Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Joseph Su, and Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War
Editors: Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: June 5 at Noon ET
The
China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for
the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update
supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses
Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for
the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to
controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
- The PRC is exerting greater pressure on Taiwan across domains following the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te in May
- Two People’s Liberation Army naval ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters near Kinmen Island on May 29, a move that signals escalating PRC efforts to assert control over the waters
- The PRC suspended tariff exemptions on 134 Taiwanese goods included in the Cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.
- PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun and a Ministry of National Defense (MoD) spokesperson expressed opposition to “rampant” US freedom of navigation activities and criticized them as illegitimate.
- The PRC MFA condemned the trilateral United States-Japan-South Korea defense ministers meeting as provocatively targeting the PRC.
- The PRC framed the Philippines as provoking regional instability at the Shangri-La Dialogue as part of an effort to justify PRC coercion targeting the Philippines in the South China Sea.
- PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning announced China will not attend the upcoming Russia-Ukraine War peace summit in Switzerland from June 15-16.
- The People's Republic of China
seeks to diversify its energy supply chains through negotiations with
Russia on the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline and diplomatic
outreach to Middle Eastern states.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The PRC is exerting greater pressure on Taiwan across domains following the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te in May. PRC
officials signaled after Taiwan’s presidential election in January that
it views the incoming DPP administration as hostile separatists who
instigate cross-strait tensions. The PRC escalated its military and
economic lines of coercion against Taiwan after Lai’s inauguration on
May 20. PRC officials have maintained fierce rhetoric accusing Lai and
the DPP of antagonism to justify the PRC’s actions since the
inauguration.
Two People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters near Kinmen Island on May 29, a
move that signals escalating PRC efforts to assert control over the
waters.[1]
Kinmen is a Taiwan-controlled island with a large military garrison
roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. The incursion follows
months of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships violating Taiwan’s restricted
and prohibited waters around its outer islands, which is aimed at
eroding Taiwan’s sovereignty over waters where it holds jurisdiction.
Taiwan does not formally claim any territorial waters around Kinmen
partly due to its proximity to the PRC, but it designates “prohibited”
and “restricted” waters around Kinmen, which it treats as equivalent to
“territorial waters” and a “contiguous zone,” respectively. The PRC has
normalized the presence of CCG ships in Kinmen’s restricted and
prohibited waters since February, increasing both the frequency of
incursions and the number of ships. PRC presence in Taiwan-controlled
waters around Kinmen peaked in May before President Lai Ching-te’s
inauguration, when five CCG ships conducted drills with seven official
PRC ships near the island.[2]
Taiwanese security analysts such as Institute for National Defense and Security Research Director Szu Tzu-yan noted the structure of the ships indicated that they were landing craft.[3] Taiwanese media outlet China Times cited unnamed military officials who stated that this was the first time in ten years that a PLA ship entered Kinmen’s restricted waters.[4] One retired general noted the significance of the event as a gray zone operation and distinguished it from occasional instances in which PRC ships cut corners through Kinmen’s restricted waters to save time.[5] The PRC’s deployment of PLA ships in Taiwan-controlled waters represents a tangible manifestation of recent PRC pressure against Taiwan. The incident follows large-scale PLA exercises that encircled Taiwan from May 23–24 after Lai’s inauguration on May 20. Ministry of Defense spokesperson Wu Qian stated that the exercises were aimed at combating the arrogance of "Taiwan independence" and deterring external interference and intervention. Wu stated that the exercises were “completely reasonable, legal, justified, and necessary.”[6] CCG ships concurrently entered Taiwan-controlled waters around two islands in the Matsu archipelago.
