By
Matti Suomenaro and the ISW Syria Team
Russia has continued facilitating Iran's expansion in
Syria following President Donald Trump's new Iran strategy rollout. Russia
sustained its air campaign in October 2017 to support ground operations led by
pro-Bashar al Assad regime forces, including Iran and its proxies. Russian
forces conducted this campaign across two fronts, targeting anti-regime
opposition forces in Western Syria as well as ISIS in Eastern Syria.
Russia continued airstrikes across opposition-held
terrain in Idlib and Hama Provinces that it began after an offensive launched
by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria – in Northern
Hama Province on September 19. Russia also supported pro-regime forces in a
major offensive along the Euphrates River Valley towards the Syrian-Iraqi
Border that included the seizure of Mayadin on 14 October. Russia
forward-deployed Su-25 ‘Frogfoot’ close-air-support aircraft to T4 (Tiyas)
Airbase in Central Homs Province in order to support its operations in Eastern
Syria. Pro-regime forces later seized multiple districts in Deir ez-Zour City
with significant air support from Russia on October 25 - 30. Pro-regime forces
likely intend to advance upon the key border town of Albu Kamal on the
Syrian-Iraqi Border. ISIS reportedly relocated a significant portion of its
leadership, media, and external attack cells to Mayadin and Albu Kamal in
response to the successful offensives by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition against
Mosul and Ar-Raqqa City.
Russia continued to masquerade as a legitimate
counter-terrorism actor while prosecuting an aggressive campaign against
vulnerable civilian populations in Hama, Idlib, and Deir ez-Zour Provinces.
Russia simultaneously targeted both legitimate military targets and
illegitimate civilian targets in order to obscure the real nature of its air
campaign in Syria. Russia targeted key civilian infrastructure in regions held
by ISIS in Eastern Deir ez-Zour Province including multiple civilian ferries
fleeing the fighting in Mayadin on October 10 -12. Russia also expanded its air
campaign beyond strikes against HTS in Idlib Province. Russia targeted a
headquarters belonging to Islamist group Faylaq al-Sham – an opposition group
formerly backed by the U.S. – on October 13. Russia also conducted airstrikes
targeting at least two schools and three internally displaced persons’ camps in Idlib Province from October 9 – 20. Russia
will continue to publicize its strikes against Salafi-Jihadi groups such as
ISIS and Al-Qaeda in order to distract from its wider punitive campaign against
civilians in opposition-held regions of Western Syria.
The preceding graphic depicts ISW's assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia's air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.
High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.