Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and George Barros
June 12, 2024, 7:45pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on June 12. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the June 13 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Ukrainian forces may be
conducting an effort aimed at degrading Russian air defenses, which, if
successful, could enable Ukraine to more effectively leverage manned
fixed-wing airpower in the long run. The Ukrainian General
Staff reported on June 12 that Ukrainian forces targeted one S-300 air
defense battery and two S-400 air defense batteries near occupied Belbek
and Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on June 11 to 12.[1]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes destroyed at
least two S-300/S-400 Russian air defense radar systems and caused
secondary ammunition detonations, and that the Ukrainian military is
clarifying battle damage. Geolocated imagery published on June 12 shows
damaged and destroyed Russian S-300 assets north of occupied Yevpatoria
and a destroyed Russian S-400 radar system south of occupied Dzhankoy,
supporting the Ukrainian General Staff's June 10 report about strikes
against Russian air defense assets in these areas.[2]
Some Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces used ATACMS in
the June 11 to 12 strike, although ISW is unable to confirm which
systems Ukrainian forces used.[3]
Founder of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
"Kraken" Regiment Kostyantyn Nemichev confirmed on June 12 that
Ukrainian forces used HIMARS to destroy four Russian S-300 systems in
Belgorod Oblast on an unspecified date, and Ukrainian outlet Suspilne referred
to Nemichev's statements as the first official Ukrainian confirmation
of strikes against a Russian S-300 battery in Belgorod Oblast on June 1
or 2.[4]
Ukrainian forces’ destruction of the Russian air defense systems in
Belgorod Oblast reportedly prompted the Russian command to deploy air
defense assets from Crimea to Belgorod Oblast in early June 2024,
reportedly degrading Russian air defense coverage around Crimea.[5]
GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov also clarified on June 12 that Ukrainian
drone strikes against the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast
between June 7 and 8 damaged two Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft instead
of just one aircraft as previously reported.[6]
S-300/S-400 air defense systems and Su-57 fighters are significant
Russian air defense and aviation assets that deny Ukraine the ability to
fly aircraft near the front and support Russian offensive operations in
Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces may seek to actively degrade Russian air defenses before
Ukraine receives a significant number of aircraft in order to set
conditions for Ukraine’s future use of manned fixed-wing airpower closer
to frontline areas. Ukrainian forces may be attempting to degrade
Russian air defenses ahead of anticipated F-16 fighter jet deliveries to
Ukraine, which reportedly will begin in small quantities in summer and
fall 2024. Ukrainian forces may be able to eventually work towards a
concept of operations that combines fixed-wing airpower to support
ground operations if the Ukrainian military receives a sufficient number
of fighter jets, Western partners train enough trained pilots, and if
Ukraine succeeds in degrading Russian air defense capabilities.
Western
officials have indicated that Ukraine will continue to face material
and training constraints, which will likely prevent Ukraine from
leveraging fixed-wing airpower at scale in 2024. Ukrainian and Western
officials have previously indicated that it will take significant time
to adequately train enough Ukrainian pilots and equip Ukrainian forces
with the roughly at least 150 F-16s necessary to gain the air
superiority necessary to support ground operations.[7]
Ukrainian officials have also identified their envisioned use of F-16s
and other fixed-wing aircraft to constrain Russian aviation operations,
and Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash noted that only two
F-16 squadrons, roughly 18 aircraft, would be enough to significantly
impact the situation in the Ukrainian airspace.[8]
These restraints should not fundamentally constrain Ukraine’s ability
to leverage airpower at scale in the long run, however, should Ukraine’s
Western partners lean into supporting Ukraine’s air domain and deep
strike capabilities.