The
PRC suspended tariff exemptions on 134 Taiwanese goods included in the
Cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).[7]
The goods are primarily chemical products, industrial metals,
machinery, rubbers, and plastics. Taiwanese exports to the PRC
constitute a large share of the total in these categories.[8]
This is the PRC’s second suspension of ECFA tariff exemptions on
similar products since December 21, just weeks before Taiwan’s
presidential elections. At that time, the PRC targeted 12 hydrocarbon
and petrochemical products.[9]
The
PRC implements trade restrictions in a coercive or punitive manner to
weaken political support for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), which it regards as a threat due to the DPP’s proactive
resistance to PRC efforts to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. The PRC
adopted bans on Taiwanese fish and pomelo imports as a form of economic
punishment after then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi arrived in
Taiwan in August 2022.[10]
The PRC also makes economic concessions to increase political support
for the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), which it favors due to the KMT’s
willingness to pursue closer cross-strait relations. The PRC Deputy
Director of the General Administration of Customs Zhao Zenglian
announced on April 28 during a meeting with KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi
that the PRC would lift its ban on Taiwanese pomelos and fish imports.[11]
PRC state media highlighted Fu’s acceptance of the 1992 Consensus in
his meeting with Zhao. The PRC established the 1992 Consensus as a
pre-condition for cross-strait cooperation. It states that both sides
agree there is only one China, and that Taiwan is part of the only
China.
Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen
Binhua framed the measures as necessary retaliation in response to
Taiwan’s alleged “unilateral adoption of discriminatory trade
restrictions” on more than 2,500 products from the PRC.[12]
The CCP’s blaming Taiwan for the deterioration of trade relations is
consistent with its efforts to style itself as the party pursuing
economic cooperation that is beneficial for both sides of the strait.
Chen highlighted a series of cross-strait economic initiatives that the
PRC is pursuing during a TAO press conference on May 29. Chen framed the
initiatives as successful modes to attract people from Taiwan to the
mainland despite recent cross-strait tensions, which it claims are a
product of the DPP government’s destructive cross-strait policies.[13]
The PRC also uses economic coercion to achieve Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation. The PRC rejected imports of Guatemalan coffee and macadamia nuts in May to punish Guatemala for maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[14] Guatemala is one of twelve states that have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesman Wang Wenbin criticized Guatemalan Foreign Minister Carlos MartÃnez for attending ROC President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20.
[15]
PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun threatened Taiwanese “separatists” and their foreign supporters in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Dong
gave a speech on “China’s Approach to Global Security” at the dialogue
on June 2 in which he claimed Taiwan’s DPP administration was “pursuing
separation in an incremental way” and had recently made “fanatical
statements that show their betrayal of the Chinese nation and their
ancestors.” Dong also accused “some external interfering forces” of
using a “salami-slicing strategy” to hollow out the One China Principle
through arms sales and Taiwan-related legislation. He was most likely
referring to the United States. He said these forces’ attempts to
“embolden Taiwan independence separatists” are “dragging Taiwan into a
dangerous situation.” Dong said that the PRC is still committed to
peaceful reunification, but that this prospect is being eroded by
“separatists” and foreign forces. He stressed that “whoever dares to
split Taiwan from China will be crushed to pieces and invite their own
destruction.”[16]
Dong’s rhetoric regarding Taiwan mirrors persistent and aggressive
diatribes against the DPP and “Taiwan separatists” from PRC officials
since Lai’s inauguration.[17] PRC messaging seeks to justify the PRC’s actions amid increasing pressure to shape the narrative of cross-strait relations.
The
ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mainland Affairs Council condemned
Dong’s comments on Taiwan. They accused the PRC of violating the UN
Charter’s provision against the use or threats of force and of
increasing risks to Asia-Pacific peace and security.[18]
China
PRC
Defense Minister Dong Jun and a Ministry of National Defense (MoD)
spokesperson expressed opposition to “rampant” US freedom of navigation
activities and criticized them as illegitimate. MND
spokesperson Col. Wu Qian said on May 30 that the PRC the US notion of
“freedom of navigation” is a “false proposition.” Wu claimed the South
China Sea is one of the freest and safest waterways in the world and
that the PRC has always respected freedom of navigation and overflight
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He said that
“navigation cannot be ‘rampant’ and freedom cannot be ‘reckless,’”
however. He said the PRC opposes “rampant freedom” and accused the
United States of using freedom of navigation as an excuse to interfere
in regional affairs, maintain US hegemony, and undermine other
countries’ sovereignty.[19]
Defense
Minister Dong Jun claimed in the question-and-answer session following
his June 2 speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue that “some countries” that
have not signed UNCLOS are using freedom-of-navigation operations
(FONOPs) to enter the territorial sea of other countries. He was
referring to the United States conducting FONOPs through waters around
the Paracel Islands and other PRC-claimed islands which the PRC
considers to be its territorial waters. Dong compared this practice to
“driving through others’ houses” instead of driving on the main road. He
claimed that “we [countries of the Asia-Pacific region] are all victims
of these kinds of operations” and denied that they should be considered
“freedom of navigation.”[20]
The
PRC most recently accused the United States of illegally intruding into
its territorial waters during a US FONOP in waters around the Paracel
Islands on May 10. The PRC claims straight archipelagic baselines around
the Paracel Islands, which means it considers all the water between the
islands as its territorial waters. The PRC also requires foreign ships
to get permission or provide advance notification when they sail through
its territorial waters. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) does not permit countries to restrict “innocent passage”
through their territorial waters, however. “Innocent passage” is
uninterrupted transit through the waters without other activities such
as fishing, research, intelligence collection, or military activities.
