By Genevieve Casagrande with Jennifer Cafarella
Key Takeaway: Pro-regime forces
accomplished Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s longstanding objective to
encircle the opposition in Aleppo City on July 28, with support from Russian airpower
and Iranian ground reinforcement. The regime will now carry out a prolonged
siege and starve campaign against the estimated 250,000 - 300,000 civilians in
Aleppo City in an effort to force the submission of the Aleppo-based opposition.
The fight for Aleppo City entered a new phase as opposition forces, including
Salafi jihadist groups, launched a counteroffensive to break the regime’s
encirclement of opposition-held neighborhoods on July 31. The groups chose to
focus on reopening a supply line into Aleppo City from its southwestern
outskirts in an effort to take the fight into urban terrain to offset the
asymmetric advantages Russian and Syrian airpower provides to pro-regime forces.
Aleppo is one of the largest strongholds of acceptable opposition groups in
Syria. Their defeat in Aleppo would ensure the dominance of Salafi jihadist
groups in northern Syria and deprive the U.S. of options to defeat ISIS and al
Qaeda in Syria in the long term.
The Syrian
regime, backed by Russian airpower, completed the encirclement of
opposition-held neighborhoods of Aleppo City on July 28, solidifying its hold
over the siege of an estimated 250,000
-300,000
civilians in the city. Pro-regime forces previously severed the opposition’s last remaining ground line of communication (GLOC) into
Aleppo City on July 26 after blockading the Castello Road north of the city.
The regime had already established fire control
over the
road after seizing a nearby hill on July 8. Opposition forces launched a
number of operations in an attempt
to lift the siege by reopening Castello throughout July, but were ultimately
unsuccessful.
The Syrian regime and Russia intend to defeat the opposition in Aleppo City, which remains one of the largest strongholds of armed opposition factions that are acceptable to the West. The regime and Russia will pursue a protracted “siege and starve” campaign in order to force the submission of these remaining acceptable groups, solidifying the dominance of the Salafi jihadist opposition in northwestern Syria. Pro-regime forces have previously used prolonged sieges against opposition-held pockets entrenched within urban terrain in Homs City and Damascus. Both the Syrian regime and Russia can also use the siege of Aleppo as leverage to procure concessions during future negotiations over the Syrian Civil War.
The Syrian regime and Russia have been setting conditions for the siege of opposition-held districts of Aleppo City since October 2015. ISW forecasted the regime’s intended encirclement of Aleppo as early as April 2015. Russian airstrikes primarily focused on opposition-held villages in the city’s northwestern outskirts throughout the first five months of the Russian air campaign in order to facilitate regime ground offensives and preclude the arrival of opposition reinforcements through their main GLOCs into the city from Turkey. Russia later shifted its air campaign to intensify airstrikes within Aleppo’s densely-populated urban neighborhoods from April - July 2016 after numerous attempts to complete the encirclement failed. Russian and regime airstrikes during this period increasingly targeted critical civilian infrastructure in opposition-held neighborhoods. The onslaught of airstrikes likely sought to drive refugee flows and prime the civilian population for eventual surrender. Russia and the Syrian regime also opened humanitarian corridors for civilians in Aleppo City in late July in another attempt to further depopulate opposition-held terrain. Local administrative bodies in opposition-held Aleppo, however, have accused regime forces of using the corridors to capture or kill civilians and opposition fighters attempting to leave the city.
The Syrian regime and Russia intend to defeat the opposition in Aleppo City, which remains one of the largest strongholds of armed opposition factions that are acceptable to the West. The regime and Russia will pursue a protracted “siege and starve” campaign in order to force the submission of these remaining acceptable groups, solidifying the dominance of the Salafi jihadist opposition in northwestern Syria. Pro-regime forces have previously used prolonged sieges against opposition-held pockets entrenched within urban terrain in Homs City and Damascus. Both the Syrian regime and Russia can also use the siege of Aleppo as leverage to procure concessions during future negotiations over the Syrian Civil War.
