Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2024

 Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and George Barros

June 22, 2024, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on June 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces appear to be intensifying the tempo of their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast while decreasing the rate of attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast — consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast are primarily intended to fix and distract Ukrainian forces in order to allow Russian forces to intensify elsewhere in theater. Russian forces increased the intensity of assaults in the Toretsk-Horlivka direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar and northeast of Avdiivka) on the night of June 18 and maintained a relatively high rate of attacks in this area between June 19 to June 22, reportedly making several tactical gains in the area.[1] Russian forces have been generally inactive on this sector of the front throughout the course of 2024, so their activation and intensification are noteworthy. By contrast, the tempo of Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast has drastically decreased in recent days, particularly in comparison with the start of Russian offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City in mid-May 2024.[2] ISW has long assessed that the Russian command intended its offensive operation in Kharkiv Oblast to fix Ukrainian manpower and scarce materiel along the northern border to grant Russian forces opportunities to re-intensify offensive operations in other more critical areas of the theater, particularly in Donetsk Oblast.[3] Ukrainian sources have confirmed that some Ukrainian forces have redeployed units to the Kharkiv direction from Donetsk Oblast, so Russian forces may be exploiting this perceived weakness of Ukrainian lines to intensify attacks, particularly in the Toretsk-Horlivka direction.[4] Russian forces have additionally maintained a high rate of attacks in the Chasiv Yar direction and around Avdiivka since decreasing the tempo in Kharkiv Oblast, and may soon intensify attacks in this area if the Russian command identifies the coming weeks as an advantageous time to push in these areas before Ukrainian forces re-allocate reserves back to Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources have warned that Russia will conduct a summer offensive that will likely focus on Ukraine's east after pursuing offensive operations in the north intended to stretch Ukraine's scarce resources, and recent intensifications in Donetsk Oblast may indicate preparations for such a summer offensive, assuming it has not already begun.[5]

US policy continues to prohibit Ukrainian forces from striking legitimate military targets in Russian territory in range of Ukrainian HIMARS. Recent reporting from the Associated Press and Washington Post indicates that US policy still prohibits Ukraine from striking Russian military targets that are not actively attacking or preparing to attack Ukraine.[6] Pentagon spokesperson Major Charlie Dietz told the Washington Post in a report published on June 21 that the US allows Ukraine to fire US-provided HIMARS equipped with GMLRS into Russia where Russian forces are attacking into Ukraine and that the rules of engagement for US-provided weapons in Russian territory are “not about geography or a certain radius."[7] US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan similarly stated on June 17 that “this is not about geography... If Russia is attacking or about to attack from its territory into Ukraine, it only makes sense to allow Ukraine to hit back against the forces that are hitting it from across the border.”[8] These statements indicate that the US will only allow Ukrainian forces to strike Russian military targets if Russian targets first demonstrate that they are engaged in active combat operations or preparations for imminent combat operations. US restrictions likely force Ukrainian leadership to carefully determine whether or not a given target meets the aforementioned requirements before authorizing tactical fire missions. US policy still perseveres the majority of Russian sanctuary space by prohibiting Ukrainian forces from launching ATACMS missiles at any military targets in Russia.[9] No major Russian military airbases are in range of GMLRS, but many are within range of ATACMS.

 

 

Russian forces are exploiting the sanctuary that US policy still protects to support Russian combat operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and elsewhere in Ukraine. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces is leveraging the sanctuary to protect Russian brigade command posts and other assets outside of the range of HIMARS equipped with GLMRS north of Kharkiv Oblast. The Associated Press quoted a Ukrainian artillery commander on June 22 who stated that Ukrainian forces could target Russian brigade command points and the entire Russian Northern Grouping of Forces if the US approved Ukraine's use of ATACMS to strike Russian territory but currently cannot because Russia has deployed such command and control elements in an area 100 to 150 kilometers away from the front line.[10] US policy still prohibits Ukraine from using ATACMS anywhere in Russia.[11]