UNCLOS also only permits designated archipelagic states to draw
straight-baseline claims around their islands. Non-archipelagic states,
such as the PRC, can only claim waters up to 12 nautical miles from
their shores as their territorial sea.[21]
PRC
Defense Minister Dong Jun met with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on
May 31 on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. This
was the first in-person meeting between US and PRC defense ministers
since 2022. MoD spokesperson Wu Qian described the meeting as “positive,
practical, and constructive.”[22]
A US readout said that Austin emphasized the importance of maintaining
open lines of military-to-military communication, expressed concern
about recent PLA activity around Taiwan, discussed the PRC’s support for
Russia’s defense industrial base, and expressed concerns about recent
provocations from North Korea including direct contributions to Russia’s
war in Ukraine.[23]
Dong said the purpose of military-to-military communication is to
enhance understanding, eliminate misunderstandings, and accumulate
mutual trust. He expressed hope that the United States will be
“consistent in words and deeds” and explore a “correct way” for the two
sides to get along in line with common interests. Dong emphasized the
PRC’s bottom line on Taiwan and Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC readout did
not mention the other issues that Austin brought up.[24]
PRC media reported that Dong also expressed strong opposition to the US
deployment of intermediate-range missiles to the Philippines during an
exercise, though the official readout did not mention this issue.[25] MoD spokesperson Wu said on May 30 that the missile deployment “brought huge risks of war to the region.”[26]
PRC Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu met US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell in
Washington, DC on May 30. Ma expressed a range of PRC grievances with
the United States on Taiwan, the South China Sea, economic issues, and
Ukraine. The US readout said the “candid and constructive”
meeting was part of an effort to maintain open lines of communication to
manage bilateral competition. Campbell raised US concerns about the
PRC’s “destabilizing actions” in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and
South China Sea, as well as PRC support for Russia’s defense industrial
base.[27]
Ma agreed to maintain high-level exchanges but said "the practice of
the United States seeking dialogue and cooperation while undermining
China's interests is not feasible and cannot be done.” He said the PRC
will never agree to contain, suppress, and deprive the PRC of its
legitimate right to development. Ma called Taiwan the “insurmountable
red line” in US-PRC relations and urged the United States to abide by
the one-China principle if it wanted to maintain cross-strait peace. Ma
also urged the United States to stop “politicizing” economic issues,
stop “instigating and supporting infringement and provocation” in the
South China Sea, and stop “smearing and pressuring China” on the Ukraine
war.[28]
The
Ma-Campbell meeting came one day after Campbell briefed NATO partners
and framed China’s material assistance to Russia as “already having
chosen a side.” Campbell said that PRC economic support for Russia is a
“sustained, comprehensive effort that is backed up by the leadership in
China” to support Russia “to the hilt” and allow Russia to “reconstitute
elements of their military force,” including long-range missiles,
artillery, UAVs, battlefield awareness, and other capabilities.[29]
The United States has accused the PRC of supplying Russia with dual-use
components including machine tools and nitrocellulose, which is used in
propellants.[30]
The PRC has officially presented itself as neutral on the war in
Ukraine and framed its economic support of Russia as “normal trade
relations.” It has largely adopted Russian framing of the war including
portraying US aid to Ukraine as “adding fuel to the fire,” however.[31]
Northeast Asia
Japan and South Korea
The
PRC MFA condemned the trilateral United States-Japan-South Korea
defense ministers meeting as provocatively targeting the PRC. The
United States, Japanese, and South Korean ministers committed to
trilateral cooperation to create a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. They also
condemned North Korean missile launches and regional provocations.[32]
PRC MFA Spokeswoman Mao Ning accused the United States of instigating
confrontation in the region. She stated the PRC aimed for the
maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula but declined to condemn
North Korean provocations.[33]
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The
PRC framed the Philippines as provoking regional instability at the
Shangri-La Dialogue as part of an effort to justify PRC coercion
targeting the Philippines in the South China Sea. Philippine
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr stated during his May 31 keynote address
that the Philippines was on the front line to assert the integrity of
UNCLOS against “assertive actors who aim to propagate excessive and