The Syrian regime and Russia have been setting conditions for the siege of opposition-held districts of Aleppo City since October 2015. ISW forecasted the regime’s intended encirclement of Aleppo as early as April 2015. Russian airstrikes primarily focused on opposition-held villages in the city’s northwestern outskirts throughout the first five months of the Russian air campaign in order to facilitate regime ground offensives and preclude the arrival of opposition reinforcements through their main GLOCs into the city from Turkey. Russia later shifted its air campaign to intensify airstrikes within Aleppo’s densely-populated urban neighborhoods from April - July 2016 after numerous attempts to complete the encirclement failed. Russian and regime airstrikes during this period increasingly targeted critical civilian infrastructure in opposition-held neighborhoods. The onslaught of airstrikes likely sought to drive refugee flows and prime the civilian population for eventual surrender. Russia and the Syrian regime also opened humanitarian corridors for civilians in Aleppo City in late July in another attempt to further depopulate opposition-held terrain. Local administrative bodies in opposition-held Aleppo, however, have accused regime forces of using the corridors to capture or kill civilians and opposition fighters attempting to leave the city.
The opposition has responded with an effort to reset the conditions
of the siege of Aleppo City, shifting the fight for control of GLOCs from
northern to southern Aleppo. The opposition decided to take the fight into
Aleppo’s urban terrain rather than attempt to break through the encirclement
north of the city. Opposition groups from Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama Provinces launched
a concerted counteroffensive on July 31 to break the siege on the city through
its urban southwestern outskirts. Jabhat Fatah al Sham – successor of al
Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra – and other members of the Idlib-based
Jaysh al Fatah coalition advanced into the city’s southern outskirts,
surrounding the Ramouseh Artillery Base from the south and west after seizing
the neighboring Al
Nasr District and the village of
Al Shurfa on July 31. Opposition forces continued to advance into the city
on August 2 despite reported increased
airstrikes and
regime reinforcement to the area, seizing regime-held
areas of the Ramouseh District. These advances position opposition forces within approximately 1.5
kilometers of breaking the encirclement and establishing new GLOCs within the
urban terrain in southern Aleppo City.
The Syrian opposition refocused its fight to break the siege through
urban terrain in southwestern Aleppo City in an effort to offset asymmetric advantages
Russian and Syrian airpower provides to pro-regime forces. The completion of
the regime’s northern encirclement on July 28 exploited the comparative
advantages that Russian air power and the regime artillery provide in flat,
rural terrain to force the opposition to defend Aleppo City on unfavorable terms.
Russian and Syrian airstrikes will be unable to achieve these same substantive battlefield
effects against the opposition inside urban terrain, however. Russia can
inflict great structural damage on opposition-held neighborhoods of the city,
but cannot achieve fidelity when attempting to strike opposition targets. Opposition
forces will therefore be more able to mount an effective defense of a potential
supply route through the urban terrain in southern Aleppo City. Pro-regime
forces even with airpower and superior armor and artillery would have
difficulty expelling the opposition from this dense urban terrain.
The
opposition will be able to take advantage of the regime’s force posture in
Aleppo in a long and drawn out fight. Pro-regime units occupy well-fortified
military positions across regime-held areas of the city that are difficult for
armed opposition forces to penetrate without taking high casualties in a
frontal assault. These positions are readily identifiable to Syrian armed
opposition commanders, however, enabling opposition factions to dedicate
considerable time and energy into softening their targets. The use of suicide
bombers by Jabhat Fatah al Sham – successor of Jabhat al-Nusra – is a highly
effective tactic in rural terrain, but is alone insufficient to penetrate these
targets. The opposition maintains an active network of tunnels
underneath various portions of Aleppo City for resupply as well as to detonate
explosive devises under identified regime positions. The ability of opposition
forces to dedicate months of preparation to these tunnels is in part a product
of the static nature of the regime’s force posture. Al Fawj al Awl –
a U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missiles recipient and member of the Fatah Halab
operations room— detonated a
tunnel bomb in the Ramouseh District in southern Aleppo City on August 2 that
facilitated the opposition advance into the district. Opposition forces have
likely prepared additional tunnels to both resupply and maintain a tactical
advantage in the coming weeks as the fight to break the siege of Aleppo
continues.