Russian air defenses will reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian F-16s if the US does not allow Ukrainian forces to use ATACMS to destroy Russian air defense systems in Russian territory. Ukrainian F-16 pilots will have to operate in a dangerous air space if US policy continues to provide a sanctuary in Russia that protects Russian forces from ATACMS. Russian air defenses will be able to cover up to 48 percent of Ukraine’s air space if Russia deploys S-400 air defense launchers within Russia outside of the range of HIMARS armed with GMLRS rockets. Such Russian air defense deployments would complicate Ukraine's ability to use manned fixed-wing airpower closer to frontline areas or against areas from which Russian aircraft, drone, and missile threats emanate. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces may be able to combine fixed-wing airpower in support of ground operations if the Ukrainian military receives a sufficient number of fighter jets, if Western partners train enough skilled pilots, and if Ukraine succeeds in degrading Russian air defense capabilities.[12]

The partial removal of the sanctuary has already had a net positive effect, underscoring the powerful latent potential a larger policy change could achieve. The Washington Post reported that the Biden Administration’s policy change allowing Ukrainian forces to strike into limited parts of Russia in late May 2024 — despite being quite limited — has allowed Ukraine to strike “areas where [Russian] equipment is concentrated and locations from where missile strikes are launched [against Ukraine].” The Washington Post quoted a commander of a reconnaissance battalion of Ukraine’s 57th Brigade who stated that Russia has not conducted a single S-300 missile strike against Kharkiv (it is unclear whether the speaker meant Kharkiv City or Kharkiv Oblast) since the Biden Administration partially removed the sanctuary in late May 2024.[13] The Associated Press reported on June 22 that Ukrainian forces have struck Russian troops and air defense systems within 20 kilometers inside of Russian territory and quoted a Ukrainian artillery commander who stated that Ukrainian forces used HIMARS to destroy Russian columns along the international border that were awaiting orders to enter Ukraine.[14] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov told the Washington Post that the situation in Kharkiv City “massively changed” after the US partially removed restrictions.[15] The Washington Post report noted that Russian glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv Oblast have not decreased, highlighting the need to allow Ukraine to strike Russian air bases and to augment Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The West maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.

Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren announced on June 21 that the Netherlands and another unspecified country will supply Ukraine with a Patriot air defense system.[16] Ollongren stated that the Netherlands and the other unspecified country have been working for "some time" to collect the components to form a complete Patriot system. US President Joe Biden recently indicated that the US has secured commitments from five unspecified countries to provide Ukraine with additional Patriots and other air defense systems, and so far, Romania and now the Netherlands have confirmed their participation in this effort.[17]

Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on a series of leadership changes within the Russian Federal Security Service's (FSB) Fifth Service, which reportedly specializes in collecting intelligence within Russia and the former Soviet Union.[18] Vazhnye Istorii stated on June 22 that a former Russian special services employee and an acquaintance of the FSB's Fifth Service Head Colonel General Sergei Beseda stated that Alexei Komkov replaced Beseda as the head of the FSB's Fifth Service. Vazhnye Istorii stated that Beseda formally retired from his position of Fifth Service Head due to his age and became a personal advisor to Russian FSB Head Alexander Bortnikov. Vazhnye Istorii's sources claimed that Komkov previously worked as Deputy Head of the FSB's counterintelligence service and that Komkov is affiliated with FSB First Deputy Director Sergei Korolev. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly relied on intelligence from the Fifth Service when launching his invasion of Ukraine.[19]

Western countries have reportedly provided Ukraine with roughly 800 million euros ($855.4 million) worth of Serbian-produced ammunition despite Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić's ongoing efforts to balance favor between Russia and the West. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 22 that it obtained estimates from an unspecified source that said that third-party countries have sent roughly 800 million euros worth of Serbian-produced ammunition to Ukraine since February 2022 and that Vučić confirmed that this number is "in the right ballpark" during an interview with FT.[20] Vučić clarified that Serbia does not export ammunition to Ukraine or Russia and that Serbia's clients in the US, Spain, and Czechia can allocate the ammunition as they see fit. Unnamed diplomats and analysts told FT that official Serbian government data purposely veils the flow of ammunition to Ukraine via third-party countries.

