Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Amin Soltani, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 9, 2023, 6:55pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 9. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the November 10 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The Russian military command
will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to
respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while
conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and
sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine. Russian
milbloggers claimed on November 9 that Ukrainian forces established
control over new positions in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and
2km from the Dnipro River) and conducted assaults towards Russian
positions south and southwest of the settlement.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are reports that Ukrainian forces advanced to forest areas south of Krynky.[2]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked near
Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River),
Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River),
and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River)
and are trying to establish positions between Pidstepne and Kozachi
Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[3]
Ukrainian military observer Konstyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian
forces have established continuous control of positions from the
Antonivsky railway bridge north of Poyma to the Antonivsky roadway
bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson and 4km from the Dnipro
River) as of November 9 and have cut the Oleshky-Nova Kakhovka (53km
northeast of Kherson City) road in at least two areas.[4]
Elements
of the Russian 18th Combined Arms Army’s (CAA) 22nd Army Corps
(formerly of the Black Sea Fleet) and 70th Motorized Rifle Division as
well as the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) appear to
be the main Russian forces responding to Ukrainian ground operations on
the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[5]
The Russian military reportedly formed the 18th CAA from other units
previously operating in the Kherson direction, and it is unlikely that
new units of the 18th CAA are comprised of fresh forces or staffed to
doctrinal end strength.[6]
Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment previously defended
positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast for almost the entirety of the
Ukrainian counteroffensive and have likely suffered significant
casualties.[7]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on November 5 that
unspecified elements of the 7th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division are
operating in the Kherson direction, although the bulk of the 7th VDV
Division appears to be committed to defensive operations in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.[8]
Mashovets claimed on November 2 and 9 that elements of the 7th VDV
Division's 171st Air Assault Battalion (97th VDV Regiment) are operating
near Pishchanivka and Poyma, but it is unclear if these reported
elements have been present in the Kherson direction since the start of
the counteroffensive or recently redeployed to the area.[9]
Elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) have reportedly
been operating in the Kherson direction since the Ukrainian liberation
of Kherson City in November 2022, but some Russian and Ukrainian sources
claim that the Russian command has since redeployed elements of at
least one its brigades to the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area.[10]
Mashovets claimed that elements of the 49th CAA still comprise the
Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces in the Kherson direction, and
elements of the 49th CAA’s 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade appeared to be
operating on the left bank as of late August 2023.[11]
The Russian command will likely face significant challenges in redeploying units from other sectors of the front should relatively combat ineffective Russian formations and currently uncommitted Russian forces in the Kherson direction prove insufficient to respond to the Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Dnipro. Redeployments of considerable elements of the 7th VDV Division or other VDV formations and units in western Zaporizhia Oblast would likely disrupt Russian defensive operations there. Russian forces reportedly continue to accumulate forces for sustaining the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka and localized offensive operations in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts.[12] Any potential Russian redeployment to the Kherson direction will likely degrade the Russian ability to sustain these other operations and efforts.
Russian
forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive
operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near
Bakhmut in recent days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported
that Russian forces conducted nearly 30 attacks northwest and southwest
of Bakhmut between November 8 and November 9, which is notably a higher
number of attacks than the Ukrainian General Staff typically reports for
the Bakhmut area.[13]
Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces entered
Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and pushed Ukrainian troops back
from the railway that runs northeast and east of the settlement.[14]
Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Russian
forces have advanced towards Klishchiivka and hold positions just east
of the settlement and west of the railway line.[15]
Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also drove Ukrainian
forces out of positions in and around Andriivka (10km southwest of
Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual evidence to substantiate these
claims.[16]
Several Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces
advanced northwest of Bakhmut in the Berkhivka-Bohdanivka direction
(directly northwest of Bakhmut to 5km northwest of Bakhmut) south of the
Berkhivka Reservoir towards the Vilyanova plant nursery.[17]
Geolocated footage from around November 7 shows that Russian forces
have advanced south of the Berkhivka Reservoir, about 3km northwest of
Bakhmut.[18]
These localized offensive operations northwest and southwest of Bakhmut are likely opportunistic tactical ground attacks intended to take advantage of the reported reallocation of Ukrainian resources away from Bakhmut. Several milbloggers noted that the pace of Ukrainian artillery fire and ground activity in the Bakhmut direction has decreased in recent days, with some Russian sources remarking that this is partially because Ukrainian forces have redeployed to other areas of the front.[19] Russian forces are likely taking advantage of a decrease in Ukrainian activity on this sector of the front to launch localized and successful attacks. Russian forces are unlikely to be able to translate offensive efforts near Bakhmut into wider and more meaningful offensive operations, as the Russian force grouping around Bakhmut is weak and disorganized because Russian forces have been committing more manpower and materiel to deliberate and larger-scale offensive operations near Avdiivka and on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.
Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8. Ukraine's
Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian Kh-31P missile
struck a civilian ship flying the flag of Liberia in a port near Odesa
City, Odesa Oblast, injuring several people and killing the ship’s
pilot.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 8 and 9 in an attempt to justify the strike that the ship was carrying military cargo.[21]
Russia has continually pursued efforts to disrupt Ukrainian exports and
curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports and will likely continue
escalatory posturing in the Black Sea meant to undermine confidence in
the Ukrainian corridor.[22]
Kremlin
Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir
Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will
occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year,
potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees
fit.[23] The Kremlin canceled Putin's annual press conference
in December 2022, which ISW assessed was likely in order to preempt the
informational risks of Putin addressing difficult questions about the
war and international situation live.[24] Similarly, in early June of 2023, Putin postponed the "Direct Line" until November or December 2023.[25]
The vagueness with which Peskov announced the two live events suggests
that the Kremlin may desire to have the flexibility to cancel them if
they deem the informational risks of holding them to be too great. The
Kremlin may hope for a wider operational victory in Ukraine to frame
both the "Direct Line" and the press conference in a positive light and
is likely trying to leave itself room to mitigate if Russian forces
cannot secure meaningful battlefield success in Ukraine in the coming
month.
Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan.
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during a meeting with
Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the 19th Russian-Kazakh
Regional Cooperation Forum in Ankara that Russia currently transports
gas to Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan and seeks to further develop this
transport.[26]
Russia began exporting natural gas to Uzbekistan for the first time in
October 2023, and Uzbekistan notably still exports its own domestically
produced natural gas, including to Russia as recently as 2021, despite
suffering domestic shortages in recent years.[27]
Uzbekistan‘s continued export of gas while importing Russian gas for
the first time suggests that Uzbekistan may not be the final destination
for all its Russian gas imports. Uzbekistan is capable of providing
Iran with direct access to other Central Asian as well as Russian and
Chinese markets, as ISW-CTP previously reported.[28]
Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and
President Ebrahim Raisi, discussed reviving Iranian-Uzbek economic
relations and signed agreements to increase bilateral trade with Uzbek
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Tehran on June 18, 2023.[29]
Iran has also increased its economic diplomacy efforts, including on
gas supplies, with other countries in Central Asia. Raisi discussed
increasing the volume of gas swaps with Turkmenistan during a meeting
with Turkmenistan People’s Council Chairman Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov
in Tehran on May 30.[30]
Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji separately announced on May 30 that
Iran and Turkmenistan will soon sign an agreement for Iran to import 10
million cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan each day, which
will allow Iran to use some of the gas it imports from Turkmenistan to
supply electricity and heat to its northern provinces.[31]
Iran has consistently struggled with natural gas shortages in winter
and summer 2023, and Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to secure further military cooperation with
Iran.[32]
Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children. A
Russian insider source claimed that Moscow authorities are
investigating and charging members of the inner circle of an unspecified
nephew of Kadyrov for various crimes including kidnapping, extortion,
and organizing a criminal community in both Moscow and Chechnya.[33]
The insider source claimed that two high-ranking Chechen security
officials lead this inner circle, and that its other members include
Chechen police officers and bureaucratic officials.[34]
The source claimed that Russian authorities allowed this circle to
commit these crimes for “quite a long time” but that “apparently,
something is starting to change.”[35]
It is possible that Russian authorities are targeting Chechen organized
crime activities. This insider source’s specific reference to Kadyrov,
however, suggests either that some Russian authorities may seek to
target Kadyrov’s affiliates through criminal charges or that some actors
may seek to target Kadyrov informationally by using this insider source
to discredit him and his family. Kadyrov has notably awarded his
children, many of whom are underage, with prominent Chechen governmental
positions and awards in recent weeks following the Kremlin’s refusal to
become involved when his 15-year-old son Adam was filmed beating a
detained man in September 2023, sparking domestic outrage.[36]
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.
- Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days.
- Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8.
- Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.
- Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan.
- Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka direction, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk.
- Russian authorities appear to be increasingly reliant on private security companies to protect domestic energy infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian far rear areas.
- Occupation authorities reportedly continued efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture
the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv
Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 9 and made a confirmed
advance. Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that
Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Pershotravneve
(24km east of Kupyansk).[37]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully
attacked near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Kharkiv Oblast and
Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and Novoyehorivka (16km
southwest of Svatove) in Luhansk Oblast.[38]
A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also
attacked near Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and achieved
unspecified ”tactical success” near Synkivka.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that there was also fighting near Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[40]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near the
Serebryanske forest area and captured several unspecified positions.[41] The milblogger claimed that there are also positional battles near Torske (15km west of Kreminna).
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 9. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Tymkivka (18km east of Kupyansk) and Synkivka, Kharkiv Oblast and Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked with Western-provided armored vehicle support northeast of Kupyansk and west of Svatove.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that there is also fighting near Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[44]
Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture
the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s
proxies in Donbas)
See topline text for updates on Bakhmut.
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on
November 9 and reportedly advanced. Several Russian milbloggers claimed
that Russian forces made gains near Stepove (6km northwest of Avdiivka)
and are consolidating new positions near the settlement.[45]
Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced up to
1km beyond the railway line about 3km away from Berdychi (4km northwest
of Avdiivka).[46] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces now hold positions within 500 meters of Avdiivka itself.[47]
Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces are trying to
break through Ukrainian lines southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane.[48]
Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr
Shtupun noted that Russian forces have increased their use of aviation
in the Avdiivka direction over the past few days and are using Ka-52 and
Mi-8 helicopters and Su-25 attack aircraft.[49]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces with aviation
support conducted unsuccessful attacks southeast of Novokalynove (10km
northwest of Avdiivka), and near Avdiivka, Keramik (10km northwest of
Avdiivka), Stepove, Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske
(10km southwest of Avdiivka).[50]
Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks in the Avdiivka direction on November 9.
Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of
Donetsk City on November 9 but did not make any claimed or confirmed
advances. Shtupun noted that Russian forces in the Marinka direction (on
the southwest outskirts of Donetsk City) are concentrating offensive
efforts near Marinka and Novomykhailivka (10km south of Donetsk City),
and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted
23 unsuccessful attacks near these two settlements over the course of
the day.[51]
One milblogger claimed that Russian forces have stopped active advances
towards Novomykhailivka and are instead focusing on consolidating their
new positions.[52]
A Russian news aggregator claimed that the situation in Marinka remains
unchanged and that there is fighting on the western outskirts of the
settlement.[53]
Russian sources also claimed that localized fighting is ongoing near
Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City), particularly east of Vuhledar
near Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[54]
Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks west or southwest of Donetsk City on November 9.
