By Jonathan Mautner
Russia intensified its air
campaign in Aleppo Province following the collapse of the nationwide ceasefire
on September 19, aggressively targeting opposition-held districts and suburbs
of Aleppo City in support of pro-regime ground operations to seize the city and
defeat the acceptable opposition in Northwestern Syria. Russian warplanes
conducted heavy waves of airstrikes against opposition forces and critical
civilian infrastructure in and around Aleppo City from September 20 – October 6,
relying increasingly on incendiary and bunker busting munitions in order to
degrade opposition defenses and render the city uninhabitable. Russian
airstrikes and concerted pro-regime ground operations concentrated against
opposition-held terrain in the southern, central, and northern districts of
Aleppo City in order to fix opposition forces along multiple fronts and hinder
the movement of opposition reinforcements within the city. These successive and
simultaneous operations are a hallmark of Russian campaign design and
facilitated pro-regime advances in the northern outskirts of Aleppo City as
well as some limited territorial gains near the city center. Russian air power
alone likely will not enable pro-regime forces to recapture the
densely-populated urban terrain of Aleppo City. Rather, the regime and Iran
will have to deploy more combat-effective ground forces in order to leverage
the asymmetric effect of the Russian air campaign to clear Aleppo City of the
Syrian opposition.
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Russia, however, briefly tempered
its air operations in Aleppo Province beginning on September 29 in order to prioritize
the targeting of core opposition-held terrain in western Syria. Russia
intensified its airstrikes against opposition forces in the vicinity of frontlines
in the mountainous Jabal al Akrad region of Latakia Province beginning on
October 5, allowing pro-regime forces to reverse opposition gains secured as
part of the Jaysh al Fatah-led “Battle of Ashura” offensive on October 10. Russian
warplanes also targeted opposition strongholds in southern Idlib Province in
order to halt the movement of fighters aiming to back opposition forces vying
to seize nearby Hama City. Russia conducted airstrikes against U.S.-backed
opposition groups in northern Hama Province as part of this effort, reportedly using
bunker busting munitions to target underground headquarters of Jaysh Idlib al
Har – a newfound coalition of former TOW anti-tank missile recipients – and TOW
anti-tank missile recipient Jaysh al Izza on September 23 and October 2,
respectively. At the same time, Russia conducted air operations in support of
the ongoing pro-regime siege-and-starve campaign in the countryside of Damascus,
using incendiary munitions against opposition-held areas in the Eastern and
Western Ghouta suburbs of the city. Russia will likely continue to coordinate
its air operations with regime siege-and-starve tactics that aim to neutralize
opposition forces in dense urban terrain with minimal military resources.
Russia also exploited the
collapse of the nationwide ceasefire to deter the U.S. from expanding the ambit
of its own military mission in the Syrian Civil War. Russia used the period
from September 18 – October 10 to move additional military assets into Syria
and prepare for the establishment of a permanent naval base in the country.
Most notably, Russia deployed
components of the S-300 (NATO reporting name SA-23 Gladiator) anti-aircraft,
anti-missile system to its naval base along the city of Tartus in western Syria
beginning on or around October 1. Russia subsequently announced
plans to upgrade and expand its existing naval facility at Tartus into
a permanent base on October 10. Russia also reportedly deployed four
Mi-28 ‘Havoc’ attack helicopters to the Shayrat
Airbase near Homs City on September 18, marking a continuation
of Russia’s practice of using ceasefire agreements to deploy additional
military assets in Syria. Further, Russia deployed an unidentified
number of Su-24 and Su-34 fighter jets to the Bassel al Assad Airbase
in western Latakia Province on September 30. Significantly, the
SA-23’s deployment to Syria coincided with the U.S. decision to suspend bilateral
engagement with Russia on the Syrian Civil War on October 3, as well as
statements from anonymous U.S. administration officials that the U.S. is weighing
direct military action against the regime and other new options to address
Russian intervention in the conflict. SA-23 missiles reportedly possess a range
sufficient to reach targets in the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, and Palmyra,
suggesting that Russia aims to use the SA-23 in order to both deter the U.S.
from conducting airstrikes against core regime terrain in Syria and project
force into the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The deployment of the SA-23 to Tartus
thus likely forecloses additional options for the U.S. to alleviate the
humanitarian crisis in Aleppo, ensures
Russia’s continued freedom of action in Syria, and will bolster Russia’s
integrated air defense system in Syria. The expansion of the Russian base at
Tartus, however, demonstrates that Russia aims to create a military foothold in
Syria that will endure beyond the conclusion of the Syrian Civil War.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
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