baseless claims through force, intimidation, and deception.”[34]
The PRC MFA stated in response that the Philippines was fully
responsible for the escalation in the South China Sea. The PRC MFA also
rejected the 2016 UNCLOS Arbitration Tribunal ruling that rejected the
legitimacy of PRC claims to territory inside of the nine-dash line and
land reclamation activities.[35]
PRC Minister of National Defense Dong Jun claimed in his June 2 speech
that “a certain country [Philippines], emboldened by outside powers
[United States], has broken bilateral agreements and its own promises,
made premeditated provocations and created false scenarios to mislead
the public.”[36]
The
PRC is conducting a campaign to enforce its territorial claims over
disputed maritime features in the South China Sea. The PRC deployed
research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal in early May,
potentially as part of a campaign to prevent the Philippines from
defending its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. This is a change from
April when the PRC deployed the Chinese Coast Guard to block Philippine
ships from reaching Second Thomas Shoal and did not conduct efforts to
reclaim Sabina Shoal.[37]
The PRC also conducted its largest-ever blockade at Scarborough in an
attempt to block a fleet of Philippine civilian ships from resupplying
fishermen near Scarborough Shoal.[38]
The Chinese Coast Guard also released new law enforcement procedures on
May 15, which it could use to justify the arrest and detainment of
non-PRC nationals and vessels, such as Philippine resupply ships or
Filipino fishermen, within the boundaries of PRC territorial claims.[39]
Oceania
Palau
President Surangel Whipps Jr. accused the PRC of conducting a
cyberattack that stole 20,000 government documents, including military
information related to the United States and Japan. The
documents appeared on the dark web in early April. These documents
included the location of a U.S. radar installation in Palau, crew lists
of Japanese Navy ships that visited Palau, and unspecified details about
Palau’s diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.[40] President Whipps emphasized the strength of Palau’s relationship with Taiwan in response to the hack.[41]
The Republic of China condemned the cyberattack and began working with
Palau to strengthen cybersecurity against “authoritarian infiltration.”[42] The PRC MFA denied responsibility for the attack and accused Palau of lacking evidence for their conclusion.[43]
Europe
The PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) claimed to have uncovered two spies working for the British intelligence agency MI6. The
MSS said one of the spies surnamed Wang studied abroad in the UK in
2015, where MI6 bribed him. He induced his wife, Zhou, to become a spy
as well, according to the MSS.[44]
The MSS accusation comes as two employees of the Hong Kong Economic and
Trade Office will go to trial on espionage charges in the United
Kingdom.[45]
The
PRC United Front Work Department provided financial support to the
Dutch political party NL Plan, which is participating in the European
Parliamentary elections from June 6–9. The United Front Work
Department is a CCP organization that blends influence activities and
intelligence operations to shape a target’s political environment and
policies to the CCP’s benefit.[46]
NL Plan received 42,000 euros (45,643 USD) from organizations
affiliated with the United Front, such as the Chinese Council for
Peaceful National Reunification in the Netherlands.[47]
United
Front-supported parties, such as NL Plan, sitting in the European
Parliament could aid the PRC in blocking EU actions, such as sanctions
against the PRC. Prominent NL Plan member Dong Lili stated that “whether
you are inside or outside of China, we should all put our energy into
making our motherland stronger.”[48] The European Parliament endorses the EU’s annual budget as well as international agreements.[49]
Russia-Ukraine War
PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning announced China will
not attend the upcoming Russia-Ukraine War peace summit in Switzerland
from June 15–16 due to the absence of Russia.[50] PRC MFA Spokeswoman Mao Ning stated that China does not believe the summit will meet China’s three proposals.[51]
China’s stated requirements for an international peace summit are
recognition by both Russia and Ukraine, equal participation by all
parties, and fair discussion of all peace plans.[52]
Mao instead said China would continue to promote dialogue and lasting
peace in “its own way” and that China’s position of non-attendance is
“fair and just, not directed at any party, and certainly not at this
summit.” [53]
PRC
President Xi Jinping met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French
President Emmanuel Macron, and President of the European Commission
Ursula von der Leyen in April and May. All three European leaders urged
Xi to pressure Russia to end its war against Ukraine.[54]
The PRC's decision not to attend the upcoming peace summit signifies
the failure of these efforts so far to convince Xi to use his leverage
over Russia to this end.