Russian
Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain
frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian
forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks on the
Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 9.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 9 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and south of Prechystivka (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[55]
Ukrainian
forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia
Oblast on November 9 and recently made confirmed advances. Geolocated
footage published on November 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced
northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[56]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued
offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast)
direction.[57]
Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD),
claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near
Robotyne, Novoprokopivka (immediately south of Robotyne), and Verbove.[58]
Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 9 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Verbove and Robotyne.[59] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces did not conduct any assaults in the Zaporizhia direction on November 8.[60] A Russian media aggregator claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Verbove on November 8 but did not specify an outcome.[61]
For details on Kherson Oblast see topline text.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian rear area in southern Ukraine and targeted occupied Crimea on November 9. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces launched two missiles at Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast and that Russian air defenses only intercepted one of the missiles.[62] Russian sources claimed that the Ukrainian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Skadovsk.[63] A Ukrainian news outlet and a Ukrainian military observer stated that Ukrainian forces struck a hotel in Skadovsk that Russian forces used to quarter Russian officers.[64] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces used the hotel as a command post.[65] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted a Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missile off the coast of Crimea on November 9.[66] Russian sources amplified imagery purporting to show smoke clouds near Sevastopol following the interception.[67]
Russian
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand
combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian authorities appear to be increasingly reliant on private security companies to protect domestic energy infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian far rear areas. Russian State Duma “Special Military Operation” Working Group Chairperson Andrei Turchak stated that the group submitted a bill for Duma consideration that will allow private security forces at Russian fuel and energy facilities to shoot down drones.[68] Turchak noted that only Russian law enforcement, security agencies, and certain private security companies with anti-terrorism specialties can legally shoot down drones.[69]
Russian National Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that roughly 410,000 people entered service with the Russian military between January 1 and November 9, 2023.[70] Medvedev previously stated that 385,000 people entered service as of October 25; 357,000 as of October 12; 325,000 as of September 26; and 280,000 as of September 3.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia will likely have recruited 450,000-460,000 personnel by the end of 2023 based on Medvedev’s statements.[72]
Russian
federal subjects continue efforts to incentivize contract service with
Russian volunteer formations. Lipetsk Oblast Head Igor Artamonov
proposed on November 8 that Lipetsk Oblast should eliminate the
requirement that volunteers recruited into Lipetsk Oblast regional
volunteer formations need to be residents of Lipetsk Oblast.[73]
Artamonov also proposed raising the one-time recruitment bonus for
contract personnel from 50,000 rubles ($542) to 250,000 rubles ($2,712).[74]
Chuvashia Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev announced on November 8 that the
government approved a draft law that will award free plots of land for
personal housing or farming for distinguished participants from
Chuvashia in the war in Ukraine.[75]
Nikolaev also stated that the government supported a proposal providing
two free meals a day to schoolchildren of Russian personnel who are
fighting or who have died in Ukraine.[76]
Russian
Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological
innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities
in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate
administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian
citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance
systems)
Occupation authorities reportedly
continued efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth. Ukrainian Mariupol City
Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on November 8 that occupation
authorities created a new “professional military orientation” program
for students in educational institutions in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[77]
Andryushchenko stated that the program encourages students to serve and
die for Russia. Andryushchenko also published photos of Russian
military personnel and authorities training and indoctrinating students
at a school in occupied Demianivka, Donetsk Oblast.[78]
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met
in Ankara for the 19th Russian-Kazakh Regional Cooperation Forum on
November 9, where they reiterated boilerplate rhetoric portraying Russia
as a valuable ally to Central Asian states.[79]
Putin stated that Russia and Kazakhstan have begun constructing a joint
production plant for butadiene, a necessary component of rubber, and
have agreed to construct a plant to produce polyethylene.[80]
Putin also stated that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to develop
logistics routes through Kazakhstan to Central Asia and towards China,
including constructing a total of 1,300 kilometers of railway in the
next three years.[81]
Putin promoted military cooperation with Kazakhstan and stated that
Russian forces help train Kazakhstan personnel and that Russia has
licensed the production and servicing of Russian military equipment on
Kazakh territory.[82]
Putin and Tokayev also emphasized Russia and Kazakhstan’s joint
commitment to their states’ strategic partnership and signed numerous
bilateral agreements on infrastructure, agricultural, technological, and
cultural cooperation at the forum.[83]
Some
elements of the Russian ultranationalist information space are
unsatisfied with the Kremlin’s overly optimistic domestic portrayals of
the war in Ukraine and failure to mobilize Russian society to a war-time
footing. A prominent Russian milblogger criticized Russian media and
television for falsely portraying the war as effectively won even though
Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations in western
Zaporizhia Oblast and larger-than-usual ground operations in Kherson
Oblast.[84]
The milblogger warned that this framing of the war may provoke shock
and fear in the Russian information space if Ukrainian forces achieve a
great victory because Russian media has not prepared its consumers for
such reports. The milblogger also criticized the Russian government for
failing to mobilize the production capacity of the Russian defense
industrial base (DIB), particularly of naval assets to replace Russian
Black Sea Fleet (BSF) losses and regain dominance in the Black Sea.