Satellite imagery confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck at least one Russian air defense training center in Krasnodar Krai during recent strikes on June 20 to 21.[21] Geolocated satellite imagery collected on June 22 shows a destroyed building and scorched fields at an air defense training center west of Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai, and footage shows fires and secondary explosions following the strike.[22] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on June 21 that Ukrainian strikes damaged barracks and injured nine personnel at the 726th Air Defense Training Center in Vorontsovka, Krasnodar Krai (south of Rostov-on-Don).[23]

Select Russian milbloggers claimed that unnamed actors, implied to be Ukrainians, conducted a strike using ATACMS against Rostov Oblast, although ISW cannot independently confirm these reports.[24] All available media reporting and senior US government officials’ statements strongly suggest that US policy still forbids Ukrainian forces from using US-provided ATACMS missiles to strike military targets anywhere in Russia.[25] ISW continues to assess that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all military targets in Russia's operational and deep rear areas with US-provided weapons.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces appear to be intensifying the tempo of their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast while decreasing the rate of attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast — consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast are primarily intended to fix and distract Ukrainian forces in order to allow Russian forces to intensify elsewhere in theater.
• US policy continues to prohibit Ukrainian forces from striking legitimate military targets in Russian territory in range of Ukrainian HIMARS.
• Russian forces are exploiting the sanctuary that US policy still protects to support Russian combat operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and elsewhere in Ukraine.
• Russian air defenses will reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian F-16s if the US does not allow Ukrainian forces to use ATACMS to destroy Russian air defense systems in Russian territory.
• The partial removal of the Russian sanctuary has already had a net positive effect, underscoring the powerful latent potential a larger policy change could achieve.
• Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren announced on June 21 that the Netherlands and another unspecified country will supply Ukraine with a Patriot air defense system.
• Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on a series of leadership changes within the Russian Federal Security Service's (FSB) Fifth Service, which reportedly specializes in collecting intelligence within Russia and the former Soviet Union.
• Western countries have reportedly provided Ukraine with roughly 800 million euros ($855.4 million) worth of Serbian-produced ammunition despite Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić's ongoing efforts to balance favor between Russia and the West.
• Satellite imagery confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck at least one Russian air defense training center in Krasnodar Krai during recent strikes on June 20 to 21.
• Select Russian milbloggers claimed that unnamed actors, implied to be Ukrainians, conducted a strike using ATACMS against Rostov Oblast, although ISW cannot independently confirm these reports.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka. 
• Russian law enforcement and security agencies continue working with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to recruit those accused of criminal offenses into the Russian military, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus
  
  

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 22 amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[26] Another Russian milblogger reiterated recent claims that Russian forces seized and cleared the entire Vovchansk Aggregate Plant and pushed Ukrainian forces south towards the Vovcha River.[27] A Ukrainian military observer stated on June 21 that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups with drone, artillery, and air support and are using armored vehicles sparingly in the Kharkiv direction.[28]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Svatove amid continued fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 22. Geolocated footage published on June 21 shows that Russian forces have advanced westward along a windbreak northwest of Novovodyane (southwest of Svatove).[29] ISW assessed on June 21 that Russian forces also recently advanced west of Novovodyane nearby the windbreak.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stepova Novoselivka, Berestove, and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka and Myasozharivka; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Nevske, Novosadove, and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on June 21 and 22.[31]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Rozdolivka; and south of Siversk near Vyimka on June 21 and 22.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured a foothold on two streets in eastern Rozdolivka and seized three windbreaks near Vyimka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[33]

Russian forces recently advanced within eastern Chasiv Yar amid continued ground attacks in the area on June 22. Geolocated footage published on June 22 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced within the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured the Chasiv Yar Hydraulic Reinforced Concrete Plant in Kanal Microraion and that elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advanced within Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[35] Some milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces have begun withdrawing from the Kanal Microraion and that Russian forces crossed an unspecified area of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal.[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces also continued ground attacks north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka on June 21 and 22.[37] Elements of the Russian "Sever-V" and 88th "Hispaniola" volunteer brigades (both of the Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[38]

 

Russian forces have reportedly seized Shumy in the Toretsk direction as of June 22, but there were no confirmed changes in the frontline in the Toretsk direction. A Ukrainian source claimed on June 21 that Russian forces seized Shumy (southeast of Toretsk) and two waste heaps immediately north and west of the settlement.[39] Russian milbloggers widely amplified the Ukrainian source and claimed on June 22 that Russian forces advanced into fields northeast of Shumy, entered Druzhba (immediately east of Toretsk and north of Shumy), and reached the outskirts of Pivnichne (southwest of Druzhba and northwest of Shumy).[40] A Russian milblogger noted that the seizure of Shumy supports the Russian military's advance to Pivnichne and will eventually set conditions for Russian forces to advance to Toretsk, which will allow this Russian grouping the option of supporting either the Chasiv Yar effort to the north or the effort west of Avdiivka to the south.[41] At least one battalion of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) is reportedly fighting in the Horlivka (Toretsk) direction.[42]

Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka amid continued attacks on June 22. Geolocated footage published on June 21 shows that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) recently seized a windbreak northeast of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a mechanized attack of an unspecified echelon from Novooleksandrivka and reached the southern outskirts of Vozdvyzhenka (immediately northwest of Novooleksandrivka).[44] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are fighting within central Karlivka (southwest of Avdiivka) while other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are only fighting on the outskirts of the settlement and that reports of Russian forces within Karlivka are unconfirmed.[45] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka) and into fields south of the settlement.[46] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces also continued ground attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Yevhenivka, Sokil, Novoselivka Persha, Novopokrovske, and Ocheretyne on June 21 and 22.[47]

 

Russian forces continued ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 22. Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane on June 21 and 22.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within central Krasnohorivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[49]

 

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[50] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[51]

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on June 22 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian rear areas in occupied southern Ukraine. Andryushchenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian base and air defense assets at the Mariupol airport, damaging five unspecified pieces of Russian military equipment, and that Ukrainian officials are still determining possible damages to air defense assets and personnel casualties.[52] Andryushchenko also reported Ukrainian strikes against a Russian training ground near Staryi Krym (northwest of Mariupol) and a Russian base near Nikolske (northwest of Staryi Krym).[53] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these strikes.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces intensified airstrikes and ground attacks near Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast) on June 22, potentially in preparation for renewed offensive efforts on this sector of the front. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Kamyanske on June 22 and also noted that Russian forces launched 36 unguided glide bombs at the settlement before resuming ground attacks.[54] ISW has not observed active Russian ground operations or heavy airstrikes in the area west of Orikhiv in the past month. Heavy Russian glide bomb usage and renewed ground attacks indicate that Russian forces may intend to renew offensive operations in this area in the coming days. Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Robotyne; east of Robotyne near Verbove; northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Novopokrovka; and northwest of Robotyne near Nesteryanka on June 21 and 22.[55] Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasingly counterattacking in the Orikhiv-Mala Tokmacha direction.[56] Elements of the Russian 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[57]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck electrical infrastructure in Russian-occupied western Zaporizhia Oblast, and used the strikes to allege that Ukrainian is trying to threaten the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).[58]

 

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky and on islands in the Dnipro River floodplain, on June 21 and 22.[59] Russian sources claimed that Krynky and the delta islands are widely contested "gray" zones.[60] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[61] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating in multiple parts of the theater. A Ukrainian air reconnaissance soldier stated on June 18 that a battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade recently redeployed to the Vovchansk area.[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against energy and civilian targets in Ukraine on the night of June 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on June 22 that Russian forces launched 10 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast, two Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea, four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, and 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea.[63] Ukrainian forces downed seven Kh-101/555 missiles, four Kalibr missiles, one Iskander-K missile, and all 13 Shahed drones. Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that Russian Kalibr missiles have become less effective since Ukrainian forces have learned how to down them.[64] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that this was the eighth strike of this scale in the past three months and that Russian forces damaged power transmission systems in Zaporizhia and Lviv oblasts.[65] Lviv Oblast Military Administration Head Maksym Kozytskyi stated that Russian missile strikes caused a fire at an energy facility in Lviv Oblast, and Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov confirmed that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in the oblast.[66] Ukraine's State Service for Emergency Situations reported that Russian rockets partially destroyed an educational institution in Prykarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Military Administration Head Svitlana Onyshchuk stated that Russian missiles damaged the Ivano-Frankivsk National Technical University of Oil and Gas, residential buildings, and other civilian infrastructure in the city.[67] This is reportedly the first Russian missile strike against Ivano-Frankivsk City since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.[68] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak stated on June 21 that Russian forces struck a food warehouse in Kryvyi Rih with a missile, reportedly an Iskander-M ballistic missile, and injured two civilians.[69]

