By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team
Outgoing Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent
Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Commander Lt. Gen. Sean MacFarland gave his final briefing
on August 10 where he discussed the pace of operations to retake Mosul. Gen.
MacFarland remarked that the fast pace of operations to retake Mosul “is not a
bad problem to have,” downplaying humanitarian concerns that the Iraqi
Government will be ill-prepared to handle the wave of refugees from Mosul,
which is estimated to have nearly one million still residing in the city. An accelerated
timeline for Mosul may also limit how many forces are prepared for operations
to retake and hold the city, as Gen. MacFarland stated that the holding force
alone would require “thousands” of police forces, but that only a portion had
been generated so far. The quickened timeline is likely a result of political
pressure on both the U.S. Government, in the wake of a presidential election,
and the Iraqi Government, as Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s position remains
tenuous. The pace may also be an effort to preclude Popular Mobilization
participation in operations in northern Iraq and particularly in Mosul. The
militias may perceive stalled operations as invitation to lend support, despite
Coalition, Kurdish, and Ninewa officials’ objections to their presence. U.S.
Presidential Envoy Brett McGurk met with senior security and political leaders
in Baghdad and Arbil from August 11 to 13 to touch on force composition in
Mosul, as the Coalition will continue to try and set the terms of militia
participation in Ninewa as the operation for Mosul nears.
PM Abadi improved his credibility in the Iraqi Government
when the Council of Representatives (CoR) approved five ministers, including
for the coveted position of Oil Minister, on August 15 in a partial Cabinet
reshuffle. The ministers are career technocrats, and the extent of their
political loyalties remains unknown. The ease in which the ministers were
approved suggests that PM Abadi had secured the support of political parties
prior to the CoR session, in comparison with the massive blow-back in April
when he attempted to pass a similar roster of ministers. It is unclear,
however, what deals PM Abadi made to secure these reforms. Former PM Nouri
al-Maliki and the Reform Front did not protest the reshuffle, even though he
had the support base within the CoR to undermine the vote. Maliki may be
focused on guaranteeing support within the CoR to dismiss Defense Minister
Khalid al-Obeidi rather than distancing possible allies by frustrating attempts
for reforms. Obeidi, whom Maliki unsuccessfully tried to dismiss in April 2015,
may face a vote of no-confidence on August 23.
