needs for increasing military industrial capacity.[23] Putin recently appointed Dyumin to the board of state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec and specifically tasked Dyumin with assisting Russian efforts to provide the Russian military with necessary weapons and equipment.[24] It remains to be seen how involved Shoigu, Dyumin, and Medvedev will be in efforts to expand Russia's DIB, however, and their roles may be at most nominal.

The apparent demotion of former First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak on June 4 is likely part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing effort to remove from power the political and military figures that violated his trust in 2023. The Russian Federal Council terminated Turchak’s powers on June 5 after Putin appointed Turchak to become the governor of Altai Republic on June 4.[25] Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko wryly stated in a farewell message that Turchak will turn Altai Republic into a “tourist Mecca.”[26] Russian insider sources and political bloggers widely claimed that Putin most likely removed Turchak from his position in Moscow for his allegedly close relationship with deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) over the control of occupied Ukrainian territories.[27] Some Russian insider sources and political bloggers also claimed that Putin may have also been dissatisfied with Turchak’s execution of a Kremlin effort to have Russian veterans participate in the Russian primaries in his role as the Chairperson of the Russian State Duma "Special Military Operation" Working Group, although some Russian sources pointed out that this failure was unlikely to have warranted Turchak’s exile to one of the most economically depressed regions in Russia over 4,000 kilometers from the Kremlin.[28] Some Russian sources also speculated that Turchak was demoted for his excessive involvement in local St. Petersburg political drama, and many sources cited Turchak’s tendency to intervene in Kremlin intrigues in an effort to improve his own political standing including by partnering up with former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[29]

Putin had likely exiled Turchak from the Kremlin because he perceived Turchak to be disloyal to the regime. ISW previously observed Russian insider reports that Prigozhin used Turchak to directly deliver Wagner Group complaints about the Russian military failures in winter 2023 to Putin in hopes that this information would prompt Putin to reappoint Wagner-affiliated commanders.[30] Turchak reportedly delivered a blunt briefing about Russian military failures in February 2023 but did not convince Putin to initiate military command changes, likely because Putin perceived Turchak’s briefing as an act of disloyalty. ISW continues to assess that Putin values loyalty over competence and had previously interpreted Prigozhin’s complaints about supply shortages and military failures as acts of disloyalty.[31] A former Russian intelligence source notably revealed that Putin began to distance himself from Wagner after Prigozhin scolded him in October 2022.[32] One Russian political commentator connected Turchak’s demotion to the recent arrest of the former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov.[33] Popov published an audio recording in July 2023 in which he stated that he was fired after raising concerns over the need for troop rotations among Russian forces receiving the summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.[34] Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev leaked Popov’s audio message, and Turchak notably implied that Popov was not involved in the leak.[35] ISW assessed that Popov likely deliberately recorded this message to appeal to the Kremlin to trigger a military command change within the Russian General Staff.[36] Popov also equated himself with a rebellion leader less than a month after the Wagner mutiny, and Turchak’s expressed support for Popov may have further convinced Putin of Turchak’s disloyalty.[37]

A recent meeting of the Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) on Russia's migration policy reflects Russia's competing imperatives of attracting migrants to offset Russian labor shortages while also catering to its ultranationalist anti-migrant constituency. The HRC held a meeting on June 4 on "ensuring the rights of Russian citizens in the implementation of migration policy" and discussed several initiatives to strengthen Russian federal control over migrant communities living within Russia.[38] The HRC discussed making Russian language tests mandatory for all children of migrants hoping to enroll in schools and kindergartens; creating "social adaptation centers" for migrants to learn the Russian language; and recognizing children who do not speak Russian at the legally mandated level as having "special educational needs," all of which would require federal oversight and funding in order to ease the integration of migrants into the Russian social sphere.[39] Some participants of the HRC meeting proposed much harsher policy changes. For example, Kaluga Oblast Minster of Internal Policy Oleg Kalugin called for a rule prohibiting labor migrants from bringing their families to Russia in the first place, suggesting that the cost of helping integrate the families of migrants into Russian society is not worth the social burden on Russian society.[40] Russian business-focused outlet Kommersant noted that these policies are mainly targeted at migrant communities from Armenia and Central Asia, predominantly Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.[41] The meeting’s focus on migrant policy as a means to protect Russian citizens (mostly insinuated to be ethnic Russians or naturalized foreign citizens) rhetorically sets a strong wedge between "Russians" and "migrants" as opposing camps, and specifically identifies Central Asian migrants as potentially threatening the rights of Russian citizens. Russian domestic policy is increasingly trying to balance a heavy reliance on migrant labor, particularly from Central Asia, to maintain its domestic economy as it continues to compensate for economic shortfalls resulting from its war in Ukraine, while also disenfranchising migrant communities to cater to its vocal and influential ultranationalist constituency.[42] The HRC will similarly have to balance fostering a policy that encourages and attracts migrants to move to Russia in the hopes of obtaining economic benefit while also appeasing the cadre of commentators that espouse anti-migrant and xenophobic views that hold that migration policy is a threat to ethnic Russians.