Russian forces also conducted devastating glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv City on June 22. Kharkiv Oblast Police Investigative Department Head Serhii Bolvinov stated that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with four D-30 glide bombs with universal joint glide munition (UMPB) modifications and that three of the glide bombs struck a production enterprise.[70] Other Kharkiv Oblast officials reported that at least one of the guided glide bombs struck a residential building, wounding at least 42 people and killing three people.[71]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian law enforcement and security agencies continue working with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to recruit those accused of criminal offenses into the Russian military, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. Kremlin-affiliated business outlet Kommersant reported on June 22 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS), Federal Customs Service (FTS), and Federal Bailiff Service (FSSP) are establishing relations with military registration and enlistment offices in order to offer male defendants ages 18 to 65 military service in exchange for a suspension and termination of criminal prosecution and a subsequent expungement of criminal records.[72] These Russian government agencies are reportedly conducting a monthly review of their interactions with military registration and enlistment offices to resolve emerging problems, likely to streamline efforts to recruit people accused of criminal offensives into the Russian military. Kommersant reported that investigators usually offer an accused individual the option to sign a Russian military service contract in exchange for receiving a legally guaranteed exemption from criminal liability "almost immediately" after the initiation of a criminal case. Kommersant reported that Russian authorities will suspend the case against an individual after the Russian MoD accepts his military service contract and will completely terminate the case against an individual if he receives a state award, is injured or killed in Ukraine, or upon the "completion" of the "Special Military Operation." Kommersant reported that the Russian MoD will restore an accused individual's rank if he previously served in the military. President Vladimir Putin signed a law on March 23, 2024 that releases individuals from criminal liability if they are called up for mobilization or sign military service contracts.[73] ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities are using these measures to coerce people into military service through accusations with increasingly suspect evidence, especially as this procedure notably does not require that Russian authorities formally prosecute the accused.[74]

Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises continue efforts to increase their production output. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on June 22 that Kalashnikov Concern, a subsidiary of the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, is forcing its employees in Izhevsk, Udmurtia Republic to work six days a week in 12-hour shifts, extended from 8-hour shifts, without overtime pay.[75]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces reportedly used an Iranian-made "Arash" loitering munition during a recent strike on Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 22 that Ukrainian forces originally mistook the Arash loitering munition for a cruise missile but discovered that Russian forces had used the loitering munition when studying the debris.[76] The milblogger noted that there has been no confirmation that Russia actually purchased the drones in 2022. ISW cannot independently verify the milblogger's claims. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Ukrainian Resistance Center reported in November 2022 that Russian forces purchased Iranian Arash drones, and Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels previously amplified claims to a similar effect.[77]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian political and military officials largely used the 83rd anniversary of the start of Operation Barbarossa (the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War) to reiterate a number of standard Russian information operations delegitimizing the Ukrainian government, stripping Ukraine of its sovereignty, and falsely accusing the West of endorsing Nazism and trying to rewrite Soviet historical legacies while ignoring Soviet cooperation with Nazi Germany to partition Poland and Eastern Europe in 1939.[78] Several Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials gave speeches condemning the removal of Soviet military monuments in Europe and framed such actions as Western "Russophobia" intended to "re-write" the history of the Second World War.[79] Russian Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Viktor Liina characterized Russia's illegal war in Ukraine as a fight to "restore historical justice."[80] Former (demoted) Russian Security Council Secretary and current Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev authored an essay in Russia's "National Defense" journal on June 22 titled "The Protection of Historical Memory is the Foundation of Russian Statehood" wherein he accused the collective West of waging a centuries-long war against the Russian state and Russian identity, claimed that the US and Europe are trying to erase the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War, and belittled Western support for Ukraine as an "obsessive goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia."[81] The Kremlin's invocation of the mythos of the Soviet Army in the Second World War is a key component of Russia's ideological attempts to justify its illegal war in Ukraine as a warranted existential struggle against the West.[82]

A Russian milblogger amplified a statement on June 22 made by a Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada deputy criticizing Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi. The deputy’s statements support long-standing Kremlin information operations meant to undermine Ukrainian military and civilian leadership.[83]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

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[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038CSwstfhrFfqonZLGethrLEj8FnbYnHCykupNFxzqLvwKnqn7n2RQEf6uBjjxGEal; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024; https://x.com/Deepstate_UA/status/1804273749841039738; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18159

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051424; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024 ; https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05/09/ukraines-defenders-anxiously-dig-in-for-a-looming-russian-assault; https://www.president dot gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-u-harkovi-vidznachiv-derzhavnimi-nagorod-90949; https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3864526-zelensky-awards-soldiers-of-92nd-assault-brigade-in-kharkiv.html