Russian Northern Fleet naval vessels arrived at Havana Harbor, Cuba, on June 12 for their planned five-day-long port call. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Northern Fleet detachment — including the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, Kazan nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, the Academic Pashin replenishment oiler, and the Nikolai Chiker rescue tug — arrived in Havana after the Kazan and Admiral Gorshkov completed planned high-precision missile exercises.[9] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the Admiral Gorshkov will be open for public viewing until June 15, and the port call will end on June 17.[10]
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also notably met with Cuban
Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla in Moscow on June 12 against
the backdrop of the port call to discuss Russian-Cuban relations and
foreign policy alignment.[11]
ISW previously assessed that the Russian port call in Havana is likely
part of a larger Russian effort to invoke the historical memory of the
Cuban Missile Crisis to encourage US self-deterrence.[12] The presence of the nuclear-capable Kazan submarine
so close to US territorial waters in a port that holds fraught
historical memory for the US is likely specifically intended to instill
fear in the US and the West in order to force self-deterrence and weaken
the West's resistance to Russia. Both US and Cuban officials have
emphasized that this port call does not pose a tangible threat to the
US.[13]
Armenian
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia "will leave" and
"will decide when to leave" the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) in a question-and-answer session with the Armenian
National Assembly on June 12 amid Armenia's continued efforts to
distance itself from security and political relations with Russia.[14] Armenian
Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan clarified that Pashinyan did not state
that Armenia is leaving the CSTO but that Armenia "will decide when
[Armenia] will leave the CSTO, and [Armenia] will not go back."[15] Western and Russian media outlets largely portrayed Pashinyan's statement as confirmation that Armenia will leave the CSTO.[16]
Pashinyan also reiterated at the National Assembly's
question-and-answer session that the CSTO failed to fulfill its
obligations to Armenia and that CSTO member states "are planning" a war
against Armenia with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan indirectly accused Russia and
directly accused Belarus in May 2024 of helping Azerbaijan to prepare
for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.[17]
Pashinyan acknowledged in February 2024 that Armenia had "essentially"
frozen its participation in the CSTO because the CSTO "failed to fulfill
its obligations in the field of security" to Armenia, particularly in
2021 and 2022.[18]
Armenia has also appeared to be attempting to reduce its bilateral
security relations with Russia, and Pashinyan stated in March 2024 that
Russian border guards will leave the Yerevan International Airport by
August 1, 2024.[19]
Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO would largely formalize a de facto
status quo given that that Armenia has effectively abstained from
participation in the CSTO since Pashinyan and Armenian representatives
failed to attend several consecutive CSTO events starting mid-to-late
2023.[20]
Armenia's formal withdrawal from the CSTO would be a more significant
blow to Russia, as Russia has leveraged the CSTO to undermine former
Soviet states’ sovereignty and project power across the former Soviet Union.[21]
Georgian opposition-leaning outlet Mtavari reported that the Georgian government is planning to resume diplomatic relations with Russia. There has been no official confirmation of Mtavari’s report as of this publication. Mtavari reported
on June 11 that unspecified sources stated that the ruling Georgian
Dream party is preparing to restore diplomatic relations with Russia and
that the Georgian and Russian governments are currently selecting
employees for the Georgian embassy in Moscow.[22] Mtavari stated
that the Georgian Dream party denied this information and called it
"groundless." The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also claimed
to Kremlin newswire TASS on June 12 that Georgian opposition sources are spreading false information about the matter.[23]
ISW continues to assess that Georgian Dream actors likely intend to
purposefully derail long-term Georgian efforts for Euro-Atlantic
integration, which plays into continued Russian hybrid operations to
divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[24]
Key Takeaways:
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian State Border Guard
Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on June 12 that the number
of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups operating in the Sumy
direction has decreased and that there is now "almost no" activity from
these groups in Sumy Oblast.[25]
Other Ukrainian officials recently denied that Russian forces seized
any territory in Sumy Oblast following Russian claims of a limited
cross-border raid into Ryzhivka, Sumy Oblast, on June 10.[26]
ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming Russian activity or
gains in Ryzhivka since June 10 and assesses that Russian forces failed
to establish an enduring presence in the settlement.
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced in Vovchansk amid continued
offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 12.
Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows that a small Russian
infantry group supported by an armored vehicle marginally advanced south
of Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky Street in northeastern Vovchansk.[27]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured another
building in northeastern Vovchansk in the Aggregate Plant area,
advancing 200 meters deep within the city, and that Russian forces also
advanced east of Vovchansk.[28]
A milblogger claimed that Russian forces lost several infantry fighting
vehicles and MT-LB amphibious armored fighting vehicles while
attempting to enter the Aggregate Plant grounds.[29]
Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Tykhe (east of
Vovchansk), Lyptsi, and Hlyboke (both north of Kharkiv City) on June 11
and 12.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks near Hlyboke.[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces continued limited offensive operations along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 12 but did not make any confirmed
advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 11 and 12 that
Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks northeast of Kupyansk near
Synkivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane;
northwest of Svatove near Berestove and Myasozharivka; northwest of
Kreminna near Druzhelyubivka, Hrekivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna
near Torske; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area.[32]
Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank
Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near
Kupyansk.[33]
Ukrainian
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar
Voloshyn noted on June 12 that the disincorporated settlement of
Tymkivka (east of Kupyansk), which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
claimed Russian forces captured on June 11, has not existed since
Soviet times and emphasized that Ukrainian forces still control the area
that used to be Tymkivka.[34]
Voloshyn suggested that the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces
captured Tymkivka for purely informational effect because the Russian
military command is counting on the fact that the average Russian does
not know where Tymkivka is on a map, much less that it does not exist as
a populated area.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued
Russian offensive operations in the area on June 12. Geolocated footage
published on June 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
southeast of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[35]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced to
the eastern outskirts of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), but ISW has
not observed confirmation of this claim.[36]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated
that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Bilohorivka (northeast of
Siversk) and are trying to push towards Siversk from two directions.[37] Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Siversk near Rozdolivka and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on June 12.[38]
Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV
Division) are reportedly operating near Rozdolivka and Vasyukivka (both
south of Siversk).[39]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 12, but
there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian
forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; east of
Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka
and Andriivka on June 11 and 12.[40]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully
counterattacked near the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[41]
Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are trying to seize Chasiv Yar,
Klishchiivka, and Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and that fighting
continues in these areas.[42]
The United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on June 12
that Russian forces have likely made a limited "break-in” in eastern
Chasiv Yar, likely referring to recent confirmed Russian advances in an
industrial area of the Kanal Microraion.[43]
The UK MoD stated that Russian forces likely remain on the east side of
the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal and have not yet traversed the water
feature, as ISW previously assessed.[44]
The UK MoD stated that Russian forces are clearing the eastern suburb
of Chasiv Yar with dismounted infantry and suffering high casualties.[45]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements
of the Russian 98th VDV Division are operating within the Kanal
Microraion.[46]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment
(150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern
Military District [SMD]), 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps
[AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 6th Motorized Rifle
Division (3rd AC) began assault operations southward along the Siversky
Donets-Donbas canal from the Ivanivske area as well as near
Klishchiivka. Elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st
Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Chasiv
Yar.[47]
Russian
forces recently advanced near Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive
operations in the area on June 12. Geolocated footage published on June
12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within Nevelske
(southwest of Avdiivka).[48]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces
out of Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka), with one Russian source
claiming that Russian forces advanced up to 1.54 kilometers wide and
1.05 kilometers deep within and north of Novopokrovske and up to 2.5
kilometers wide and up to 500 meters deep north and east of
Novopokrovske.[49]
Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces control more than
70 percent of Novopokrovske but that part of the settlement is a
contested "gray zone."[50]
One Russian source claimed that Russian forces only entered
Novopokrovske and that fighting is ongoing in the center of the
settlement.[51]
Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced along the
pond north of Sokil (nothwest of Avdiivka) and 700 meters deep east of
Sokil.[52]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out
of the heights south of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and
seized the dam northwest of the settlement.[53]
Another Russian milblogger, however, claimed that information that
Russian forces advanced to the dam northwest of Novooleksandrivka is
unclear.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka
near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Novopokrovske, Novoselivka
Persha, and Sokil and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on June 11
and 12.[55]
Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are concentrating their efforts in
the Pokrovsk (Avdiivka) and Kurakhove (west and southwest of Donetsk
City) directions, where Russian forces have concentrated the largest