Chechen Republic Rosgvardia Head and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov accused State Duma Deputy Chairman and New People Party Head Vladislav Davankov of contradicting the Russian Constitution and attempting to divide Russian society, exposing continued tension between Chechen efforts to operate autonomously and the Russian state’s efforts to regulate perceived Islamic extremist threats from migrant and indigenous Muslim communities. Davankov submitted a bill to the State Duma on May 28 that would allow educational institutions and regional authorities to ban religious clothing that "partially or completely hides the face" from municipal and public spaces.[43] Delimkhanov responded to Davankov's proposal by claiming that the Russian Constitution guarantees religious freedom and noting that the hijab, which he claims is a religious obligation for Muslim women, does not cover the face.[44] Delimkhanov claimed that Chechens are against niqab, which covers the face, however. Delimkhanov further asserted that Davankov's bill could cause a rift in Russian society since he raised "one of the most sensitive topics" without "proper consideration of the subject." Delimkhanov also observed that Russian Orthodox Christianity expects women to wear headscarves for piety and humility. Davankov defended himself against Delimkhanov's criticisms citing Russia's secular education system and claimed that parents demanded the ban in schools given that migrant children "have difficulty speaking Russian, let alone wearing religious clothing."[45] Davankov also noted that the Russian Supreme Court upheld a ban against wearing religious garments in schools in the Mordovia Republic in 2015.[46] Delimkhanov's immediate criticism of Davankov highlights continued tension between the Chechen Republic and the Russian government's long-term efforts to subjugate Chechnya, likely exacerbated by intensified Kremlin crackdowns against indigenous and migrant Muslim communities following the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.[47] The renewed debate on restrictions against Islamic religious clothing will likely continue to foster division along ethnic and religious lines, despite the Kremlin's efforts to portray Russia as a harmonious and united multiethnic and multi-confessional country.[48]

Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom reportedly assesses that it is unlikely to recover gas sales it lost following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrating how Western sanctions are achieving some long-term impacts against Russian revenue streams supporting Russia's war effort. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Gazprom's leadership commissioned a report at the end of 2023 on the long-term prospects for gas sales, which found that Gazprom's annual exports to Europe by 2035 will average 50 billion to 75 billion cubic meters — roughly a third of its annual exports to Europe before the full-scale invasion.[49] Gazprom reportedly noted that a new pipeline to the People's Republic of China (PRC) aims to offset lost export volume to Europe but will only have the capacity to transport 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year.[50] Russia has relied on oil revenues to buoy federal budgets amid increased spending on its war in Ukraine, and long-term constraints on other energy exports will likely limit additional significant sources of funding for the Kremlin.[51] Russia has managed to rely on oil revenues to support a record level of defense spending in 2024 by engaging in a concerted effort to circumvent the G7's price cap on Russian oil and petroleum products.[52] The West is expanding sanctions to curtail Russian efforts to skirt the G7 price cap, and significant constraints on Russian oil exports could also achieve substantial impacts on Russian state revenue.[53]

Russian investigative outlet the Insider and Moldovan outlet Little Country published an investigation on June 5 detailing how former Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Igor Gorgan operated as an agent on behalf of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU). The Insider and Little Country reported that they obtained access to Telegram correspondence between Gorgan and his GRU handler Colonel Alexei Makarov which shows that Gorgan regularly reported on internal Moldovan matters and the visits of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) representatives to Moldova since 2019.[54] The Insider reported that an unspecified military intelligence source stated that GRU's active contact with Gorgan began when Gorgan served on a NATO mission in 2004.[55] Gorgan served as Moldovan Chief of the General Staff in 2013 and from 2019 to 2021 and reportedly offered GRU information on Moldovan military capabilities and activities, requests from the Ukrainian MoD, and information about internal Moldovan politics.[56] Gorgan reportedly assured the GRU that he still has contacts in the Moldovan MoD who can continue to supply him with information.[57]Gorgan also reportedly routinely told Makarov that Moldova was ready for the arrival of Russian forces and that he would keep "the whole situation in the army under control" and help Russia "deal with [Moldovan] politicians."[58] The GRU's response to Gorgan's offers is currently unclear. The Kremlin is engaged in efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova's European Union accession, and Gorgan's relationship with the GRU illustrates how Russia is leveraging pro-Russian Moldovan actors in these efforts and how Russia could rely on such actors to conduct future hybrid operations or support conventional military aggression against Moldova.[59]

Key Takeaways:

• US officials continue to attempt to clarify US policy regarding Ukraine's ability to strike a limited subset of Russian military targets within Russia with US-provided weapons, but public communications about US policy remain unclear.
• Western-provided artillery ammunition has reportedly started arriving to Ukrainian forces on the frontline, although not at a scale that would allow Ukrainian forces to fully challenge the Russian military's current artillery shell advantage.
• Russian missile and drone strikes have caused significant long-term damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will reportedly face even greater energy constraints in summer 2024.
• Ukrainian outlet Liga reported on June 4 that a source in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that there are roughly 550,000 Russian military and paramilitary personnel concentrated in occupied Ukraine and near the international border.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 4 that former Russian Defense Minister and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu will coordinate efforts to increase Russian defense industrial capacity alongside former Tula Oblast Governor and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin and Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev.
• The apparent demotion of former First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak on June 4 is likely part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing effort to remove from power the political and military figures that violated his trust in 2023.
• A recent meeting of the Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) on Russia's migration policy reflects Russia's competing imperatives of attracting migrants to offset Russian labor shortages while also catering to its ultranationalist anti-migrant constituency.
• Chechen Republic Rosgvardia Head and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov accused State Duma Deputy Chairman and New People Party Head Vladislav Davankov of contradicting the Russian Constitution and attempting to divide Russian society, exposing continued tension between Chechen efforts to operate autonomously and the Russian state’s efforts to regulate perceived Islamic extremist threats from migrant and indigenous Muslim communities.
• Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom reportedly assesses that it is unlikely to recover gas sales it lost following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrating how Western sanctions are achieving some long-term impacts against Russian revenue streams supporting Russia's war effort.
• Russian investigative outlet the Insider and Moldovan outlet Little Country published an investigation on June 5 detailing how former Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Igor Gorgan operated as an agent on behalf of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU).
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, near Chasiv Yar, west of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• The Kremlin likely authorized the Crimean branch of the Kremlin-created "Defenders of Fatherland" state fund to help grant combatants in Russian private military companies (PMCs) legal veteran statuses, possibly as part of an ongoing state effort to centralize control over irregular formations operating in Ukraine.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyptsi direction on June 5 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Lyptsi on June 4 and 5.[60] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 5 that Russian forces are concentrating their main efforts north of Kharkiv City on Lyptsi and Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi).[61]

Fighting continued near and within Vovchansk on June 5 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[62] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces in the Vovchansk direction are trying to inflict maximum losses on Russian forces, prevent Russian gains, and gradually regain territory.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified counterattacks within and near Vovchansk on June 5, and Vovchansk City Military Administration Head Tamaz Gambarashvili stated that Ukrainian forces have recently retaken unspecified positions within the town.[64] Gambarashvili added that Ukrainian forces fully control central and eastern Vovchansk but that Russian forces control a large part of northern Vovchansk.[65]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published an audio intercept on June 5 wherein a Russian soldier stated that Russian forces are concentrating a grouping of an unspecified size near Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast.[66] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 26 that Russian forces are preparing for new offensive actions and are concentrating a grouping of an unspecified size near the Ukrainian border 90 kilometers northwest of Kharkiv City, likely referring to the Grayvoron-Borisovka-Proletarskiy area in western Belgorod Oblast.[67] Grayvoron is about 65 km northwest from Kharkiv City, for example. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov has repeatedly warned about the possibility of Russian offensive operations in the direction of Zolochiv (northwest of Kharkiv City) but has noted that Russian forces have not yet concentrated a "strike group" in the area as of June 1.[68] The Grayvoron-Borisovka-Proletarskiy area notably offers Russian forces opportunities to launch offensive operations southward in the direction of Zolochiv and Bohodukhiv (also northwest of Kharkiv City) or to the west in the direction of settlements in Sumy Oblast along the P-45 highway that connects Bohodukhiv with Sumy City.[69] ISW has not observed specific indicators suggesting that Russian forces are likely to launch offensive operations in the direction of Sumy Oblast versus in the direction of Kharkiv City, and a concentration in the vicinity of  Grayvoron could facilitate offensive operations in either direction.

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 5. Geolocated footage published on June 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced near Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and southwest of Novoselivske (southeast of Kupyansk).[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the direction of Andriivka (west of Svatove), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[71] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction are trying to break through Ukrainian defenses from two unspecified directions.[72] Fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka, Novoyehorivka, and Cherneshchyna; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; southwest of Kreminna near Yampil; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on June 4 and 5.[73]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 5 but did not make any confirmed advances in this area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on the night of June 4 and during the day on June 5.[74] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Verkhnokamyanske, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian advances near Verkhnokamyanske.[75] Elements of the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 51st VDV Regiment, reportedly continue to operate near Rozdolivka.[76]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances north and southeast of Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces have advanced along Lisova Street in eastern Kalynivka (just north of Chasiv Yar).[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 300 meters northeast of Kalynivka, and other milbloggers reported Russian advances within and around Kalynivka, which is generally consistent with available geolocated footage.[78] Additional geolocated footage published on June 1 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced in fields northeast of Andriivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[79] The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service posted footage on June 5 showing Ukrainian troops repelling a roughly reinforced platoon-sized Russian attack near Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and reported that about 50 Russian personnel participated in the attack with armored vehicle and tank support.[80] A Ukrainian news outlet cited a Ukrainian soldier who reported on June 5 that Russian forces have intensified attacks in the Kanal and Novyi microraions in eastern Chasiv Yar since June 4 and managed to penetrate limited Ukrainian positions in the Kanal Microraion.[81] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and the "Alabasterova" pond area (just east of Klishchiivka).[82] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, 11th VDV Brigade, 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar area.[83]

 

Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in this area on June 5. Geolocated footage published on June 5 shows that Russian forces advanced across the C051801 Umanske-Netaylove road north of Netaylove (west of Avdiivka).[84] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.5 kilometers in the Karlivka area and are moving towards Umanske and Yasnobrodivka (all west of Avdiivka).[85] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced east and north of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian advances in this area.[86] A Ukrainian soldier fighting in the Avdiivka area reported on June 5 that Russian forces are advancing towards Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka) from Umanske (just south of Novoselivka Persha) and recently conducted assaults with two armored personnel carriers in this area.[87] The Ukrainian General Staff reported heavy fighting near Sokil and Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) on the evening of June 4 and throughout the day on June 5.[88] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Avdiivka.[89]

 

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 5. Geolocated footage published on June 2 shows that Russian forces advanced in fields northwest of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City).[90] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced up to 1 kilometer within Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and up to 900 meters deep along a 350-meter-wide front in forests northeast of Paraskoviivka.[91] Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in a windbreak near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) up to 1.5 kilometers deep along a 1-kilometer-wide front.[92] Some milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces have advanced west in Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City), and that there are some unconfirmed reports that Russian troops seized all of Heorhiivka.[93] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian advances either in the Paraskoviivka-Kostyantynivka area or in Heorhiivka. A Ukrainian brigade operating near Heorhiivka published footage on June 5 of Ukrainian forces repelling individual Russian armored vehicles near Heorhiivka.[94] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian ground attacks west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Avdiivka near Paraskoviivka and Vodyane.[95] Elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka.[96]

 

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area on June 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske and southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Zolota Nyva on both June 4 and 5.[97] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Staromayorske, although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of these claims.[98] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that elements of Russia's 5th Combined Arms Army (5th CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]), specifically its 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade, are operating within Staromayorske; elements of the 143rd and 394th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are operating in the direction of Rivnopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka); and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating in the Urozhaine area.[99] Mashovets stated that elements of the 36th and 29th CAAs are operating substantially below the intended end strength in this area. Mashovets reported that Russian offensive operations in this area likely intend to divert Ukrainian forces away from the Novomykhailivka-Kostyantynivka area (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).[100]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Robotyne up to 400 meters deep and 1.5 kilometers wide, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[101] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, east of Robotyne near Verbove, northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka, and northwest of Robotyne near Mali Shcherbaky on June 4 and 5.[102]

 

Fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on June 5. Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces maintain positions north of Oleshky near the Antonivsky roadway bridge.[103] Positional engagements continued near Krynky and on islands in the Dnipro River Delta on June 4 and 5.[104] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have an insufficient number of boats and outboard motors to effectively operate in the Dnipro River Delta and evacuate military personnel.[105]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 4 to 5 and a missile strike against Odesa Oblast during the day on June 5. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 27 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and that Ukrainian forces shot down 22 drones over Mykolaiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Poltava oblasts.[106] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian drones struck an industrial facility in Poltava Oblast causing a fire.[107] Odesa Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Raion (near Odesa City) with an unspecified number and type of missiles.[108]

Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on June 5 that Russian forces have tripled their strikes against Kharkiv City in May 2024 as compared to April 2024.[109] Terekhov stated that Russian forces launched 37 D-30 universal joint glide munition (UMPB) guided glide bombs, 25 unspecified missiles, 12 Shahed-136/131 drones, and three lancet loitering munitions against Kharkiv City in May.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin likely authorized the Crimean branch of the Kremlin-created “Defenders of Fatherland” state fund to help grant combatants in Russian private military companies (PMCs) legal veteran statuses, possibly as part of an ongoing state effort to centralize control over irregular formations operating in Ukraine.[110] Head of the Crimean branch of the Russian state fund “Defenders of Fatherland” Vladimir Tregub stated on June 5 that Crimean PMC combatants are now actively receiving documentation granting them official veteran statuses. Tregub implied that Crimean occupation officials resolved the question of awarding Crimean PMC combatants veteran statuses with support from the Russian government. Tregub also noted that Crimean occupation officials are trying to resolve issues with denied state compensation for PMC combatants who have sustained combat injuries by having the combatants undergo medical commissions.

Putin notably tasked “Defenders of Fatherland” on June 1 with supporting PMC combatants and all personnel who had fought in Ukraine since 2014 during his meeting with “Defenders of Fatherland” Head Anna Tsivileva.[111] Putin stated that all Russian personnel involved in the war effort in Ukraine must receive government support, including members of PMCs.[112] Putin’s statement marks another notable departure from his previous refusals to acknowledge the existence of PMCs in Russia and is likely a continuation of his effort to establish information conditions that could allow the Russian government to legally recognize PMCs. Putin had a scripted interaction with a claimed Redut PMC fighter during his Direct Line press conference on December 14, 2023, and this interaction may have marked the start of the Kremlin’s information campaign to socialize the possibility of further state recognition of PMCs.[113]

Russian Minister of Science and Higher Education Valeriy Falkov announced on June 5 that 70 Russian universities are developing training programs to teach students to operate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for civilian professions.[114] Falkov claimed that the Russian government needs around one million specialists including UAV operators, engineers, and developers. Falkov added that Russia needs drone operators to fulfill forest protection, emergencies, and agricultural roles. ISW previously observed that Russian officials are increasingly opening new military UAV training programs in universities across Russia, and the Russian government likely aims to incentivize students to join these programs to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine.[115]