The People's Republic of
China (PRC) seeks to diversify its energy supply chains through
negotiations with Russia on the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2)
pipeline and diplomatic outreach to Middle Eastern states. The Financial Times (FT) reported
on June 2 that three unspecified sources familiar with the matter
stated that the PRC and Russia are in stalled negotiations regarding the
PS-2 gas pipeline. The PRC wants to pay prices near Russia's subsidized
domestic gas prices and to commit only to buying a small part of the
pipeline's planned capacity.[55]
Russia seeks higher prices to make up for lost LNG exports to the EU
following a unified EU drive to move away from Russian energy products.
The EU is on track to import roughly 82 percent less LNG from Russia in
2024 than in pre-war 2021.[56]
The PRC is simultaneously pursuing greater access to oil and natural
gas resources in the Middle East, such as through the China-Arab States
Cooperation Forum (CASCF) on May 30. PRC diplomatic efforts with the UAE
and Iraq at the CASCF included discussions about expanding cooperation
and Chinese investment in the oil and natural gas industries.[57]
The
PRC seeks to diversify its energy supply chains to meet increasing
domestic demand beyond 2030. Columbia University's Center on Global
Energy Policy stated that the PRC will mostly or entirely be able to
meet its projected increased demand for imported gas with existing
supply contracts until 2030, but that the PRC's demand for imported gas
will exceed the capacity of its existing contracts by roughly 150
billion cubic meters, 50% of China’s predicted imports of 300 billion
cubic meters by 2040.[58]
The PRC’s state-owned China National Petroleum Company projected
China’s total natural gas demand would sit at roughly 605.9 billion
cubic meters with domestic Chinese production fulfilling the additional
300 billion cubic meters required.[59
The
European Union is finalizing a sanctions package against Russia, which
may grant leverage to the PRC in its negotiations over the PS-2
pipeline. European Commissioner for Energy Kadri Simson stated on June 3 that the EU aims to finalize its 14th
sanctions package against Russia in June. This will be the first
sanctions package to target the Russian liquid natural gas (LNG) trade.[60]
This would provide the PRC with greater economic leverage over the
Russian energy market as Russia would have fewer avenues to sell over 18
billion cubic meters of LNG to the EU, as it did in 2023, after the
sanctions.[61]
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-8Ppsit9nI
[2] https://www.cga dot gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=160424&ctNode=650&mp=999
[3] https://udn dot com/news/story/10930/8003708
[4] https://www.chinatimes dot com/newspapers/20240602000272-260118?chdtv
[5] https://www.chinatimes dot com/newspapers/20240602000272-260118?chdtv
[6] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/xwfyr/16310979.html
[7] https://gss.mof dot gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcejiedu/202405/t20240531_3936150.htm
https://gss.mof dot gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcefabu/202405/P020240531308646828162.pdf
[8] https://web02.mof dot gov.tw/njswww/webMain.aspx?sys=220&ym=11204&ymt=11304&kind=21&type=1&funid=i9121&cycle=41&outmode=0&compmode=00&outkind=1&fld0=1&codspc0=13,1,15,1,27,1,32,1,&rdm=R75408
[9] https://gss.mof dot gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcejiedu/202312/t20231221_3923284.htm
[10] https://www.storm dot mg/localarticle/4487288
[11] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/bmst/202404/t20240428_12616786.htm
[12] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202405/t20240531_12624451.htm
[13] www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/speech/202405/t20240529_12623892.htm
[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-rejection-guatemalan-shipments-could-be-related-taiwan-ties-guatemala-2024-05-25/
[15] https://www.mof dot gov.tw/singlehtml/278?cntId=66539
https://web02.mof dot gov.tw/njswww/webMain.aspx?sys=220&ym=11204&ymt=11304&kind=21&type=1&funid=i9121&cycle=41&outmode=0&compmode=00&outkind=1&fld0=1&codspc0=13,1,15,1,29,1,32,1,&rdm=R73175
[16] https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2024/plenary-sessions/fifth-plenary/
https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3265088/new-chinese-defence-minister-says-taiwan-separatists-will-be-crushed-pieces-and-hits-out-philippines
[17] www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/speech/202405/t20240529_12623892.htm
[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbiVmeucldE
https://www.mac dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=05B73310C5C3A632&sms=1A40B00E4C745211&s=2B2264EFC5BFF300
[19] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/xwfyr/jt/16312675.html