[5] https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05/10/ukraine-will-hold-if-it-gets-the-arms-it-needs-says-a-top-general; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/04/17/kyrylo-budanov-ukraine-general-russia-war-attacks/

[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/21/ukraine-firing-range-us-weapons-russia/; https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-us-weapons-long-range-missiles-7f061044c7b50a1946409eea9e9c399f

[7] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/21/ukraine-firing-range-us-weapons-russia/

[8] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/sullivan-hamas-cease-fire-response-has-both-understandable-and-out-of-step-proposals

[9] https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-us-weapons-long-range-missiles-7f061044c7b50a1946409eea9e9c399f; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/21/ukraine-firing-range-us-weapons-russia/

[10] https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-us-weapons-long-range-missiles-7f061044c7b50a1946409eea9e9c399f

[11] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/21/ukraine-firing-range-us-weapons-russia/; https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-us-weapons-long-range-missiles-7f061044c7b50a1946409eea9e9c399f

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2024

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/21/ukraine-firing-range-us-weapons-russia/

[14] https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-us-weapons-long-range-missiles-7f061044c7b50a1946409eea9e9c399f

[15] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/21/ukraine-firing-range-us-weapons-russia/

[16] https://www.nd dot nl/varia/varia/1229126/nederland-levert-oekraine-samen-met-ander-land-patriot-systeem ; https://nltimes dot nl/2024/06/21/netherlands-teams-another-country-supply-ukraine-patriot-missile-system

[17] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/06/13/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-in-joint-press-conference-fasano-italy/

[18] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/news/2024/06/22/sergei-beseda-pokinul-post-rukovoditelya-pyatoi-sluzhbi-fsb-yego-mesto-zanyal-aleksei-komkov-istochniki-vazhnikh-istorii/index.html

[19] https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/opinions/2022/05/16/kak-putin-prinyal-reshenie-o-voine/index.html; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2024/06/22/7462080/ ; https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/news/2024/06/22/sergei-beseda-pokinul-post-rukovoditelya-pyatoi-sluzhbi-fsb-yego-mesto-zanyal-aleksei-komkov-istochniki-vazhnikh-istorii/index.html

[20] https://archive.ph/GcJrO ; https://www.ft.com/content/136ed721-fd50-4815-8314-d9df8dc67fd6 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/06/22/financial-times-ukraina-cherez-tretih-lits-poluchila-boepripasy-iz-serbii-na-800-millionov-evro

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024

[22] https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1804500837173182745; https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1804506532232511611

[23] https://t.me/astrapress/58076

[24] https://t.me/treugolniklpr/40518 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/45794 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24139 ; https://t.me/zhivoff/15167 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/45798

[25] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3812734/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/ ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/21/ukraine-firing-range-us-weapons-russia/ ; https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-us-weapons-long-range-missiles-7f061044c7b50a1946409eea9e9c399f

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/20649 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/15351 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12039 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127635

[27] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10760

[28] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/11298

[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5873; https://t.me/ab3army/4220

[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wC7j8EoQtYCcgUbaMfcozaXJKBezycuA1rJEkyMXQBzvXgaL7uzsFUmMRYc6mNq7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Dg2vHQttLd49drx7vUBDjKEVysVRfnrr7Eqkzji1mQRsa7evvpx3dHSDKdqouFSMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MMHUt9VJaK1mTiQ2JuL3nT6MaxwiWRSNd11nK4XqNnECMaNwpnwSzDU7KxunnhzTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pr5X5FLvHZJewQMeLFPedcE5DezfjYMnntWmhpyqrUb7uENk12t9eRSTPEnLTrKNl;

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wC7j8EoQtYCcgUbaMfcozaXJKBezycuA1rJEkyMXQBzvXgaL7uzsFUmMRYc6mNq7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Dg2vHQttLd49drx7vUBDjKEVysVRfnrr7Eqkzji1mQRsa7evvpx3dHSDKdqouFSMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MMHUt9VJaK1mTiQ2JuL3nT6MaxwiWRSNd11nK4XqNnECMaNwpnwSzDU7KxunnhzT; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pr5X5FLvHZJewQMeLFPedcE5DezfjYMnntWmhpyqrUb7uENk12t9eRSTPEnLTrKNl

[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12041; https://t.me/rusich_army/15345 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/45784