Russian independent outlet Lyudi Baikala found that every third volunteer from Irkutsk Oblast and the Republic of Buryatia killed in action was a prisoner prior to their death in Ukraine.[116] Lyudi Baikala analyzed over a thousand obituaries from the Baikal region and found that 334 deceased volunteers had a criminal record. Lyudi Baikala also discovered that a third of the deceased volunteers with past criminal convictions served prison time for murder. Lyudi Baikala added that the real number of deceased Russian convicts who had volunteered to fight in Ukraine is likely higher and noted that the Russian prisoner population decreased by 86,000 people since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[117]

A source in the Russian shipbuilding industry told Russian state news wire TASS on June 5 that Project 677 “Velikiye Luki” submarine will enter service as part of the Baltic Fleet before the end of 2024.[118] The source added that the Project 677 “Velikiye Luki” submarine is a cruise missile carrier and will be equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Russian milblogger who routinely delivers military aid to Russian forces operating in southern Ukraine published a list of promised military equipment that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) has yet to produce.[119] The milblogger complained that the Russian DIB wasted 20 trillion rubles ($224.6 billion) but did not supply Russian frontline troops over the past two and a half years with new T-14 Armata tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles based on the T-14 chassis; experimental batches of the “Boomerang“ armored personnel carrier; S-60 and “Altius” drones; 2S35 “Koalitsiya-SV” self-propelled gun with new armament; a significant number of “Tornado-S” and “Uragan 1M” multiple rocket launchers; or “Peresvet” laser or other directed energy weapons.[120] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) presented some of the mentioned military equipment during various military parades. The milblogger implied that the Russian DIB needs to invest in the development of more equipment such as “Lancet” drones, which the milblogger credited with successfully supporting Russian counterbattery capabilities in Ukraine.

Another Russian milblogger and former “Storm Z” instructor responded to the milblogger’s claims about “Lancet” drones’ effectiveness, claiming that the loitering munition only weighs 25 kilograms and lacks the payload necessary to destroy Ukrainian military equipment.[121] The former “Storm Z” instructor added that “Lancets” can temporarily disable Ukrainian military equipment and that Russian forces have a chance of inflicting some critical damage or destruction with two or three of such loitering munitions from different directions.[122] The former “Storm Z” instructor added that Russian forces also frequently strike Ukrainian decoys, likely due to poor sensors on Russian reconnaissance and loitering munitions.[123]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukraine's defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with representatives of international news agencies on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 5 and heavily focused on internal US politics in an effort to downplay the threat that Russia poses to the US and to dissuade US actors from supporting Ukraine.[124]

Kremlin officials continue to depict Armenia's ongoing attempts to distance itself from political and security relations with Russia as part of alleged Western efforts to destabilize Armenia and the South Caucasus. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin stated on June 5 that Armenia has distanced itself specifically from interactions with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) because of Western pressure and accused the West of threatening Armenia's sovereignty.[125] Galuzin alleged that the West intends to destabilize countries surrounding Russia and disrupt integration through Russia-dominated multilateral organizations like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[126] The Kremlin has previously explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the CSTO and return to a pro-Kremlin alignment.[127]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 5 that Russian propagandists are attempting to exploit search engine algorithms to present Russian propaganda to residents in occupied Ukraine.[128] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that searches in the Ukrainian language will typically offer residents in occupied territories access to independent Ukrainian information resources and not the Kremlin’s desired pro-Russian propaganda.[129] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian propagandists are creating Ukrainian language versions of Russian news platforms so that residents in occupied territories using Ukrainian on search engines will still encounter Ukrainian language Russian propaganda.[130]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko visited the Irkutsk Aviation Plant in Irkutsk Oblast, Russia on June 5, possibly to discuss Belarusian contributions to the Russian aviation industry.[131] Lukashenko reportedly visited plants for the assembly of aircraft equipment, the assembly and docking of the fuselage of the Su-30 SM fighter aircraft, and the robotic assembly of the MC-21 passenger aircraft.[132] General Director of the Russian United Aircraft Corporation Yuri Slyusar stated that Belarusian enterprises may receive orders for three to five billion rubles ($33 million to $56 million) annually from the Russian aircraft industry for parts and assembly of passenger and cargo aircraft.[133] Lukashenko also discussed prospects for further cooperation with Irkutsk Oblast Governor Igor Kobzev and set a target of increasing Belarus-Irkutsk Oblast trade by two or three times.[134]

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Secretary General Zhang Ming announced on June 5 that Belarus will become a full member of the SCO at the upcoming SCO summit in Astana, Kazakhstan in July.[135]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

---

[1] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/06/04/on-the-record-press-gaggle-by-white-house-national-security-communications-advisor-john-kirby-previewing-president-bidens-travel-to-france/

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2024

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1450 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/04/vijska-rf-u-travni-obstrilyuvaly-harkiv-vtrychi-bilshe-nizh-u-kvitni/; https://t.me/synegubov/9908

[5] https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-weapons-biden-kharkiv-c46c3ca0f0f4893c8c3b0ef53e974438

[6] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1797569964288667850; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024

[7] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/06/05/ukraine-soldiers-russian-territory-joe-biden/ ; https://archive dot ph/A1Wxt