number of assault units from eight “shock” brigades.[56]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 137th, 74th, and 55th
motorized rifle brigades (all of the 41st CAA, CMD), the 15th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), and 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR
AC), reinforced with unspecified regiments and battalions from the
territorial troops and the mobilization reserve, are operating northwest
of Avdiivka.[57]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk
City on June 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in
the area. Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk
City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City
near Paraskoviivka on June 11 and 12.[58]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central
Krasnohorivka and north of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Donetsk City),
but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[59]
Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are
reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of
Donetsk City), and elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR
AC) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[60]
Russian
force continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblast border
area on June 12 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have finished clearing
operations in Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Fighting continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske on June 11 and 12.[62]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Geolocated
footage published on June 11 shows that Russian forces made a marginal
gain in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but that Ukrainian forces regained
some positions after conducting a counterattack.[63]
The footage shows Russian forces advanced along a windbreak north of
Myrne (northeast of Robotyne), after which Ukrainian forces
counterattacked and regained some limited tactical positions along the
windbreak. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east
of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 11 and
12.[64]
Elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined
Arms Army, Southern Military District) reportedly continue operating in
the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[65]
Limited
positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on
June 11 and 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[66]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against
Ukraine on the night of June 11 to 12. Ukrainian military sources
reported that Russian forces launched four Kh-101/555 cruise missiles
from Saratov Oblast; one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied
Crimea; one Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile from Tambov Oblast; and
24 Shahed 136/131 drones from Yeysk and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar
Krai.[67] Ukrainian air defense shot down all missiles and drones with the exception of the Iskander-M.[68]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on June 12
reportedly of a Russian Iskander-M strike on a Ukrainian airfield in
Poltava Oblast.[69]
The Kyiv City and Oblast administrations noted that Ukrainian air
defense activated over Kyiv City in response to the cruise missile
launches, and Ukrainian sources later reported a fire in a residential
area due to falling debris from the strike.[70]
Russian
forces additionally conducted a ballistic missile strike against Kryvyi
Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, during the day on June 12. Ukrainian
sources reported that the strike damaged administrative and residential
infrastructure, killing and wounding civilians.[71]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian defense company officials
in a list of recent recipients of labor awards during a "Russia Day"
speech on June 11, indicating Putin's continued emphasis on
strengthening the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).[72]
Putin gave "Hero of Labor" awards to the General Director of Russian
shipbuilding corporation Sevmash, Mikhail Budnichenko, and the Chief
Designer of Russian aerospace company Raduga, Yeltugan Syzdykov, in May
2024.[73]
Putin specifically claimed that Sevmash's production of nuclear missile
carriers strengthens Russia's nuclear triad and that Raduga's advanced
missile designs strengthen Russia's defense capabilities.
Russian
forces reportedly continue to suffer from poor-quality supplies and
uniforms. Former Russian Airborne (VDV) Commander and State Duma Deputy
Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov compared the Russian military to a
"partisan squad" due to its poor quality of uniforms and the fact that
military personnel must spend their own money on better-quality uniforms
and supplies on June 11.[74]
A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger agreed with Shamanov and claimed that
some Russian commanders are not interested in solving the problems of
their subordinates.[75]
Russian milbloggers have often lamented the poor quality and limited
amount of supplies on the frontline and have advocated for the
government transfer of seized civilian vehicles, firearms, and boats to
Russian forces.[76]
Sri
Lankan Foreign Minister Tharaka Balasuriya stated that Russia and Sri
Lanka agreed that Russia would stop recruiting Sri Lankan citizens into
the Russian military after a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov on June 11.[77] France24 reported that Sri Lankan defense officials told Agence France-Presse (AFP) that 22 Sri Lankan citizens who joined the Russian military escaped and returned to Sri Lanka.[78] Sri Lankan Defense Ministry Spokesperson Nalin Herath told AFP that Russia has "duped" many Sri Lankans into serving in the Russian military, and France24 interviewed a Sri Lankan citizen whom the Russian military impressed after they arrived in Russia for a promised driving job.[79]
ISW has recently observed reports that the Russian military is
increasingly using recruits from Serbia, Cuba, and African countries in
combat operations in Ukraine.[80]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated
his call for Russia to seize the entirety of Ukraine in celebration of
Russia Day on June 12. Medvedev published an animated map on his
Russian-language Telegram account that claims the entirety of Ukraine as
Russian rather than just the current parts of Ukraine that Russia
illegally occupies, or the regions of Ukraine that Putin illegally
declared as annexed in September 2022.[81]
Medvedev has periodically explicitly and implicitly called for Russia
to completely eliminate Ukrainian statehood by seizing the entirety of
Ukraine.[82]
Medvedev has frequently made statements that are more extreme than the
Kremlin's current rhetorical lines but which set conditions for the
Kremlin to later publicly adopt similarly-extreme views.[83]
Medvedev's choice to publish this expansionist map on his
Russian-language Telegram account suggests that he intended to posture
to a domestic Russian audience to garner support for the war effort.