Russia
continues defensive posturing in Central Asia amid the war in Ukraine.
The agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan creating a joint regional
air defense network as part of the unified Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) air defense network came into force on November 9.[85]
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov announced during Putin’s visit to the
Russian military airbase in Kant, Kyrgyzstan on October 12 that the
Kyrgyz parliament ratified this agreement on October 11.[86]
Significant
activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence
in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable
frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
The
Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on November 9 that
Belarusian missile and artillery forces will conduct management and
combat trainings from November 9 to 11.[87]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/dva_majors/28737 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16342 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4614 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4628
[2] https://t.me/dva_majors/28778
[3] https://t.me/wargonzo/16342 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4614 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4628 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38606 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28737 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28778 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/42332
[4] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1390
[5] https://amalantra dot ru/18-armiya-rossii/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2023 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28063 ; https://t.me/PYRATYDNEPRA_ZV/755 ; https://t.me/talipovonline/14235 ; https://t.me/marzoev_oleg/4711 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/15611; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/30225 ; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1693498113212699085 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/16134
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2023
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2023
[8] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56275 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56239 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32174 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32165 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32154 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32165 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1377 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56030 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32099 ; https://t.me/vdv_ZA_teplinsky/274 ; https://t.me/soldat_Krymskoy_vesny/982 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/55846 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28366 ; https://t.me/soldat_Krymskoy_vesny/757; https://t.me/vdv_ZA_teplinsky/211 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4237
[9] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1370 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1391
[10] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1301 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/54382 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23
[11] https://twitter.com/JanR210/status/1696783607602233753?s=20 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2023
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110123 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2023
[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9P2SARxicvFjcizfQVbRcNEsTTnNUAGmzXzBtMLDUK6PA6g4y9ZdXoDzCyUW6Rhl
[14] https://t.me/readovkanews/69117; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38606; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103369; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103376 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51982; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51964; https://t.me/dva_majors/28737; https://t.me/dva_majors/28730; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/25423 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28732; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/8575 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28744; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/25431 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28756
[15] https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1722629039809294509?s=20; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1722620738019217628?s=20
[16] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103376 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51982; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103369; https://t.me/readovkanews/69117
[18] https://www.facebook.com/56brigade/videos/879580120441975/; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7213
[19] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/8575 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28744; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4612; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103369; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103376 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51982
[21] https://t.me/romanov_92/42302 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103388 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28737 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/6794
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100223
[23] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/09/v-kremle-poobeschali-do-kontsa-goda-odnovremenno-provesti-pryamuyu-liniyu-s-putinym-i-ego-press-konferentsiyu-kogda-imenno-neyasno-v-proshlom-godu-ih-otmenili
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060823
[26] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72704; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72704
[27] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russia-starts-gas-supplies-uzbekistan-via-kazakhstan-2023-10-07/; https://pressroom.rferl.org/a/32467361.html
[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-20-2023
[29] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/767; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26549; https://president dot ir/fa/144889; https://en.irna dot ir/news/85144447
[30] https://president dot ir/fa/144444
[31] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85126979
[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-16-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-17-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-18-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-26-2023; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/02/world/middleeast/iran-heat-shutdown-power-grid.html; https://www.dw.com/en/iran-faces-gas-shortage-despite-vast-reserves/a-64395365;
[33] https://t.me/vchkogpu/43601