[8] https://news.err dot ee/1609362356/err-in-ukraine-frontline-troops-find-west-is-delaying-with-its-aid

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024

[10] https://www.ft.com/content/4d583259-7565-4cbc-972e-ea77f4a76175

[11] https://www.ft.com/content/4d583259-7565-4cbc-972e-ea77f4a76175

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2024

[13] https://www.ft.com/content/4d583259-7565-4cbc-972e-ea77f4a76175

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-russian-strikes-more-effective-ukraine-exhausts-defenses

[15] https://news.liga dot net/ua/politics/news/dzherelo-v-hur-rosiiany-zoseredyly-v-ukraini-ta-na-kordoni-550-000-zaharbnykiv

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024

[19] . https://t.me/tass_agency/252637

[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/252776

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100523

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051624

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024

[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/252710

[26] https://t.me/tass_agency/252726

[27] https://t.me/russicatrend/4359; https://t.me/kolezev/15089; https://t.me/istrkalkglk/5275;

[28] https://t.me/vizioner_rf/8195 ; https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-russias-poorest-regions-war-in-ukraine-exacts-heavy-toll-11662722109; https://t.me/russicatrend/4342; https://t.me/LastOfRus/11467 ; https://t.me/russicatrend/4344; https://t.me/russica2/57611; https://t.me/vizioner_rf/8195

[29] https://t.me/russicatrend/4342; https://t.me/russicatrend/4349; https://t.me/russicatrend/4352; https://t.me/istrkalkglk/5275; https://t.me/plutovstvo007/3768; https://t.me/LastOfRus/11467; https://t.me/russicatrend/4344 ; https://t.me/russicatrend/4343; https://t.me/obrazbuduschego2/17587; https://t.me/russica2/57611; https://t.me/russicatrend/4339

[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2023

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2023

[33] https://t.me/russicatrend/4347

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2023

[35] https://t.me/turchak_andrey/1346;

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2023

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2023

[38] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6746185; http://www.president-sovet dot ru/presscenter/news/valeriy_fadeev_pokupku_grazhdanstva_rossii_nado_prekratit/; https://zavtra dot ru/events/spetczasedanie_spch_po_migratcionnoj_politike_i_novie_dannie_skr_po_migrantskoj_prestupnosti; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/36610

[39] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/36610

[40] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/36610; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6746185; https://kaluganews dot ru/fn_1499618.html

[41] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6746185

[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2024

[43] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6746976 ; https://ria dot ru/20240605/davankov-1950554895.html ; https://t.me/davankov/978

[44] https://t.me/adelimkhanov_95/2785

[45] https://t.me/davankov/991

[46] https://t.me/davankov/991 ; https://meduza dot io/en/news/2015/02/11/russian-supreme-court-upholds-ban-on-headscarves-in-schools

[47] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWarO41224

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122023

[49] https://www.ft.com/content/21f8f63f-80d6-455f-abf8-fce269d70319

[50] https://www.ft.com/content/21f8f63f-80d6-455f-abf8-fce269d70319

[51] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120623

[52] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120623

[53] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021324

[54] https://theins dot ru/politika/272103

[55] https://theins dot ru/politika/272103

[56] https://theins dot ru/politika/272103

[57] https://theins dot ru/politika/272103

[58] https://theins dot ru/politika/272103

[59] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050924 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2024

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02B5XsCxoEaVTLE4552trc3gtQvoG1wZcKSexr3wjFjoyUmLiKVoShp7pmESC3TVkfl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cLb4SD77vbRDDh7KhyQTnLRgyUbSb16Qk3pRZbuEXwWT9m9B6Fr4PuXGuT7nceeal ;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0thx9A11xEzTaLXFiWT8zeZo3JgHr9xSNEPUYXwTeF71jkn5fDzofgY1LjKTa9nNZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02w4TpC7Y5GsPJ1puRWd2qio8ekP1h2LMTkeM2CmzbJRsBsuRHEEYDRtftds3e5SA3l

[61] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid0EmavyQyfcVAJRNMbry8Es2Gsw2znCLGF3Cc94zugTyVDwkFpfojc9gjjRJYoKhrhl

[62]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0thx9A11xEzTaLXFiWT8zeZo3JgHr9xSNEPUYXwTeF71jkn5fDzofgY1LjKTa9nNZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02w4TpC7Y5GsPJ1puRWd2qio8ekP1h2LMTkeM2CmzbJRsBsuRHEEYDRtftds3e5SA3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cLb4SD77vbRDDh7KhyQTnLRgyUbSb16Qk3pRZbuEXwWT9m9B6Fr4PuXGuT7nceeal ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11448 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20331 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/23551

[63] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid0EmavyQyfcVAJRNMbry8Es2Gsw2znCLGF3Cc94zugTyVDwkFpfojc9gjjRJYoKhrhl

[64] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/761541-naskilki-zrujnovanij-vovcansk-skilki-tam-ludej-i-ci-prodovzuetsa-evakuacia-situacia-na-5-cervna/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252694 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11448 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20331 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/23551 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44399 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125970