[34] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/16398; https://t.me/official24ombr/101

[35] https://t.me/rybar/61152; https://t.me/rybar/61165; https://t.me/dva_majors/45764; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12033

[36] https://t.me/motopatriot/24140; https://t.me/motopatriot/24150

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wC7j8EoQtYCcgUbaMfcozaXJKBezycuA1rJEkyMXQBzvXgaL7uzsFUmMRYc6mNq7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MMHUt9VJaK1mTiQ2JuL3nT6MaxwiWRSNd11nK4XqNnECMaNwpnwSzDU7KxunnhzTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pr5X5FLvHZJewQMeLFPedcE5DezfjYMnntWmhpyqrUb7uENk12t9eRSTPEnLTrKNl; https://t.me/rybar/61152;

[38] https://t.me/spainrus/1327; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37053; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70869 (Chasiv Yar)

[39] https://x.com/Deepstate_UA/status/1804273749841039738

[40] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18159; https://t.me/vrogov/16293; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127608; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127577; https://t.me/sashakots/47474; https://t.me/motopatriot/24132; https://t.me/donbass1422/19875; https://t.me/motopatriot/24129; https://t.me/wargonzo/20649; https://t.me/budnisvo/7599 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24127; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18153; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70885; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70857

[41] https://t.me/sashakots/47474

[42] https://t.me/wargonzo/20656

[43] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5871?single; https://t.me/bolshiepushki/8068; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1804526722869522489; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/170305

[44] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18158

[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12049; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57098; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18153

[46] https://t.me/motopatriot/24131

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wC7j8EoQtYCcgUbaMfcozaXJKBezycuA1rJEkyMXQBzvXgaL7uzsFUmMRYc6mNq7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pr5X5FLvHZJewQMeLFPedcE5DezfjYMnntWmhpyqrUb7uENk12t9eRSTPEnLTrKNl

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wC7j8EoQtYCcgUbaMfcozaXJKBezycuA1rJEkyMXQBzvXgaL7uzsFUmMRYc6mNq7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Dg2vHQttLd49drx7vUBDjKEVysVRfnrr7Eqkzji1mQRsa7evvpx3dHSDKdqouFSMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pr5X5FLvHZJewQMeLFPedcE5DezfjYMnntWmhpyqrUb7uENk12t9eRSTPEnLTrKNl

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/20649; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27093; https://t.me/rybar/61165; https://t.me/dva_majors/45764; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18153

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MMHUt9VJaK1mTiQ2JuL3nT6MaxwiWRSNd11nK4XqNnECMaNwpnwSzDU7KxunnhzTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Dg2vHQttLd49drx7vUBDjKEVysVRfnrr7Eqkzji1mQRsa7evvpx3dHSDKdqouFSMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wC7j8EoQtYCcgUbaMfcozaXJKBezycuA1rJEkyMXQBzvXgaL7uzsFUmMRYc6mNq7l

[51] https://t.me/grey_zone/23348

[52] https://t.me/andriyshTime/23582

[53] https://t.me/andriyshTime/23593; https://t.me/andriyshTime/23585; https://t.me/andriyshTime/23582

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wC7j8EoQtYCcgUbaMfcozaXJKBezycuA1rJEkyMXQBzvXgaL7uzsFUmMRYc6mNq7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MMHUt9VJaK1mTiQ2JuL3nT6MaxwiWRSNd11nK4XqNnECMaNwpnwSzDU7KxunnhzTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Dg2vHQttLd49drx7vUBDjKEVysVRfnrr7Eqkzji1mQRsa7evvpx3dHSDKdqouFSMl

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wC7j8EoQtYCcgUbaMfcozaXJKBezycuA1rJEkyMXQBzvXgaL7uzsFUmMRYc6mNq7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MMHUt9VJaK1mTiQ2JuL3nT6MaxwiWRSNd11nK4XqNnECMaNwpnwSzDU7KxunnhzTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Dg2vHQttLd49drx7vUBDjKEVysVRfnrr7Eqkzji1mQRsa7evvpx3dHSDKdqouFSMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pr5X5FLvHZJewQMeLFPedcE5DezfjYMnntWmhpyqrUb7uENk12t9eRSTPEnLTrKNl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02gusHNSXjyP63YXF5KdPapeCgkUNbgX1jwiE9Sm9ueeQ4NriyqKYyKZojmmmCiHEil; https://t.me/wargonzo/20649; https://t.me/rybar/61165; https://t.me/dva_majors/45764