[34] https://t.me/vchkogpu/43601
[35] https://t.me/vchkogpu/43601
[36] https://t.me/akhmeddudaev/2464 ; https://ria dot ru/20231109/orden-1908417655.html ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28777 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42048; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Oct%203%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M2UuHs3uzvu6B427Pi1imVyz11yHeT2QEhqWVqXuj5KMtXkFqbyrP8cHGVjNYTgAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9P2SARxicvFjcizfQVbRcNEsTTnNUAGmzXzBtMLDUK6PA6g4y9ZdXoDzCyUW6Rhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2ec1xJoBFDWLHHiXvCH8NKZtFXTGTDdVoU1MUYjMoYqwyxsymS6XGzU45KcUrz6l
[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/28784; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51983; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103376 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51982; https://t.me/readovkanews/69117
[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4626; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38606; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51983
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4626; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56325; https://t.me/readovkanews/69117
[49] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/09/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-ukrayinski-zahysnyky-znyshhyly-ponad-500-okupantiv-i-majzhe-piv-sotni-vorozhoyi-tehniky-oleksandr-shtupun/
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M2UuHs3uzvu6B427Pi1imVyz11yHeT2QEhqWVqXuj5KMtXkFqbyrP8cHGVjNYTgAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9P2SARxicvFjcizfQVbRcNEsTTnNUAGmzXzBtMLDUK6PA6g4y9ZdXoDzCyUW6Rhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2ec1xJoBFDWLHHiXvCH8NKZtFXTGTDdVoU1MUYjMoYqwyxsymS6XGzU45KcUrz6l
[51] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/09/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-ukrayinski-zahysnyky-znyshhyly-ponad-500-okupantiv-i-majzhe-piv-sotni-vorozhoyi-tehniky-oleksandr-shtupun/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M2UuHs3uzvu6B427Pi1imVyz11yHeT2QEhqWVqXuj5KMtXkFqbyrP8cHGVjNYTgAl
[53] https://t.me/readovkanews/69117
[54] https://t.me/readovkanews/69117; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103376 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51982
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9P2SARxicvFjcizfQVbRcNEsTTnNUAGmzXzBtMLDUK6PA6g4y9ZdXoDzCyUW6Rhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2ec1xJoBFDWLHHiXvCH8NKZtFXTGTDdVoU1MUYjMoYqwyxsymS6XGzU45KcUrz6l
[56] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1722318292008792438?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1722318295758434767?s=20; https://t.me/ghost_of_khortytsia/13
[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02K9P2SARxicvFjcizfQVbRcNEsTTnNUAGmzXzBtMLDUK6PA6g4y9ZdXoDzCyUW6Rhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2ec1xJoBFDWLHHiXvCH8NKZtFXTGTDdVoU1MUYjMoYqwyxsymS6XGzU45KcUrz6l
[58] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38606 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103376 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51982 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16342 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32326 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32332
[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M2UuHs3uzvu6B427Pi1imVyz11yHeT2QEhqWVqXuj5KMtXkFqbyrP8cHGVjNYTgAl
[60] https://suspilne dot media/613569-za-minulu-dobu-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-vijskovi-rf-ne-veli-nastupalnih-dij-stupun/
[61] https://t.me/readovkanews/69117
[62] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/1409
[63] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/1410 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28768 ; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/15329 ; https://t.me/sledcom_press/9708 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28774 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4618 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4628
[64] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/6127; https://t.me/censor_net/39953
[65] https://t.me/andriyshTime/14947
[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/32335 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28783 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51994 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/55939
[67] https://t.me/milinfolive/110381
[68] https://t.me/RG_SVO/383; https://t.me/wargonzo/16354
[69] https://t.me/RG_SVO/383; https://t.me/wargonzo/16354
[70] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/929819 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/16358
[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Oct%2025%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20September%203%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Sept%2026%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF_0.pdf
[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103410
[73] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/16347
[74] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/16347
[75] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/19233865
[76] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/19233865
[77] https://t.me/andriyshTime/14948
[78] https://t.me/andriyshTime/14969
[79] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72699; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72705; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72704; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72706
[80] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72699; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72705; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72704; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72706
[81] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72699; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72705; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72704; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72706
[82] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72699; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72705; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72704; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72706
[83] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72699; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72705; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/72704; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72706
[84] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51991 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28780
[85] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19240129; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202311090002; https://t.me/sashakots/43240
[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023
[87] https://t.me/modmilby/33670