[65] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/761541-naskilki-zrujnovanij-vovcansk-skilki-tam-ludej-i-ci-prodovzuetsa-evakuacia-situacia-na-5-cervna/

[66] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/hruppyrovok-tam-ty-ne-boisia-tam-ia-dumaiu-chto-my-tam-pervye-poprem-chem-ony.html; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3943

[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2024 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/mi-ne-hochemo-shob-tak-samo-yak-ci-knizhki-zgoriv-statut-oon-91137

[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2024

[70] (Ivanivka) https://x.com/sternenko/status/1798330266576130255 ; https://x.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1798371925942747350 ; https://x.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1798368841107664958 ; https://x.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1798374244545695878

(Novoselivske) https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/433; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5731; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26994

 

[71] https://t.me/motopatriot/23558 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/11892

[72] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid0EmavyQyfcVAJRNMbry8Es2Gsw2znCLGF3Cc94zugTyVDwkFpfojc9gjjRJYoKhrhl

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02w4TpC7Y5GsPJ1puRWd2qio8ekP1h2LMTkeM2CmzbJRsBsuRHEEYDRtftds3e5SA3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0thx9A11xEzTaLXFiWT8zeZo3JgHr9xSNEPUYXwTeF71jkn5fDzofgY1LjKTa9nNZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02B5XsCxoEaVTLE4552trc3gtQvoG1wZcKSexr3wjFjoyUmLiKVoShp7pmESC3TVkfl

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nU8yvZacZCexdX7e6kLvHtDnyQ5fmBhc9nHfewttPXcfDiV2nc2T1zHpsfwfqMpxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0thx9A11xEzTaLXFiWT8zeZo3JgHr9xSNEPUYXwTeF71jkn5fDzofgY1LjKTa9nNZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cLb4SD77vbRDDh7KhyQTnLRgyUbSb16Qk3pRZbuEXwWT9m9B6Fr4PuXGuT7nceeal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al

[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69676

[76] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26990; https://t.me/rusich_army/15012

[77] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1798104323617857602 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1798110070665797998 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1798113040941895958 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1798114682051457224 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1798116609304695047 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1798118070369837555 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1798143759735255448

[78] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11449; https://t.me/DKulko/540

[79] https://x.com/GermanObserver1/status/1798387490367406445; https://x.com/GermanObserver1/status/1798387494565904505; https://t.me/ssternenko/29369

[80] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=317668334724985

[81] https://t.me/stranaua/156895

[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nU8yvZacZCexdX7e6kLvHtDnyQ5fmBhc9nHfewttPXcfDiV2nc2T1zHpsfwfqMpxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0thx9A11xEzTaLXFiWT8zeZo3JgHr9xSNEPUYXwTeF71jkn5fDzofgY1LjKTa9nNZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cLb4SD77vbRDDh7KhyQTnLRgyUbSb16Qk3pRZbuEXwWT9m9B6Fr4PuXGuT7nceeal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al  

[83] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11449; https://t.me/rusich_army/15003; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69667; https://t.me/milinfolive/123459 (general Chasiv Yar area); https://t.me/DKulko/540 (Kalynivka)

[84] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15698

[85] https://t.me/wargonzo/20331; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11458; https://t.me/motopatriot/23552; https://t.me/rybar/60660; . https://t.me/dva_majors/44399

[86] https://t.me/motopatriot/23542; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26988; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69665

[87] https://www.youtube.com/live/dVemyI5HesU?si=02qbU-SEZdNpay_L&t=486 ; https://suspilne dot media/761317-zelenskij-zustrinetsa-z-makronom-bajden-rozpoviv-akim-bacit-mir-v-ukraini-833-den-vijni-onlajn/

[88] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02w4TpC7Y5GsPJ1puRWd2qio8ekP1h2LMTkeM2CmzbJRsBsuRHEEYDRtftds3e5SA3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nU8yvZacZCexdX7e6kLvHtDnyQ5fmBhc9nHfewttPXcfDiV2nc2T1zHpsfwfqMpxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0thx9A11xEzTaLXFiWT8zeZo3JgHr9xSNEPUYXwTeF71jkn5fDzofgY1LjKTa9nNZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cLb4SD77vbRDDh7KhyQTnLRgyUbSb16Qk3pRZbuEXwWT9m9B6Fr4PuXGuT7nceeal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al

[89] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/11909

[90] https://x.com/klinger66/status/1798073399409037517; https://x.com/ayzin_illya/status/1798008290875695285; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1797202016042643937

[91] https://t.me/wargonzo/20331; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11455; https://t.me/rybar/60659

[92] https://t.me/rybar/60659; https://t.me/motopatriot/23545; https://t.me/dva_majors/44399

[93] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26996; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56749; https://t.me/motopatriot/23561

[94] https://t.me/oaembr46/858; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/poblyzu-georgiyivky-desantnyky-rozbyly-tehniku-okupantiv/

[95] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cLb4SD77vbRDDh7KhyQTnLRgyUbSb16Qk3pRZbuEXwWT9m9B6Fr4PuXGuT7nceeal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02B5XsCxoEaVTLE4552trc3gtQvoG1wZcKSexr3wjFjoyUmLiKVoShp7pmESC3TVkfl  