Russian
authorities denied any wrongdoing of a Danish-Russian dual citizen
accused of having connections to Russian intelligence.[84]
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova
claimed on June 12 that Danish authorities have not presented any
evidence of the accused woman's guilt and accused Danish intelligence
services of attacking Russia.[85] The Danish Broadcasting Corporation
(DR) notably published an investigation on June 11 that used leaked
documents that connect the accused woman to Russian Foreign Intelligence
Service (SVR) officers and Russia's ongoing attempts to use its
narrative of protecting Russian-speaking "compatriots abroad" through
soft power centers.[86]
Russian authorities will likely continue to use this arrest and any
future arrests to continue this narrative of so-called "compatriots"
facing persecution from NATO member states. A prominent,
Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger amplified a call on June 11 for
Russian authorities to investigate organizations connected to
"compatriots abroad," claiming that most so-called "compatriots,"
particularly in Australia, do not "broadcast their position to the
outside world" because they "do not care about the fate of their own
people" and are "useless."[87]
Kremlin outreach to its "compatriots abroad" and attempts to expand the
Russian sphere of influence are a critical component of the Kremlin's
hybrid toolkit against the West.
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kr7PLiyJWiaKCuckRoE4ZS7vV1orfttJtjDS1WV1S2J9Fef5tFfGrkouLj7YWNDvl
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2024; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jJtNBtyPniJ3YUV7cT8SbTDXArs8YPsVJvdxpX51C1kT1L7J84TSuS9hkMFcFGYhl; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8622; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1800833774571434131; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8618; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1800832760237654307
[3] https://t.me/grey_zone/23298; https://t.me/infomil_live/7195
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024;
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1797569964288667850;
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1797571490252304780;
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1797602162614403477;
https://t.me/lost_warinua/78921; https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/539 ;
https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1797572867791413687 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1797571849934753994;
https://suspilne dot
media/kharkiv/767083-artsistemami-hinars-znisili-ustanovki-s-300-akimi-rosiani-bili-po-harkovu-zasnovnik-specpidrozdilu-kraken/
; https://t.me/natsionalKharkiv/6358;
[5] https://t.me/atesh_ua/4820
[6]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/06/12/gur-diznalosya-stupin-poshkodzhennya-dvoh-rosijskyh-su-57/;
https://gur dot gov.ua/content/vpershe-urazheno-su-57.html;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024l https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/13/u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-skilky-litakiv-potribno-ukrayini/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024;
ttps://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240518-zelensky-expects-russia-intensify-offensive-northeast-ukraine-vladimir-putin-air-defence-kharkiv
; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1088753818869820 ;
https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelensky-warns-russia-could-step-002340061.html
; https://suspilne dot
media/748745-si-zapevnav-so-kitaj-pidtrimue-teritorialnu-cilisnist-ukraini-zelenskij/
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/05/18/spochatku-treba-stabilizuvaty-front-prezydent-pro-perspektyvy-dlya-kontrnastupu/l
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024; https://www.politico.com/news/2024/06/05/ukraine-f-16-pilot-training-00161742
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024;
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/04/13/u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-skilky-litakiv-potribno-ukrayini/;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024
[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/39684; https://t.me/tass_agency/254281 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47263
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024; https://t.me/mod_russia/39684
[11] https://t.me/MID_Russia/41682; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41693; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41707
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024
[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-warships-enter-havana-harbor-under-washingtons-watchful-eye-2024-06-12/
[14] https://armenpress dot am/hy/article/1193465 ; https://armenpress dot am/ru/article/1193465
[15] https://www.mfa dot am/hy/press-releases/2024/06/12/am_na/12693
[16]
https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-ends-military-alliance-with-russia-pm-nikol-pashinyan-confirms/;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/12/armenia-russia-csto-security-alliance/4227a3c6-28c7-11ef-835a-2a6acac1f8a6_story.html;