[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12032; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12042 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/45792

[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/45748

[58] https://t.me/tass_agency/256117 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/45750; https://t.me/tass_agency/256121; https://t.me/tass_agency/256193; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/254301; https://t.me/tass_agency/256204 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/256207; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57100; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/3399; https://t.me/vrogov/16292

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Dg2vHQttLd49drx7vUBDjKEVysVRfnrr7Eqkzji1mQRsa7evvpx3dHSDKdqouFSMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MMHUt9VJaK1mTiQ2JuL3nT6MaxwiWRSNd11nK4XqNnECMaNwpnwSzDU7KxunnhzTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pr5X5FLvHZJewQMeLFPedcE5DezfjYMnntWmhpyqrUb7uENk12t9eRSTPEnLTrKNl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02gusHNSXjyP63YXF5KdPapeCgkUNbgX1jwiE9Sm9ueeQ4NriyqKYyKZojmmmCiHEil; https://t.me/dva_majors/45764

[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127606; https://t.me/dva_majors/45801

[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/45801

[62] https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1803094339687514293

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wC7j8EoQtYCcgUbaMfcozaXJKBezycuA1rJEkyMXQBzvXgaL7uzsFUmMRYc6mNq7l ; https://t.me/kpszsu/15703 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/22/syly-oborony-zbyly-25-povitryanyh-czilej/ ; https://t.me/ComAFUA/319; https://t.me/kpszsu/15703

[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/22/vorog-namagayetsya-zrobyty-azov-bazoyu-dlya-udariv-kalibramy/ ; https://www.youtube.com/live/JFvyCBahZ_k?si=YckdHrS2VzLwCHzI

[65] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/2975 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/8596 ; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/14641 https://www.svoboda.org/a/rossiya-atakovala-energosistemu-ukrainy-dvoe-postradavshih/33004733.html

[66] https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/14641 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/8596; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/2975

[67] https://dsns dot gov.ua/news/nadzvicaini-podiyi/ivano-frankivska-oblast-vorog-vdariv-po-navcalnomu-zakladu-stalasia-pozeza ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/22/na-lvivshhyni-ivano-frankivshhyni-ta-volyni-likvidovuyut-naslidky-vorozhyh-udariv/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/29396 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/22/vorog-vpershe-z-pochatku-povnomasshtabky-atakuvav-ivano-frankivsk-raketamy/

[68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/22/vorog-vpershe-z-pochatku-povnomasshtabky-atakuvav-ivano-frankivsk-raketamy/

[69] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/13895 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/21/vorog-poczilyv-raketoyu-po-prodovolchomu-skladu-u-kryvomu-rozi/ ; https://www.ukr dot net/news/details/dnipro/105219215.html; https://unn dot ua/news/udar-po-produktovomu-skladu-v-kryvomu-rozi-zavdaly-balistychnoiu-raketoiu-iskander-m-vilkul

[70] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/774457-tri-rosijskih-umpb-vlucili-v-zavod-u-holodnogirskomu-rajoni-harkova-e-zagiblij-ta-poraneni/

[71] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1483 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/22/u-harkovi-vorog-vluchyv-u-zhytlovyj-budynok-ye-zagybli/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1482 ; https://t.me/synegubov/10033 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/29422

[72] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6788289?

[73] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/20336195 ; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202403230018 ; https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/mekhanizm-osvobozhdeniya-ot-ugolovnogo-nakazaniya-dlya-uchastnikov-svo-utochnili.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2024

[75] https://t.me/astrapress/58113

[76] https://t.me/milinfolive/124544

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8

[78] https://t.me/tass_agency/256181; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/254304; https://t.me/tass_agency/256210; https://t.me/mod_russia/40177; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42344; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42294 ; https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/8285; https://oborona dot ru/product/zhurnal-nacionalnaya-oborona/zashchita-istoricheskoj-pamyati-fundament-rossijskoj-gosudarstvennosti-45910.shtml

[79] https://t.me/MID_Russia/42344; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42294 ; https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/8285

[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/40177

[81] https://oborona dot ru/product/zhurnal-nacionalnaya-oborona/zashchita-istoricheskoj-pamyati-fundament-rossijskoj-gosudarstvennosti-45910.shtml

[82] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011024

[83] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70918