 |
| The above photo shows opposition commanders designing their campaign plans with the help of a tabletop model of the Old City of Aleppo. The ability of opposition commanders to plan with a mock-up of the city itself demonstrates how the stalemated nature of the urban fight inside Aleppo City enables the opposition to design military plans based on known positions and predictable regime counterattacks |
An urban
fight in Aleppo would require the regime to sustain high levels of attrition.
The regime has a large military force in Aleppo Province, but has difficulty
replenishing its ranks for offensive operations from other front lines because
of its overall manpower
shortage. The regime has tried to offset this deficit using Iranian-backed
militia forces. A substantial influx of Iranian and Iranian proxy fighters enabled
the regime’s advance north of Aleppo City in early February 2016. The regime
initially deployed hundreds of Iranian backed Afghan militiamen in addition to
an increased deployment of Hezbollah fighters in a failed attempt
to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City in early 2015. A second major influx of Iraqi
Shi’a militia fighters later helped the regime advance south of Aleppo City
starting in mid-October 2015 with the support of significant Russian
airstrikes. Iran’s casualties in opposition operations south of Aleppo city throughout
April and May were high, including the death of 13 IRGC forces and the wounding
of 21 others in Khan
Touman in early May, forcing the unit to redeploy back to Iran. The
remaining forces are enough to encircle and besiege opposition-held neighborhoods,
but will not enable the regime to retake terrain if opposition forces are able
to establish a foothold in the regime-held southern districts of Aleppo City. It
is likewise important for Iran and the Syrian regime to demonstrate progress in
order to maintain political support domestically. Iranian officials as well as
the Iranian public are currently supportive of operations in Syria. The Syrian
opposition, however, could take advantage of a prolonged stalemate in Aleppo
City to erode popular support for Iran’s intervention in Syria and limit
Iranian will to continue providing manpower for the regime.
Conclusion
The opposition in Aleppo will face an existential
threat if they are unable to break the regime’s siege on the city. The possible defeat of the Aleppo-based opposition by
the Assad regime and Russia would fundamentally alter the nature of opposition
forces in northwestern Syria, posing a direct challenge to U.S. interests in
Syria. The collapse of acceptable armed opposition groups in Aleppo would not
only solidify the staying power of hardline opposition factions in northwestern
Syria, but would also ensure a continued Salafi jihadist safehaven in Idlib
Province. The U.S. remains at risk of losing some of its last remaining
acceptable partners from within the armed opposition in northern Syria that
remain capable of challenging al Qaeda’s influence in the country. Al Qaeada’s
Syrian affiliate’s recent rebranding as Jabhat Fatah al Sham does not preclude
the group from continuing efforts to transform the Syrian opposition. Rather,
the group’s reported split from al Qaeda will likely allow the group to further
network itself within the armed opposition, which remains one of Jabhat Fatah al
Sham’s – successor of Jabhat al Nursa – largest
source of strength in Syria. A regime victory in Aleppo would allow the
group to deepen ties with the opposition and further its own strategic vision
of establishing an Islamic emirate in Syria.
The encirclement of the city remains the largest source
of leverage for Russia and the regime over the international community during
negotiations over the Syrian Civil War. Syrian President Bashar al Assad will
likely continue to leverage the worsening humanitarian crisis in Aleppo caused
by his own siege of civilians in order to extract concessions that will further
his own legitimacy. Moreover, the Syrian armed opposition will be less likely
to participate in future negotiations as Salafi jihadist groups, who reject
political settlement, become increasingly dominant on the battlefield. The
encirclement of Aleppo will further protract the Syrian insurgency and inhibit
a legitimate settlement to the Syrian Civil War, securing the long-term staying
power of U.S. adversaries in Syria.