https://www.euronews.com/2024/06/12/armenia-to-leave-russian-led-collective-security-treaty-organisation;
https://www.newsweek.com/armenia-csto-nato-putin-1911862 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/254280; https://t.me/tass_agency/254283
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052224
[18]
https://www.primeminister dot
am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2024/02/23/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-France-24/
; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32832284.html ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2024
[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2024
[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112423
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putins-%E2%80%9Cpeacekeepers%E2%80%9D-will-support-russian-wars;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-unprecedentedly-expansive-military-exercises-fall-2020-seek-recreate-soviet
[22] https://mtavari dot tv/en/about ; https://mtavari dot tv/news/158708-otsneba-moskovshi-saelchos-gasakhsnelad-emzadeba ; https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2024/06/12/broadcaster-reports-georgia-actively-working-to-restore-diplomatic-ties-with-russia-en-news
[23] https://tass dot ru/politika/21077493
[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051624
[25] https://t.me/UkraineMediaCenterKyiv/9442
[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2024
[27] https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1800860450881708191; https://t.me/ua_dshv/2874
[28] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70139 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44941; https://t.me/motopatriot/23858;
[29] https://t.me/motopatriot/23876
[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sdV9dyAcLiX3khjgoHMtLKqc8ryJ6oM4sxKbsPDAwGH66yHqGPgD6Kx6TM1YvmSSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kB1qCdKFRpV3rqsxfeKFFDvtEaZC11LigXxC9ShBFDWZWPaQp2FRiq4CgBVAXnqtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3c7g2NrLPRBDuD3yDojABS5Lnz3rHeZawurwtXTT1fcSJ1wbgHU21LEhNQ77j1vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssMdHhH3qMgx4SxLRuenjF5eovbLqvJoQrbGfRAPMjgF8YxtuyBCeiFoVF6wFnZ3l
[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/20441; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11727
[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sdV9dyAcLiX3khjgoHMtLKqc8ryJ6oM4sxKbsPDAwGH66yHqGPgD6Kx6TM1YvmSSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kB1qCdKFRpV3rqsxfeKFFDvtEaZC11LigXxC9ShBFDWZWPaQp2FRiq4CgBVAXnqtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3c7g2NrLPRBDuD3yDojABS5Lnz3rHeZawurwtXTT1fcSJ1wbgHU21LEhNQ77j1vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssMdHhH3qMgx4SxLRuenjF5eovbLqvJoQrbGfRAPMjgF8YxtuyBCeiFoVF6wFnZ3l
[33] https://t.me/milinfolive/123893
[34] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/766849-ce-ak-nimci-zahopili-b-prostokvasino-rosia-zaavlae-pro-zahoplenna-na-harkivsini-sela-akogo-ne-isnue/
[35] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/475; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5799
[36] https://t.me/motopatriot/23850
[37] https://t.me/osirskiy/719
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kB1qCdKFRpV3rqsxfeKFFDvtEaZC11LigXxC9ShBFDWZWPaQp2FRiq4CgBVAXnqtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3c7g2NrLPRBDuD3yDojABS5Lnz3rHeZawurwtXTT1fcSJ1wbgHU21LEhNQ77j1vl
[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70181
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssMdHhH3qMgx4SxLRuenjF5eovbLqvJoQrbGfRAPMjgF8YxtuyBCeiFoVF6wFnZ3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kB1qCdKFRpV3rqsxfeKFFDvtEaZC11LigXxC9ShBFDWZWPaQp2FRiq4CgBVAXnqtl; https://t.me/wargonzo/20441
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11731
[42] https://t.me/osirskiy/719
[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024; https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1800808551331266700
[44] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1800808551331266700 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2024
[45] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1800808551331266700
[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1945
[47] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12138; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70159
[48] https://x.com/Playfra0/status/1800930753284612189; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/475
[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70146; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27037
[50] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18062; https://t.me/motopatriot/23859
[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11734
[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70146; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18058; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11734
[53] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18059 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126643
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot/23871
