By Matti Suomenaro
and the ISW Syria and Turkey Teams
Russia renewed its violent, indiscriminate
air campaign against civilians in Western Syria in order to coerce groups
opposed to the Bashar al-Assad regime to accept a ceasefire or ‘de-escalation
zone’ in Idlib Province. Russia shifted its air campaign to target rebel-held
terrain in Idlib and Hama Provinces following an offensive launched by
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – the successor of Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham – in Northern Hama Province on September 19. The Russian Ministry
of Defense launched an immediate disinformation
operation to present this shift in its air campaign as a legitimate series of
strikes against extremist groups attempting to disrupt a ‘de-escalation zone’
in Idlib Province brokered
by Russia, Turkey, and Iran on September 15. Russia nonetheless mounted a
systematic campaign of airstrikes against civilian infrastructure – including hospitals, schools,
power
stations, and mosques
– as well as former U.S.-backed rebel groups unaffiliated with HTS or al Qaeda.
The strikes marked a return to the widespread punitive air campaigns Russia previously
directed against opposition-held terrain across Western Syria. Russia also employed
advanced weapons systems to further inflict violence against Idlib Province
under the guise of counter-terrorism operations. The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Permanent
Mediterranean Task Force launched Kalibr cruise missiles targeting Ma’arat
al-Numan in Southern Idlib Province on September 22. Russia Tu-95MS ‘Bear’
strategic bombers later launched Kh-101 cruise missiles targeting the outskirts
of Idlib City on September 26. Russia’s deliberate use of violence against
civilians precludes any legitimate, Russian-enforced ‘de-escalation’ zone in
Idlib Province.
Russia also leveraged its ongoing
air campaign to co-opt Turkey away from the U.S. and NATO in order to further
set conditions for the planned ‘de-escalation zone’ in Idlib. Russia
concentrated its airstrikes in areas of Western Idlib Province along the
Syrian-Turkish Border from September 25 - 30. The Russian Air Force likely
sought to interdict the movement of HTS and opposition forces ahead of a
Turkish Armed Force (TSK) deployment into Idlib by targeting rebel-held areas
connecting Western Aleppo Province to the Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing on the
Syrian-Turkish Border as well as key supply routes around Idlib City. Turkish
President Recep Erdogan subsequently announced
the start of cross-border operations to implement the Idlib ‘de-escalation
zone’ on October 7. Erdogan stated that Russia would support his intervention. The
TSK began deployments to observation positions in Northern Idlib Province near
the majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton on October
12 following earlier reconnaissance missions. Russia likely perceives an
opportunity to exploit widening diplomatic fissures between the U.S. and Turkey.
Russia could thus attempt to use the ‘de-escalation zone’ to compel Turkey into
deeper – albeit temporary – cooperation with Russia in Northwestern Syria at
the expense of the United States.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.
High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
