By Kathleen Weinberger
Vladimir Putin
has mobilized military forces in Crimea and on Ukraine's northern and eastern borders. He has raised the level of fighting in
eastern Ukraine to levels not seen in over
a year and then arranged a ceasefire. He has moved advanced air defense systems
into Crimea
and is raising new Russian divisions near
Ukraine. Analysts are baffled. Some
note that this unprecedented mobilization makes little sense if Putin does not
mean to fight Ukraine soon. Others dismiss
it as the normal
activities of a great power’s military.
Neither view is correct. There is
nothing normal about this mobilization, but neither does Putin desire a war
with Ukraine. He intends, rather, to use
this mobilization and escalation of conflict to create leverage to weaken EU
sanctions, destabilize the Ukrainian government, undermine NATO, and present
the next American president with a series of faits accomplis. He is likely to succeed in all these aims.
Escalation against
Ukraine
Putin has maintained a significant military presence in Crimea
and eastern
Ukraine since the Russian invasion in 2014. Putin and the separatists he supports
have failed to resolve the conflict by either military or diplomatic means. Putin
has steadily increased Russia’s military presence in
and around
Ukrainian territory and the
Black
Sea since early
2016, with much of the groundwork
having been laid in 2014. He announced
plans to move the advanced S-400 air defense system to Crimea in July. The recent escalation, however, has been much
more sudden, rapid, and substantial than his previous undertakings.
Putin seized on rumors of a Ukrainian sabotage operation in
Crimea on August 7th and 8th to shift his operations into
high gear. Local sources began reporting
many Russian troops and much military hardware moving to the de-facto
border between Ukraine and Crimea, onto the Crimean
Peninsula
from Russia, and along Ukraine’s northern
border on those very days. The S-400 system appeared in Crimea on August
12th. Russian rhetoric during this period hyped the threat of
war while framing these measures
as defensive.
Putin said
on August 10th that Russia would take “additional measure to provide
security, including serious additional measures.” These actions and threats are
likely intended to press Ukraine, France,
and Germany to make significant concessions to Russia in order to avoid
further escalation.
The deployment of additional military capabilities to Crimea
in the context of this invented tension serves another purpose for Putin. It allows Russia to create a formidable
exclusion zone that extends north into much of Ukraine and across a large
portion of the Black Sea. Putin has probably always planned to increase his military
capabilities in the region significantly, as his steady expansion of forces in
Crimea shows. The “crisis” he created in August, however, has allowed him to frame
these deployments as a response to Ukrainian aggression, accomplishing in days what
might otherwise have taken months. The atmosphere of crisis and desire on the
part of Europeans to de-escalate it, moreover, have spared Putin any
consequences for these moves, which are likely to be permanent.
Aims
But what is Putin trying to do? Conditions for a Russian invasion of Ukraine have
been set for some time now. Continued
delay works only to the advantage
of Ukraine. Putin may be pursuing some
more nuanced strategy that will end up in war, but it appears that he is
actually pursuing other aims. He is
working, in fact, to pressure EU states to remove sanctions and negotiate a
settlement in Donbas that will upset Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s
regime. He seeks, in other words, to
obtain his objectives without having to fight for them, as is his customary
strategy.
Putin’s primary desire is likely to erode or eliminate
European sanctions against Russia while also advancing his goals in
Ukraine. He seeks to force the Europeans
to capitulate on all fronts, in other words, without making any concessions
himself.
EU
sanctions against Russia based on the conflict in Donbas are valid until January
31, 2017 unless renewed. Lifting them
is, in principle, contingent on Russia fulfilling all points of the Minsk
agreements. Those agreements
require Russia to withdraw all of its forces from Ukraine and to permit the
demobilization of the separatist militias in Donbas. Putin clearly desires to do neither, and so
seeks to use his newly-created leverage to cajole Europe into easing sanctions
in any case.