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sdV9dyAcLiX3khjgoHMtLKqc8ryJ6oM4sxKbsPDAwGH66yHqGPgD6Kx6TM1YvmSSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kB1qCdKFRpV3rqsxfeKFFDvtEaZC11LigXxC9ShBFDWZWPaQp2FRiq4CgBVAXnqtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3c7g2NrLPRBDuD3yDojABS5Lnz3rHeZawurwtXTT1fcSJ1wbgHU21LEhNQ77j1vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssMdHhH3qMgx4SxLRuenjF5eovbLqvJoQrbGfRAPMjgF8YxtuyBCeiFoVF6wFnZ3l ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18057; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18058; ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20441
[56] https://t.me/osirskiy/719
[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1944
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3c7g2NrLPRBDuD3yDojABS5Lnz3rHeZawurwtXTT1fcSJ1wbgHU21LEhNQ77j1vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssMdHhH3qMgx4SxLRuenjF5eovbLqvJoQrbGfRAPMjgF8YxtuyBCeiFoVF6wFnZ3l; https://t.me/wargonzo/20441
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11723; https://t.me/wargonzo/20441; https://t.me/voin_dv/9080
[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126636; https://t.me/astrahandm/12153; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10664
[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/9080
[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kB1qCdKFRpV3rqsxfeKFFDvtEaZC11LigXxC9ShBFDWZWPaQp2FRiq4CgBVAXnqtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssMdHhH3qMgx4SxLRuenjF5eovbLqvJoQrbGfRAPMjgF8YxtuyBCeiFoVF6wFnZ3l ; https://t.me/voin_dv/9080 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11736
[63] https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/3260; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15964
[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3c7g2NrLPRBDuD3yDojABS5Lnz3rHeZawurwtXTT1fcSJ1wbgHU21LEhNQ77j1vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssMdHhH3qMgx4SxLRuenjF5eovbLqvJoQrbGfRAPMjgF8YxtuyBCeiFoVF6wFnZ3l; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9917; https://t.me/osirskiy/719; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/476; https://t.me/wargonzo/20441
[65] https://t.me/rogozin_do/5903
[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sdV9dyAcLiX3khjgoHMtLKqc8ryJ6oM4sxKbsPDAwGH66yHqGPgD6Kx6TM1YvmSSl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9917; https://t.me/osirskiy/719; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/476
[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3c7g2NrLPRBDuD3yDojABS5Lnz3rHeZawurwtXTT1fcSJ1wbgHU21LEhNQ77j1vl ; https://t.me/ComAFUA/311
[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0K3c7g2NrLPRBDuD3yDojABS5Lnz3rHeZawurwtXTT1fcSJ1wbgHU21LEhNQ77j1vl ; https://t.me/ComAFUA/311
[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/39679
[70] https://www.facebook.com/RuslanKravchenkoKyiv/posts/pfbid02P7cESmTf7TQW1cDgaQcv8mYgRe7MLttTqmGHeXnscY1L1dK2595riDGQDmcWKrkKl ; https://armyinform
dot
com.ua/2024/06/12/na-kyyivshhyny-dosi-likvidovuyut-pozhezhu-na-promyslovomu-obyekti-cherez-ataku-rf-zalucheno-67-odynycz-tehniky/
[71] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9929; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/13635 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/12/kryvyj-rig-piddavsya-raketnij-ataczi-ye-postrazhdali-ta-rujnuvannya/; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/965; https://www.severreal dot org/a/rossiya-udarila-po-krivomu-rogu-est-pogibshie-desyatki-postradavshih/32990025.html;
https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/24342; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/10719
[72] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74260
[73] http://static.kremlin dot ru/media/events/files/ru/o6KfmA2LEajnC3ZPpTAZrOFAx6xmoXnV.pdf
[74] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/11/06/2024/66685eda9a794738f15ad509
[75] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56874
[76] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2024
[77] https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20240611-the-duped-sri-lankans-fighting-in-russia-s-ukraine-war
[78] https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20240611-the-duped-sri-lankans-fighting-in-russia-s-ukraine-war
[79] https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20240611-the-duped-sri-lankans-fighting-in-russia-s-ukraine-war
[80] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024
[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/254230; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/504
[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024;
[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024;
[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2024;
https://www.dr dot
dk/nyheder/indland/moerklagt/kvinde-anholdt-hjaelpe-russisk-efterretningstjeneste-i-danmark;
https://www.dr dot
dk/nyheder/indland/moerklagt/dokumenter-afsloerer-aarelang-pengestroem-fra-russisk-spionfond-til
[85] https://t.me/tass_agency/254249; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41672
[86]
https://www.dr dot
dk/nyheder/indland/moerklagt/dokumenter-afsloerer-aarelang-pengestroem-fra-russisk-spionfond-til;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9Choly-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2024;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024
[87] https://t.me/rybar/60852; https://t.me/AussieCossack/18250