[20] https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2024/plenary-sessions/fifth-plenary/
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-17-2024
[22] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202405/1313393.shtml
[23] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3792119/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-meeting-with-peoples-republ/
[24] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16312968.html
[25] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202405/1313393.shtml
https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3264822/china-us-relations-defence-ministers-dong-jun-and-lloyd-austin-meet-shangri-la-dialogue-singapore?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[26] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/xwfyr/jt/16312675.html
[27] https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-campbells-meeting-with-prc-executive-vice-foreign-minister-ma-zhaoxu/
[28] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/wjbxw_new/202405/t20240531_11368606.shtml
[29] https://www.politico.eu/article/us-europe-china-aid-russia-trade-tariffs-kurt-campbell/
[30] https://www.politico.eu/article/us-accuses-china-backing-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/
[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-april-18-2024
[32] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3793913/united-states-japan-republic-of-korea-trilateral-ministerial-meeting-tmm-joint/
[33] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202406/t20240603_11375826.shtml
[34] https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2024/plenary-sessions/keynote-address/
[35] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202406/t20240603_11375557.shtml
https://news.usni.org/2016/07/12/document-overview-south-china-sea-tribunal-decision
[36] https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2024/plenary-sessions/fifth-plenary/
[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-17-2024
[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-17-2024
[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-24-2024
[40] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/02/world/asia/palau-taiwan-china-hack.html
[41] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/02/world/asia/palau-taiwan-china-hack.html
[42] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/06/04/2003818846
https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20240603003590-260407?chdtv
[43] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/02/world/asia/palau-taiwan-china-hack.html
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[44] http://www.81 dot cn/ss_208539/16313477.html
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-30-2024
[46] https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/select-committee-unveils-ccp-influence-memo-united-front-101
[47] https://www.rtl.nl/nieuws/artikel/5453538/nieuwe-partij-nl-plan-heeft-nauwe-banden-met-beinvloedingsnetwerk-chinese
[48] https://www.rtl.nl/nieuws/artikel/5453538/nieuwe-partij-nl-plan-heeft-nauwe-banden-met-beinvloedingsnetwerk-chinese
[49] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68899405
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[51] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202405/t20240531_11367990.shtml
[52]https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202405/t20240531_11367990.shtml
[53] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202406/t20240603_11375826.shtml
[54] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_2464
https://apnews.com/article/china-france-xi-macron-visit-c7f48d55fd9ccb345fc6e9eda105f89b
https://apnews.com/article/china-germany-scholz-xi-jinping-2de75f16b8f44603dea60eccd35b3d63
[55] https://www.ft.com/content/f7a34e3e-bce9-4db9-ac49-a092f382c526
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https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/#:~:text=Import%20from%20Russia%20declined%20from,2021%20to%2087.7%20in%202023.
[57]https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202405/t20240531_11368472.shtml
https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/wjbxw_674885/202405/t20240529_11313812.shtml
[58] https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/the-future-of-the-power-of-siberia-2-pipeline/%C2%A0;
https://www.ft.com/content/f7a34e3e-bce9-4db9-ac49-a092f382c526
[59] https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/lng/120823-chinas-natural-gas-demand-to-peak-in-2040-at-6059-bcm-etri
[60] https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/lng/060324-interview-eu-expects-to-finalize-14th-russian-sanctions-including-lng-in-june-simson
[61] https://www.acer.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/acers-monitoring-shows-eu-lng-imports-might-be-near-its-peak
