By Ellen
Stockert and the ISW Syria Team
Russia has reshaped its military campaign in Syria to constrain the
U.S.’s current operations and future options. Russia deprioritized its airstrikes
against opposition-held terrain in Western Syria following the announcement of
four ‘de-escalation
zones’
brokered by Russia, Iran, and Turkey on May 6. Russia claimed this shift was a continuation
of its supposed counter-terrorism campaign in Syria. Russia’s actual target for
this new operational phase is not ISIS or Al-Qaeda, but rather the U.S. and its
partners and allies.
Russia positioned pro-Bashar al-Assad regime forces to disrupt the
U.S. in Syria under the guise of anti-ISIS operations. Russian airstrikes
supported pro-regime forces in a major offensive in Eastern Aleppo Province
that culminated with the seizure of Maskanah - the last urban center held by
ISIS in Aleppo Province - on June 4. These gains nonetheless placed the
pro-regime coalition on the border between Aleppo and Ar-Raqqa Provinces within
55 miles of Ar-Raqqa City. Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime could use this
region as a base to disrupt ongoing U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operations to seize Ar-Raqqa City from ISIS. Russia
similarly reasserted its capabilities with cruise missile strikes against ISIS logistics positions
near Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province on May 31. The Russian Navy’s Mediterranean
Task Force simultaneously conducted exercises with Russian Marines off the
Syrian coast. Russia’s actions in Eastern Aleppo Province, Homs Province, and
the Mediterranean demonstrate Russia’s resolve to compete with and undermine U.S.
influence throughout Syria.
Russia continued to leverage partnerships with local forces in
order to maximize the impact of its air campaign in Syria. Russian airstrikes targeted U.S.-backed opposition groups
Jaysh Asoud al Sharqiya and the Ahmed Abdo Martyrs Brigade near the Zaza
Junction in the Badia region of Eastern Homs Province on May 31. Pro-regime
forces advanced throughout April and May toward
the joint U.S.-Syrian opposition base at Tanaf on the Syrian-Iraqi border until
U.S. airstrikes on May
18
and halted pro-regime forces from further incursion into an established “de-confliction”
zone. The U.S. conducted additional strikes against pro-regime forces near
Tanaf on June
6
and June 8. Pro-regime
advances near Tanaf could impede U.S. freedom of movement along the
Syrian-Iraqi border and deter potential U.S. operations against ISIS launched from Eastern Deir ez-Zour Province. Russia has also
resumed air support for pro-regime ground efforts in Dera’a City in Southern
Syria despite the ‘de-escalation zone’ agreement brokered by Russia,
Iran, and Turkey in Dera’a Province. Pro-regime
forces reportedly deployed from Aleppo City and Damascus to
Dera’a City between May 29 - 31. Russia and the pro-regime coalition may attempt
to use the deployment to Dera’a City to consolidate pro-regime control over
Southern Syria and block potential U.S.-Jordanian mobilization along the
Syrian-Jordanian border.
Russia also advanced political efforts to constrain potential U.S.
action in Syria. Russian officials met with representatives from Iraq,
Iran, and the Assad regime in Moscow on May 21 to discuss terrorism and
cooperation on Syrian-Iraqi border security. An Iraqi partnership with the
Russia-Iran-Assad axis would undermine U.S.-Iraqi relations and open the door
to greater Russian influence in Iraq. U.S. and Jordanian officials reportedly met with Russian representatives in
Amman, Jordan, to discuss a de-escalation zone along the Syrian-Jordanian
border. The expansion of Russian influence along Syria’s borders will put
Russia and the U.S. in greater competition in
Southern and Eastern Syria. The U.S. risks losing opposition partners and
influence by partnering with Russia and must not misconstrue Russian air and
missile strikes against ISIS as an indicator of Russian reliability in Syria.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.
High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