[96] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69684

[97] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nU8yvZacZCexdX7e6kLvHtDnyQ5fmBhc9nHfewttPXcfDiV2nc2T1zHpsfwfqMpxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0thx9A11xEzTaLXFiWT8zeZo3JgHr9xSNEPUYXwTeF71jkn5fDzofgY1LjKTa9nNZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cLb4SD77vbRDDh7KhyQTnLRgyUbSb16Qk3pRZbuEXwWT9m9B6Fr4PuXGuT7nceeal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al; https://t.me/dva_majors/44399

[98] https://t.me/dva_majors/44399; https://t.me/voin_dv/8947

[99] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1929

[100] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1929 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1932 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1931 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1930

[101] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125986

[102] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02w4TpC7Y5GsPJ1puRWd2qio8ekP1h2LMTkeM2CmzbJRsBsuRHEEYDRtftds3e5SA3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cLb4SD77vbRDDh7KhyQTnLRgyUbSb16Qk3pRZbuEXwWT9m9B6Fr4PuXGuT7nceeal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02B5XsCxoEaVTLE4552trc3gtQvoG1wZcKSexr3wjFjoyUmLiKVoShp7pmESC3TVkfl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20331 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11436 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26993 ;

[103] https://t.me/Horskyi_Hora/130; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15708

[104] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cLb4SD77vbRDDh7KhyQTnLRgyUbSb16Qk3pRZbuEXwWT9m9B6Fr4PuXGuT7nceeal ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dNen5DfuG1FPNf1KfxUhK3sbiyZvg47oD81k6qAaF1AoEUyLhGHmvijvNG8S9E2Al ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02bg9NDeYHi6MM5WrDrac4wpVhxJDChcDf5aMJphvLaYt8WzL1Ahdn4Z9mgFN5su6il ; https://t.me/osetin20/8616 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44388 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44399

[105] https://t.me/osetin20/8616 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44388 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44399

[106] https://t.me/ComAFUA/306

[107] https://t.me/suspilneodesa/36381 ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/15053

[108] https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/360

[109] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1450; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/04/vijska-rf-u-travni-obstrilyuvaly-harkiv-vtrychi-bilshe-nizh-u-kvitni/

[110] https://crimea.ria dot ru/20240605/v-krymu-boytsy-chvk-poluchayut-status-veteranov-boevykh-deystviy-1137845529.html

[111] https://crimea.ria dot ru/20240601/putin-poobeschal-podderzhku-fonda-zaschitniki-otechestva-boytsam-chvk-1137779801.html

[112] https://crimea dot ria.ru/20240601/putin-poobeschal-podderzhku-fonda-zaschitniki-otechestva-boytsam-chvk-1137779801.html

[113] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/12/14/1011058-putin-nazval-situatsiyu-chvk-probelom-minoboroni

[114] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/05/06/2024/666035909a79473f1a906d44

[115] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20August%2017%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20May%202%2C%202024%20%28PDF%29.pdf

[116] https://t.me/Baikal_People/5871?single ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18970; https://t.me/Baikal_People/5870 ; https://baikal-journal dot ru/2024/06/05/proshhajte-geroi/

[117] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18970; https://t.me/Baikal_People/5870

[118] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20995119

[119] https://t.me/zhivoff/14730

[120] https://t.me/zhivoff/14730

[121] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1022

[122] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1022

[123] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1023

[124] https://t.me/tass_agency/252830 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252834 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252861 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252863 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252864 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252865 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252866 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252867 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252868

[125] https://t.me/tass_agency/252698 ; https://tass dot ru/interviews/20986875 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41237

[126] https://t.me/tass_agency/252698 ; https://tass dot ru/interviews/20986875 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41237

[127] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424

[128] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/propagandystski-sajty-rf-majzhe-znykly-z-poshuku-gugl-na-tot-yak-yih-pozbutysya-povnistyu/

[129] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/propagandystski-sajty-rf-majzhe-znykly-z-poshuku-gugl-na-tot-yak-yih-pozbutysya-povnistyu/

[130] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/propagandystski-sajty-rf-majzhe-znykly-z-poshuku-gugl-na-tot-yak-yih-pozbutysya-povnistyu/

[131] https://t.me/pul_1/12597

[132] ttps://t.me/pul_1/12597; https://t.me/pul_1/12598 ; https://t.me/pul_1/12595; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/251337 ; http://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-pribyl-na-irkutskij-aviatsionnyj-zavod-predprijatie-natseleno-na-rasshirenie-kooperatsii-s-639101-2024/; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/251338 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/251340; https://t.me/pul_1/12600

[133] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/belorusskie-predprijatija-mogut-poluchit-zakazy-na-milliardy-rossijskih-rublej-ot-aviastroitelnoj-639138-2024/

[134] https://eng.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-meets-with-governor-of-russias-irkutsk-oblast-158865-2024/#:~:text=IRKUTSK%2C%205%20June%20(BelTA),5%20June%2C%20BelTA%20has%20learned; https://t.me/pul_1/12604; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/251377

[135] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/gensek-shos-belarus-stanet-polnopravnym-chlenom-organizatsii-na-predstojaschem-sammite-v-ijule-639228-2024/