This strategy appears to be working. German Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated on August 19th that the EU could “gradually
phase out sanctions” if Russia could demonstrate progress and offered
that Russia could rejoin the G7. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has softened
her previous stance, saying that the “sanctions will be weakened” when Russia makes
“progress in the Minsk negotiations.” French President Francois
Hollande stated
that there is a “real risk of escalation in Ukraine.” Putin will meet with
Merkel and Hollande on the sidelines of
the G20 on September 4-5 and is likely to press both leaders to take a more
lenient stance in exchange for avoiding further conflict.
Putin can also use this escalation to push for a settlement
of the conflict that undermines domestic political support for pro-Western Ukrainian
President Poroshenko. Pressure from European partners and Russia’s military posture
may be sufficient to make Poroshenko accept an unfavorable deal regarding the
separatist regions. Poroshenko’s government already faces significant criticism
for Ukraine’s poor
economic performance. His hold on power is further threatened by
populist and pro-Russian parties, which have been positioning themselves to
make a comeback in Ukraine. An unpopular resolution of the conflict in Donbas could
be enough to trigger snap
elections and allow these anti-Western parties to return to power in
Ukraine’s parliament. A settlement that grants the separatist regions
significant autonomy could also upset the pro-Kyiv volunteer battalions. These
militia groups, which have fought hard against Russian-backed forces since the
beginning of the conflict, already oppose Poroshenko on many issues. Poroshenko
could lose the limited support he now has were he to accept a deal on Donbas
that looked like surrender.
Timing
A number of factors combined to make August a propitious
moment for Putin to force this issue. The
looming elections to Russia’s legislature, the Duma, as well as the impending
U.S. election have long made it likely that Putin would act now. The failed Turkish coup and resulting Russo-Turkish
rapprochement, however, created the ideal environment for the current
gambit.
Russo-Turkish
Rapprochement
Russo-Turkish relations soured badly at the end of 2015 as
Russian aircraft flew combat sorties against Turkish-backed opposition forces
in Syria. Turkish forces shot down a
Russian Su-24 jet in November, 2015, starting a tense confrontation between
Moscow and Ankara. President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan sought out Russia’s enemies as partners in this confrontation,
starting military cooperation with Ukraine. The two states conducted two joint
naval drills in the Black Sea in March and April 2016 and signed a military
cooperation plan in May.
Erdogan began the rapprochement with
Russia in June, before the coup attempt, apologizing for shooting down the
Su-24. He has turned increasingly to
Russia after
the coup, moreover, discussing economic and military cooperation, while
Turkey’s Prime Minister hinted that Russia might be allowed to use the NATO
airbase at Incirlik
from which the US Air Force is currently operating. Turkey and Ukraine have not undertaken
further joint cooperation efforts, in the meantime, and public displays of close
relations have ended.
Erdogan has simultaneously pursued a policy of confrontation
with the US, demanding the extradition
of a Turkish exile he accuses of plotting the coup and blaming
various senior US military officials for supporting it. Erdogan has not officially changed his policy
towards Ukraine or towards the US, and his hostile anti-US rhetoric has
softened somewhat in recent days. Turkey’s improved relations with Russia,
however, changed the regional security balance so that Russia could escalate
the conflict in Ukraine without fear of complications in Turkey.
Russian Parliamentary
Elections
The Russian parliamentary elections are likely the main
driver of the timing of this offensive, however. Putin seeks to rally support ahead of the
September elections, which is challenging because of the falling
popularity
of United Russia, his party. That support
could grow if Putin could announce progress on sanctions relief.
Russia’s budget is in dire straits because of the continuing
low price of oil, as well as structural problems and corruption. Putin could hope to stabilize it only through
one of two high unpopular measures: drawing more heavily on Russia’s sovereign wealth funds, or introducing
confiscatory
taxes. The promise of the easing of sanctions and the reintegration of
Russia into European markets could allow Putin to avoid taking these measures,
at least in the short term. He could expect to gain at the polls if he could
secure some promise of sanctions relief from the key European leaders he has
been simultaneously courting and threatening.
US Presidential
Elections
The timing of US presidential elections is the third factor
that makes this moment so opportune for Putin’s aggressiveness. The Obama administration has been busily
attempting to negotiate
an agreement to work with Russia in Syria and has eschewed any reaction to
various Russian aggressive actions in the Middle East and Ukraine—or even to
reports of Russian attempts to influence
the US election. Putin likely sees an opportunity to establish
himself solidly in Ukraine, with a settlement or the promise of one in Donbas,
with sanctions eased or lifted, and with his base in Syria secure when the next
American president takes office. Such a
position would be an admirable baseline from which Putin could begin either to
try to normalize relations with the US or to expand his gains further—or both.
Prospects for Putin’s
Gambit
Sanctions fatigue in Europe and protracted political
instability in Ukraine mean that Putin will likely accomplish two of his goals.
Europe is likely to ease and eventually lift most sanctions as Brexit, immigration,
and other factors combine to strain
the EU as an institution, and as Russia’s long-standing and concerted
efforts to improve relations with individual EU states bear fruit. Austria,
Greece, Hungary
and Italy, among others, have expressed pro-Russian sentiments and are
continuously targeted by Russia with economic and diplomatic incentives. The EU
Council requires sanctions votes to be unanimous, so
one state could veto their renewal, particularly if the leading states of
Europe are wavering.
Putin will also likely succeed in removing pro-Western
Poroshenko in Ukraine and seeing him replaced with either an anti-Western
populist or a pro-Russian leader. Economic
hardship, low
satisfaction with the current regime, frustration
on the part of foreign partners and competition
from other political parties mean that Poroshenko is incredibly vulnerable to
further shocks, such as an unpopular resolution of the conflict in Donbas. Even
if Poroshenko retains power some sort of bad deal, Ukraine’s economy will most
likely further suffer as international attention wavers and European desires to
reconcile with Russia increase.
Putin will probably be able to use these successes to
continue to split Europe to the detriment of NATO and the US. Europe faces extreme pressure from the refugee
crisis and prospect of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU. Putin is working hard to advance
controversial projects, such as the NORDSTREAM
II pipeline to Germany, which would further align western European states
with Russia. The eastern states will
continue to fear Russia, however—all the more if it appears that Putin is
succeeding in bending Ukraine to his will.
Russia will also continue to try to leverage
its operations in Syria to push for cooperation with European countries and
the US, which could decrease the alliance’s ability to posture against Russia
without threatening interests in the Middle East. All of these activities will tend to paralyze
and divide the Western alliance, making concerted resistance to Russian
aggression difficult if not impossible.
Implications
If Putin succeeds in having sanctions significantly eased or
removed and resetting relations with a number of key European countries, the
new US president may be unable to rely on a united EU or NATO response to
Russian actions. Russia would have greater leverage in Europe by which to increase
ties with certain states and to undertake increasingly hostile actions against
others. Putin might choose to threaten or even undertake military operations
against other European countries, such as the Baltic States, Finland or Norway.
He is more likely to use the weakening of the Western alliance to cajole them
into neutral or pro-Russian policies.
The replacement of pro-Western Poroshenko with a populist or
pro-Russian leader would be the first step towards returning Ukraine to
Russia’s sphere of influence. Ukraine would not likely be able to reorient
again towards a pro-Western, pro-democratic path in the near future. This development
would constitute the first forceful reintegration of a former Soviet state back
into Russia’s control, and would stand as a precedent for future operations.
Establishment of these conditions will allow Russia to renegotiate
relations with the US from a position of significant strength. Without the
weight of the conflict in Donbas or the stigma of sanctions, Russia would be
able to undergo a second “reset” in relations with the West, despite having
illegally annexed the sovereign territory of a European state. The new US
administration would be forced to negotiate with a newly emboldened Russia
without the same political and economic tools available during the Obama
administration, and potentially have fewer allies in countering Russian
aggression.
